to that of coverture so as to prolong the statutory saving against the legal effect of the lapse of time. Riggs v. Dooley, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 236. In Texas, a female infant upon her marriage immediately becomes of age, and the statute then begins to run against a previously existing claim. Thompson v. Cragg, 24 Tex. 582; White v. Lattimer, 12 id. 61. But the rule is generally other wise, and the statute does not begin to run until she becomes of age. Wilson v. Kil. cannon, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 182. But in North Carolina it is held otherwise. Davis v. Cooke, 3 Hawks (N. C.), 608. But see Duckett v. Crider, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 188, where it was held that a woman under age was entitled to her action to recover possession of a slave. She married before she came of age, and it was held that the two disabilities of nonage and coverture could be joined for the purposes of deferring the bar of the statute of limitations. See Boyce v. Dudley, 8 id. 511, where a contrary rule was adopted; and Martin v. Letty, 18 id. 573; Clark v. Jones, 16 id. 121; and see Wellborn . Finley, 7 Jones (N. C.) L. 228, where it was held that the disability of nonage and coverture could not be joined to prevent the operation of the statute. In Keil v. Healey, 84 Ill. 104, it was held that the operation of the statute is not arrested by cumulative disabilities, as where a female is not married until five months after age, her coverture does not create a disability as to matters accruing before coverture; and the same doctrine was adopted in a similar case in Cozzens v. Farnam, 30 Ohio St. 491, adopting the invariable rule that the disability which Arrests the running of the statute must exist at the time when the right of action accrued. Hinds v. Whiting, 31 id. 53; Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. S. 773; Bozeman v. Browning, 31 Ark. 364; Den v. Moore, 8 Wall. Jr. (U. S. C. C.) 202; Hull v. Deatley, 7 Bush (Ky.), 687; Fritz v. Jones, 54 Ill. 101; Harris v. McGovern, 2 Sawyer (U. S. C. C.), 515; Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 187; Swearingen v. Robertson, 39

Wis. 462.

saving of the statute, except such as existed at the time when the cause of action accrued. McCoy v. Nichols, 5 Miss. 31. And no after-accruing disability can stop the statute after it has once commenced to run. Parsons v. McCracken, 9 Leigh (Va.), 495; Fitzhugh v. Anderson, 2 H. & M. (Va.) 289; Hudson v. Hudson, 6 Munf. (Va.) 352; McDonald v. Johns, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 358. In Demorest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 129, the court held that a disability to relieve a party from the operation of the statute limiting real actions must exist when the right first accrues, and that although before the termination of the first disability another commences, the statute begins to run from the termination of the first. In Lewis v. Mar-shall, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 469, it was held that a former statute of limitations of Ken-tucky, limiting the right of action against one in the adverse possession of land to twenty years, provided "that if any person or persons entitled to such writ or writs, or title of entry, shall be or were under the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or not within the Commonwealth, at the time such right accrued or came to them, every such person, his or her heirs, shall and may, notwithstanding the said twenty years are expired, bring or maintain his action, or make his entry, within ten years. next after such disabilities removed, or death of the person so disabled, and not afterwards." Under this provision it was held that if an adverse possession of land commenced during the disability of a claimant, who died during such disability, the limitation of ten years began to run against his heirs from the time of his death; but if the right of such claimant descended to his heirs before the commencement of the adverse possession, the statute did not operate against them until their disability was removed. In Texas, by statute, a female infant, upon her marriage, becomes of full age although in fact a minor; and this is held to deprive her of both the disabilities of infancy and coverture as to all rights of action which accrued before her marriage. Thompson v. Craig, 24 Tex. 582. The provisions in

1 Bunce v. Walcott, 2 Conn. 32. The rule is, that a party cannot avail himself of any disability to bring himself within the

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1 Martin v. Letty, ante; Robertson v. Wurdeman, 2 Hill (S. C.), 324; Layton v. State, 4 Harr. (Del.) 8; Carter v. Cantrell, 16 Ark. 154.

2 Warfield v. Fox, 53 Penn. St. 382; Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194; Favorite v. Booher, 17 Ohio St. 548; Pryor v. Ryburn, 16 Ark. 671; Bucklin v. Ford, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 393; Wells v. Child, 12 Allen (Mass.), 333; The Sam Slick, 2 Curt. (U. S.) 480; Baines v. Williams, 3 Ired. (N. C.) L. 481 ; Dozier v. Ellis, 28 Miss. 730; Sacia v. De Graff, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 356; Harrison v. Harrison, 39 Ala. 489.

In a case recently decided in Iowa, Carrier v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., there is a dictum to the effect that the specification by the legislature of exceptions to the operations of the statute of limitations will not preclude the court from applying exceptions to such statute which are recognized by the common law, other than those prescribed by the legislature. This dictum and this doctrine were wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case, and the actual decision of the case was placed upon another ground entirely. And it is quite difficult to know precisely what the court meant by the words " from applying exceptions to such statutes as are recognized by the common law," inasmuch as the common law made no exceptions whatever to the statute except such as the statute itself contained. There was, however, a class of cases in which it was held, although the statute made no exception upon that ground, that where a cause of action had been fraudulently concealed from the person in whose favor the right of action existed, the statute did not begin to run until the fraud was discovered, although this doctrine never found much support in the courts of this country or of England. Indeed, independent of the

statute making them, no exceptions to the operation of the statute existed, except in equity, nor even in that court where the statute was in express terms made applicable to courts of equity, as well as to courts of law. In that case an action was brought to recover from the defendant the excess paid by the plaintiff for freight charges over the defendant's road, over and above those which were charged to other shippers for the same service; the agent making such charge representing to the plaintiff that the price charged was the usual price for such services. of limitations in lowa provided simply that in actions for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, and in actions for trespass to property, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, or trespass complained of shall have been discovered by the party aggrieved.

The statute

GIVEN, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "These are law actions, and clearly not such as were heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery, and therefore not within this exception to the general statute of limitations.

"It is not contended that they are within any of the other expressed exceptions to the general statute; but appellees rely upon the rule laid down in Boomer Dist. Twp. v. French, 40 Iowa, 601, and cases cited as approving and following that case. That was an action to recover moneys alleged to have been received by the defendant, French, as treasurer of the plaintiff township, and appropriated to his own use. The petition alleged that at the close of his term a partial settlement was had with the defendant, but, by means of false and fraudulent entries in his books as treasurer, and by means of fictitious entries and corrupt and fraudulent concealments and misrepresentations, the defend

ant kept from the plaintiff's knowledge the fact of the receipt of said sum until October, 1883, and plaintiff had no knowledge of the facts, or of the gross frauds perpetrated by defendant, till said date. The petition showing that the action was not brought within three years, defendant demurred, on the ground that the action was barred. The demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff appealed. This court, after citing Code, sec. 2530, says: "This action does not come within the language or meaning of the section quoted, for the reason that the action is not for relief on the ground of fraud, but on the ground that the defendant failed to pay, over money received by him. The cause of action does not grow out of the fraud alleged. It existed independent of the fraud. Under the provisions of the section quoted above, the fact that the plaintiff, by reason of the fraud of the defendant, failed to discover the cause of action, does not defeat the bar of the statute. This is defeated by the terms of that section, only where the cause of action is grounded in fraud.'

"There is some contention as to whether these actions are for unreasonable charges and unjust discriminations, or for unreasonable charges only. Mere discrimination, without injury, would not be actionable. When the discrimination is by charging unreasonably, it is the unreasonable charge that is the ground of the action. The ground of the action against French was his failure to pay the money received; the ground of these, the defendant's failure to pay back the money charged and received in excess of what was reasonable. In each case the plaintiffs have a cause of action independent of the frauds alleged. These cases, like that of Boomer Dist. Twp. v. French, measured by the statute alone, are clearly barred; but in that case this court held the rule to be that "where the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the means of diligence, have been discovered.'

"Appellant contends that these cases are distinguishable from that; that French occupied a fiduciary relation towards the township, by virtue of which it was his duty to disclose the truth, and especially not to deceive, while such was not the legal duty of this defendant. The defendant is a quasi public corporation, owing certain duties to the public, and, in the absence of statute, fixed its rates without other restriction than that they should be reasonable.

"It was said in Heiserman v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 63 Iowa, 736, that

railroad companies are public carriers, and those who employ them are in their power, and must bow to the rod of authority which they hold over consignors and consignees of property transported by them.'

"The reason for the rule requiring disclosures and fair dealing applies to this defendant with the same force that it did to French.

"Appellant contends that when exceptions are provided to a general statute it excludes all others than those expressed, and that courts are not at liberty to ingraft other exceptions than those expressed upon such a statute. This claim finds strong support in the following cases, cited by counsel: Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kissanne, 32 Fed. Rep. 429; Engel v. Fischer, 102 N. Y. 400, 3 Cent. Rep. 303; Fee v. Fee, 10 Ohio, 470; Amy v. Watertown, 22 Fed. Rep. 418; Alabama Bank v. Dalton, 50 U. S. 9 How. 526 (13 L. ed. 243); Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 125 (27 L. ed. 437); Favorite v. Booher, 17 Ohio St. 554; Woodbury v. Shackleford, 19 Wis. 55; Somerset Co. v. Veghte, 44 N. J. L. 509; Demorest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 143; Miles v. Berry, 1 Hill, L. 296; Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. 33.

"These precise questions were presented and passed upon in a number of those cases, and the doctrine announced that the general statute was an exclusion of all others, and that when the legislature has made exceptions the courts can make none, as that would be legislation. Several decisions by this court are also cited in support of these propositions.