is not that which reflects the ghastly image of war.

WHAT A TRIAL BALANCE OF COMMERCE SHOWS

If a balance could be rightly struck in this country is there any one who believes that our interests would be best served by war in some other country? This is quite apart from any question of humanity or civilization. Let it be a trial balance of commerce alone and it will show a heavy debit against war. And an accounting will show the same result in all other countries. If this be true, with only current commerce entering into the equation, how staggeringly true it becomes when the piled up debts caused by war are considered. Economists who have examined the matter state that this war has already cost over forty billions of dollars. And the end is not yet.

So why shouldn't business, which has been binding the world more closely together for centuries, be employed to protect the world against the waste and loss of war? Hague Conferences have sought earnestly for penalties that would save their Conventions from being treated as mere "bits of paper." Penalties that every nation would be bound to respect could be enforced through economic pressure. The loss in trade would be small or great in proportion to the amount and. duration of the pressure; but it would be at most only an infinitesimal fraction of the loss caused by war.

THE WORLD COURT CAN BE ESTABLISHED

The Chairman reminds me that my twenty minutes is expiring. So let me briefly refer in conclusion to that wonderful address made by Rabbi Silverman yesterday. In it he seemed to say that religion had broken down because the war had come. As he spoke I was reminded of going across Illinois a week ago this morning. I lifted the curtain of my sleeper berth and there in a little town we

were passing through stood a church with the cross shining above it in a golden radiance across the great green stretches of the valley-a scene of peace. Then I thought how the cross and the temple and the mosque were looking down that very May morning in the valleys of the Vistula, the Marne and the Rhine on guns, on soldiers and armed camps—a scene of war. Then I thought that the other strong spiritual forces of the world had not been sufficiently powerful to bring wars to an end. In the great Public Library here in Cleveland and in the Libraries of all the warring nations are the works of Goethe and Schiller, of Hugo and Balzac, of Shakespeare and Milton, of Tolstoi and Turgenieff-all imperishable contributions to the world's intellectual life, but still they have not ended war. Your orchestras as well as those of Paris, Berlin and London, play the music of Beethoven, Tschaikowsky, Berlioz and Haydn, and music is one of the most spiritual of the arts, but it has not ended war. Painting and sculpture are part of the common heritage of mankind but they have not ended war. Isn't it possible that the world has depended too much on these spiritual forces? By that I mean, the world has not yet been brought to the stage of civilization. by these forces where it can depend on them wholly to end war. The world has had churches and schools and libraries and galleries-but the world like this great city and this country and every other city and country needs a Court House. To my mind, all these spiritual forces have been working through the generations. toward a time, toward this very time, when the world would be ready for a World Court. That Court is within our grasp. What is needed is to give it force. and power through economic pressure that will compel its use and it will forthwith become a mighty bulwark of civilization, protecting the world from the waste and futility and the utter tragedy of war.

NSTITUTIONAL advances in the progress of the world are rarely made abruptly. They are not like Minerva, who sprang full-armed from the brain of Jove. If they are to have the useful feature of permanence they must be a growth so that the communities whose welfare they affect may grow accustomed to them as natural and so accept them. Our socalled AngloSaxon civil liberty with its guaranties of the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act and the Independence of the Judiciary, constituting the unwritten British Constitution, made our American people familiar with a body of moral restraints upon executive and legislative action to secure the liberty of the individual. The written limitations upon Colonial legislative action in Colonial charters granted by the Crown and their enforcement by the Privy Council of England probably suggested to the framers of our Federal Constitution that the principles of British Constitutional liberty be given written form and be committed to a Supreme and Independent Court to enforce them as against the Executive and Congress, its coördinate branches in the Government. The step, epochal as it was, from judicially enforcing such limitations against a subordinate Legislature under a written charter of its powers, to a judicial en forcement of the limitations imposed by the sovereign people on the Legislature and Executive that they the people had created in the same instrument, was not radical but seemed naturally to follow. The revolted Colonies after the Revolu

tion, though united by a common situation and a common cause in their struggle with Great Britain, and acting together through the Continental Congress in a loose and voluntary alliance, were sovereigns independent of each other. The Articles of Confederation, which declared their union to be permanent, were not agreed to and ratified in such a way as to be binding until some five years after the Declaration of Independence. Mean

time it had become increasingly evident that, strong as were their common interests, they had divergent ones, too, which might embarrass their kindly relations. The leagues of Greece had furnished an example of confederations of small States, forced together by a common oppressor and foe, which had found it wise to settle their own differences by some kind of arbitral tribunal. The office which the Privy Council and the Crown had filled in settling inter-colonial controversies suggested an analogy less remote than those in Grecian history and prompted the adoption of a substitute. So there was inserted in the Articles of Confederation a provision for a "court to determine disputes and differences between two or more States of the Confederation concerning boundary jurisdiction or any other cause whatever." The complainant State was authorized to present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question and praying for a hearing. Notice of this was to be given by order of Congress to the other State in the controversy, and a day was assigned for the appearance of the two parties by their lawful agents who should agree upon judges to constitute a court for hearing

the matter in question. If they could not agree, Congress was then to name three persons out of each of the thirteen States. From this list each party was required alternately to strike out one until the number was reduced to thirteen, and from these thirteen not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress should direct, were in the presence of the Congress to be drawn by lot, and the persons whose names were so drawn, or any five of them, constituted the court to hear and finally determine the controversy.

Proceedings were instituted under this provision before the Constitution by New Jersey against Vermont, by New York against Vermont, by Massachusetts against Vermont, by Pennsylvania against Virginia, by Pennsylvania against Connecticut, by New Jersey against Virginia, by Massachusetts against New York, and by South Carolina against Georgia. Only one of these cases came to hearing and decision by a court selected as provided. That was the case of Pennsylvania against Connecticut, involving the governmental jurisdiction over the valley of Wyoming and Luzerne county. The court met and held a session of forty-one days at Trenton in New Jersey. Able counsel represented the parties, and the court made a unanimous decision in favor of Pennsylvania, without giving reasons. A compromise is suspected, because Connecticut promptly acquiesced, and soon thereafter, with the approval of the Pennsylvania delegation, Congress passed an act accepting a cession by Connecticut of all the lands claimed by it west of the west line of Pennsylvania, except the Western Reserve, now in Ohio, which Connecticut was thus given ownership of, and which it sold and settled. A number of the other cases were compromised, and in some no proceedings were taken after the initial ones.

In the Constitutional Convention the necessity for some tribunal to preserve peace and harmony between the States was fully conceded by all, but the form of court was the subject of some discussion. O proposal was that the Senate should

be a court to decide between the States all questions disturbing peace and harmony between the States, while the Supreme Court was given only jurisdiction in controversies over boundaries. Ultimately, however, the judicial power of the United States exercised through the Supreme Court was extended to "controversies between States," without exception.'

To those who do not closely look into this jurisdiction of the Supreme Court it seems no different from that of the ordinary municipal court over controversies between individuals. The States are regarded merely as municipal or private corporations subject to suit process, trial, and judgment to be rendered on principles of municipal law declared by statute of State Legislature or Congress, or established as the common law. It is assumed that the Constitution has destroyed the independence and sovereignty of the States and made the arrangement a mere domestic affair. This is a misconception. The analogy between the function of the Supreme Court in hearing and deciding controversies between States and that of an international tribunal sitting to decide a cause between sovereign nations is very close. When the suit by one State against another presents a case that is controlled by provisions of the Federal Constitution, of course there is nothing international about it. But most controversies between States are not covered by the Federal Constitution. That instrument does not, for instance, fix the boundary line between two States. It does not fix the correlative rights of two States. in the water of a non-navigable stream that flows from one of the States into another. It does not regulate the use which the State up stream may make of the water, either by diverting it for irrigation or by using it as a carrier of noxious sewage. Nor has Congress any power under the Constitution to lay down principles by Federal law to govern such cases. The Legislature of neither State can pass laws to regulate the right of the other State. In other words

there is nothing but international law to govern. There is no domestic law to settle this class of cases any more than there would be if a similar controversy were to arise between Canada and the United States.

For many purposes, the States are independent sovereigns and not under Federal control. They have lost the They have lost the powers which the people in the Constitution gave to the Central Government; but in the field of powers left to them each is supreme within its own limits, and by the exercise of that power may trespass on the exercise of similar power by its neighbor. How is such a conflict to be settled? It may be by diplomacy, i.e., by negotiation and compromise agreement, but this under the Constitution must be with the consent of Congress. It might be settled by war, but the Constitution forbids. And the State invaded by the forces of another State can appeal to the General Government to resist and suppress the invasion, no matter what the merits of the quarrel. In other words, one of the attributes of sovereignty and independence which the people in ordaining the Constitution took away from the States was the unlimited power to make agreements between each other as to their respective rights, and the other was that of making war on each other when other means of settlement failed.

What did the people through the Constitution substitute for these attributes of unrestricted diplomatic negotiation and compromise and the right to go to war over such interstate issues? The right of the complaining State to hale the offending State before the Supreme Court and have the issue decided by a binding judgment.

Now, can the complaining State bring every issue between it and another State before the Supreme Court? No. The only issues which the Court can hear and decide are questions which in their nature are capable of judicial solution. Mr. Justice Bradley first called such questions "justiciable," and Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice Brewer used the same term. There are issues between States

of a character which would be likely to lead to high feeling and to war if they arose between independent sovereignties, and which the Supreme Court cannot decide because they are not capable of judicial solution. In such cases between States of course there can be no war, because the Federal Government would suppress it. Therefore, if an amicable understanding cannot be reached, the States are left with an unsettled dispute between them and no way of deciding it. They must put up with the existing state of things.

There have been several interesting cases before our Supreme Court illustrating the character of the jurisdiction I have been describing. Chicago built a sewage canal to drain her sewage with the aid of the waters of Lake Michigan into the the Desplaines River, then into the Illinois, and then into the Mississippi, from which St. Louis and other Missouri towns derived their water supply. The Governor of Illinois was empowered to open the canal. The State of Missouri brought suit in the Supreme Court of the United States to enjoin the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago from continuing the flow, on the ground that the impurities added to the Mississippi water had greatly increased the typhoid fever in Missouri. It was held that this was a subject matter capable of judicial solution-that Missouri was the guardian of her people's welfare and had a right to bring such a suit, and, if she made a clear case, to enjoin such use of the Mississippi and its tributaries.

Mr. Justice Shiras, in upholding the jurisdiction (Missouri vs. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241), spoke for the Court as follows:

"The cases cited show that such jurisdiction has been exercised in cases involving boundaries and jurisdiction over lands and their inhabitants, and in cases directly affecting the property rights and interests of a State. But such cases manifestly do not cover the entire field in which such controversies may arise, and for which the Constitution has provided a