Our fishing rights and liberties along the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland, as fixed by the treaty of 1818, are rights to be enjoyed in common with the British people, and are such as no other nation has. They are partnership rights, in the intimate character of the association, in their labors and privileges, of our fishermen with theirs. No two nations were ever drawn into a closer relationship, or one in which good-will and mutual forbearance were more essential to the profitable pursuit of a great industry, than that established between us by the joint struggles of the colonies, confirmed by the treaty of 1783, and renewed, as to ports of Labrador and Newfoundland, almost without restriction, by the treaty of 1818. As to this, by far the most essential part of the rights reserved to us in that treaty, we can no more preserve and enjoy its value to us, under the plan of reprisals, through retaliatory laws, upon British commerce, than copartners can promote their joint business interests by each one attempting constantly to destroy the value of the other partner's share in the venture.

Our vessels and theirs are anchored side by side in the bays, or follow the same schools of fish, and capture them wherever they are found along these coasts. One fisherman entices the fish around his vessel with bait and another comes in and takes what he can with his lines or nets, just as if the whole business was a copartnership. If these vessels belong to countries that are arrayed in commercial hostility based upon retaliatory laws and ready to break out, upon slight provocation, into a war their friendly association will be impossible.

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XI. THE USE OF FLEETS TO INTERPRET A TREATY.

Under the misunderstandings of the past we have on both sides sent fleets to these waters to protect our fishermen against each other and against the unfriendly conduct of the local governments: fleets to enforce agreements that the governments concerned could not expound by a mutual understanding.

If these questions are left open, and commercial war is inaugurated through measures of retaliation, how many ships and guns is it supposed will be needed to keep the peace between our fishermen on the coasts of Labrador and Newfoundland?

The danger in this direction does not come from the desire of either Government to promote a war, but from their inability to prevent its initiation through the personal hostilities of men associated in the use of common rights and privileges, and stimulated by rivalries which are encouraged by laws of retaliation enacted by their respective Governments.

These are some of the dangers against which this treaty wisely makes safe provision.

XII. THE AREA YIELDED BY THE DELIMITATIONS OF THIS TREATY, AS COMPARED WITH THOSE YIELDED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THEIR CONSTRUCTION OF THE LIMITS OF OUR RENUNCIATION " UNDER THE TREATY OF 1818.

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It is alleged by some that this treaty yields to the British Government 50,000 square miles of exclusive fishing-grounds beyond what we yielded in the treaty of 1818.

Taking the contention of the United States that no headland theory is to be found in the treaty of 1818, and that the exclusive fishing limit is a line 3 miles from the shore, at low water, that enters all harbors, bays, and creeks that are more than 6 miles wide at the entrance, and follows the sinuosities of the coast thereof, this estimate of the area surrendered in this treaty is greatly exaggerated.

This is the narrowest limit to which we have confined our renunciation in the treaty of 1818, of the common right of fishery, in our contentions with Great Britain.

The total area as to which we renounced the common right of fishing, according to this construction of that treaty, is 16,424 nautical square miles.

The additional area of renunciation under the delimitations of the proposed treaty, now before the Senate, is 1,127 square miles, being 6 per cent. addition to the former area of exclusion.

10

The total area of bays, creeks, and harbors not more than 6 miles wide at their mouths is about 6,599 square miles, and is included in the above-mentioned measurement of 16,424 square miles.

The British claim as the true construction of the agreement in the treaty of 1818, that it fixed the line within which we renounced the common right of fishery at the distance, measured seaward, of 3 miles from the entrance of all bays, harbors, and creeks of His Majesty's dominions. This would add an area of 3,489 square miles to the exclusive fishing grounds claimed by the British Government, while the area in which we have renounced the common right of fishing in those bays, harbors, and creeks under the proposed treaty now before the Senate is 1,127 square miles.

Thus, under the British contention that Government yields, in this treaty, 3,489 square miles of exclusive fishing waters to the people of the United States as a common fishery, and we yield 1,127 square miles to the British Government as exclusive fishing waters, which we now claim to enjoy with them as a common fishery under our construction of the treaty of 1818, which they refuse to admit.

They yield more than two-thirds of their claim to us, and we yield less than one-third of our claim to them, for the sake of settling forever a dispute that has lasted for seventy years, and has been in every way a costly and disturbing contention to our people. (See official statement from the Coast Survey, marked D.)

If these disputed areas were the richest fisheries in the world, the settlement of our respective rights in them, as arranged in the treaty now before the Senate, should be welcomed by the American people with entire satisfaction.

When we know, from the examination and report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that this disputed area is of no real advantage to our fishermen, and that this statement is supported by conclusive evidence, furnished by the Halifax Commission, and by Professor Baird, our former Commissioner of Fisheries, no ground seems to be left for the contention of those who oppose this settlement.

XIII. THE VIEWS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 3, 1887, op

POSED TO THOSE OF THE CAPITALISTS WHO CONTROL OUR FISHING INDUSTRY AND REAP THE GREATEST ADVANTAGES FROM THEM.

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The president of the American Fishery Union, in 1887, brought the subject of retaliation to the attention of the President of the United States, and insisted that it should be applied only to the exclusion of British-American fishing products from the markets of the United States. To that demand the President of the United States replied as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, D. C., April 7, 1887.

GENTLEMEN: I have received your letter lately addressed to me, and have given full consideration to the expression of the views and wishes therein contained in relation to the existing differences between the Government of Great Britain and the United States growing out of the refusal to award to our citizens engaged in fishing enterprises the privileges to which they are entitled either under treaty stipulations or the guaranties of international comity and neighborly concession. I sincerely trust the apprehension you express of unjust and unfriendly treatment of American fishermen lawfully found in Canadian waters will not be realized; but if such apprehension should prove to be well founded, I earnestly hope that no fault or inconsiderate action of any of our citizens will in the least weaken the just position of our Government, or deprive us of the universal sympathy and support to which we should be entitled.

The action of this administration since June, 1885, when the fishery articles of the treaty of 1871 were terminated under the notification which had two years before been given by our Government, has been fully disclosed by the correspondence between the representatives and the appropriate departments of the respective Governments, with which I am apprised by your letter you are entirely familiar. An examination of this correspondence has doubtless satisfied you that in no case have the rights or privileges of American fishermen been overlooked or neglected, but that, on the contrary, they have been sedulously insisted upon and cared for by every means within the control of the executive branch of the Government.

The act of Congress approved March 3, 1887, authorizing a course of retaliation, through executive action, in the event of a continuance on the part of the British-American authorities of unfriendly conduct and treaty violations affecting American fisherman, has developed upon the President of the United States exceedingly grave and solemn responsibilities, comprehending highly important consequences to our national character and dignity, and involving extremely valuable commercial intercourse between the British possessions in North America and the people of the United States.

I understand the main purpose of your letter is to suggest that, in case recourse to the retaliatory measures authorized by this act should be invited by unjust treatment of our fishermen in the future, the object of such retaliation might be fully accomplished by prohibiting Canadian-caught fish from entry into the ports of the United States."

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The existing controversy is one in which two nations are the parties concerned. The retaliation contemplated by the act of Congress is to be enforced, not to protect solely any particular interest, however meritorious or valuable, but to maintain the national honour, and thus protect all our people. In this view the violation of American fishery rights and unjust or unfriendly acts towards a portion of our citizens engaged in this business is but the occasion for action, and constitutes a national affront, which gives birth to or may justify retaliation. This measure once resorted to, its effectiveness and value may well depend upon the thoroughness and extent of its application; and in the performance of international duties, the enforcement of international rights, and the protection of our citizens, this Government and the people of the United States must act as a unit, all intent upon attaining the best result of retaliation upon the basis of a maintenance of national honor and duty.

The nation seeking by any means to maintain its honor, dignity, and integrity, is engaged in protecting the right of the people; and if, in such efforts. particular interests are injured and special advantages forfeited, these things should be

patriotically borne for the public good. An immense volume of population, manufactures, and agricultural productions, and the marine tonnage and railways to which these have given activity, all largely the result of intercourse, between the United States and British America, and the natural growth of a full half century of good neighborhood and friendly communication, form an aggregate of material wealth and incidental relation of most impressive magnitude, I fully appreciate these things, and am not unmindful of the great number of our people who are concerned in such vast and diversified interests.

In the performance of the serious duty which Congress has imposed upon me, and in the exercise, upon just occasion, of the power conferred under the act referred to, I shall deem myself bound to inflict no unnecessary damage or injury upon any portion of our people; but I shall, nevertheless, be unflinchingly guided by a sense of what the self-respect and dignity of the nation demand. In the maintenance of these and in the support of the honor of the Government, beneath which every citizen may repose in safety, no sacrifice of personal or private interests shall be considered as against the general welfare.

Yours, very truly,

GEORGE STEELE,

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GROVER CLEVELAND.

President American Fishery Union, and others, Gloucester, Mass.

From this letter, to which the minority of the committee refer with great satisfaction, as a correct exposition of the duties that Congress has imposed upon the President in the enforcement of our laws of retaliation, it will be seen that the present administration will treat this subject in the same sense that Congress has treated it, as a question of national concern, and not as a means of promoting the pecuniary interests of those who control and derive the chief benefit of our fisheries, such as the owners and outfitters of fishing fleets, and warehousemen and those engaged in salting, drying, and canning fish for the interior markets.

The hardy fishermen of the United States will, we believe, also be protected in the administration of our retaliatory laws, and other similar statutes, against the common practice that speculators in the fishing industry now resort to of placing their vessels in charge of captains and crews imported from Canada, because they can underbid our fishermen in the matter of wages.

This practice is a far more serious injury to our fishermen and to the people of the United States than would come from yielding twice the area of fishing waters that are yielded by the delimitations of this treaty, even if they were good fishing waters. It has already compelled many of our best fishermen to withdraw from this, and to seek a living in other pursuits.

XIV. THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH HEADLAND THEORY, AS TO SMALLER BAYS AND HARBORS ALONG THE COASTS, AND THE LIMITS OF OUR RENUNCIATION OF THE RIGHTS OF FISHING, AND THE NATURE OF THE RESTRICTIONS UPON THE RIGHTS OF OUR FISHERMEN TO ENTER THE BAYS AND HARBORS OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, ARE MATTERS OF DISPUTED RIGHT. ADMISSIONS MADE HERETOFORE BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATISTS, AS TO THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTRUING, GRAMMATICALLY, THE TEXT OF THE TREATY OF 1818, GIVE COLOR TO THE BRITISH CONSTRUCTION, AND PROVE, AT LEAST, ITS SINCERITY.

It is boldly asserted, in opposition to this treaty, that there is no sort of equivalent for the 1,127 square miles of fishing waters that we concede by the fixed lines of delimitation in this treaty. This assertion impeaches both the right of the British Government and the sincerity of its claim of the headland theory, as it applies to

bays more than 6 miles wide at the entrance. Nevertheless that assertion is much weakened by the official opinions of eminent American publicists, communicated to the British Government.

If the territorial claims of both Governments were sincerely asserted, as we believe they were, in reference to the fishing waters, the modification of them by mutual consent has always been held in the conduct of nations as a good equivalent, moving from each to the other, for the concessions mutually made. This doctrine is also applied by the courts as between individuals to support agreements based on the consideration of yielding or settling disputed claims.

In contrast with the assertion of the utter want of reason in the claims of Great Britain, based on the headland theory, we find many strong declarations of our Government. Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, on December 30, 1816, admitted that a discussion of rights should be avoided when mutual concessions were necessary to bring the treaty powers to a mutual agreement. He said to Mr. Bagot:

In providing for the accommodation of the citizens of the United States engaged in the fisheries on the coasts of His Britannic Majesty's colonies on conditions advantageous to both parties, I concur in the sentiment that it is desirable to avoid a discussion of their respective rights, and to proceed, in a spirit of conciliation, to examine what arrangement will be adequate to the object. The discussion which has already taken place between our Government has, it is presumed, placed the claim of each party in a just light. Our claim then was that we had a common right of fishery, on all the coasts, with the people of the British North American Possessions.

The British Government then claimed that the war of 1812-15 had destroyed all our claims in such fisheries. On the 28th July, 1818, Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, instructed Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Rush as follows:

The President authorises you to agree to an article whereby the United States will desist from the liberty of fishing, and curing, and drying fish within the British jurisdiction generally, upon condition that it shall be secured as a permanent right, not liable to be impaired by any future war, from Cape Ray to Ramea Islands, and from Mount Joli, on the Salvador coast, through the straits of Belle Isle, indefinitely north, along the coast; the right to extend as well to curing and drying the fish as to fishing.

This instruction was certainly much more liberal to the subjects of Great Britain than the first article of the treaty that was made under it. But the instruction stated the demand of the United States, and the British have a right to argue, at least, that the treaty was intended to conform to it as to the principles involved in it.

Claiming absolutely the right to enjoy these fisheries in common with the Canadians, and basing our claim upon the highest considerations of justice, we were met with the counter-claim of Great Britain, that all our fishing rights in Canadian waters were granted to us by the treaty of 1783, and that that treaty had been abrogated by war. In this dispute, which was vital, we found so much reason for an adjustment, that our plenipotentiaries offered to Great Britain the surrender of our rights to the extent they were renounced in the treaty of 1818.

Our plenipotentiaries, in explaining the treaty to our Government, say:

It will also be perceived that we insisted on the clause by which the United States renounce their right to the fisheries relinquished by the convention, that clause being omitted in the first British counter-project.