clared nugatory,13 for a construction should be given that will carry into effect, if possible, all the provisions of the policy, and each clause.15 Again, the policy should also be interpreted by the context, so as, if possible, to give a sensible meaning and effect to all its provisions; and so as to avoid rendering portions of it contradictory and inoperative, by giving effect to some clauses to the exclusion of others.16 But although clauses apparently repugnant must be reconciled if it can be done by any reasonable construction, yet a proviso utterly repugnant to the body of the contract and irreconcilable with it will be rejected.17

Where printed and written portions of the policy are contradictory, the printed will be rejected.18 And the last of two repugnant irreconcilable clauses will be rejected and the first will stand, especially so where a different construction would defeat the evident purpose of the contract. 19 Words in the policy will not be so construed as to lead to unreasonable results.20 Portions of the description. which are false will be disregarded if enough remains to identify the property.1

§ 214. General and special clauses.-The general clauses, says Emerigon, are to be interpreted, generally, as they are written.2

Fire Ins. Co. 153 Iowa, 168, 132 N. W. 870, 40 Ind. L. J. 2133, 2138, quoting from Insurance Co. v. Ayers, 88 Tenn. 728, 13 S. W. 1000.

13 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 431, 136 Am. St. Rep. 326, 51 So. 61, Civ. Code Art. 1951. See as to general principle, State (ex rel. Davis) v. Mortensen, 69 Neb. 376, 5 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 291, 95 N. W. 831.

14 Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McLimans, 28 Neb. 846, 45 N. W. 171; Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Imperial Tobacco Co. 132 Ky. 7, 136 Am. St. Rep. 164, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 277, 116 S. W. 234, 38 Ins. L. J. 446.

15 Ferguson v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. 187 Mass. 8, 72 N. E. 358, 34 Ins. L. J. 53, 54, considered under § 212 herein.

16 Crosby v. Vermont Accident Ins. Co. 84 Vt. 510, 80 Atl. 817, 40 Ins. L. J. 2036.

17 Jones v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. 140 N. Car. 262, 111 Am. St. Rep. 843, 52 S. E. 578, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932 note.

18 Hernandez v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. 6 Blatchf. (U. S. C. C.) 317, Fed. Cas. No. 6415. See § 223 herein.

On typewritten matter as written or as printed matter within rule that written shall prevail over printed provisions in case of conflict, see note in L.R.A.1915D, 1084.

19 Employer's Liability Ins. Corp. Ltd. of London v. Morrow, 143 Fed. 750, 74 C. C. A. 640; Bean v. Etna Life Ins. Co. 111 Tenn. 186, 78 S. W. 104; Wisconsin Marine & Fire Ins. Co. Bank v. Wilkin, 95 Wis. 111, 60 Am. St. Rep. 86, 69 N. W. 354. See also as to general rule Vickers v. Electrozone Commercial Co. 67 N. J. L. 665, 52 Atl. 467; Brady v. Carolina Steel Bridge & Construction Co. 76 S. Car. 297, 56 S. E. 964.

20 Ogden v. Columbia Ins. Co. 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 273.

1 Hatch v. New Zealand Ins. Co. 67 Cal. 122, 7 Pac. 411.

2 "The contracting parties are to impute to themselves the inconvenience of not having affixed any instructions. These rules are taught us by all our doctors." Emerigon on

But general words, says Lord Bacon," "not express and precise, shall be restrained unto the fitness of the matter and the person," and general words may be aptly restrained according to the subject-matter or person to which they relate. If both clauses are general one does not control the other. But it is also held in construing a like clause (incontestable) that it controls. A special clause in a policy which creates an exception to a general clause governs the latter,7 and a special stipulation in a certificate will control a general stipulation therein. So the meaning of general words, phrases and stipulations will be restricted when it is evident from the special or particular provisions of the contract that they were not intended to have the broad signification of which they are fairly susceptible.9 But a special provision will override a general provision only where the two are irreconcilable and cannot stand together, for if both can be given reasonable effect they will be retained.10 The clauses are to be taken literally when clear in themselves," but the literal application of words may be controlled by other parts of the policy.12

§ 214a. General provisions not referred to in separate, independent paragraph nor limited by prior clause: accident policy.-If a clause in an accident policy is not expressly connected by words of limitation with those which precede it, but is a separate, independent paragraph and does not include words in any way expressly or impliedly relating to the prior general provisions, it has been in

Insurance (Meredith's ed. 1850) 48, 49.

"The general clauses are to be construed as they are written, and because it depends on the parties either not to stipulate them or to modify them." Emerigon on Insurance, (Meredith's ed. 1850) c. xii. sec. 45, p. 513.

3 Bacon's Law Max. Reg. 10. 4 Sawyer v. Dodge County Mutual Ins. Co. 37 Wis. 503.

5 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41, 136 Am. St. Rep. 926, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 431, 51 So. 61 (incontestable clause).

6 Massachusetts Benefit Life Assoc. ́ v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256, 42 L.R.A. 261, 30 S. E. 910, 27 Ins. L. J. 1023. See also Goodwin v. Provident Savings Life Assur. Soc. 97 Iowa, 226, 32 L.R.A. 473, 66 N. W. 157. This question of incontestable clauses is, however, considered elsewhere herein.

7 Bowman v. Pacific Ins. Co. 27 Mo. 152; Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. 17 Mo. App. 627. See 17 Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England, p. 528.

Exception of loss from specified cause followed by qualifying clause, see § 2675 herein.

8 Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212, 55 Am. Rep. 192, 4 N. E. 582.

9 Sun Insurance Office v. Varble, 103 Ky. 758, 41 L.R.A. 792, 27 Ins. L. J. 798, 46 S. W. 486.

10 German Fire Ins. Co. v. Roost, 55 Ohio St. 581, 36 L.R.A. 236, 60 Am. St. Rep. 711, 45 N. E. 1097, 26 Ins. L. J. 699.

11 "In contractu assecurationis inspici debit in tantum, quod certum est inter contrahentes." Emerigon on Insurance (Meredith's ed. 1850) c. ii. sec. 7, p. 49; c. i. sec. 2, p. 16.

12 Grant v. Delacour, 1 Taunt. 466.

dependently construed as embracing loss of life from causes specified therein, though not within the prior statement covering loss from general and specified injuries.18

§ 215. Construction will be given to uphold the law.-When a law is susceptible of two constructions, the one which will give effect to the law, rather than the one which would render the law unconstitutional, must be adopted.14 So it is declared that the law does not presume that the parties to a contract intend by it to accomplish an illegal object; but it rather presumes that they intended to accomplish a legal purpose.15 And it is held that a statute controls where the terms of the policy conflict therewith."

§ 216. Words are to be construed in ordinary and popular sense.Words are to be construed in their plain, ordinary, usual, and popular sense, unless they have been given a contrary, legal construction, or have acquired a distinct commercial meaning by usage, or are peculiar to some art, trade, or science, and have thereby acquired a technical meaning, or unless it is apparent from the context that a distinct and particular meaning was intended; 17 and this applies

13 Schumacher v. Great Eastern Casualty & Indemnity Co. 197 N. Y. 58, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 480 (annotated on whether general requirement as to external, violent, and accidental means applies to a separate provision as to liability in case of death or injury from certain specified causes) 90 N. E. 353, 39 Ins. L. J. 428 note.

14 New Orleans v. Salamander Co. 25 La. Ann. 650.

15 Page v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 98 Ark. 340, 135 S. W. 911, 40 Ins. L. J. 1144, per Hart, J.

16 Fletcher v. New York Life Ins. Co. 4 McCrary (U. S. C. C.) 440, 13 Fed. 526, 528; Wall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 32 Fed. 273, aff'd 140 U. S. 226, 35 L. ed. 497, 11 Sup. Ct. 822; Marsden v. Hotel Owners' Ins. Co. 85 Iowa, 584, 52 N. W. 509; Taylor v. Merchants' & Bankers Ins. Co. 83 Iowa, 402, 49 N. W. 994; Fidelity Mutual Life Assn. v. Fichlin, 74 Md. 172, 23 Atl. 197. But see §§ 194, 194(g)-194a herein. 17 United States. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379, 38 L. ed. 231; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Finch, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 308, 147 Fed. 388, 77

C. C. A. 566, s. c. 203 U. S. 592, 51 L. ed. 331, 27 Sup. Ct. 780; Delaware Ins. Co. v. Green, 120 Fed. 916, 921, 57 C. C. A. 188, 193, 61 L.R.A. 137, 140; Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 94 Fed. 314, 319, 36 C. C. A. 265, 270; McGlother v. Provident Mutual Accident Co. 89 Fed. 685, 689, 32 C. C. A. 318, 322, 60 U. S. App. 705; Fred. J. Kiesel v. Sun Ins. Office, 88 Fed. 243, 60 U. S. App. 10, 31 C. C. A. 518, s. c. 171 U. S. 688, 43 L. ed. 1170, 19 Sup. Ct. 885.

Arkansas.-Monongahela Ins. Co. v. Batson, 111 Ark. 144, 163 S. W. 512.

District of Columbia.-Mitchell v. Potomac Ins. Co. 16 App. D. C. 270. Georgia.-Melson v. Phenix Ins. Co. 97 Ga. 722, 727, 25 S. E. 189; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wimbish, 12 Ga. App. 712, 78 S. E. 265.

Illinois. Peoria Marine & Fire
Ins. Co. v. Whitehill, 25 Ill. 466.

Indiana.-Etna Life Ins. Co. v.
Fitzgerald, 165 Ind. 317, 112 Am.
St. Rep. 232, 6 Am. & Eng. Ann.
Cas. 551, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 422 note,
75 N. E. 262.
Iowa.-Vorse

V. Jersey Plate

to the laws of a fraternal or mutual benefit society,18 also to an accident policy,19 and to an automobile fire policy.20 The rule is in accordance with all the authorities. So Emerigon says: "The true meaning of an expression in its ordinary use is the idea that people are accustomed to attach to it." And Lord Ellenborough declares that the policy "is to be construed according to its sense and meaning as collected, in the first place, from the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have generally, in respect to the subject matter, as by the known usage of trade or the like, acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of the same words, or unless the context evidently points out that they must in the particular instance, and in order to effectuate the immediate intention of the parties to that contract, be understood in some other special and peculiar sense." 2 So Chancellor Walworth declares that "a policy of insurance, like any other contract, is to be construed by the popular understanding or the plain and ordinary sense of the terms

Massachusetts. Whitmarsh v. Conway Ins. Co. 16 Gray (82 Mass.) 359, 77 Am. Dec. 414.

Minnesota.-Bader v. New Amsterdam Gas Co. 102 Minn. 186, 120 Am. St. Rep. 613, 112 N. W. 1065. Missouri.-Renshaw V. Missouri State Mutual Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 103 Mo. 595, 23 Am. St. Rep. 904, 153 S. W. 945; Hoover v. Mercantile Town Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 93 Mo. App. 111, 118, 69 S. W. 42.

New Hampshire.-Thorp v. Aetna Ins. Co. 75 N. H. 251, 72 Atl. 690, 38 Ins. L. J. 800; Stone v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co. 69 N. H. 438, 45 Atl. 235, 29 Ins. L. J. 250.

New York. DeLonguemere v. New York Fire Ins. Co. 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 120.

Effect must be given to an insurance contract according to the fair meaning of the words used. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 8 Sup. Ct. 1360. Cited in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 L. ed. 308, 114 Fed. 268, 281, 52 C. C. A. 154, 164.

Language is to be given its usual and ordinary meaning where there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent. McCarthy v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. 178 Ill. App. 502.

18 Mund v. Rehaume, 51 Colo. 129, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1243, 117 Pac. 159; Beile v. Travelers' Protective Assoc. of America, 155 Mo. App. 629, 135 S. W. 497. See § 381 herein.

19 Houlihan v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. 196 N. Y. 337, 25 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1261, 89 N. E. 927.

20 Preston v. Aetna Ins. Co. 193 N. Y. 142, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 133, 85 N. E. 1006.

employed, unless those terms have received a legal construction or have acquired a technical meaning in reference to the subject matter of the contract." 3 So answers to questions must be taken in the popular sense of the language used, and the words "jewelry and clothing, being stock in trade," will be construed in their ordinary and popular sense, and as not including musical and surgical instruments, etc., in the absence of evidence that a particular meaning has attached to the words by usage.5

But the settled construction given by the commercial world to stipulations in an insurance policy, will, though differing from the natural import of the words, be sanctioned by the courts."

7

8

§ 217. Construction: technical, etc., words.-Where a word has acquired by usage in trade or commerce a meaning peculiar thereto, or is a word of technical application, as where used in some art, trade, or science, or where it appears from the context that words are used in a particular sense to compass the intent of the parties, such meaning may be shown by proper evidence, and the exact technical and commercial meaning or particular meaning will govern; and "technical terms or terms proper to the arts and sciences are ordinarily to be understood according to the definition given them by masters in the art." 9 So where technical terms have a well recognized legal meaning they should be understood in their technical and legal sense, where there is no context in the contract nor any statute or provision in the charter of the insurer to indicate that such words are used in a broader sense. 10 Illustrations under this

3 Dow v. Whitten, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 160, 167, per Chancellor Walworth. (See criticism 1 Duer on Insurance [ed. 1845] 229, et seq.) See also 17 Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England, pp. 342, et seq. 527.

4 Ripley v. Etna Ins. Co. 30 N. Y. 136, 86 Am. Dec. 362.

5 Rafel v. Nashville Marine & Fire Ins. Co. 7 La. Ann. 244.

6 Maryland Ins. Co. v. Woods, 6 Cranch (10 U. S.) 29, 3 L. ed. 143, cited in General Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. (55 U. S.) 352, 362, 14 L. ed. 452, 456; Ocean Steamship Co. v. Etna Ins. Co. 121 Fed. 882, 884; Hernandez v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co. 6 Blatchf. (C. C.) 317, 325, Fed. Cas. No. 6,415; Pride v. Providence-Washington Ins. Co. 6 Pa. Dist. R. 227, 231.

7 See §§ 246-255 herein.

8 Whitmarsh v. Conway Ins. Co. 16 Gray (82 Mass.) 359, 77 Am. Dec. 414; Rose v. Franklin Life Ins. Co. 153 Mo. App. 90, 132 S. W. 613, 40 Ins. L. J. 180; Fowler v. Etna Fire Ins. Co. 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 270; Hone v. Mutual Safety Ins. Co. 1 Sand. (N. Y.) 137, 2 N. Y. (2 Comst.) 235, per Sandford, J.; Robertson v. Money, 1 Ry. & M. 75; 1 Phillips on Insurance (3d ed.) sec. 143, et seq.; Bacon's Benefit Societies and Life Insurance (1st ed.) secs. 256, 264; 17 Earl of Halsbury's Laws of England p. 342, et seq.