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lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Applause, the Members rising.]

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa; if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without; and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution. Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. Indeed, on the 2d of September 1945, just following the surrender of the Japanese Nation on the battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:

"Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start, workable methods were found insofar as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, leagues of nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter destructiveness of war now blots out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2,000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh." [Applause.]

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory-not prolonged indecision. [Applause.] In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory. [Applause.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson. For history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an

enemy in the field? I could not answer. [Applause.] Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that as military action is confined to its territorial limits, it condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment, while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. [Applause.] They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were "Don't scuttle the Pacific." [Applause.]

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there and I can report to you without reservation they are splendid in every way. [Applause.] It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always. [Applause.]

I am closing my 52 years of military service. [Applause.] When I joined the Army even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that

"Old soldiers never die; they just fade away." And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away-an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-by.




August 17, 1951.

Chairman, Senate Joint Committee on Armed Services and

Foreign Relations,

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: On August 17, 1951, the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, constituted to hold hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur and the military situation in the Far East, adopted the following resolution:

"That the Committees transmit and report to the Senate for its information the hearings and the records with their appendixes.

"That the Committee file no further report, that no views or conclusions be denominated as majority or minority views or conclusions but that members be permitted before September 1st to file their views and conclusions with the Chairman, and that said views be printed in the appendix."

In accordance with that resolution, the undersigned members of said Joint Committee transmit herewith views which they each adopt as individual memhers of said Joint Committee in connection with the hearings above referred to.

This document, representing the individual views of the undersigned, is to be incorporated in the appendix of the records of the hearings which are to be transmitted to the Senate for its information in accordance with the resolution above set out.

Respectfully submitted.










August 17, 1951.

Chairman, Joint Committees on Investigation Into Far East Policy,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Without endorsing all the statements in the compilation of views to which this letter is appended, I agree with its criticism of the way in which General MacArthur's dismissal was handled and communism was given a "green light" in China and Korea. I concur in its tribute to the valor of our troops.

I shall very soon submit my own views on the other issues raised by the investigation.

Sincerely yours,


United States Senator.



August 17, 1951.


Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: At Senator Saltonstall's request, I submit herewith for your attention his statement relative to the MacArthur hearings. Sincerely yours,



Secretary to Senator Saltonstall.


I join in most of the individual conclusions contained in the above report, particularly that concerning the valor of our men, but I do not agree with all the bases upon which these conclusions are reached. I therefore add the following few thoughts of my own.

At the conclusion of the hearings held jointly by the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a statement was prepared by Senator Russell, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, with regard to those hearings and their significance. This statement was unanimously approved by the membership of both Committees. I personally endorsed it then and enthusiastically approve that statement now.

I did not personally believe that any further Committee comment was required beyond this statement of Chairman Russell. Since, however, it appears that individual views are to be published, I would like to add briefly my own views. Let me say first that I do not intend to draw conclusions on this vital matter on the basis of the personal strength or weaknesses of any one witness. They are all highly responsible officials of our government and whether or not we like them personally, we must do our utmost in these difficult times to maintain the confidences of our friends throughout the world in our leadership and our objectives.

I believe that by reason of the unusually ample coverage given these hearings, the American people have had an excellent opportunity to form their own judgments as to General MacArthur's removal and with regard to the problems of foreign policy that have been illuminated by it.

I believe that the feeling is now almost unanimous that the President clearly had the right as Commander-in-Chief under our Constitution to dismiss General MacArthur from his command. The General himself agrees to that.

I do, however, feel that the method by which the dismissal was carried out showed a lack of judgment and foresight on the part of the President. I believe it showed a total lack of appreciation of a great American and of the service which he has for half a century rendered our nation. It is, I feel, unseemingly at any time that those who have served America should be so lightly considered and so abruptly dismissed.

I believe these hearings proved that General MacArthur did not consciously violate the orders of his military superiors. They did reveal, however, that here in Washington and in other capitals throughout the world General MacArthur's periodic public statements caused considerable doubt as to whether he was in sympathy with the orders of his superiors. The created serious doubt as to whether he or the President, through the Department of State, was the spokesman for our government's position in the Far East. This doubt and uncertainty seem to me to make clear the need for any commanding general to return periodically to Washington to report on his own activities, to review the problems of his command as they relate to our total policy and to refresh himself as to the attitudes and objectives of our government rélative to other nations in the world.

In 1949, I urged strongly and voted that General MacArthur be ordered back to the United States for a review of just such matters, and for a report to the President and the Congress on the problems of the Far East as he saw them.

Had this been done, I believe the unfortunate situation resulting in his dismissal might never have occurred. A thorough mutual understanding of the problems and policies involved would undoubtedly have prevented this regrettable result.

Boiled down, the differences between General MacArthur and his superiors in Washington on the conduct of affairs in Korea and China are not great. They concern primarily the fundamental policy question as to whether the United Nations, for which we are carrying the major share of the load, should carry out an aggressive war by bombing in Manchuria over the Yalu River, and by conducting reconnaissance over China itself, or whether we should contain the fighting to Korea alone. General MacArthur had a positive policy, which if successful would end the fighting with a prompt victory. The Administration's policy, as I see it, can win only by the wearing down of the Chinese Communists. Whatever happens, the valor of our fighting men has been magnificent.

The hearings unquestionably emphasized, clarified and crystallized the policies of the Administration, as never before, on (1) the necessity of maintaining Formosa in free hands as an adjunct of our security, (2) the impossibility of permitting Communist China to shoot her way into the United Nations, and (3) putting off indefinitely the recognition of Communist China by the Government · of the United States.

I believe that while serious and even tragic mistakes have without question been made by the Administration at the Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta conferences, with resulting unfortunate and dangerous consequences to the future security of this country, our present task and duty are to deal with the present and with the future and to look ahead to the solving of the difficulties that confront us rather than look backward in anger and with recriminations.

These hearings also brought more clearly to the minds of all of us the relationship of the Far East to our problem in Europe. It has hammered into our minds the stringent necessity of preserving our military and economic strength in order to build up our security to our best advantage and of promoting thereby greater opportunities for a more peaceful world.

Clear-headed and positive action taken now and in the future is, I believe, the best possible medicine that we can apply if we are to restore an ailing foreign policy to full and effective health.

In final emphasis of the foregoing comments, I quote from the Joint Statement of June 27, unanimously approved by both the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees:

"But the free world has no cause for dismay. The fact that we do not always speak with a single voice does not mean that we have weakened in our united purpose. The objectives of the people of the United States are unchanged by anything that has transpired during this ordeal of controversy. We are unshaken in our determination to defend ourselves and to cooperate to the limit of our capabilities with all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom."










MAY 3-JUNE 27, 1951


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