There follow the current areas in which there is a remarkable unanimity of agreement.

1. The right of the President to remove General MacArthur

No one disputes the President's authority and power to assign, reassign, or remove officers of the Armed Forces of the United States.32 The President is given this authority under the Constitution and can remove personnel at his complete discretion.

This fact was recognized by all Senators participating in the inquiry as well as the witnesses appearing before the committee and by General MacArthur himself. The general, in answer to a query from Senator Bridges, said that he did not question the President's action in the slightest degree as his authority is clearly stated in the Constitution and is inherent in our system of Government. However, General MacArthur added that in his judgment the abrupt dismissal was not in the best interests of the United States. The summary recall necessitated turning over to his successor, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, without proper briefing, numerous responsibilities that not only affect the security of the United States, but very definitely involve the security and administration of Japan and the Far East.3

33

2. Method of removal ill-advised

The witnesses appearing before the Joint Armed Services-Foreign Relations Committee decried the method used in the removal of General MacArthur. Secretary Acheson, who has been one of the strongest critics of General MacArthur for many years, recognized the dominant attitude of the people when he stated "the effect of the relief of General MacArthur in Japan was one of very considerable shock when it was announced." 34

During the interrogation of the various witnesses, the members of the committee attempted to have answered the big question as to why the summary dismissal of General MacArthur was necessary. They felt, and reflected the attitude of the people, that if there was some misunderstanding between the Commander in Chief and General MacArthur, he should have been ordered home for conferences in an attempt to reach a common ground of understanding. Although all administration witnesses except Secretary Marshall agreed that possibly the removal could have been handled in some other way, they were bound to go along with a Presidential decision. General Bradley for example testified that, "I think, frankly, it would have been better had it been handled in a little different way." 99 34a Secretary Marshall said that if he had to do it all over again, he would feel that the matter should be handled in the same fashion.

35

The attitude of the people of the United States, as evidenced by the spontaneous receptions afforded General MacArthur, reflects their very clear understanding of this unusual situation.

3. MacArthur never violated military directives

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their statements that the general had not violated any military directives during the progress of the Korean campaign. General Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, at first stated that General MacArthur had violated a military directive by using American troops on the Korean frontier. Under cross-examination General Collins altered his testimony as follows: "* * * it is true that answering the first question, I indicated that it was a violation of a directive, or words to that effect. Í promptly corrected that

* * * 36

It was further shown that General MacArthur's action was dictated by military necessity for the protection of our troops.

The Joint Chiefs stated that they were in general agreement with him on the strategy developed in Korea and recognized that no field commander can properly conduct a campaign unless he is permitted to do the job as he sees it on the

scene.

The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control of the use thereof. The President's authority over the Armed Forces of the Nation is based on article 2, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which provided that he "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." 33 Hearings before the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees inquiring into the military situation in the Far East, etc., p. 26, supra (hereafter referred to as Hearings).

34 Ibid., p. 1753.

34a Ibid., p. 751. 35 Ibid., p. 514. 30 Ibid., p. 1299.

General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, said that he did not concur in the initial planning of the Inchon landing, but conceded later that it was a brilliant piece of military strategy."

General MacArthur, both during his appearances before the joint session of Congress and while appearing as a witness before the Joint Armed Services, Foreign Relations Committee stated unequivocally that he had never to his knowledge violated a military directive.38

4. There was no serious disagreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur. The military in no way initiated or recommended the recall of General MacArthur

There was never any major disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the conduct of the campaign in Korea. All of the witnesses have joined in to praise General MacArthur as a great military strategist and one of the most brilliant military leaders in American history. The issue defined to the joint committee involves administration disagreement with MacArthur over the issuance of public statements carrying views allegedly contrary to the administration's foreign policy.

During the hearings the following exchange took place between Chairman Russell and Secretary of Defense George Marshall:

"Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Secretary, one of the issues here is as to whether or not General MacArthur directly or indirectly violated any orders or directives issued to him by you, as a representative of the Department of Defense or by the President of the United States. I would like to have you discuss that. "Secretary MARSHALL. In relation to the conduct of the campaign, no, he has not, not that I can recall. In relation to public statements he has."9

Later in discussing this matter with Senator Wiley the following exchange took place:

"Senator WILEY. Don't you mean that to what you have referred to as policies he may have made counterrecommendations? There may have been disagreement. In your previous statement, however, you said he carried out every military policy. Do you mean that?

"Secretary MARSHALL. He did not violate these restrictions. He carried out the military directives, which is quite a different thing from the discussion of the limitations, as they were related to our allies, all of our allies in the conduct of that campaign."

99 40

Evidence that the military in no way initiated or recommended the recall of General MacArthur can be found in the following comments from the record. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman, and General Bradley were called to the White House on April 6, 1951, to attend the first of a series of meetings to discuss the removal of General MacArthur. "Senator WILEY. All right General, who initiated that first meeting? "Secretary MARSHALL. The first meeting was initiated by the President." " General Omar Bradley described his participation in the MacArthur recall as follows:

"Chairman RUSSELL. When did you first learn or when were you first consulted with respect to the advisability of relieving General MacArthur of his several commands? When did you first learn that he was under discussion? When was your opinion asked?

"General BRADLEY. My first information that there was some concern being shown by the President over this was late the afternoon of Thursday, the 5th of April, when I received the information-I don't remember where from-but I think I received it from a telephone from someone; at which time I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon, and told them that the President was concerned about some statements that had been made by General MacArthur and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it. There was nothing more than that said about it. "Chairman RUSSELL. When were you next approached with respect to this? "General BRADLEY. On Friday, the 6th of April, there was a meeting in the President's office, right after a Cabinet meeting, at which they asked me to join certain others, including Mr. Acheson, General Marshall, Mr. Harriman, and

37 Ibid., p. 1295.

38 Ibid., pp. 27 and 283.

39 Ibid., p. 341.

40 Ibid., p. 414.

41 Ibid., p. 421.

we were with the President I would say, from around 11:30 to 12:30, and that is the first time I had heard first hand the concern of the President in the matter." 5. The recommendations offered by General MacArthur were based on his sincere desire to bring about victory in Korea

We agree that the recommendations offered by General MacArthur with regard to strategy were based on his sincere desire to bring to a victorious conclusion the mission to which his command had been committed in the Korean War. His recommendations with regard to policy, we believe, were based on his equally sincere conviction that we must have an affirmative plan to oppose the enemy which he defined as communism.

Every witness who commented on the policy or strategy advocated by General MacArthur specifically agreed that he was motivated only by the desire and conviction which so greatly impressed us. Whatever conclusion one may reach as to his opinions, there was no suggestion by anyone to impugn the motives of General MacArthur.43

A temporary lull in Korea, which later develops into a Far East Munich-type appeasement of the Chinese and Korean Communist aggressors, is no guarantee of peace or security for the free world. The Munich of 1938 for "peace in our time" lasted just 1 year.

6. The integrity, ability, and accomplishments of General MacArthur were made clear by the testimony

General MacArthur graduated from West Point in 1903, having attained a 4-year scholastic record of 98.14, which is the highest rating in the last 75 years. After serving in various military posts and establishments around the country and as an aide to his father, Lt. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, in the Philippines, he organized during the First World War the celebrated Rainbow (Fortysecond) Division and became the youngest division commander in the United States Army. He was wounded and gassed while serving with the AEF and was commended for his leadership and ability by General Pershing and other high officers serving in the First World War.

After his return to the United States, he was appointed Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point, where he served from 1919 to 1922. In that post he was the youngest general officer to serve as the administrator of the Academy. In quick succession, he was appointed United States Army Chief of Staff and military adviser to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. In this latter post, he held the rank of field marshal. In 1937 he retired to live in the Philippines and served both that Government and his own as a military adviser.

In 1941, he was recalled to active duty as a major general to command United States forces in the Far East. The same year he was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant general and the four-star rank of full general. His campaigns in the Pacific will go down in military annals as among the most daring military offensive actions in United States history, especially when it is recalled that the war in Europe received priority in men and matériel and that General MacArthur had to improvise his campaigns out of a minimum of military strength.

In 1944, he was promoted to General of the Army, our highest military rank. A year later he was appointed supreme Allied commander in the Pacific to receive the Japanese surrender and to command United States occupation forces in Japan.

The witnesses appearing before the committee stated that General MacArthur displayed great ability in his administration of the Japanese people. Each of these witnesses paid tribute to the eminent soldier and statesman. Some of these remarks from the record are:

General Marshall said:

"He is a brother Army officer, a man for whom I have tremendous respect as to his military abilities and military performances, and from all I can learn from his administration of Japan." "

General Bradley said:

"At the very outset, I want to make it clear that I would not say anything to discredit the long and illustrious career of General MacArthur. We may have

42 Ibid., p. 739.

43 Ibid., p. 1997.

44 Ibid., p. 323.

83797-51-pt. 5- -29

different views on certain aspects of our Government's military policy, but that is not unusual.

"Certainly there have been no personal considerations in our differences of opinion. In matters of such great scope and such importance, many people have different ideas and might consequently recommend different courses of action.” * General Collins said:

"I think he is one of the most brilliant military leaders that this country has ever produced. Throughout his career, he has been brilliantly successful." General Vandenberg said:

"I have a great admiration for him, sir." 47 Admiral Sherman said:

48

"I would like to add that preceding that statement, I told General Marshall that I was very fond of General MacArthur, that I had been associated with him for many years and what I had to say, I said with the utmost regret." "I would say that he was in the forefront among the strategists with respect to the coordinated use of land, sea, and air power."

The Secretary of State Dean Acheson said:

"He played a very large part in the whole postwar administration, of course, as SCAP, and did a very fine job indeed." 50

General Wedemeyer said:

"General MacArthur occupies a unique position in my judgment in this country. He is a generation ahead of many in the military hierarchy. He has had positions of great responsibility which involved not only military responsibility, but included diplomatic, political, and economic responsibility."

51

"This man was an outstanding leader and had served his country for more than 50 years in an outstanding manner." 52

Louis Johnson said:

"The stature of MacArthur is so great, his military record is so superb, and his desire to serve the country and what he believes are the country's interests, are so controlling, that if I had been one of those with whom the President conferred about ousting him, I would have asked that it be done a little differently whether he let me do it or somebody else." 53

Chairman Russell said:

"On the permanent pages of our history are inscribed his achievements as one of the great captains of history through three armed conflicts; but he is not only a great military leader, his broad understanding and knowledge of the science of politics has enabled him to restore and stabilize a conquered country and to win for himself and his country the respect and affection of a people who were once our bitterest enemies."

1954

The President of the United States said:

"General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service he has rendered our country in posts of great responsibility.'

99 55

Furthermore the President has said:

"He [General MacArthur] is carrying out his mission with imagination, courage, and effectiveness which has marked his entire service as one of our greatest military leaders." 56

Yet again the President has said:

"On all of these matters I have found our talks most helpful and I am very glad to have had this chance to talk them over with one of America's greatest soldierstatesmen who is also now serving the unique position of the first commander in chief of the United Nations peace forces.57

7. MacArthur has prevented the spread of communism in Japan

Realizing the chasm that exists between the thinking of Gen. Douglas MacArthur and the Secretary of State, it is extremely significant that in his testimony

52 Ibid., p. 2346.

53 Ibid., p. 2603.

54 Ibid., p. 1.

55 Compilation, p. 189.

56 Compilation, p. 25.

57 Compilation, p. 127, President's statement relative to his meeting with General MacArthur at Wake Island, October 15, 1950.

Secretary of State Acheson admitted, after interrogation, that under General MacArthur's administration, Japan has come into the camp of the western powers. This is not to say that the entire credit for retaining Japan as a bastion against communism in the Pacific belongs to General MacArthur, but acknowledgment must be made that under his wise and capable administration the Japanese people have been influenced and encouraged to embrace a concept of social and political ideals which more nearly conform to our system.

8. The military potential of the United States was not maintained at a level commensurate with our political commitments or financial expenditures since V-J day

It is recognized that, in 1945 and early 1946, the American people were exerting extreme pressure on the Defense Department to demobilize our armed services and restore our peacetime economy. During this period, however, the administration entered into a number of agreements which involved military obligations. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the adherence on the part of the United States to the system of collective security necessitated that the military potential of the Nation be maintained at a level sufficient to fulfill its obligations.

Despite the testimony of General Vandenberg that we have a "shoestring" air force and the testimony of Generals Marshall, Bradley, and Collins that we are unprepared, it must be remembered that, from fiscal year 1946 to 1950, the following sums have been expended by the Department of National Defense: Expenditures for the Department of National Defense, fiscal years 1945

1946

through 1950

$45, 134, 000, 000 14, 316, 000, 000

1947

1948.

1949

1950_

Total.

10, 961, 000, 000

11, 914, 000, 000

12, 303, 000, 000

Estimates:

1951

1952

Total__

1

94, 628, 000, 000

20, 994, 000, 000

41, 421, 000, 000

1 62, 415, 000, 000

1 Federal Budget in Brief, issued by the Bureau of the Budget. Table, p. 44, entitled "Budget Expenditures by Functions." In 1945 Defense expenditures were $84,569,000,000. Much of this was used in the prosecution of World War II. What happened to the arma-" ment-planes, tanks, and guns-purchased with the balance?

The testimony of former Secretary of Defense Johnson and others established that in no instance could the present lack of military preparedness be attributed to the failure on the part of the Congress to appropriate funds requested for defense by the administration. As a matter of fact, witnesses recalled the wellknown story that the Eightieth Congress appropriated sufficient funds toward the building of a 70-group air force but the Executive refused to authorize the use of the funds provided, and froze the air force to fewer than 48 groups (as late as June 1950) after the Berlin blockade and the Greek civil war had revealed the aggressive designs of communism. This is particularly significant since the Congress had been given to understand that our strategic concept of defense was based on overwhelming air power.

9. None of the United Nations (with the obvious exception of Russia) had prior information of the June 25 attack despite repeated intelligence warnings The difficulty of precisely predicting the hour of an attack by the North Koreans is understandable. The aggressive tendencies which manifested themselves in constant maneuvers on the South Korean border were well reported. The explanation most frequently given is that every week end the North Koreans violated the South Korean border and then returned to the north with apologies. On June 25, however, they just kept on coming.

It is impossible to accept this explanation. The truth is that the attack took the South Koreans completely by surprise. Since the State Department and the United Nations had the sole responsibility in Korea, they must answer for the failure of the intelligence missions.