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I think wherever that treaty has shown itself to be a treaty of compromise it has to that extent lost the sympathy and support of our idealistic people, for what we have wanted in this world is not to seize other people's territory. What we have wanted is not to impress ourselves as an imperialistic nation upon nations that were weaker than

We have endeavored, since the foundation of this republic, to make the name of America a name of honor, to make the ideals that we have stood for as a nation something for which all nations should stand, and I regret to see that as a result of the treaty so many people have come to say that the French have a form of government which for them is as good as ours is for us, and that the British have a form of government which for them is as good as ours is for us.

The doctrine that I have been accustomed to hear from childhood up is that we have the most ideal form of government which was ever devised by the mind of man, and I believe it as much to-day as I did before the Paris treaty was written. [Applause.)

I have nothing to say in criticism of the government of any other nation on the face of the earth, but I have this to say about our American government, — that I believe as thoroughly to-day as I did when I was a boy and when, out of deliberate choice, having been born in Canada, I threw off allegiance to the British Empire and became a citizen of the United States, that I joined a citizenship which represented the highest ideals in citizenship that this world has ever seen and, whether or not the British system may be different from ours, that the system which I entered and which I am proud to-day to belong to, represents the highest ideals of citizenship of all the nations of this world. [Applause.)

It is because we believe in these ideals that we have been anxious that there should be expressed in the Paris Treaty, and in the document which grew out of it, the covenant of the League of Nations, a great deal of idealism. It is true that it contains certain forms of idealism which we do not sympathize with, but there is no form of idealism in the covenant of the League of Nations that surpasses in any respect what we had before. We had before, higher ideals in our American type of government and in our American Constitution, than are expressed in the covenant of the League of Nations. Our American Constitution speaks of the people and speaks of the rights of the people. The covenant of the League of Nations speaks of government and of the rights of governments, and we, as Americans, know no such thing as rights of governments except such governments as are established by the consent of the governed.

We know nothing about the rights of any government except those rights which are given to it by the people, and when we are drawn into a covenant in which one government is compared with another and one government makes compromises with another, I submit to you that we have not gone forward at all in making higher ideals for ourselves. We had a higher ideal in our American Constitution and in our American ideals than anything that is proposed in the covenant of the League of Nations. That, to my mind, is a primal and fundamental fact of present circumstances. (Applause.)

It is because of our belief in the rights of people that many of us have seen, in the action that was taken at the Paris Conference concerning China, a stroke against the very fundamental principles of the American Constitution. We believe that people should not be bartered about. We believe that it is not in the power of any conference or of any set of men to say that they will take a vast mass of people and turn them over to some other nation. We believe that the people concerned should have something to say about the disposition of their own interests and their own future.

When you have been told that after all, China is not unanimous, that it is divided, that it has various opinions and has gone to war over those opinions, as far as the settlement of its own affairs is concerned, I quite agree with you, but on this question of Shantung there is no difference between the north and the south. They are all opposed to this disposition of their rights. They are not favorable to Germany and they are not favorable to Japan. They do not make any comparison between what Germany did in Shantung and what Japan proposes to do. They did not want Germany in 1898, and they do not want Japan in 1919.

It is not a question as to whether they got along well with the Germans during their occupation of this province and are fearful lest they should not get along with the Japanese. China never willingly consented to the giving away of any portion of its territory to any nation. China has had a hard time, and the hardest of all its times was in 1898, when Russia came down from the north and took the Liaotung Peninsula. And then Germany came in and took part of the province of Shantung, Kiauchau territory, and England took the hinterland opposite Canton, and France took a portion in the south. China had a very hard time in that year.

But the following year America came to her rescue, and Mr. Hay proposed a series of notes to the great powers, starting with a note to Germany which was presented by our minister at that time, Mr. Andrew D. White, in which it was requested that the German government should give our government assurance that, whatever stand it took in China, it would adhere in future to the policy of protecting the territorial integrity and keeping an open door for commerce. That policy enunciated by Mr. Hay, under the leadership of our departed President, William McKinley, far from being an ineffective, weak policy, was so strong that for all of the fifteen years from 1899, when it was promulgated, down to 1914, at the opening of the war, not one foot of Chinese territory was ceded to any foreign nation.

Now, when the moral strength of the word of the United States and when the moral strength of the opinion of the United States is questioned, it is for us as American citizens to point to that instance of enunciation of the Hay policy toward China, to prove that without the use of arms, without resorting to war, without sending battleships to enforce our will, we were able for fifteen years to impose upon the world a policy for the protection of the territorial integrity of China, keeping an open door for commerce to all the nations of the world. The Hay policy, far from being ineffective, was the most effective and the only effective policy which has ever been promulgated concerning China, and this was in the face of a crisis such as China never had in any of her previous history.

After the end of the China-Japanese War, when Japan got such an easy victory over China, the world threw up its hands and said China is so weak that we might as well step in and partition it. The European nations were fresh from their dividing up of the continent of Africa, and said, “We will go to China and divide it up." England became very much worried about it because England had greater interests in China at that time than any other nation, and so she sent out a commission headed by Lord Beresford, who died recently in Scotland, and the purpose of that mission was to report upon a plan which would prevent the breaking up of China. You will remember that Lord Beresford wrote a book on the break-up of China and how to prevent it. England, being very much worried at that time, wanted to set in motion some plan which would keep China from being divided up. She had no plan of her own. America came forward with the Hay doctrine and did the work, and the promulgation of the Hay doctrine was the greatest influence toward maintaining the peace of the Far East that has ever been issued by any government.

Following 1899 there came about that awful outbreak of patriotic feeling which had been incited by the German occupation of Kiauchau. There was every temptation that year to divide China, and yet what stood against it was the American policy which has been expressed by Mr. Hay. Another temptation came along with the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. The Hay policy stood there against it.

If the amendment proposed by my distinguished friend, Senator Lodge, is voted down, we are sure to have a reservation; and if that reservation is passed, saying that the United States Senate does not concur with any disposition of China's territory which involves the sacrifice of the sovereign rights of China, and turns over part of her population to a foreign government, we need send no army to the Far East. The very fact that the moral opinion of the United States is expressed is sufficient in itself to help maintain peace, and I have not one single doubt of it. We need send no army. We need fear no war. What we need to fear more than anything else is a lack of courage on our part which will cause us to hesitate to do our duty in the face of a great crisis. [Applause.]

If we, as an American people, are not afraid to give expression to our moral sentiment, are not afraid to say to Japan or Great Britain or France, or any other nation, frankly and fully, that our policy concerning dependent and weak nations is different than yours; that we believe in our policy and do not believe in yours; that we intend to maintain our policy, and are not going to compromise with you in yours; that we are not going to share with you in your attempt to hold down weak and dependent nations, but are going to give them every possible chance to get on their feet, the assertion of such an American policy as that is sufficient to help maintain the peace of the Far East.

I do not believe at all that we should hesitate to send the whole treaty back to be handled by the Paris Conference again rather than do an injustice to 38,000,000 Chinese residents of the province of Shantung. (Applause.] I would send the treaty back a dozen times until we were able to impress on our Allies that when it comes to a matter of the sacrifice of our American principles, for which we entered the war and which we maintain as firm a belief in as we did when we entered the war, we are not afraid of the deliberations of any Paris Conference. We are able to declare our Policy and to maintain it, whether our allied nations agree with us or disagree with us. That policy is an American policy, and, being an American policy, it is something which we as American people intend to maintain for all time to come. [Applause.)

I am sorry to see the amount of misstatement concerning the Chinese position, for China has had what we consider more or less of a sorry history. I have been most intimately connected with Chinese governmental affairs for more than twenty-five years, and have seen the lack of adaptability toward modern conditions on the part of the government — and indeed I owe my position to the fact that China is a backward nation. If China was not a backward nation they would not need an adviser like myself.

There is no need to disguise the fact that China is a backward nation and needs help and guidance in developing along modern lines, and yet, when one stops to think that you are the product of a nation that has had a century and a half of history, a nation that has been favored by Providence in being placed in one of the most fertile districts of the world, and has had immense natural resources and every inducement to give virility and enterprise and push to a new nation; when you remember that you belong to a nation of that kind, which, after all, has had only this brief history, but that in China you are dealing with men whose ancestors can be traced in an unbroken line for a thousand years (I have often been associated with men who in their ancestral temples have a string of tablets erected to their ancestors which carry back one thousand or twelve hundred years in an unbroken line) when you are associated with a people like that, and remember that they have the longest historical existence of any people, you think that something is awry in modern life which makes it necessary for that nation, in order to adapt itself to the new conditions of the world, to call in men from nations which have had such a short history.

I cannot give you any better idea of the sound sense of the people than the way in which the Chinese Republic has treated the old Manchu imperial house. They made Chinese of them, as was said by Dr. Edwards at the dinner upstairs. After the Manchus had been in the country for less than one hundred years they all became Chinese. In fact, China is the only nation on the face of the earth that has been able to take the most virile race outside of China the Jewish race — and absorb a Jewish colony so that nothing was left of them in physiognomy or in characteristics of any kind, and they all became Chinese. I wish we had strength enough in our New England blood to take every Italian and every Pole and every Jew that comes to us, and make Americans of them in such a way that there would never be any division between Jews and Gentiles, Europeans and Americans, but that we should all be loyal Americans and nothing else. (Applause.)

China was able to do that, and she has done that with every race which has come in there and, strange to say, when Europeans settle down in China and do not return to their own countries, as a rule they take on more Chinese characteristics than the European characteristics which they brought with them to the country; and when they intermarry with the people of China and have children, the children are much more apt to be like Chinese than they are like Europeans. They are a strong, virile race, and I have no doubt that if Japan succeeded by military force in overrunning all China and reducing it to a subject province of Japan, within a hundred years the Japanese who tried to be the conquerors of China would be conquered by China and would become Chinese.

When you think of the statement which was made in a very distinguished religious convention just now in session in one of our Middle West cities, that if China had this province of Shantung returned to it by Japan, according to her promise in 1914, she could not have kept it longer than two years, and that she would have bartered it away for something else, I want you to know that from the first day of my arrival in China down to the present time China has never bartered away a single bit of her territory. She has had a lot of her territory seized, but she has never bartered away a foot of it, and she was no more in danger of bartering away Shantung if Japan had promptly returned it to her in 1914 than she would have given Russia the things which she gave her in Manchuria. These things have not been given by China. They have been wrested from China. And the whole of our American policy , in China has been not to wrest anything from her and not to consent when other nations wrested things from her, and, for the first time in the history of our entrance into Far Eastern affairs, we have been asked to step up to the table and put our signature to the wresting of Chinese territory from that nation.

England took a large tract near Hongkong, but she did not ask us to approve it. Germany took Kiauchau, but she did not ask us to approve it. If Japan wants to go in and seize China's territory, I do not believe we should go to war with Japan and say, “ You must not do it"; but we should not be asked to step up to the platform and sit down at a table and take a pen and write the name of the President of the United States and our Secretary of State to any cession of Chinese territory to any other nation. Japan asks us to do that at present. We should not reverse our policy. We should not say, “ You must get out of China.” We should say that according to our American principles we will never be a party to anybody else taking Chinese territory, as we do not intend to take it for ourselves. [Applause.)

It might seem to you that Japan, being a neighbor of China, had what was called in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, territorial propinquity with China - a delightful phrase which I invite you to try and enunciate. You will notice how carefully I make the attempt to enunciate

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