Our Chinese allies on the mainland in 1946 had begun to hammer at the Communist forces in the civil war within their land. They were making considerable headway late in 1946 in defeating this armed revolutionary movement.

However, our diplomats gave away our victory in secret agreements, so that in the year 1951, our foreign policy in the Far East stands revealed as a complete failure. China is in the hands of the Red; communism has swept through Asia; and we are involved in a war. Only Japan has been kept in the camp of the Western Powers, and the explanation for that may largely be found in the fact that our State Department exercised little authority in that area.

While Secretary Acheson's policies and those of his predecessors were largely instrumental in making 450 million of our former Chinese allies into enemies, General MacArthur's policies were largely instrumental in making 80 million former Japanese enemies into our friends.

It is doubtful if the annals of history reveal any similar instance wherein the fruits of victory, gained at such terrific cost in lives and treasure, have been so recklessly thrown away.

3. It has been impossible to determine who wrote the instructions for General Marshall on his mission to China

On November 27, 1945, the President accepted the resignation of Ambassador Patrick Hurley and announced the same day the appointment of General of the Army George C. Marshall to serve as his special representative in China. In the instructions issued to General Marshall, the President directed that he bring to bear the influence of the United States to the end that the "unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods”1 might be achieved and concurrently to endeavor to effect a termination of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists.

This, of course, had to do with the efforts to bring about a coalition governIment in which the Communists were to participate alongside of the bitterly anti-Communist Nationalist Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek. The Communists themselves have told all the world that their intention in participating in democratic processes of government is only to be considered as a stepping stone toward the ultimate creation of a Marxist Communist state. Who wrote the instructions for the Marshall mission still remains a mystery despite repeated attempts on the part of members of this committee to ascertain this fact. Secretary Marshall stated that he did not write the instructions in the Presidential directive to him. The Secretary of State states that Secretary Marshall sat down and wrote his own instructions.

Senator Smith (Republican, New Jersey) referred to a communication from which a correspondent gave some personal views on the MacArthur situation. The final paragraph of the letter reads as follows:

"General Marshall was appointed and on December 11, 1945, sat down with Dean Acheson to write out the instructions President Truman was to give him."" Senator Smith continued to read this letter. It contained reference to a report General MacArthur made in 1945 in which he evaluated the armed forces in China.

Having listened to the reading of the letter, General Marshall stated:

"In the first place I have not a recollection of that report of General MacArthur's, but I have a very decided recollection of the reference in there that I sat down in the State Department and drew up this policy. I did not.” Senator Smith had previously asked:

2

"Do you recall who had a hand in the preparation of the directives that sent you to China?" 1

To which Secretary Marshall replied:

"At that time, Senator, Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; Mr. Acheson was Under Secretary of State, and I presume he had a hand in it; John Carter Vincent was the head of the China group in the State Department, certainly he had a hand in it. I do not know what others did. "On my part, General Hull, who is now on duty in the Army headquarters, and was the head of the Operations Division during the war for me, he represented my interest so far as I was concerned in that, together with a man from Time magazine forces, who had helped me briefly in the latter part of the war in the prepa

1 China white paper, p. 132.

2 Hearings, p. 467.

ration of my final report, and who the directorship of Time loaned me to take to China with me because he had been there throughout a good period of the

war.

When Secretary Acheson testified on this subject, he supplied the Senators with his version of the Marshall instructions, which is shown in the transcript as follows:

Secretary Acheson said:

"At the end of November 1945, Secretary Byrnes and General Marshall met. This was after General Marshall had been asked to go to China.

"Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum suggesting the outline of instructions for him. General Marshall did not approve it.

"General Marshall said that he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some of his associates, in drafting the instructions.

"This he did; and a draft was prepared by him, in conjunction with four generals who were working very closely with General Marshall. This was submitted to Secretary Byrnes.

"On the 8th of December Secretary Byrnes made his suggestions to General Marshall, that is, suggestions of changes or alterations or additions to the draft prepared by General Marshall.

"General Marshall's draft, with Secretary Byrnes' suggestions, was discussed at a meeting in Secretary Byrnes' office on Sunday morning, December 9, 1945, by Secretary Byrnes, General Marshall, Mr. John Carter Vincent, General Hull, and myself. I was then Under Secretary of State.

994

"Those of us went over the instructions. General Marshall approved the suggestion made by Secretary Byrnes and we then had a completely agreed draft." The testimony from these two Cabinet officers is obviously contradictory. It is impossible to determine who actually wrote the instructions for General Marshall which contained the coalition policy which cost us our Chinese allies. 4. Some United States officials were so opposed to Chiang Kai-shek that they were automatically on the side of the “Red regime."

Evidence has been presented to the committee that some of the American officials assigned to assist the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China were so much opposed to Chiang and his government so as to be automatically on the side of the Chinese Communists."

This committee did not attempt to explore fully the importance and widespread ramifications of this situation. However, the sworn testimony presented to this committee cannot be ignored. If the personal feelings of American diplomats operate to thwart the policy of their Government, there is a situation created which demands a complete and thorough inquiry.

It appears unlikely to us that the executive branch will undertake to expose this situation to the light of day. The situation strongly suggests that an appropriate committee of Congress endeavor to investigate this question and recommend remedial legislation.

5. It has not been the consistent policy of the United States to support the Republic of China

The Secretary of State testified it is the "firm and continuing" policy of the United States to support the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China. He stated this policy has been pursued by our Nation from the outbreak of World War II down to this very day.

The evidence before the committee indicates that this policy has been neither firm nor continuous. On the contrary, the policy has been obscured by constant conflict within the State Department, in the press, and in public debate. There has not been and even today there is no unanimity of opinion in the Government on the subject of aid to the Republic of China.

A policy of supporting the Republic of China should have been the firm and continuing policy of the United States. President Chiang Kai-shek was and is the outstanding anti-Communist leader in Asia. Our enemy in Asia and throughout the world has been identified as Russian communism.

The administration cannot straddle the fence on this issue. It claims to have followed a policy of supporting Chiang. The China white paper is a blunt denial of Secretary Acheson's statement. We have not been convinced that Chiang lost

China for any other reason than that he did not receive sufficient support, both moral and material, from the United States.

The importance of moral support in any conflict in Asia was emphasized by General Wedemeyer. He testified that lack of moral support was the key to the downfall of the Government of the Republic of China.'

Evidence of the continuing lack of moral support can be found in the quixotic attacks leveled by administration stalwarts, both in and out of Government, against President Chiang and all those who want to support him in his 25 years of struggle against communism and aggression.

The record is replete with the evidence of the lack of material support. Such military equipment as China Nationalists received in the critical days of the war against the Communist regime has been described as "moldy," broken, lacking parts, etc. One shipment of automatic weapons arrived without magazines, in such shape the guns were of no more value than broomsticks."

Official Government reports show that since VJ-day our former enemies, Japan, Germany, and Italy, have each received more United States aid and assistance than our wartime ally and historic friend, the Republic of China.

The contention that the administration consistently and firmly supported the Chinese Republic is simply not true.

Further evidence that the administration did not support the Government of the Republic of China is shown in the orientation fact sheet "Army Talk." This was an official War Department Publication used in World War II to indoctrinate our soldiers. The issue, dated April 7, 1945, was entitled "Our Ally China” and the role of the Communists was discussed."

Throughout the article "Communist" was in quotation marks and it was pointed out that when we speak of the Chinese "Communist," we should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of Chinese farmers, many of whom own but little land themselves but rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" are not like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese."

This astonishing orientation sheet continues to say:

"The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very difficult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches 'to both sides.' The Communists say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms that the Kuomintang has up to now been unable or unwilling to make. Some American and other observers who have visited the 'Communists' agree that their program is a moderate one and that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as liberal democracy."

Concluding the orientation is a brief discussion of Our Basic Concern which contains the statement that "the issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the National Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead of winning the war."

American soldiers desiring to obtain more facts in regard to the problem of our Chinese ally were given a reference for further reading. That reference was The Making of Modern China by Owen Lattimore.

6. If the Republic of China had received effective military aid from the United States they might have defeated the Communists

Early in 1948 there were three high American officials in China, who felt the need for immediate action if China was to continue free of Communist domination. Theses officials, Ambassador Leighton Stuart, ECA Mission Chief Roger Lapham, and Vice Admiral Oscar Badger, journeyed to the north of China to see for themselves what could be done to stall the Communist advance and place the initiative in the hands of the Nationalist forces. They were impressed with

7 Ibid., p. 2317.

8 Ibid., p. 2747.

8a See appendix IV.

the appearance, actions, and spirit of the armies of Gen. Fu Tsu Yi as well as the military stature of General Fu.

At the time of this visit General Fu told the United States officials "that he could do little more than to keep the Communists out of the area with his equipped armies and that he was constantly employing them on a defensive basis to meet Communist thrusts from various directions."" However, the general went on to say "that if he could obtain equipment for the four additional trained armies he would then be able to set up an offensive to the northeast stabilizing the Chinhuangtao Hulutal corridor and for the eventual relief of Mukden."

He explained "that in relieving Mukden he could reopen a channel of supply for about 300,000 of the best troops in China (many of them American trained and equipped) which were cut off there and were very lacking in American munitions.'

Immediately after this conference with Gen. Fu Tsu Yi a recommendation was sent to the JCS specifically listing the equipment required, and which was estimated at a total value of $16 million. It was approved in July 1948 but no specific action was taken to implement the decision.

In November 1948, Admiral Badger received word that a ship was about to enter Tiensin with about 10 percent of the recommended equipment on board. He said:

"Well, that's pretty bad. It's too bad that isn't the full business, but maybe it will still have a morale effect." 10

After the cargo was unloaded, Admiral Badger received a communication from General Fu reporting the deficiencies of the weapons. Of the total number, 480 of the machine guns lacked spare parts, tripod mounts, etc.; Thompson submachine guns had no magazines or clips, no loading machines for the loading of ammunition belts, only a thousand of the light machine guns with mounts and only a thousand clips for the 2,280 light machine guns. General Fu's commentary on this deplorable situation was according to Admiral Badger along the following lines:

"The above-mentioned weapons are not in good condition and, for the most part, cannot be used. I do not know how or why these weapons were forwarded in an incomplete state."

As a result of the arrival of this long anticipated shipment of arms in such an unusable condition, General Fu's plans for an offensive collapsed. The troops were completely demoralized and in Admiral Badger's judgment this action "was the straw that broke the camel's back." 12

The myth that the Republic of China fell because the Chinese troops refused to fight is again refuted by sworn testimony.

7. The propaganda campaign against the Republic of China was vicious

We have been greatly disturbed by the evidence which shows the terrific impact of the propaganda campaign against the Chinese Nationalist Government, originated by forces both within and without the United States. The constant attacks upon the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the repeated assaults upon the alleged corruption and graft of his associates softened the fiber of Nationalist resistance, especially since many of these attacks originated within a nation which claimed to be aiding and supporting the Republic of China.

It is clear that the defection of a friend is more destructive of morale than the victory of an enemy.

8. The administration believed that the Chinese Communists would work in harmony with the Nationalists in a coalition government

The habit of administration witnesses to contradict themselves during the course of this investigation did little to allay misgivings as to the conduct of our foreign affairs. Nowhere were these misgivings more pronounced than in discussions of the China policy when the Secretary of State was asked:

"Was there ever any chance in your opinion of actually bringing the two Chinese groups to work together in harmony?"

He replied "Yes, sir." 13 He then went on to say "it was the view of all our military people that it was possible and it was the only way to get real Chinese fighting against the Japanese." In direct contradiction to this statement is

Ibid., p. 2746. 10 Ibid., p. 2747. 11 Ibid., p. 2747. 12 Ibid., p. 2748. 13 Ibid., p. 1986.

83797-51-pt. 5-30

the statement of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer who_certainly can qualify as a military expert in the Far East, that "I told him [General Marshall] very frankly that in my judgment he could not accomplish that mission. His mission was one that I thought was just like mixing oil and water." 14

Later on the Secretary was asked if it was not the "objective" of Communists in every government in which they had a part, to take over that government "Lock, stock, and barrel." The Secretary admitted that it was and that just such "captures" had ocurred in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland."

Yet the administration persisted in pushing for a coalition policy for years after the Japanese had surrendered. The contention was made that the United States desired a "unified" China. The effort to achieve such unification was to insist upon an alliance of the Nationalists with the forces committed to their destruction, the Chinese Communists.

The admission that a policy could not be successful and, at the same time, adherence to that same policy, is a self-indictment.

9. The administration has been unduly preoccupied with the defense of America in Europe to the neglect of the defense of America in Asia Since the days of Pearl Harbor, the American people have become used to the terms "global strategy," "global responsibilities," etc., and yet it is apparent to the signers of this report that the administration and the State Department have considered the globe to be much larger in its European aspects than in its Asiatic aspects.

While granting the importance of Europe and while recognizing the military and economic potential of that continent, we cannot help but feel that there has been a myopia approaching blindness whenever we have dealt with matters of the Pacific.

There has never been the same amount of effort expended on behalf af Asiatic matters by the State Department as there has been toward those of Europe. It is unfortunate, but true, that the State Department has been affected by a group who have interpreted Asiatic problems to the advantage of Russia rather than that of the United States.

In the present day, Asia is as important to the United States as Europe. The situation in southeastern Asia is generally recognized as very menacing. Our temporizing in Korea might encourage the Chinese Reds to move in this

area.

We can't attract and maintain the respect and friendship of the people of the Far East unless we demonstrate a sympathetic understanding toward their emerging nationalism.

10. The administration has sole responsibility for the failure of our far eastern policy

The abject failure of our far eastern policy, aimed at maintaining a friendly China and establishing a free and united Korea, is the sole responsibility of the State Department. No other department of our Government has, in fact or in theory, had responsibility for this failure. China is under the domination of a Communist regime and Korea, far from being free and united, is devastated by war and remains divided by an artificial boundary.

The administration failed to devise a policy to keep China free. It likewise failed to devise a technique to guarantee our victory by creating a free and unified Korea. While the Secretary of State claims it is administration policy to back a free government in China and to unify and free Korea, the facts belie his claims.

There have been desperate efforts to becloud this elementary failure. The administration and its apologists have sought to create the impression that the failure was achieved under bipartisan sponsorship, and that all must share the responsibility for the failure.

The record refutes this claim.

During the last 6 years, members of both political parties as well as interested citizens have voiced strong protests against the trends in Asia.

Many Members of Congress are on record as consistently opposing any concessions to the Asiatic Communists. As a result of these hearings the administration has shifted and has shown some signs of stiffening their attitude toward the Asiatic Communists.

14 Ibid., p. 2305.

15 Ibid., pp. 2125-2126.