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Although many dogmatic statements without supporting evidence of any kind have been made with regard to the Korean situation and Russian intentions, visà-vis, both Korea and Western Europe, there has been a curious failure to examine and analyze such evidence as to Russian intentions as is furnished by experience. Despite the great flexibility of Communist strategy which often reverses its course overnight, the Russian tactics and procedures follow rigid patterns as is indeed necessary in any regimented state. Let us examine the record of the past 6 years to determine whether it reveals any evidence that might be of value in determining Russia's intentions and probable course of action today.

Russia has positively refused to fight on two great fronts. Despite Japan's known weakness early in 1945, and despite the fact that Russia had strong military forces in Siberia-as she has now-Stalin refused to enter the war against Japan until after the surrender of Germany. As a matter of fact, he specified that he would not enter the Japanese war until 90 days after the surrender of Germany. Now, Stalin desired to participate in the Japanese defeat more than he wanted anything else at that time. Long before the surrender of Germany he knew that Japan was weakening fast, for the Japanese had requested the Russians to sound out the Allies with regard to a negotiated peace. There was some danger that Japan might surrender before the 90-day period of grace expired. Nevertheless, he held firmly to his course in order to make sure that Germany was completely defeated and that Russian forces occupied selected strategic areas in Germany on the Western front before turning his attention to Japan on the Eastern front. Stalin is as aware of the value of Western Europe to his dream of world conquest as we are, and it is inconceivable that he will deliberately jump into a war in Korea, and possibly Japan, and thereby be forced into fighting on two great fronts. The available evidence on this point indicates that Stalin will not permit Russsia to be drawn into a war in the Far East.

It is extremely doubtful that Russia can fight a war of major proportions in the extreme Far East. Although she has been endeavoring to industrialize central and eastern Siberia to the point where it could support a major war from its own resources, there are many indications that she has not yet attained her objective. An army of one or two million men plus a large air force, plus a considerable force of submarines and other supporting forces would still have to draw an enormous tonnage of supplies and replacement personnel from the Ural region and from Russia proper.

Russia has undoubtedly collected a tremendous stockpile of military supplies in eastern Siberia, but there are always certain classes of supplies and certain critical items which must be brought up regularly from the zone of the interior. We could certainly prohibit her operation of a supply line by sea, and it is doubtful whether the two Siberian railroads could move the tonnages required by her Far Eastern forces in a sustained campaign, particularly if the railroads roads are slowed up by air attack, The evidence on this point is not very pertinent since Russia's last sustained war in the Far East was with Japan in 1904-1905. At that time the second trans-Siberian railroad was not built but Russia was deefated quickly-partly because of a lack of supplies and partly because of other reasons. If those who fear a Russian attack on Korea and Japan have any evidence supporting the theory that Russia is capable of waging a major war in those areas, it should be presented to the public.

An attack upon Korea and Japan would be no picnic excursion for the Russians. She certainly would not precipitate a world war by attacking United Nations forces in Korea unless she was prepared to follow through by undertaking the conquest of Japan. Granted that the Russian armies could drive our forces out of Korea, it can be assumed that a considerable number would be evacuated to Japan, despite Russian air and submarine attack. We already have two divisions in Japan and we should be able to defend our airfields and essential naval facilities there and on Okinawa. Russia does not have enough shipping in the Far East to undertake a massive landing on the main Japanese islands and a landing in great force would be necessary to insure success. addition to the United Nations forces in Japan, any attempt at armed invasion by Russians would be met by the Japanese "police" army and by as many veterans of the last war as could be armed. There must be more than two million trained veterans still fit for military duty who could and would fight in defense of the homeland. Of course, small Russian units could cross the narrow straits from southern Sakhalin to Hokkaido, but Sakhalin has very poor transport communications and could hardly serve as a supply base for a sustained campaign.


All the available evidence indicates that Russia would not precipitate a world war with the relatively insignificant objective of driving us out of Korea and that she would have little hope of success at an attempt to overrun Japan with the means she has available or can make available within a reasonable time. As a matter of fact, available evidence reveals that Stalin is opposed to open warfare as a mean for spreading Communism. He has indicated on numerous occasions that he prefers infiltration and overthrow from within. Stalin is opposed to war because he has learned from experience that it is destructive and that the outcome of war is not always certain. He was forced into World War II by Hitler's treacherous attack, and he kept out of the war with Japan until he was certain that Japan could not win. He refused to use Russian soldiers in Greece though there is no doubt that he wanted a Communist satellite on the Mediterranean Sea. All of the evidence indicates that Stalin will refrain from open war unless Russian territory is invaded or until the time arrives when he is convinced that his retention of power depends upon war.

Then what are his intentions with regard to the conflict between the United Nations and the combined Chinese-Korean Communist forces? Why are there repeated reports of an increase in Russian troops, airplanes and submarines in eastern Siberia? It is these reports that have frightened us into maintaining the present limitations upon our military action against the Chinese Communists and which caused the summary removal of General MacArthur. It is curious that such precise reports of Russian troop movements and dispositions "leak out" from Siberia but the vast build up of Chinese troops and supplies on the Korean border last October was concealed from the American Army in Korea, from Tokyo and from Washington. Can it be possible that the Siberian intelligence leaks are intentional? Has Washington suddenly opened a pipeline under the Siberian iron curtain or is it only a blow hole which spouts nothing but that which the Russians pump into it?

Of course, there have been other and more illogical arguments for maintaining the "Privileged Sanctuary” in Manchuria and for continuing trade with Communist China. A strong allied faction argues that bombing Mukden and other targets in Manchuria would alienate the friendship of the Chinese people, and make them really angry with us, in fact. Another strong group, principally British trade tycoons, argue that a blockade of the China coast is impracticable and that economic sanctions deprive us of valuable contacts with the Communists. History produces plenty of evidence that the British, Americans and other naval powers have always resorted to blockade in order to weaken the enemy's war potential in the past. A blockade of China might not stop all smuggling, but it would certainly halt the movement of hundreds of thousands of tons of rubber, petroleum products, steel, chemicals, medicines, motor vehicles, dyes, fabrics and other indispensable war materials which are now flowing into China's emaciated military stockpiles.

As for alienating the people by bombing Manchurian targets, the argument is silly for it overlooks the obvious fact that the Chinese people have nothing to say about the war in Korea. It is the hierarchy of Red Chinese leaders who are responsible for that war and all evidence indicates that they have already alienated themselves from our group of friends. They have repeatedly proclaimed that Russia is their only friend, that they look only to "Father Stalin" for guidance and assistance and that they will fight to the death against the "imperialist" forces in Korea. In my considered opinion, the people would be happy to see bombing attacks upon the airfields, railways, arsensals and other war objectives and would stand on the streets and wave at our airplanes during the attack-just as they did during our attacks upon targets in Japaneseoccupied areas during the last war. Available evidence derived from numerous reports from the interior of China, indicates that the Red Chinese leaders are none too secure in their seats of power. Despite the mass campaign of assassinations and terror which they launched in February, there are still hundreds of thousands of guerrillas actively operating in all of the provinces and the masses of the people are becoming more and more dissatisfied with the benefits of the Peoples' Democracy with its Russian background. It is more than likely that any action which would prevent Chinese Communist armies from continuing their aggression in Korea would result in the elimination of the current Chinese leaders and possibly in the overthrow of the Red government. The Red leaders have pledged themselves to the liberation of Korea and failure to attain their objective will weaken their positions enormously.

With all of this evidence before us, I think we can determine, with a fair degree of accuracy, the intentions of Stalin with regard to the Russian program in the Far East, barring, of course, some totally unexpected incident which might -occur to upset his calculated course.

First, Stalin has no intention of engaging in a major war in the Far East because of anything that may happen to the Chinese Communists. When Stalin decides that war is necessary to defend Russia or to maintain his power, he will launch his Red hordes against the most valuable objective, western Europe. Second, Stalin is opposed to fighting on two great fronts. He had hoped that Red China could drive the United Nations forces out of Korea and then continue Communist conquest in Asia. He is still backing them with supplies, technical supervision, tanks and airplanes but not with Russian ground troops.

Third, Stalin is satisfied to have the war in Korea continue indefinitely as a bloody see-saw between Chinese and United Nations forces. It is a distinct drain upon our resources and it costs the Chinese little but manpower, of which they have an inexhaustible reserve. Any hope that the Chinese will become discouraged and ask for peace because of manpower losses is simply wishful thinking. Neither the Chinese nor Stalin place any value whatever on human life, and human suffering.

Fourth, Stalin also needs time before a world war begins. He has troubles of his own both at home and in many satellites. Our leaders who justify a stalemate in Korea in order to gain time, are playing Stalin's game. He still believes that the democracies will so weaken their economies by inflation, unemployment and unbalanced budgets that Communism will gain its objectives without a great world war.

Fifth, Stalin would not be embarrassed if we used all available means, including all four of General MacArthur's recommendations, to end the Chinese aggression in Korea, provided there is no violation of Russian territory or invasion of Chinese territory by foreign troops. Our success in Korea would be a slight set-back in the plan of Communist conquest, but Stalin would quickly evaluate the new factors and adjust his stategy accordingly.

The question for us to decide is not whether President Truman was justified in removing General MacArthur, or whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the President or with MacArthur, but whether we want to continue sacrificing Allied soldiers and war materials in Korea until Stalin calls off the Chinese. The means and the power to force a successful decision are available to us. Will we use them or will we continue to play Stalin's game? I say the decision should be to use whatever means and methods are necessary to end the war in Korea quickly, thereby saving the lives of thousands of our boys and the further impoverishment of a country and a people who are already in desperate circumstances. The Korean people-men, women, and little children-are the real sufferers from the stalemate war. Furthermore, of course, the ending of the conflict in Korea would enable us to direct our undivided attention and effort toward any other danger area that may be created by Stalin. If this decision is made, all parties and all factions should unite to give it one hundred percent support.

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Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations




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