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if its retention entailed a cost of a million and a half a year he would support it as a measure of ultimate economy.

Lord Beaconsfield saw no use in again reviewing the history of the Afghan war, but he admitted that, after the Congress of Berlin and the explanation of the Russian Chancellor, he did announce to the House that of the proceedings of Russia in Afghanistan at the time when war between that Power and England was supposed to be imminent we had no cause to complain. The conversation between him and the Russian Minister at our court to the same effect occurred in November 1878, which was a year before the discovery of the secret papers at Cabul. He repudiated the suggestion of having said to the Russian Minister that the Government of India had forced the hands of the Government at home. The mistake happened through a misapprehension on the part of Count Schouvaloff, who was a most honourable man. The observation about forcing hands had reference not to an operation of war, but to the sending of the mission to the Ameer, which was an operation of peace, taken without the concurrence of the Government at home, and of which they disapproved. Coming to the motion, he expressed his belief that even if we did not retain Candahar we should be able to preserve our empire of India, because the key of India was not Herat or Candahar, but London. It was wise, however, to avail ourselves of local resources. This country had long acted on that principle, and had generally managed to secure a precise and scientific frontier. The fact that the power of England could be felt on the spot was the best security for peace, and consequently for economy.

Lord Granville, after calling attention to the difference of the key in which Lords Salisbury and Cranbrook had pitched their speeches when compared with that of Lord Beaconsfield, stated that the written opinions of the military men, including the Duke of Cambridge, who were in favour of the retention of Candahar, were filled up with 'political and trade padding," from which he inferred that the military reasons required to be so supplemented. He announced that Lord Cranbrook was mistaken in the assumption that the present Viceroy was in favour of the retention. He was not sure as to the opinion of the other members of the Council of the Government of India, with the exception of Major Baring, who was not in its favour. He was not one of those who thought the diplomatists of Russia were superior to all others; but the greatest diplomatic success he had ever heard of was that of Russia in Afghanistan, which by a mere mission drained us of twenty millions of money, cost us a great loss of life, and brought about a state of feeling which it should have been our object to prevent.

The House then divided, and endorsed the resolution by 165 to 79, thus practically censuring the Government by a majority of two to one.

The Opposition was not slow in following up this blow by a direct challenge to the Government in the House of Commons.

On the first night after the close of the debate in the Lords, Mr. Stanhope gave notice of a resolution to the effect that the withdrawal of our troops from Candahar was not conducive to the true and permanent interests of India. On the appeal of Sir Stafford Northcote, Mr. Gladstone consented to give up the very first available Government night to the discussion, which was ultimately fixed for March 24. On the eve of the debate a Parliamentary white-book was issued, containing three very important despatches. The first of these, dated December 3, 1880, was from Lord Hartington to the Viceroy, recapitulating the views of the Government (communicated in his previous secret despatch of May 21) with regard to Afghanistan. They objected to the occupation of Candahar in support of a native ruler for the purpose of disintegrating the country, though some such arrangement might be necessitated in consequence of the pledges which had been given to Wali Shere Ali. As to the military position acquired under the Treaty of Gandamak, Lord Ripon was left full liberty of action. The recognition of Abdurrahman as Ameer of Cabul and the withdrawal of our troops were fully approved by the Government, and whilst the exact date of the withdrawal from Candahar was left to the Viceroy, the Government trusted that its occupation would not be prolonged beyond the winter. Lord Hartington went on to express his approval of the withdrawal of our troops from the Khyber Pass and Kuram Valley; and as regarded Pishin, although valuable as a strategic point, its possession would keep the Government of India involved in the complications of Afghan politics, and would be a constant temptation and pretext for interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan; therefore for these and other reasons the Home Government had decided upon the abandonment of the post. Lord Ripon's reply, dated February 2, supported by minutes from the members of the Council, separated the question of the withdrawal from Pishin from that of the restoration of Candahar. Mr. Rivers Thompson especially deprecated the proposed action of the Home Government, and quoted the authority of Sir R. Sandeman that by our withdrawal we should abandon to anarchy and confusion the peace and prosperity we had established. Major Baring, on the other hand, regarded the decision of the Home Government as eminently statesmanlike, and forced upon India by financial as well as by political reasons.

With these State papers indicative of the action of the Government, Mr. Stanhope commenced his attack on its policy. In common with other speakers on both sides of the House he travelled over the lines followed in the Upper House. Laying it down that the cardinal point in our Afghan policy must be to exclude all foreign influence from that country, and to maintain British influence paramount there, he traced the diplomatic advances of Russia to Afghanistan, showing how they became more and more intimate; and contending that though they culminated when the relations between

England and Russia were somewhat strained, they commenced long before, and continued long after. The danger arising from such relations must be greatly increased by the nearer approach of Russian troops to Afghan territory, and if Russia set her foot in Afghanistan it would only be for the purpose of making it a vantage-ground to embarrass us. Admitting that the late Government had not contemplated the retention of Candahar when the Peace of Gandamak was made, he pointed out that the failure of Yakoob Khan had entirely altered the circumstances, and he called on the Government to state what were their plans for excluding Russian influence from Afghanistan. He objected to the withdrawal, because it was inopportune, and in opposition to the pledges given to the people of Candahar, as well as against the weight of authority. In its hurry to get away from Candahar the Government had made no arrangements for the future, and displayed its strength only by a policy of masterly surrender.

The defence of the Government policy was opened by Sir C. Dilke, who, referring to the Russian advance, pointed out that the first act of the Czar had been to stop it, and to recall General Skobeleff; and, in reply to the argument of the loss of prestige, he asked whether the late Government had sacrificed prestige when it left Cabul, and whether Russia had lost prestige when she abandoned some of her Central Asian conquests. As to the pledges, the people of Candahar had forfeited them by their hostility to our troops after the disaster of Maiwand; and he showed by reference to the "Candahar Official Journal " that the late Government never determined permanently to remain there. All the difficulties with which this Government had to deal sprang from the vacillation of their predecessors, on which he dwelt at length, and on the point of opportuneness he maintained that if we did not withdraw now we should be unable to withdraw at all, and the arrangements they had made, though not the best in the abstract, were the best that could be made under the circumstances which they found existing. Discussing the authorities, he pointed out that Sir G. Wolseley and Sir D. Stewart said that Candahar was useless as a military station; and that we could go there at any time if we wanted was shown by the late war. To occupy it in time of peace, he showed, would impose a strain on the Indian finances which they could ill bear. Next he contended that the position was useless for purposes of trade, as a centre for counter-working intrigue, and as an outwork against a Russian advance. India, he asserted, was stronger for distant operations than Russia herself, and the best security against an invasion was good government in India and a thrifty management of her finances.

The son of the leader of the Opposition (Mr. Northcote) was followed by the son of the leader of the House (Mr. H. Gladstone), who in his maiden speech thoroughly justified the hopes entertained of his ability as a speaker. The chief point of his argument was to prove that it was neither the intention nor the interest

of Russia to invade India, and that the difficulties in the way were well-nigh insuperable. On the second night of the debate the chief burden fell upon Lord George Hamilton, who devoted himself to analysing the value of the authorities, military and political, on which the Government relied. As to the danger from Russia, it was not invasion but intrigue, we had to fear; and, dilating on this point, he mentioned that the three survivors of the Council who had signed Lord Lawrence's famous minute-Sir H. Maine, Sir R. Temple, and Sir J. Strachey-approved of the Afghan policy of the late Government because they believed that the masterly inactivity policy had failed. As it was common ground with both parties that Russian influence must be excluded from Afghanistan, he asked the Government to state what was their plan for attaining this object. The general direction of Lord G. Hamilton's speech, with that of Mr. Stanhope, his successor at the India Office under the late Administration, pointed to a permanent retention of Candahar, necessitated by the attitude of Russia. Lord Hartington's reply was altogether on the theme that, if we were ever to abandon Candahar, the sooner we did so the better; and that as the resolution did not attack the policy of the Government, but merely its opportuneness, he maintained that whilst Candahar might in some circumstances be strategically valuable, the first condition was its occupation with the consent of the Afghans and of their allies. Sir Stafford Northcote pointed out that the Government had given no reasons for not abiding by the promise contained in the Queen's speech, that the troops would not be recalled until a settled government had been established. policy pursued by the Government was full of peril; it would inflict a serious blow on our reputation in India; and it gave grounds for apprehending that if a Liberal Government remained in office for twenty years, very little of the British Empire would be left. The division which immediately followed was a strictly party one. Out of a House of which the full complement was 639, no less than 579 voted or paired. The minority voting was composed of 208 Conservatives, three Home Rulers, and five Liberals, including Mr. J. Cowen; whilst the majority comprised 306 Liberals and 30 Home Rulers. Amongst the absentees were 30 Home Rulers, including Messrs. Parnell, Biggar, Dillon, and Finigan. The judgment of the House of Lords having been thus emphatically reversed by the Commons, Indian affairs occupied but little more of the attention of Parliament-the evacuation of Candahar and the Pishin Valley, which was completed before the prorogation, attracting but little notice. The Indian Budget, postponed until nearly the last day of a protracted session (August 22), called forth no serious discussion in an almost empty house. It was chiefly interesting for its summary of the cost of the Afghan war. The total war expenditure (including the frontier railways) was set down at 23,412,000l., of which 5,000,000l. was to be borne by England, leaving 18,412,000l. as the financial burden thrown upon India. As

The

late as February 1880, Sir J. Strachey had estimated the total expenditure on the war as little over 10,000,000l. Lord Hartington's estimate was somewhat different:-'If there had been no war charge and no construction of frontier railways, and, at the same time, provision of 1,500,000l. had been made in each year for the relief of famine, there would have been in each of the years of the war the following surpluses;-In 1878-9, a surplus of 1,523,885l.; in 1879-80, of 3,521,515l.; in 1880-1, of 3,623,174l.; and in 1881-2, of 855,000l.; or a surplus during the four years of 9,523,574l. Of course, these surpluses, amounting to nine millions and a half, have gone for payment of the war; the balances of the famine insurance, amounting to 4,035,309l., have been appropriated to payment of the war. There were also contributions from the British Treasury, amounting to 5,000,000l., towards payment of the war; and there was taken from cash balances for the same purpose a sum of 4,513,470l.

With regard to the Indian expenditure of 1879-80, the latest year for which the accounts were made up, Lord Hartington showed that the revenue was 68,484,666., and the expenditure 69,667,615l., showing a deficit of 1,182,949l. The first or Budget estimate had put the revenue at 64,562,000l., and the expenditure at 65,917,000l., both of them nearly 4,000,000l. short of the truth. For 1880-1, the regular (i.e. not the Budget, but the revised) estimate gave revenue, 70,783,615l. (including 2,000,000l. contributed by England), and expenditure, 77,003,3821., showing a deficit of no less than 6,219,7671., in spite of the English contribution towards the revenue. The Budget estimate for 1881-2 showed a revenue of 70,981,000l., and an expenditure of 70,126,000l., giving an anticipated surplus of 855,000l. Lord Hartington stated that the Government fully accepted the obligation of providing 1,500,000l. a year as an insurance fund against famine, and that the whole of any balance not used in any year for the actual relief of famine is to be spent either on protective works or on the reduction of debt,—a canal in the Deccan, a railway in the Punjab, and minor relief works in Madras and Bombay, being the first protective works selected for execution.

§ 3.-FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The Berlin Treaty and the Greek Demands-Settlement of the Frontier Question. In the Speech from the Throne, the settlement of the new frontier line of Greece was declared to be under discussion, whilst other portions of the Treaty of Berlin, still unfulfilled, were simply the objects of anxious attention. Lord Beaconsfield, in reviewing the Ministerial position, touched but lightly on its foreign affairs, and contented himself by asserting that, whereas the Treaty of Berlin might have affected or left unsettled various points, it nevertheless secured the peace of Europe; whereas the result of the Conference of Berlin, which seemed to have in view to upset the work

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