for three weeks. On his return, he found that the work was not as explained by the owner, and that some extra work had been added, the value of all that had been done being $900, instead of $350, the contract price. The owner refusing to pay more than the contract price, the painter brought suit, and it was decided that the contract was invalid, by reason of the misrepresentations made as to the amount of work; and that he was entitled to recover the actual value of the work done. Moreover, in reply to the claim that the painter ought, if the work to be done proved not to be as represented, to have notified the owner before going on with it, and thereby involving the owner in a much larger expense than he had contemplated, the court decided that, having been absent from the town, he was excused from the obligation to give such notice. It should be observed, however, that in most cases a court would insist on the necessity for giving a notice of the kind, and that the painter, if he had not happened to have so good a reason for not giving it, would have found it hard, after doing the work, to collect $900 for a job which he knew that the owner thought he was to have done for $350. This principle has been expressly laid down by the courts. In two cases it has been held that, if a contract has been made for work to be done at a stipulated price, and it is discovered before the work is commenced that a misrepresentation has been made in respect to its value, the party engaging to do the work may repudiate the contract; and if he does not do so, but goes on and performs it, he can afterwards demand no more than the contract price. It has, moreover, been decided in California that where mistake or misrepresentation in regard to the subject-matter of a contract affects only certain stipulations of a contract, as, for example, where the conditions which would affect the time of completion have been erroneously stated, only those stipulations of the contract which are affected by the error are invalidated, and the others remain in full force. In a somewhat similar case in England, a contract was Martine vs. 51 Ill. 422. Contract or Should Give Notice on Discovering Mistake. Saratoga, etc. vs. Row, 24 Wend. 74. Lloyd vs. Brewster, 4 Paige 537. Verzan vs. McGregor, 23 Cal. 339. Pattison vs. 10 L. R. Ex. 330. Contract may not be Entirely Vitiated by Fraud. made for building a house. After the contract was signed, it was placed in custody of the architect, who then surreptitiously made, or allowed to be made, a material alteration in it, the alteration being in the provision with regard to extras. Some extra work was done, but payment for it was refused, on the ground that the contractor had not complied with the provisions of the contract relating to such work, such compliance being, by the contract, a condition precedent to the right to recover payment. The contractor then sued for payment for the extra work on quantum meruit, on the ground that the contract was void on account of the alteration, or, at least, that the defendant could not avail himself of it. On trial, it was held that the contract, although altered, was still binding on the plaintiff, or, at least, might be looked at to see what the terms were, and that the plaintiff could not recover on quantum meruit. H CHAPTER XXI. THE RIGHTS OF THE LOWEST BIDDer. GREAT deal of unhappiness often arises, after the award of contracts for public work, from a misapprehension, on the part of contractors, of the rights of the lowest bidder. It is very commonly supposed that the person who offers to do the work submitted for estimate for the lowest price is entitled to have it awarded to him, unless distinct notice has been given, in the invitation to bidders, that the lowest tender will not necessarily be accepted. This notion is an erroneous one. In some cases the laws of a State, or the regulations of a private or public corporation, provide that bids shall be invited for all work for the State or corporation exceeding a certain sum in value, and that the work shall be awarded to the lowest bidder; and, where this is the case, the officials in charge of the matter have no discretion; but where no such law or regulation exists, the lowest bidder has no claim to be preferred, and no notice need be given that his bid will not necessarily be accepted. In many cases, where the law or regulation on the subject, instead of saying simply that the work shall be given to the lowest bidder, provides that it shall be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder," the discretion which the law allows the officials in judging of responsibility is so extensive that here also the lowest bidder has practically no claim to the work which he can enforce, if the officials have in good faith decided that The Lowest Bidder not Necessarily Entitled to Contract. People vs. Croton Bd., 9 Barb. 259. Topping vs. Swords, 1 E. D. Smith, 109. Starkey vs. Minneapolis, 19 Minn. 203. The "Lowest Responsible Bidder." it would be better to give it to some one else. An instructive case involving this point was decided in Pennsylvania a few years ago. There is a statute in Pennsylvania which says that "All stationery, printing, paper and fuel used in the councils and other departments of the city government, and all work and materials required by the city, shall be furnished, and the printing and all other kinds of work to be done for the city shall be performed, under contract, to be given to the lowest responsible bidder, under such regulations as shall be prescribed by ordinance." Under this statute bids were invited by the Water Committee of the city of Pittsburgh for wrought-iron forcing mains, to be made in conformity with certain specifications. The firm of Snyder & Co. made a proposal, in conformity with all the requirements, which was $5,000 lower than any other bid received, and accompanied their offer with a good and sufficient bond. Instead of awarding the contract to them, the Water Committee, after some consideration, awarded it to another firm, whose bid was higher. Messrs. Snyder & Co. thereupon applied to the courts for a mandamus, to compel the committee to award the contract to them. The committee, being summoned to show cause why the mandamus should not be granted, said that it "was within their full knowledge and belief" that the said Snyder & Co. on a previous occasion, "by some means or other, attempted and did perpetrate a gross deceit and wrong" upon the committee, "in surreptitiously departing from the specifications for a certain contract for the construction of boilers for the new water-works, by striking therefrom, without the knowledge or consent of the said committee, the word 'mud-drum,'" and that "it was within the knowledge of some, if not all, the members of the Water Committee that N. Snyder, the senior member of the firm of Snyder & Co., was a man of intemperate habits, whose character for sobriety was not such as would warrant the committee in giving said firm a responsible contract; that said N. Snyder also had attempted to bribe the mechanical engineer of the water-works, who was the inspecting officer of said contract," and that Snyder & Co. were "otherwise disqualified for the proper filment of the requirements of the proposed contract." ful The court appointed a commissioner to take testimony, and found, on his report, that Snyder & Co. were the lowest bidders, and were pecuniarily responsible; and further, that the evidence did not sustain the allegation that "it was within the knowledge of the committee that Snyder & Co. had attempted or perpetrated a gross deceit or wrong" upon it; or that N. Snyder was a man of intemperate habits, or that he had attempted to bribe the engineer; but it was of opinion that the committee fully believed that these facts were true. On this finding the court held that the action of the Water Committee could not be interfered with. 66 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which confirmed the decision of the court below, saying, "The learned "judge who, as the mouthpiece of the court to which this case was submitted, delivers the opinion, finds that the facts stated "in the petition are true, and that the allegations contained in "the answer, as above set forth, are wholly without founda"tion, but that, notwithstanding this, the committee fully be"lieved that what was asserted in the answer was true. We "must take this opinion of the court as to the belief of the "respondents to be correct, . . . nevertheless, it does some"what surprise us that this body of men, intrusted with so "important a duty, should have rested so contentedly under a "delusion which a little inquiry in the right direction would "have dissipated, and thus saved a handsome sum of money "to the city treasury." The Court, however, held with that below, that the word "responsible," as employed in the statute," means something more than pecuniary ability." "In a "contract such as the one in controversy, the work must be "promptly, faithfully and well done; it must, or ought to be, "conscientious work; to do such work requires prompt, skil"ful and conscientious men. A dishonest contractor may impose work upon the city, in spite of the utmost caution of "the superintending engineer, apparently good, and even 66 Commissioners vs. Mitchell, 82 Penn. 342. |