to the sums to be advanced to Holland, their lordships would observe that only two millions were to be paid at present. The noble earl had said, that the money expended on the frontier fortresses was thrown away but in that respect his opinion was widely different from that of the most eminent military characters; and on a former occasion it had been urged with considerable force, that this was by far the cheapest mode in which the great interests which this country had in the protection of the Netherlands could be secured. The expense of one campaign to repair the mischief that might result from the want of these fortresses would be greater than that which would be required to put the whole of the frontier in a complete state of defence. This, therefore, was an expense which was warranted by every consideration of sound policy, and even of an enlightened economy. With regard to the colonies, they were in many respects of great importance to this country, but particularly so in this view-that they were in a great measure cultivated by British capital. Without going further into the subject at present, he trusted their lordships would be of opinion that the ministers of Government had not departed from the line of their duty, but had, upon a sound view of the whole circumstances of the case, acted in the manner best calculated to promote the permanent interests of the country. Earl Grey conceived the security of which the noble earl boasted, to be good for nothing, and to be just so much money thrown away. It would have been better to have left the Sovereign of Holland his colonies, and to have given the Netherlands to some third Power, capable of defending them. The Earl of Liverpool said, that the opinion of the noble earl on this subject was at variance with the opinion of the first military authorities. NAVAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY.] The Earl of Darnley rose and said: My lords; Under the most favourable circumstances-with public attention perfectly alive to the subject, and with all the charms of novelty to recommend it-I am not vain enough to imagine that any thing brought forward by me can have much claim to the attention of the House; but when I consider the many and unusual disadvantages under which I labour on the present occasion, I am under the necessity of soliciting a more than usual portion of your lordships' indulgence. Nothing, indeed, but a sense of duty, and the desire to appear consistent, would have induced me, at this late period of the session, with other objects of more immediate interest, and of greater importance than this (however important I may still think it) pressing upon your attention, to attempt to divert it for a moment, to the mass of papers on your table, for which I have moved in order to prove the assertions I have heretofore made, on the conduct of the late War with America, and more especially the Naval Administration of the Country. I certainly could have wished that the task of calling your attention to this subject had originally fallen into other and better hands. I am fully aware of the difficulty of doing justice to so extensive and complicated a subject; and I think I have some reason to complain that, among near a thousand members, of which the two Houses of Parliament are collectively composed, there should be found no one, but the humble individual who has now the honour of addressing your lordships, to call for an inquiry into those repeated naval disasters, which more than two years since first impelled me irresistibly to bring forward that most interesting subject. On that occasion, your lordships, it is true, thought fit to reject my motion for inquiry; but I have the satisfaction to reflect, that your time was not altogether thrown away. I flatter myself that my attempt to direct the attention of Government more particularly to the causes of the disasters of which I complained did not altogether fail. Certain it is, that, from whatever cause, about that time they began to equip and construct a larger description of frigates, of which there are at present, as appears by one of the papers on the table, twelve in commission, whereas at that time there was not one; the Endymion, the only one in existence, not having then been fitted out. The manning, however, of ships, is of far more consequence than their construction. For I will venture to assert that the difference of a few more guns is comparatively of little importance, provided the two ships opposed to each other are upon something like an equality in the number and description of their crew. I believe, if the ships had been tolerably well manned, the three successive disasters of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, and the Java, would not have taken place. The last of these was [726 enemy, the insecure manner in which the fighting bolts of the Epervier were fitted, and the breeching bolts drawing from being badly clinched, and the inefficiency of the crew." With respect to the last, it consisted of 103 men (proved in the evidence to have been of the worst description) and 15 boys; whereas the crew of her opponent, the Peacock, consisted of 182 picked men, and only 3 boys. The other case of the Wasp and Avon termi the loss of 40 killed and wounded, out of an equally weak crew, while the American lost only I killed, and 2 wounded, and was apparently unhurt by the effects of the action. 1 the immediate cause of my having originally brought the subject before the House; and I cannot but recollect that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty on that occasion stated, that at least the Java was adequately manned. In point of numbers she certainly was; but in justice to the memory of her gallant and lamented commander, I must now state, what I have lately learnt from the best authority, that the crew of the Java was of the worst possible description, com-nated in the destruction of the latter, with posed, in the first place, of a small and weak crew of a frigate, paid off in the river, and sent to Portsmouth just before the ship sailed, and made up to the number wanted by that of a sloop of war sent home from the West Indies, for having These, and other disasters of the same shown symptoms of mutiny, and disincli- nature, we must conclude, at length innation to fight against the Americans. duced the Admiralty to turn their attenCaptain Lambert was so well aware of the tion to providing a better and stronger nature of his ship's complement, that no- description of sloops of war to cope with thing but a sense of duty, paramount to those powerful and well-appointed vessels every other consideration, would have in- of that class belonging to the United duced him to go to sea with them; and States, as they had before in the case of he was heard to declare, that in the event the frigates; but in doing so, they appear of falling in with an American frigate he to have exceeded all the bungling and must inevitably be taken. Yet notwith- ignorance which have at all times more standing the disadvantage of such a crew, or less prevailed in this branch of our which he had not any time to discipline naval service. To prove that this has or arrange, in the well-fought action, been the case, I will quote an authority which terminated in the destruction of to which the noble viscount must pay himself and his ship, by a foe in every the greatest deference-I mean the Rerespect so much superior, he not only did port of the Commissioners of Naval Renot decline the contest, but was uniformly vision. In their third Report they state the assailant. Since the destruction of the that, "Where we have built exactly after Java, no disaster of the same nature has the form of the best French ships that we happened in the case of frigates; but many have taken, thus adding our dexterity in circumstances have taken place equally building to their knowledge in theory, the disastrous in the capture and destruction ships, it is generally allowed, have proved of sloops of war. The minutes of the the best in our navy; but whenever our courts-martial in two of these cases are on builders have been so far misled by their the table, in consequence of motions made little attainments in the science of naval by me; and your lordships will see, by architecture, as to depart from the model referring to these documents, that in point before them in any material degree, and of size and guns, and still more in the in- attempt improvements, the true principles adequacy of their crews, the British vessels upon which ships ought to be constructed had no chance whatever of success, in being imperfectly known to them, have these unequal, though well-fought contests. been mistaken or counteracted, and the In the case of the Epervier it appears alterations, according to the information that, in addition to these disadvantages, given to us, have in many cases done by some strange and most culpable harm. From the same cause there has neglect in fitting her out, the guns of this been infinite variety in the alterations ship were so badly secured, that at the made, and in the forms which have been first broadside, five out of nine became adopted. The alterations being on no unserviceable; and by referring to the certain principles, no similarity in the sentence of the court-martial, you will find form of the ships could be expected, and "the Court agreed, that the cause of the they have the appearance of having been capture of his Majesty's late sloop Eper-constructed on the chance, that in the vier, was the very superior force of the multitude of trials made, some one might be found of superior excellence. While, therefore, our rivals in naval power were employing men of the greatest talents and most extensive acquirements to call in the aid of science for improving the construction of ships, we have contented ourselves with groping only in the dark in quest of such discoveries as chance might bring in our way. Nothing certainly can be more surprising, than that in a nation so enlightened as this is, and whose power, importance, and even safety, depend on its naval superioity, matters so essential to the preservation of that superiority should so long have been neglected."-[Signed, Fordyce, Curtis, Domett, Serle.] pears by the correspondence between captain Browne and the Admiralty and Navy Boards, that as usual the model was altered and spoilt. The Navy Board at first assert positively, as appears by the Report on the table (see Letters of the 4th of October, 1811,) that the new ship is built by the lines of the old one, and precisely similar; but afterwards, when pressed on the subject, they confess, that they had given her greater width in the after-part, at the wing transom; the consequence of which was, that although when light, the Hermes sailed well (for then the lines of the Bonne Citoyenne took effect), as soon as the increased width touched the water, she could not sail at all; and in other respects her construction was so faulty, that nothing but the skill and exertions of her commander could have rendered her an effective man of war: that, however, she became, notwithstanding her faulty construction, and was one of the very few in the British navy, in any way likely to be capable of contending on equal terms with the American ships of the same class. Another ship was then to be called the Myrmidon, whose captain informs us in a letter on the table, of a recent date, that though intended to resemble the Bonne Citoyenne, she is unlike her in every respect. It appears, also, that among the alterations suggested by captain Browne in the Hermes, one was to lower the deck forward, or to raise it abaft. In the Myrmidon the surveyors of the navy did both, and thereby equally spoilt the ship. This Report was made, I think, in the year 1806; and, to prove that no amendment has yet taken place, in the construction of the two large ships, the Newcastle and the Leander, the Navy-board having procured a plan for the former ship, which they were themselves unable to furnish, and which by all accounts has perfectly answered in the construction of the latter, have, as usual, made some alteration which has spoilt the symmetry and perfection of the model. But the most curious in-ordered to be built after the same model, stance of ignorance and misconduct in the construction of ships of war, that ever appeared, is probably to be found in the papers on the table; and to which I must beg the attention of the House. It seems, that before the war with America, as long ago indeed as the beginning of the year 1810, the Board of Admiralty gave directions for the building of a sloop of war to be called the Hermes, after the model of the Bonne Citoyenne, which had formerly been taken from the French, and was found to possess excellent qualities as a vessel of this class, far superior indeed to any sloops of war originally of British construction. Not having any model of our own to work from, or any men of sufficient science to furnish a plan equally good, I do not blame the adoption of this measure. But how was it carried into execution? The Hermes, when fit for sea, was placed under the command of an officer of great merit and abilities, whose case has lately been brought before your lordships by a noble earl (Egremont); and in consequence the Admiralty have restored him to his rank, of which he appears to have been deprived, without sufficient reason, by the sentence of a courtmartial; and are about, I trust, by employing him again, to make him farther amends for the injury he has sustained. It ap We come now to the remaining fourteen ordered to be built on the same lines, but of reduced dimensions. The credit of these precious vessels belongs, as I have been told, rather to the Admiralty than to the Navy Board; but, be that as it may, it appears clearly that they never have been, and never can be, with all the bungling expedients and alterations that have been resorted to, efficient men of war, so that their cost (which, exclusive of alterations, amounts to between two and three hundred thousand pounds) has been absolutely thrown away. But that is not the worst; for the attempt to use these vessels, puts in perpetual danger the lives of our brave officers and men, and the honour of the British flag. If your lordships will take the trouble of reading these papers, you will find that some cap. tains complain of one thing, some of an 729] been abundantly proved by the minutes On the subject of the warfare in the Naval Administration of the Country. other. In general they think them overmasted. One officer is of a contrary opinion, and wants larger masts and yards. But one thing, of which frequent notice is taken, appears quite sufficient to account for their bad qualities. The size of these vessels was considerably reduced, and yet they are fitted with the same guns and weight of metal as the larger vessels. At first, indeed, the Board ordered them to carry two guns more; till one of the officers commanding represented that with only 20 ports he could not mount 22 guns. But it is obvious, that if a certain weight of ordnance was just sufficient for a ship of 500 tons, it would be too much for one of 450; and that, in this case, as in all others, the ignorant attempt of partial alteration had destroyed the symmetry of the machine, and utterly spoilt it. One of these ships, the Lee, was in March last nearly lost, and with difficulty her escaped, by throwing over-board guns in a gale of wind; and after this severe trial her captain earnestly recommends that she should be armed with 24 instead of 32 pound cannonades, which he deems" far too heavy for her;" and although this suggestion of the captain was supported by the recommendation of the Navy Board, the captain is threatened to be superseded if he does not choose to go to sea in the ship-or, in other words, for doing his duty by stating that these wretched craft were unequal to their weight of guns. In short, whoever will take the trouble of looking into the details which the papers furnish on the subject of these vessels, will find that a stronger case of mismanagement and waste of public money never was presented to Parliament. This miserable attempt to provide a number of vessels of adequate qualities to cope with the powerful American sloops of war, has utterly failed; and at this moment, after all the experience and warning we have had, there are not more than two or three vessels of that description in the British navy. For I repeat what I have before asserted, that a very large proportion of the smaller vessels of war, which by the accounts on the table appear to have been in commission at the close of the contest with America, were utterly useless for any purpose except that of patronage. The list of sloops of war amounts to 173. The best of these were, in point of force, and still more from the inefficiency of their crews, unequal to the adversaries they had to encounter, as has of the war (August 26 1812) sir George Amongst the attempts made by Govern- < at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and taken up the rapids to Lake Ontario, to be built there a second time,-is not the least curious. It appears by the papers on the table, that on the spot the plan was at once deemed impracticable; and although, by the zeal and exertions of an individual, one of the ships was actually conveyed to its place of destination, and there altered and launched, the three others were disposed of-we are not in formed how; nor are we told what the expense of this senseless project has been to the nation. Just at the close of the war we recovered, it is true, our superiority on Lake Ontario, by the equipment of a three-decker. But how was this effected? Not by any forethought or provision made by the Government at home, but by the accidental arrival of some men of war on the coast of America, with part of the Duke of Wellington's army, after the conclusion of the war with France, which furnished their stores just in time to enable sir James Yeo to fit out the large ship, which, but for this accidental supply, could not have been brought forward before the winter. Some of these ships furnished anchors and cables and other necessary stores, and the Centaur her lower-deck guns; without which the new ship could not have been effective; and her being rendered so, in the opinion of sir James Yeo, as. I have been informed, saved the province of Upper Canada. or attention, even when the intelligence first arrived, that, I am ashamed to say, I really believe, the paltry occurrence of the breaking of my windows, and those of the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, which happened about the same time, occasioned a greater sensation. How then can I, at this distance of time, hope to call the attention of this House and the public to this fatal and disgraceful transaction? But it was impossible altogether to pass over what appears to me to form a most prominent feature in the misconduct of the late war. But, my lords, to return to the conduct of the Naval Administration, which is my principal object,-it appears to me, that however you may be disposed to forget the late war with America, and to think all retrospective inquiry inexpedient and unavailing, you cannot shut your eyes to the importance of considering, whether the naval service of the country is well or ill conducted. On the subject of the construction of our men of war, I have endeavoured to call your attention to a very flagrant case of misconduct, detailed in the papers on your table. But this is by no means the only case of a similar nature. In the naval administration of the noble earl now at the head of the ordnance (earl Mulgrave), a great number of 74-gun ships were built, which, as I hear, are familiarly known in the navy by the name of the Forty Thieves. The plan and construction of these ships were could have been good men of war, if they had been composed of good materials; but the execution was; if possible, worse than the plan, and many of them showed immediate symptoms of premature decay, and the necessity of great and expensive repairs before they had been many months at sea. The original cost to the nation of these 40 ships cannot have been so little as four millions; and I fear very few of them would be found at this moment in any respect effective men of war. On the subject of the military opera-faulty in the extreme; and they never tions in the late war with America, I shall say little; and it is but justice to acknowledge that our gallant army, on every occasion, maintained its bigh reputation; even in that concluding scene, in the ill-judged and ill-fated expedition to New Orleans. On this subject I must observe, that no disaster in the history of this country ever called more loudly for inquiry into the conduct of the authors and projectors of the plan. It seems to have been originally undertaken without any object but that of plunder; and it is difficult to imagine what national advantage could have arisen, or how the great objects of the war could have been materially promoted by complete success, Its complete failure was calamitous in deed, attended by a heavy loss of the gallant and victorious followers, and of the companion and brother of the illus. trious Wellington himself. And yet such was the total absence of all public feeling The Queen Charlotte, a first rate, is well known to have been found in so defective a state, as soon as she was launched, that it became necessary, before she could be sent to sea, to repair her, or rather, it may be said, to build her over again at an expense (as I have been informed) of 70,000%. With these and many such facts before us, can it be stated, that the faulty consrtuction and premature decay of our men |