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approval of ordinary people, but the arrangement should be made before the work is begun. After it is completed, and the builder has explained to the owner that all the delays and blunders that have occurred about the building have been entirely due to the fault of the architect, the latter will have more difficulty in reaching an amicable understanding with his employer.

If he should fail to do so, and the aid of the courts should have to be called in, he will find them tolerably liberal in their ideas of the latitude which should be afforded him in such matters.

The most important case involving this point to be found in our records was decided in Texas.

Here an architect was, as he said, instructed to prepare plans for a hotel, to cost "about $100,000." After the plans were made, the lowest estimate which could be obtained for carrying them into execution was $102,475. The owner then abandoned the undertaking, and refused to pay the architect anything; and the architect brought suit for the compensation which had been promised him. The owner claimed that the limit which he gave the architect was $75,000, instead of $100,000; that, the lowest estimate having exceeded $100,000, he was not bound to pay the architect anything, even on the architect's own version of the matter; and that the architect omitted to include his own commission of five per cent in the estimated cost, so that the lowest estimate should have been estimated at $107,589.73. The court below instructed the jury that if the owner really directed the architect, as he alleged, to make plans for a building to cost $75,000, and it turned out that it would cost more than $100,000 to carry the plans which were made into execution, the architect could recover nothing for making them; but if the direction given was to make plans for a building to cost about $100,000, the preparation of plans which would cost $102,475 to execute was a sufficient compliance with the instruction.

As to the architect's fees, and the expense of superintending

May be Agreed Beforehand.

What

Courts
Think.

Smith vs. Dickey, 74 Tex. 61.

Architect's Fees not Properly a Part of Estimated Cost.

Nelson vs.
Spooner,

2 F. & F. 613.

A Question for the Jury in England.

the building, the court held that they were not properly to be regarded as a part of the estimated cost; but even if they were to be so regarded, the court considered that the total amount, of $107,589.73, would still be "about $100,000," and the agreement, as testified to by the architect, would have been complied with.

The owner's counsel appealed from these rulings, but they were sustained by the Supreme Court.

Here, therefore, the Supreme Court thought that if the lowest estimate had been one-third greater than the limit given the architect, the latter could have recovered nothing for his work; but an excess of about eight per cent, where the limit had been given only as "about $100,000," would not be sufficient to deprive him of his right to his pay.

In an English case, an architect made plans for a schoolbuilding for a board of trustees, who had only £1,350 in their hands to pay for it. After the plans were made, the architect estimated that it would cost £1,545 to carry them out; and he repeatedly assured the trustees that his buildings "never exceeded the contracts," unless changes were authorized by the owners themselves. After these plans, and his estimate, had been presented, he suggested some changes, which, he said, he thought could be included in the estimated price. The plans were then submitted to builders for bids, and the lowest bid received was £2,056.

The trustees then told the architect that they should do nothing further about carrying out his plans, and returned his drawings; and he sued them for his pay. There was contradictory evidence as to whether the original plans could have been executed for the sum estimated by the architect, and whether the discrepancy between this and the actual bid arose from the additions and changes made in them; and the question was submitted to the jury, whether the bids were reasonably near to the architect's estimate, so that the trustees ought to have employed him. The jury disagreed on this point, and were discharged, and the case appears to have been settled out of court.

Here, therefore, a jury seems to have found it doubtful whether a discrepancy of nearly one-third between the architect's estimate and the lowest actual bid was sufficient to deprive the architect of his right to payment for his work.

Where the plans are selected by competition, it is very commonly the case that committees are deceived by estimates made by unskilful and irresponsible architects; and even the better class of architects, who feel that it is a mere chance whether they get the work, are apt to be much less careful in making their estimates than they would be in dealing directly with a confiding client; so that public competitions are often followed by financial griefs on the part both of architects and owners.

In 1884, the two celebrated architects, Bourdais and Davioud, were selected in competition as the architects of a combined theatre and hotel, to be erected by the municipality in the town of Cannes. The limit of cost was fixed by the terms of competition at 500,000 francs for the entire building, one-half this sum being allotted to each part. When the plans were ready for estimating, it was found that the cost of the hotel alone would be 417,000 francs. The municipality, nevertheless, began operations, and spent 70,000 francs in the preliminary work on the building, and then suddenly decided to abandon the construction of the theatre altogether, and, after dismissing Davioud and Bourdais, employed another architect to complete the building of the hotel. The programme of competition had reserved to the municipality the right to abandon the whole. affair, paying the successful competitor 2,500 francs, or to pay 2 per cent on the cost for plans and specifications alone. Bourdais brought suit for 24 per cent on 417,000 francs, the estimated cost of the hotel, together with damages for wrongful discharge. The court decided that he was entitled only to his commission of 2 per cent on 250,000 francs, the expenditure contemplated in the programme, and that he had no claim for damages for his discharge. If the town had done nothing about carrying the plan into execution, it would, under the conditions of the programme, have had to pay only the 2,500 francs

Nelson vs.
Spooner,

2 F. & F. 613.

Estimates in Competition.

Bourdais et
Davioud vs.
Cannes.
Dalloz, 1885,
3-4.

Ada St. M. E.
Church vs.
Garnsey,
66 Ill. 132.

Conditional Acceptance of Plans.

stipulated; but, having begun operations, it could not claim to have abandoned the undertaking, so far as Bourdais was concerned.

In another case, decided in Illinois, an architect submitted plans in competition for a church. They were accepted, on condition that they could be carried out for a certain sum. It was proved that they could not be carried out for that sum, and the church refused to pay the architect for his work. The architect brought suit, but he failed to show any promise to pay him for his plans, except the conditional one, and the court held that he was not entitled to recover anything.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ARCHITECT FOR HIS OWN WORK.

WE have seen that the present tendency is to separate the responsibility of the architect from that of the builder, making the former liable only for the consequences of what is shown to be lack of ordinary professional skill and care in preparing his plans and specifications, or in supervising the work under his charge. Within this limit, however, he is held to a strict accountability. The reports of French courts have contained, in past years, accounts of cases in which this accountability has been enforced with what seems cruel severity, and the modern French architects complain, apparently with reason, that architects are held responsible for mishaps which, if they were to occur in buildings constructed under the charge of engineers, would be looked upon as cases of force majeure, or as the result of an excusable oversight.

One reason for this is that architects are nowhere, except, perhaps, in Germany, organized as closely in defence of their common interests as engineers, and the world is always disposed to crowd a little those who are too feeble to defend themselves.

In this country, where the standard of practical knowledge in the profession is probably higher than in France, the dread of expert investigation into their work seems to be much less common among architects, but it is probable that there would not be much difference in the strictness with which they would be pursued for a real fault. In a California case, Moore &

The Responsibility of the Architect, as Distinguished from that of the Builder.

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