it, because unless one's tongue is fairy free it is difficult to do so. Japan has territorial propinquity to China, but she has no capacity for leadership to China. You would think, in consequence of China and Japan having a common civilization in many ways, Japan having borrowed her early civilization from China, that Japan would be in a position to become a leader of the Far East. I do not concede that for a moment.

Japan has done wonders in her own country. It is a marvel what Japan has done in developing the resources of her own country, in teaching her people, in making roads, in developing railroads and steamships, and entering into the life of the world in such a way that she was recognized in Paris as one of the Big Five. All honor to Japan! But, let me remind you that in addition to the enterprise and progress of the people themselves, one factor which entered into the progress of the modern life of Japan, which they gloss over at the present time but which is well known to those of you who have read the history of the development of the Far East, one of the chief elements in that development, was the kindly attitude of the United States toward that nation.

After insisting that Japan should not murder our stranded seamen, and after insisting that Japan should open its doors to the commerce of the world, we went there to do business with them in the same way that we would do business with any of our own people. We did not take a foot of Japanese territory. We did not ask any. England came behind us a year later and took concessions at Yokohoma and Nagasaki. We did not take such concessions and never intended to impose our will upon Japan. Then Japan gradually began to reform her legal system and to get her currency on a better basis. We encouraged her to revise her treaties and to deal with all of the nations, and to withdraw extra-territorial rights. We encouraged Japan to follow our example, and we were the first to give this helping hand to Japan.

All we want for China is that we should adopt and continue with China the same generous policy which America extended to Japan and which, along with the virile spirit of the Japanese people, helped Japan to become a great nation. Now, Japan, which is the greatest recipient of the effects which came from that policy, should be the last nation on the face of God's earth to oppose it. We helped to make Japan what she is to-day through the policy of friendliness which we adopted toward her, neither taking any of her territory nor willing that others should do so. I believe that the American people are just as anxious at the present time to continue that policy toward China as we were in giving it to Japan in the first instance. [Applause.]

Japan will never be the leader of China. China will never accept Japanese leadership. China to this day continues to look upon Japan and to consider Japan's position relative to modern civilization, to be exactly the same as it was relative to her own civilization. Japan had no civilization of her own, so she borrowed everything from China. Now China sits by and watches her take up all the civilization of Europe and have modern schools and modern courts, and China in her heart says, "Japan is the same copyist of the West that she was originally of us, and if we are going to adapt ourselves to modern conditions, we

must not do it by copying the West. We must not do it by throwing away all that we had of our own civilization of the past. What we must do is to go along a slower process, the more painful process of adapting our older civilization to this new civilization with which we are coming in contact."

I want to say to you, gentlemen, that I believe this policy of the Chinese government, although it has brought untold disaster upon her, will in the end be a sounder policy than the more flashy policy of Japan, which immediately discarded all her old Chinese civilization and began to copy the civilization of the West. Those of you who think of Japan as an oriental nation are entirely mistaken. Japan is not an oriental nation. The leaders of the Japanese nation at present are more occidentals than we are. They are further along in the progress and the understanding of the European method of civilization than many of the nations of Europe are. They have been apt pupils, but in this study of Western methods they have entirely parted with their former civilization, so that when a learned Japanese comes to China at present he is more nonplussed in his dealings with the Chinese people than a European people is.

The natural leader of China, in her gradual development as a republic, is the United States, and we have adopted a tutelage of that country and I do not believe we will ever resign it. We mean to help the republic of China which set itself up as a republic on the model of the United States and which has drawn all of its ideals from the United States and intends to adapt its ancient civilization along the lines which America has shown to be best, and that is to have a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.

What China needs is the continuance of the friendly feeling of the people of the United States. That cannot be continued unless America takes a strong, straight stand on this Shantung question. No one defends it. The President, who was responsible for the consent of the United States toward the insertion of this article in the treaty, has never advocated it as an ideal compromise. He has simply said that he was forced to do this lest other and worse things might result. He is continually taking the position of the old couplet: "I know the right, condemn the wrong, and yet the wrong pursues.' I am very glad that the Senate of the United States, that represents the will of the people and is the only body of any of the nations which entered into that treaty which provides a means by which the people of any country are able to express their opinions about the acts of their servants at tht conference, will insist not only that we should condemn the wrong, bue that we should not pursue it, not only that we should recognize the right, but that we should insist that in our dealings with China we should follow it. [Applause.]

It was said by Dr. Nogi, in an address in Boston, from a platform from which I also spoke, that the Japanese nation is united in its opinion as to its disposition of Shantung. I do not believe it for a moment. The Japanese Imperialistic Party, represented by the kind of military party which was dominant in Prussia previous to the war, wants this,

just as they wanted the annexation of Korea and insisted upon it until they got it. But, fortunately, there is growing up in Japan a strong liberal party, and that liberal party is represented by men who desire to do the right thing toward their neighboring nations and, far from the whole country being behind the government in its present attitude, there is a large proportion of the people who do not believe in this.

In a recent statement which came from Japan, which was prepared by the professor of international law in the University of Tokio, Dr. Yoshino, he said that there are two Japans, the new democratic Japan and the old military Japan. Because of these two elements, Japan has been greatly misunderstood by America and other foreign nations, and the military, being the most powerful, is the most known to the outside world. He went on, criticizing the military government of his own people.

Gentlemen, what we want to do in our dealings with other nations of the world is to ally ourselves with the liberal element of those nations and not with their military or imperialistic parties. What we want to encourage in Japan is that Japan should develop the rights of her own people, should adopt a liberal policy, and should get rid of her military menace. I do not believe for a moment that we want to kotow to Japanese military authority any more than we wanted to kotow to the German military authority. The Japanese military authority is just as much a menace to the peace of the Far East, and when it menaces the peace of the Far Easti t menaces the peace of the world, as the German military autocracy was a menace to the peace of Europe.

Unless we show ourselves entirely in accord with the liberal policy of Japan and with the liberal thought of Japan, and directly and straightforwardly opposed to the militaristic and imperialistic policy of Japan, some time we will pay the penalty for it. [Applause.]

The militaristic party has recently been interjecting opposition to an arrangement which China had been making for a loan in conjunction with a quadruple syndicate of bankers of Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States. The military party of Japan said that they do not desire their bankers to go into this banking proposition unless the other nations agree that as far as Mongolia and Manchuria are concerned, the loan agreement toward Japan does not apply to that part of the country. In other words, they desire to cut off Manchuria and Mongolia as fields for only Japanese investment. I do not believe for a moment that our bankers would agree to any such scheme as that, and if they do agree to it, I believe the spirit of the American people will be brought so strongly to bear upon it that they will withdraw from it, because we do not want to have China chopped up.

That is the worst feature of this treaty. It starts in one section to deal with German interests in China and says what shall be done with these interests, - the interests in Tientsin, and Hankow and Peking; and then comes another section, in Part 4, Section 8. It deals in one section with China and in the other section with Shantung, just as if we were making a treaty with some foreign nation in which the interests of the United States were handled in one section, and in another

section the interests of Massachusetts were set aside to be handled by themselves. This was the shrewdest move which Japan made in the whole treaty, in separating the German interests in all other parts of China from the German interests in this special part of Shantung. That gave Japan the entry into claiming her special rights in this province. We do not want any special rights over Japan in Manchuria or Mongolia any more than we do in Shantung.

Criticism is constantly made of China, and it is asked: Why is she so weak? Why doesn't she try to raise an army and protect her own interests? That is, I would remind you, a two-edged sword. If the time should come when China should arm herself, or we were, by our weak actions, to force China into a position where she would become a strong military nation, there is no combination of powers on the face of the earth that could withstand her. Do we want to drive China into becoming a military nation? Do we want to force those people to change their policy of minding their own business and developing their interests and attending to their own affairs? Do we want to make of them a military nation and make them a menace to the rest of the world? say no. I say that anything which will help us keep that nation from arming and becoming a military menace to the rest of the world should be done, and the first thing that should be done is to make those people feel that the nations of the earth intend to treat them justly. Now they believe that a great injustice has been done to them.

I

There is not a single man in the province of Shantung who wants to become a Japanese subject. Why should we put our name to a treaty which is going to force these people into allegiance to Japan? There is not a single man from the northern boundaries of China to the south of China who goes to Japan as a merchant and wishes to remain there as a citizen. After he has made his money he always comes back and dwells in his own country. Are you going to say to these people, "We do not care about your 30,000,000 of people; if you have not the strength to protect them yourselves, let Japan take them "? Are we going to set up a moral standard like that, and introduce into China a rule of brute force such as we have seen the last five years in Europe? I say the thing for us to do is to encourage that nation along the same kind of moral ideals that we have always held, and to encourage them to believe that the rest of the world intends to treat them justly and hopes that they will not arm and hopes that they will not try to become a great military power, but will attempt to develop themseves along peaceful, orderly lines. [Great applause.]

Previous to the address by Dr. Ferguson, a dinner was given in his honor at which Mr. James T. Williams, Jr., presided, introducing the following speakers: Charles F. Weed, Louis A. Coolidge, Samuel L. Powers, Dr. Martin Edwards, and Rev. William E. Huntington.

DR. MORTON PRINCE

October 23, 1919

Dr. Prince was introduced to the audience in the Auditorium by former Lieutenant-Governor Louis A. Frothingham. The distinguished speaker was received with applause, the audience standing, and he said, in part: "I had been led to believe that there is a great scarcity of sugar in Boston, but I am convinced that the City Club must have an abundance. At least, it has been given to me in abundance to-night, just now, and at the dinner in the room above. Well I am glad of it, because I like it. [Laughter.]

"When America, at last, decided to cast her lot with the Allies, who were trying to save the world from brute dominance, I did my best to persuade General Gorgas that I was only twenty-nine years old [laughter], which was the age limit over which no medical officer could be accepted for war duty. But General Gorgas said, 'You can't put that over on You can easily imagine my delight, then, when Governor McCall called me on the telephone and asked me to take charge of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Bureau in Paris, which this old Commonwealth, of which we all are so justly proud, was about to establish. You may easily guess how many moments I took in saying 'yes.'

Dr. Prince then briefly outlined the work of the bureau, which, he said, was to furnish club rooms for men on leave in Paris, and to act as liaison aids between the families at home and the soldiers in the field. He then spoke feelingly of the magnificent accomplishments of our armies. He said:

"What must have been the spirit of those American youths in France! What splendid courage displayed, what unutterable sacrifices made in winning that ground from a stubborn enemy, against fire from strongly emplaced machine guns, and fire from hidden cannon, a trip to those war-torn battlefields, a view of the indescribable ruin wrought in what was but lately one of the fairest lands in Europe, will show. But, more than all this, it is the graves of our men, with their wooden crosses row on row,' which bring to the beholder the fullest realization of sacrifice, of duty done and honor won.' We rejoice in the crosses which profoundly grateful governments bestow upon our soldiers. We take pride in these marks of appreciation of the valor of our young American manhood; but the cross which moves us most is the simple little wooden cross, each decorated with a tiny American flag, the outstretched arms of which seem to be saying: 'All for thee, all for thee.'

It seems to me that we should erect in France a great memorial hall in honor of these dead heroes. In it there should be a niche in which every state could set up a tablet to its dead. And on its walls should be inscribed the name of every boy who lies in France. A Valhalla of heroes, a monument to our dead. It is impossible to bring them all home, and the French government will gladly coöperate with us in honoring them where they lie.