Tilley vs. 13 Otto, 155. hereafter be determined upon by the common council of the city of Chicago and the county board, provided the estimate of the architect who presented said plan as to the cost of construction of the building shall be verified." Tilley then went over his figures of cost again, without being asked to do so. Soon after, differences arose between the city and county authorities, and the county appointed another architect. Tilley then sued the city and county jointly for five per cent on the estimated cost of the building, his bill, as presented, amounting to $145,481.45. He proved, at the trial, that he had verified the cost, and was confirmed as to the correctness of his estimate, of thirty-five cents per cubic foot, by several architects. He offered to prove the cost and value of his plans; that by the usage and custom of architects, in the absence of a special contract, the superintendence of the construction of a building belonged to the architect whose plans were adopted; that, by the usage and custom of architects, where prizes for plans were offered, the plans of the successful competitors belonged to them, and, if subsequently adopted as the plans to build by, were always paid for in addition to the prize itself; and he offered evidence to establish the value of his services in verifying the estimated cost. All this evidence was excluded by the court. There was no evidence that his plans were ever used, or that any contract was made with him beyond the adoption of the resolution quoted above. The court held that the adoption of this resolution "was not a proposition, but simply the expression of a purpose to build their structure after the plans of the plaintiff, subject to such changes and modifications as might thereafter be determined upon by the Common Council and the County Board." "The resolution was not adopted at his instance or suggestion." He did no act, nor did he give any assent. "There was no mutuality, and, therefore, no consideration, both of which are necessary to a contract." The resolution might have been reconsidered and rescinded the next day, and the architect might have refused to furnish his plans and superintend the building. The Council and Board would have had, in that case, no claim against him, and he, in return, had none against them. As to the custom of architects which he offered to prove, the court thought that it really was that, if the building was erected according to his plans, he was entitled to pay for them. "That would be such an acceptance and adoption of his plans as would give him the right to compensation therefor, and the right to superintend the erection of his building and receive the usual remuneration;" but a custom which bound a person who merely announced his intention to build in accordance with a certain plan, to pay for it if he did not use it, and to pay its author for superintending a building never erected, would be absurd and unreasonable, and, therefore, not binding. If the plaintiff had offered to show that after the passage of the resolution the defendants had erected their building according to his plans, then the evidence of the custom would have been pertinent. As to the evidence of the value of the work expended in verifying the cost, the court held that there was no implied contract to pay for services voluntarily rendered by the plaintiff, and of which no use was made by the defendants, and the evidence was properly excluded. It may be said that, in general, courts do not look with much favor on competitions. If architects choose to enter contests in which no definite promises are made to them by responsible parties, the law will not supply the promises; and judges are quite ready to believe, from their own observation, that architects are willing to do a good deal of work without them; and, as in Mr. Tilley's case, they will give no help in recovering pay for volunteered service. An architect in Missouri made plans for a building, and took them to the owner of the land, who told him that, if he built, he would employ him as architect. Afterwards the owner employed another architect. The first one sued for compensation for his plans, but was defeated, the court holding that nothing was due him for his services. These services, it said, were rendered "under hope of being Tilley vs. Cook Co. 13 Otto, 155. Volunteered Service. Allen vs. 7 Mo. App. 29 Druiding vs. 7 Mo. App. 199. The Value of Competi tive Drawings. Adams Express Co. vs. Egbert, 36 Peun. St. 360. Watson vs. Ambergate, 15 Jurist, 448. employed to superintend," and the owner was not bound to make any return for them. A case of a different kind, of considerable importance for architects who engage in competitions, may close this part of the subject. The Trustees of the Touro Almshouse, in New Orleans, advertised for competitive designs, offering a single premium of $500. In response to the advertisement, Dr. Egbert delivered to the agent of the Adams Express Company at Carlisle, Pa., a set of plans, to be transmitted to New Orleans, and prepaid the freight. The agent of the express company omitted to mark the package prepaid, and when it arrived at its destination the Almshouse Committee refused to pay the freight. Some months later, after the competition had been decided, and the $500 awarded to some one else, the mistake in marking the package was discovered, and the box again sent to the committee. At the request of the express company, the committee was convened to consider the plans, and found that they were unsuitable, not having sufficient provision for ventilation, and that they would not have received the prize in any case. The jury in the court below, when Dr. Egbert sued the express company for damages, awarded him $375. The Supreme Court reversed the decision. Egbert's counsel cited an English case, in which a prize had been offered for the best plan and model for a machine for loading coal from barges into vessels, the plans and models to be sent in by a certain day. The plaintiff sent a plan and model, but, through the negligence of the railway company, they did not arrive until after the appointed day. The English court appeared to be of the opinion, although the point was not directly raised, that the proper measure of damages was the value of the labor and materials expended in making the plan and model, and not the chance of obtaining the prize, the latter being too remote a ground for damages. Justice Pattison said that the right principle on which damages were recoverable was that the goods were made for a special purpose, which has been defeated by the negligence of the defendants, and thus they had become useless. The Pennsylvania court, however, thought that if Dr. Egbert's plans were unsuitable, he was not damaged by having them mislaid, and could recover only a nominal sum, and said that, if the plaintiff's competition for the prize had proved unsuccessful, "the time and labor would have been "lost, without any breach of the contract." The professional reader will be inclined to disagree with the Pennsylvania judge, and to think that Dr. Egbert suffered a real damage by the loss of his plans. Even the unsuccessful competitors in such an affair, if their designs are made with reasonable skill, are benefited by having them shown to the committee or to the public. It often happens that a plan which does not receive a prize, or which is obviously unsuitable, attracts by some quality the attention of persons who keep its author in mind for future employment, and architects who enter much into competitions find it for their interest to have their names as widely known as possible. All advantages of this kind Dr. Egbert lost by the negligence of the express company, and it certainly seems as if he were entitled to compensation for them. The Architect's Position in Society. The Skill and Care Required of Architects. CHAPTER II. THE ARCHITECT'S DUTIES TO HIS EMPLOYER. HERE appears to be a difference of opinion among courts as to the position of architects in society. In Minnesota, their relation to their "customers" has been mentioned in a judicial decision, as if they were merchants of some sort; but in Missouri it has been distinctly held that they practise "a liberal profession," and this view appears to be rapidly gaining in favor. As professional men, their duty is plainly laid down in the text-books, and in many decisions of courts. They are bound to serve their employers with reasonable skill and care, and, of course, with perfect honesty. They are not bound to the utmost skill, such as only a few members of any profession attain to, but they must show what other architects will generally consider to be a reasonable degree of profes sional intelligence and knowledge. The care and attention, apart from the skill, which they should devote to their employer's affairs, ought to be greater than that which they would bestow upon their own affairs of similar character, in order to satisfy the legal idea of their duty; but the testimony of other architects will be admitted to show whether the care used in a particular instance was all that could reasonably be expected of a conscientious architect under the circumstances. As might be supposed, the testimony on these points in different cases varies considerably, and, as precise information in regard to decisions actually made is of great importance to architects, it seems advisable, even at the risk of making this |