gentleman who had just left that country, | impression was, he should not have prenamely, that the very guard of prince sumed, upon the imperfect, and perhaps Blucher consisted of Saxons, and that that erroneous information which a member of general was personally under the care of parliament was able to pick up, to advise Saxons only. The noble earl had stated, the Government to commence a war that neither Prussia, Russia, nor Austria, which ministers did not think expedient. would be able to march so large a force He expressed some concern that the as last year. The fact was directly the House were not called upon to consider reverse; for all three would march a this subject earlier, for the sake of giving much more considerable force. The more satisfaction to the country, of counnoble earl had talked of the powerful di- teracting many unfounded opinions, and version which Saxony would cause; but removing many groundless prejudices. had omitted to mention the troops of the But the delay had afforded him the oppor King of the Netherlands, who had no tunity of examining and re-examining existence last year. As to the British opinions, of the correctness of which he army, there were, unquestionably, many had so much reason to doubt, when he regiments which Government was not able found they differed from those of his noble now to place under the command of the friend-of whose judgment he thought so duke of Wellington, which had been so highly. To give an opinion in favour of placed last year; but when the noble earl a continuance of the calamities of war, was represented his army as no longer so for- a painful task to any man; but it was midable-[Earl Grey interrupted the noble some consolation to feel that that was the earl to say, that his observation applied opinion of a man whose whole public life only to the diminished numbers of the had expressed a general abhorrence of British troops].-Earl Bathurst continued, war, and who thought that in order to be that the question was not whether we were just, a war must not only be necessary, as powerful as we were last year, but but unavoidable. The first question was, whether we had a greater prospect of whether we had just grounds to consider success next year. If Buonaparte's army ourselves at war. There was a saying of was so formidable as the noble earl had Mr. Burke, recorded in those volumes in represented now, it would next year be which, if so many things were often applimore formidable. Then it was said, that cable, it was because they were founded this was an interference with the govern- on the solid principles of truth—that neiment of France. To a certain extent, we ther a profitable wrong, nor an unprofithad a right to such interference. He able right, were fit objects to be pursued protested against carrying this principle by war. Even though it were demonbeyond what was absolutely necessary; strable, that the greatest possible advanbut contended for the right, if necessary, tage might be derived from the prosecu with a view to secure ourselves against tion of war, yet if it could be shown that serious and alarming danger. If a go- the war was unjust, the waging such a vernment exercised its functions in a war was more unprofitable to its interests manner which was dangerous to its neigh- than any advantage could benefit them. bours, those neighbours had a right to Much had, of necessity, been said reproscribe that government, if necessary. specting the general right of interfering with the government of other nations. In the abstract principle, that no government had a right to interfere with another, every body would agree. The right was unquestionable, like the rights of men in a state of nature; and if any political state could be found in a state of nature, the rights of a state so separated from the other states would be absolute and undeniable; but it was with societies as with individuals, with governments as with men-when they stand in any relation to each other, they must be contented to see their rights regulated with a view to the mutual rights of all. The rights of others in relation to that state were as sacred as Lord Grenville said, he considered the present ruler of France as the common enemy of Europe, and had no doubt that if he had been placed in the situation the Prince Regent's ministers had been placed in, that he should have given the same advice as to the present state of war. Now that Parliament was called upon for its ́support, he could not, after all the consideration he had been able to give the subject, bring himself to doubt that it was their duty to declare their determined resolution to support the Crown to the ut most in the prosecution of the war. But if any hesitation had appeared on the part of the Executive Government, strong as his [366 the rights of the state itself. He did not throne. The question, therefore, was not apprehend that this principle would be on the abstract right of interfering in the denied; every page in the history of choice of a government for France, but every country furnished examples of its on the right of enforcing a solemn treaty. being acted upon. His noble friend had It mattered not what was the case of right, mentioned two striking instances which if it was allowed, as no mau denied, that had lately occurred. That this principle France had the right to conclude lawfully must not be made the pretext of oppres- the Treaty. That gave to the Allies the sion and injustice, was true of every other right of enforcing it. The Treaty was ground of war; and there was no legiti- made, and it could not be lawful for mate ground of war which might not by France to break it. It was founded on abuse be distorted to the purposes of in- certain stipulations: but France breaks it, justice. There was no country which had and retracts from part of the bargain; her not tried the effect of a treaty with Buo- obligation was the exclusion of Buonanaparté-which had not experienced that parté's dynasty. The moment that vioin restraining his power, or diminishing lation was committed, a just cause of war his aggressions, treaties were of no avail ensued. Their lordships might, though it whatever. If the House had not been of was not necessary, look back to the War this opinion, the moment for them to have of the Succession, and the original prindeclared it was when the Prince Regent's ciple on which that war was founded. ministers signed the declaration to that The Allies, he would not say whether effect: they should then have required wisely or not, did relax from the original ministers to have withdrawn such declara- principle of excluding the Bourbon fation in the name of England. He cor- mily from the Spanish throne; but they dially approved of the declaration on insisted on the means for preventing the that foundation France accepted the offers crowns of the two nations being worn by of the Allies; and that Government- the same person. It might then have dewhich was originally a military usurpa-pended on the life of a weak and sickly tion-had it been the most legitimate in the world, would, by the misconduct of the Sovereign, have forfeited its title to its King, and have produced the extreme case of the necessity of driving from the throne the person who had so abused his authority. If France possessed the right of choosing her own government, and had, after so many years of war, by which she had been so great a sufferer, made some sacrifices for the advantages of the restoration of tranquillity, her own limitation of that right could not be doubted: and so the bargain was made at Paris. This would appear the true sense of the treaties, looking on the whole business as one great transaction. In civil transactions, some competent tribunal or jurisdiction was referred to, which prescribed certain forms as necessary to be attended to for the regulation of a contract; which he who did not act upon, neglected at his peril. But in affairs between nations, there was no common authority or tribunal to refer to, or which had authority to prescribe and all that could be required was, to impose on both parties the duty of performing what they undertook. The intention to perform the contract must be made known to all parties, and this was the case respecting the exclusion of Buonaparte and his family from the French child, whether Philip would not become the rightful heir of France. Had the contemplated event occurred, then France would have desired and attempted the annexation of Spain as a province of France; not as it was afterwards, a virtual province, but an actual added province or kingdom. If the policy, then, was admitted to be right, what was the inference respecting the present circumstances? The point then was, not the exclusion of all the Bourbons or others from the throne of Spain, but to prevent Philip 5 from wearing the French crown; and we now said, that by the Treaty Buonaparté cannot lawfully be considered as the Emperor of France. This was our ground, and as to the enemy nothing more was necessary. The case was this: he had violated, and the Allies claimed the observance of the Treaty. It was fitting to show to France that we were justified in those steps which might bring on France all the calamities of war. His opinion was, that there was no option left us; nor any grounds for long deliberation. We were placed by an imperious necessity in a state to do what could not be avoided. The first great point of importance was the observance of the Treaty. It was no light matter after twenty-five years of trouble, and even at the close of war, to find in France the prevailing passion which occasioned the early calamities-a passion under the dominion of which, she was preparing to commence a new war. Could France alone have a right to examine, question, or cancel treaties, without assigning any reason why she was not bound by them? If there remained any hope for the maintenance of peace in Europe against such a power as France, it must be grounded upon a determination that she should be bound by the force of her contracts. Europe was not to tolerate her principles of destroying treaties, such as she avowed in the case of the opening of the Scheldt, for instance, some years ago. So now she renounced her contract by one of the most insulting papers ever known in the annals of diplomacy, called by Caulaincourt "a proposition for peace," which was founded only on this that France might, at her pleasure, dispense with all compacts. What occasion was there now for the question whether relations should be entered into with France, seeing that she had shown that she would not abide by any treaty ? She gloried in violating a treaty. She scattered it to the winds. By twenty-five years of fatal experience, she had taught Europe how she appreciated treaties. Other securities must, therefore, be found for her than those of solemn compacts. To all propositions from Buonaparté there was an insuperable objection. He could offer no security. We had now a duty imposed upon us. He had flagrantly broken his faith; and because he had done so, were we to break faith with our Allies? If they called on us to enforce an unjust demand, we might reply, that we were no party to the matter. If they called on us to support one, which though just was yet new, we might say, that the interest of the country was to be first considered. But our Allies now called upon us only for the observance of a treaty agreed to by all, and we could not consistently set up a plea of our own interest as a reason for not assisting in securing its observance. To refuse to maintain the Treaty of Paris, would be conduct towards our Allies of a character similar to the bad faith of Buonaparte. There were yet other grounds for deciding on this fearful alternative. He held good faith to our Allies to be indispensable; but his real opinion was, that it was essential to the general security of all (he knew not how to make shades of difference), that the stipulations of the Treaty should be enforced. No reasonable man, certainly no man in that House, could confide in the security to be found in treaties with Buonaparte. Security must be looked for in other means. Speaking of the security or insecurity of treaties, he should not attempt a statement of how many violations of treaties Buonaparté had been guilty; but he would ask any one to show him a single country during the last ten or twelve years, which had sought peace or safety by treaty with him, that had not found itself visited with the aggravation of the very evils it had so attempted to ward off? Instead of enu merating violations, he would ask, who would rest his security on Buonaparté ; and who would point out a treaty with him that was not followed by the detriment of the other contracting party? His noble friend, in a laudable anxiety for peace, which he fully shared with him, had indulged in expectations in which he (lord Grenville) could not indulge. Age certainly imposed limits on the activity and ambition of man; but, with respect to Buonaparte, that period had not as yet arrived. As little could he trace as to the amendment of his disposition. God forbid he should suppose that no amendment could take place in any man: but in looking to the general safety of nations, and to the happiness and existence of his own country, he could not rest upon probabilities merely, where especially he saw no reasonable hopes, and when the very act of the man which occasioned the present crisis, was one of the strongest examples of his faithlessness and ambition which his life had offered. Lord Grenville said, that from any means of information which he possessed, he knew not how to estimate the proportion of those in France who desired the return of Buonaparté, and of those who wished for any other government. appeared, however, that he was replaced by the active efforts of the military. There were no traces of any other interference. Though he could not estimate and distribute the different proportions of the opinions of the French; yet from all he had heard, from every report on the subject that he had read, it did appear that under Louis the 18th the army felt a radical discontent at the pacific principles of that monarch. His moderation and pacific disposition was the very cause, for which, as for a crime, he was deposed. He was the victim of peace. He was the sacrifice of his good faith. He had not suffered, like his unfortunate brother Louis It 16, upon charges alleged against him, for, designing to violate the liberties of France, or for any, harshness of proceeding. His Government was a government of lenity. It could not be charged against him that he was shaking the constitution that had been formed. Though it was the interest of the present Government to find out charges of a disposition to unsettle the present state of property in France, he had not been able to discover a single proof of any such accusation. The lawful assemblies under the new constitution paid him all allegiance up to the very moment that he became an exile. It was because he was the friend of peace, and was desirous to keep peace with the other countries of Europe, that a soldiery, accustomed to rapine, and raised by their former Chief to principalities and powers, carved out of the just rights of other people, were discontented, and desired no Monarch, but a General prepared to renew the work of spoliation. Was it nothing now to be desired to sanction a system under which Europe had so long groaned, with such an army and such a chief at its head? If his disposition was said to have undergone some change, his situation again was now changed; and as the army was formerly upheld by spoliation and plunder, so now, for the same objects, he was recalled by his former instruments, who alone could maintain him in his regained power. As to new constitutions, he was firmly of opinion, that a good constitution could only be formed by the adaptation of remedies from time to time, under the circumstances which required them. The only exception mentioned was that of America; but that did not apply. The founders of that constitution acted with great wisdom. It was framed so as to produce as little change as possible in the existing laws and manners under the altered form of government, which, though a republic, was constructed as nearly as the difference would admit, on the monarchical form of our own constitution. If any person would consider the present situation of Buonaparté in France, it must appear that, judging by all human probability, it would be necessary for him (even supposing we were inclined to remain at peace with him), to keep his army in humour with him, by leading them on to some fresh aggression against some foreign nation; which would force us into the contest, however we might be disinclined to it. If we looked at all his former policy, (VOL. XXXI.) we should see that he was under a sort of necessity of maintaining his power by the same means by which he had acquired it. Against his recurring to his former policy, his noble friend appeared, by the amendment he had moved, to consider that it would be sufficient security for this country to continue in peace with him. A state of peace did not, however, now exist between us and Buonaparté. We had now no treaty with him; and he wished to know upon what grounds we could now negociate with him? In the overture, as it was called, that Buonaparté had made to this country, he mentioned nothing about the Peace of Paris, nor even condescended to say any thing as to the terms on which he was disposed to treat with us. It appeared, however, by lord Clancarty's letter, that the proposal which was forwarded to Vienna, was, that he was content to abide by the Treaty of Paris. He, for his part, had always thought that by that Treaty, the great points which remained to be settled for the future peace of Europe were left too undefined. It was settled, indeed, that France should preserve her ancient frontiers, and that we were to restore to her the greater part of her colonies. All the other great interests of Europe were, however, reserved to be discussed at the Congress, to which France also sent her minister. Now, if it were proposed to negociate for peace with Buonaparté on the terms of the Treaty of Paris, was it also to be left open to him to interfere in all those arrangements that by that Treaty were left undefined, but which had since been agreed upon by the different Powers at Vienna? If this was the case, even although we might take the Treaty of Paris as the foundation of peace, we should soon find ourselves entangled in a hostile negociation with Buonaparté, about those other interesting points which had been happily settled, after long deliberation, by the Congress at Vienna. With such a wide field of discussion thrown open, what hopes could there be of the defensive system being long maintained? It was impossible for their lordships not to recollect what dif ferences had existed between the Powers of Europe upon those points, when they w were under discussion. How greatly would those differences be increased, if those discussions were now to be re-opened, and Buonaparte was admitted to become a party in them. Under such circumstances, and with all the opportunities he would then (2 B) 156 112 Against it-Present... 102 Majority for the Address... List of the Minority. DUKES. Sussex Norfolk Somerset Grafton Devonshire Argyll MARQUISSES. Lansdown Douglas EARLS. Derby Albemarle Jersey Cowper Ilchester Carnarvon Stanhope Cork Grey Rosslyn LORDS. Say and Sele Foley HOUSE OF COMMONS, Wednesday, May 24. MOTION RESPECTING THE GRANT TO LORD MELVILLE.] Lord Milton, on rising to bring forward a motion on this subject, with the particulars of which the House, he said, were well acquainted, disclaimed all motives for interference but those of his public duty. He had no feelings of an adverse nature towards the deceased nobleman or any of his relatives or friends, but on public grounds only he deemed it necessary to take up the subject. The history of the grant might be traced to the letter of the earl of Buckinghamshire to the Court of Directors, of the date of the 12th January, 1814.* This letter, which had long been before the House, referred to a conversation which the noble * COPY of a LETTER from the Right Honourable the Earl of Buckinghamshire to the Chairman of the East India Company, dated the 12th January 1814, referred to on the Minutes of the General Court of the 4th May, 1814. "India Board, January 12, 1814. "Sir; Understanding from the conversation I had with you and the deputy | chairman, that the Court of Directors have not yet come to any determination respecting the continuance of the pensions granted to lord Wellesley, lord Melville, and myself, I consider it my duty to state, as distinctly as I can, my sentiments upon the subject. "With reference to the grant to lord Wellesley, I should ill discharge the functions of the office I have the honour to hold, if I did not convey to you my decided opinion, that no man can read the Records of the East India Company during the period that lord Wellesley filled the situation of Governor-general of India, without being impressed with the deepest sense of his eminent services; and whatever differences of opinion might have occasionally arisen between him and the Court of Directors upon particular points, the exertions he made, the talents he displayed, and the benefits he rendered, were of a nature to entitle him to a signal and substantial reward; and that the continuance of his pension would not only be an act of liberal and wise, policy, but of strict justice on the part of the East India Company. "The pension granted to the executors of the late lord Melville is connected with. circumstances which it may be a little difficult to discuss; but which, in order to make myself clearly understood, I cannot entirely overlook. "Upon an examination into the state of the late lord Melville's affairs at his : death, it was found that his property was inadequate to the payment of his debts by a very large sum, for which the present lord Melville has made himself responsible. "Into this voluntary engagement he was induced to enter, at great personal inconvenience to himself and family, his property being settled, from a sense of |