1869. V. men. members, as being illegitimate, an inheritance, the DU BOULAY present suit is the only attempt I have ever heard DU BOULAY. of to deprive them or their progeny of a name, and this after thirty years of emancipation, and after the Grandchildren and Great-grandchildren of the almost forgotten Slave have, by education and integrity, won for themselves an equal place with their fellowThank Heaven, I know of no Law which I can be called on to administer by which such an attempt can be supported. The present Appellant is the issue of a manumitted Slave, and has assumed, and for some time borne, the name of Du Boulay, and the present suit is instituted to deprive the Appellant of this patronymic. And the Court is to inquire, whether there be any Law in force in Saint Lucia by which the object of such a suit can be attained. It was stated from authority at the Bar, that there was a time when in France names were changed without any solemnity, but such a latitude was prohibited by an Ordonnance of the 11th of April 1803. Without any hesitation, I say, that Ordonnance is not in force in Saint Lucia. No Ordonnance in France was deemed to be in force in her Colonies unless registered there, or extended to the Colonies by the Order of the parent State. The Coutume de Paris was the law of the French Colonies, but why? because the 33rd Article of the arrêt of the "Conseil d'Etat du Roi," of May, 1664, establishing the West India Company, expressly declares its obligatory effect in the West India Colonies, as it had been established in French Colonies in the East. The Coutume de Paris is still continued as the law of Saint Lucia. It does not appear that the Ordonnance of the 11th of April, 1803, was extended by 1869. its terms, or by any other Edict of the French Government, to its Colonies, and it has not been registered in Saint Lucia. The History of Saint Du BOULAY. Lucia throws some further light on this subject. About two months after the passing of the Ordonnance of 1803, that is to say, on the 22nd of June, 1803, Saint Lucia capitulated to the British arms under General Greenfield, and it has remained a British Colony ever since. Now, regard being had to the unsettled condition of France in its state of transition at the time of the passing of this Ordonnance, to the existence of war, by which the irregularity in the communication then existing between Europe and Antilles was necessarily increased, to the length of time consumed in a voyage across the Atlantic in those days, and to the slowness that attends on all Government action, it is not too much. to presume, in absence of any evidence to the contrary, that this Edict was unheard of in Saint Lucia at the time of its conquest in 1803. By treating a name as property which may be wrongfully taken from another, as would seem to be attempted by the Respondents here, one commits oneself to this ridiculous paradox. A. takes from B. his property, while B. still remains in possession of it. The Appellant takes from the Respondents their surname, they being at the same time in the possession and enjoyment of it. I do not deem it necessary to prolong the present inquiry further. I can come to no other conclusion than that the judgment of the Court below be reversed, with the costs of suit there and in this Court." The grounds of dissent of the Chief Justice of Saint Lucia were stated by him in these terms: 1869. V. DU BOULAY. "The case has been extremely well argued before DU BOULAY this Court and the Court below, and the discussion of it has enabled me to reconcile my judgment in the Royal Court with my present view of the case. The case involves in it questions of infinite importance to families having their domicile of origin in this and the other Islands governed by the French Law, and which have been so repeatedly agitated in Courts of Law in France and the Colonies, as to remove any difficulty I might have felt in getting at the justice of the case. The two learned Judges forming the majority of the Court appear to have conceived the main question at issue to be between an ancient Master and his Slave, or rather between a Father and his illegitimate offspring, for their judgment (as prepared by Mr. Justice Woodcock) is prefaced by an elaborate dissertation on the 'baneful influence of slavery in the West Indies,' the boundless sensuality of the Master, and the degrading condition of the bondswoman and her issue at that time. It is not extraordinary that the learned Judge should have been guided by this only small and purely collateral point in the case, without much examination into the cardinal questions and the real Law of it, for the difficulty which an English Judge has to overcome in this country in the application of the French law is indeed immense. It would be superfluous to discuss here the many questions submitted for consideration in the case, inasmuch as they have been treated in a sufficiently clear and satisfactory style by Counsel on both sides; I will, therefore, only recur to those which are the principal grounds of my judgment. The first is, whether Du Boulay is the Family or patronymic name of the Respondents? The Ap 1869. V. DU BOULAY. pellant contends, that the Respondents' family name is Cornibert and not Du Boulay, and that to that DU BOULAY family name, Cornibert (I use his own language), has been added the surname of Du Boulay. This is an attempt which has been, however, proved unsuccessful, for the very documents filed both in this Court and the Court below by the Appellant himself, coupled with the plea put in by his Counsel, wherein Du Boulay is called the 'surname' of Respondents' family, show clearly that Du Boulay is the patronymic name of the Respondents, and that their family have been in the possession of it for centuries, as evidenced by the numerous authenticated documents produced by the Respondents, and among which is the certificate of marriage of the late Jean Louis Cornibert Du Boulay, the Father and Grandfather of the Respondents, who was at that time thirty years old, and was represented to be the son of one Jean Baptiste Cornibert Du Boulay, the Greatgrandfather of the said Respondents. That document is dated April, 1787. It is useless to dwell any longer upon a question which has been so admirably simplified by the Appellant himself; suffice it to observe, that surnames (surnoms') are to-day the pride of families that live in countries where the French law prevails, and that being hereditary, they form what is called family or patronymic names. It is the most valuable patrimony of each family; it is transmitted by the Father to the Son; and I may add, without fear of contradiction, that a family or patronymic name being of all property that which is the least within commerce, the Law prohibits its alienation and usurpation. (Vide Merlin, Rep. de Jur. verbo 'Nom;' Dict. du Notariat, by the modern 1869. V. DU BOULAY. Jurisconsults of France, on the same head.) Next DU BOULAY comes a question of some more importance, viz., whether a family or patronymic name is a property, and, as such, hereditary? This question is entitled to much consideration, it being one of the two on which the success of this case entirely rests. In principle, the name of a family is a real right constituted for the benefit and advantage of that family, and has for its exclusive end to prevent confusion between strangers and that family; it emerges from the law of nature, which is 'lex éternel,' and forms part of the Common Law by which almost all the determinations in Courts of Law are guided. I have minutely studied the leading authorities quoted by the Counsel of the Respondents on this important point, and have no scruple in declaring my concurrence that a family name is a property that belongs to that family, and can never be taken by persons who have no right to it, either by descent or inheritance. The civil status of the Citizens (says Merlin, verbo Etat Civil') is their property, and that property being inviolable, like others, must be submitted to the same rules and to the same forms. This general rule was and is still adopted and followed by both the ancient and modern legislation of France, and must be, ex necessitate, applied to the Courts of Saint Lucia, which are still governed by the ancient law of France in all matters of property and inheritance: Dict. du Notariat, sect. 3, De la Propriété des Noms;' Merlin, Rep. verbo Nom,' and 'Etat Civil;' Denisart, Questions d'Etat; Decree of the Court of Paris, in Lacarelle v. Darien, in the Bulletin Judiciare, June, 1859; Lawless v. Lawless; Decree of the |