possible discord. Perhaps we must charge specially, in this respect, our nationalization of the Panama Canal. The greater its success, the greater must be the perils attending complete control over it by any one nation.

TOWARD UNITY.

It is not, however, the intention of this article to study these various questions, but merely to recite them, and to revert always to this fact: That a reasoned defense of our pretensions, whatever they may be, can not be worked out, except under the following conditions: (a) A single body of experts must study army and navy needs as at single problem; (b) For a given degree of safety, the solution of the problem will vary according to the requirements of varying political theories.

All students of the question may at a glance see that the magnitude of our armaments will have a necessary relation to our political pretensions, but the effect of the one upon the other is even more intimate. It involves an actual variation in the materiel of our constructions.

OUR RESPONSIBILITIES.

This subject will, for present purposes, be sufficiently illustrated by pointing out that large movements of troops from our own country, over long water lines must, almost certain ly, be assumed as an important element in any warfare arising out of the four following causes:

(1) Our insistence that no new and foreign establishments of sovereignty shall be made in Central or South America. Obviously, we cannot "make good" in this pretension by merely staying at home and protecting New York and Boston Harbors. We must go down to Central or South America and throw out the offending intruder.

(2) The maintenance of our sovereignty in the Philippine Islands.

(3) The maintenance of our sovereignty in and around the Panama Canal.

(4) The maintenance of our pretensions as to the "open door" in China.

I am aware that any one of these objects might possibly be accomplished by terrific naval pressure upon the home ports of an enemy. It is just such a problem as this that requires the combined study of army and navy experts.

Shall we provide large land forces, and transport them to fight directly in the territories above named if they be occupied by those who challenge our interests? Or shall we, on the other hand, build a huge navy and rely upon it to seize or blockade the ports of an enemy, and punish him to such extent that he will yield his pretensions to ours in the various situations above. mentioned?

The difference in personnel and materiel involved in the determination, is obvious.

NEED OF OFFENSIVE.

In any case, it should be noted that we must prepare for offensive war, strategically considered. We may be defensively engaged, in the sense that our alleged interests may be found at right angles to the alleged interests of others- both sides being willing to fight for their respective claims. In other words, our enemy will declare, as shall we, that he is "defending" a just

cause.

Yes, we are a peace-loving people. But our national policies, if challenged, are peculiarly exacting in offensive strategy.

To bring about the very best results in "Preparedness" would require a reform so radical that it must be proposed almost without hope of its adoption.

We should have one Cabinet officer called the Secretary (or Minister) for National Defense. The functions now performed by the heads of our War and Navy Departments would then fall to two permanent Under Secretaries,

retaining seats in the Cabinet, perhaps, but recognized as being subordinate to the Minister for National Defense.

The General Staff of such a Department would be almost the Commission on National Defense, recommended in this article. But it should be strengthened by the addition of three civilian members.

Putting aside this common-sense idea of a Minister of National Defense as (unhappily) an iridescent dream, we may more confidently propose a good, but awkward arrangement, not shocking those separatist traditions. which handicap our military development, both in Administration and in Legislation.

A Commission on National Defense should be formed, consisting of two army, two navy, and three civilian members. Of the latter, one, at least, should be a railway man, one a civilian engineer or contractor, the third a manufacturer.

The Commission should be empowered to call upon the Secretaries of various governmental Departments for desired information, and for the detail of several officers to serve under the Commission. Its reports should be made in duplicate to the two Secretaries (War and Navy), who should transmit them to the President, with such remarks as they see fit to add. From the President this report should go to Congress, with his comments— no suppressions anywhere along the line.

THE PERTINENT QUESTIONS.

In recommending various armaments, the Commission should consider them in relation to the following questions:

(1) Shall we resist any attempt of any foreign power to occupy, temportrily or permanently, by force or by consent, any South or Central American territory? Or shall we not?

(2) Are the Philippine Islands to be defended as if they were an integral

part of our national territory, or not? (3) Shall we have a naval base (or bases) in the Philippine Islands, or not?

(4) Shall we uphold the theory of closing neutral ports by belligerents, as practised in the present war, or not?

(5) Shall the sale of munitions by neutrals to belligerents be recognized, or not?

(6) Shall the Suez Canal be claimed as open to all vessels during time of war, or not?

(7) Shall the Panama Canal Canal be claimed as open to all vessels during time of war, or not?

(8) Shall the partition or subordination of China by any other power be considered as inimical to our interests, or not?

(9) Shall the "cooling-off" treaties be considered as diminishing the chances of war-and if so, to what extent?

(10) Shall preparations be based on meeting a one, two, or three power opposition?

(11) Shall preparations aim only at (a) Prevention of seizure of territory by an enemy landing large forces on our shores; or,

(b) Prevention of such seizure and also prevention of blockade of any of our ports; or,

(c) Prevention of such landing and also prevention of blockade of our most important ports; or,

(d) Prevention of all landings, all blockades, and also a seeking of the enemy, wherever he may be found?

THE NEXT STEP.

From the strictly military point of view, it would be best if the next step, after the receiving of such a report by Congress, could be the adoption of a general program and the appropriation of the lump sum required for it, this sum to be available over a period of ten years. If such course were pursued, the Commission could then assign the proper respective amounts to each of the existing departments and could pursue the construction program without

much publicity. It should also be free to modify even those detailed forms of construction which it may have originally recommended to Congress. Our inventive age demands elasticity in construction plans.

Obviously, even if large power were given to administrators, the mere building of big ships would advertise them to all the world. But in many other constructions, and in the details of the ships themselves, we might attain a desired secrecy.

There is, of course, the difficulty of getting low competitive prices without publication of specifications. There is also possibility of fraud. These are real dangers, but I believe that much should be sacrificed in military matters to se. crecy and flexibility of control in our preparations. In other words, we must trust somebody very largely. An occasional probe by special committees would cover this point well enough.

REFORM ELSEWHERE.

Turning from the administrative to the legislative side of the problem, we ought to have a reform of Congressional organization similar to that proposed in the executive branch. There should be one National Defense Committee in each House, with two sub-committees, and joint meetings of Senate and House Committees should be frequent, rather than exceptional, as is now the case.

It has always seemed to me possible that even without legislation two willing Secretaries could institute a General Staff study of defense by officers of the Army and Navy, working together. Surely nothing in the statutes would prevent a Secretary of War from saying to certain of his officers, "You are to consult constantly with certain officers that will be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, with like instructions. The duty which you and they have to perform is the study of national defense along such and such lines."

I believe if one such report were made to the country without legislation,

there would follow all that is necessary in the way of statutes to officialize and strengthen such an action.

DEFINITE ACTION.

Faint beginnings of progress in the directions discussed in this article may be found in at least two pending Senate measures. One is Senate Bill 2710, introduced by Senator Shafroth. The writer had much to do in coöperating with Senator Shafroth in this Bill, but without much hope that its provisions of reform in regard to a National Defense Commission would be adopted.

The proposition made by Senator Newlands in Senate Resolution 91 is for the appointment of a joint committee, consisting of members from the Army and Navy Committees of both Houses, this joint committee to report upon various general problems of defense.

Those who have not been engaged in such efforts, can scarcely understand the extraordinary difficulty met, even by Senators themselves, in pressing forward a reform of existing organization methods. Congress has gone far in what may be called the "separatist" tendency in the organization of its committees. This tendency is inspired by two forces-one the real necessity of dividing up the overwhelming work which Congress has to perform and second, the normal desire to have as many committee heads as possible, in order to gratify the ambitions of capable men. This latter force remains constantly as an obstacle to consolidation of committee work, even when it is admitted that the sub-division process has been carried too far.

IN CONCLUSION.

May I close this article by a further reference to Senate Bill 2710, above mentioned? It provides for a lump sum appropriation, to be expended under the direction of a single Commission but, frankly, its chief object was to serve as a carrier for Section 3, which reads as follows:

That if at any time before the total sum hereby appropriated shall have been expended or contracted to be expended, there shall have been established, with the coöperation of the United States of America, an international tribunal substantially in accord with the principles herein below set forth in the tentative draft of articles of agreement constituting_an International Tribunal of Decree and Enforcement, then any unexpended balance of this appropriation shall be carried into the Treasury, and the program of defense adopted by the commission shall be suspended.

This Section 3, if adopted as a proviso in any military appropriation bill, would constitute a real step forward toward the establishment of a true International Tribunal, rendering unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments.

The difficulty of obtaining, in this very crowded session of Congress, attention to any of the details of the pro

posed Articles of Agreement is very great. Hence it has been decided to attain as much as possible of the original object by omitting reference to those Articles, and modifying the proviso to read as follows:

That if at any time before the appropriations authorized by this Act shall have been contracted for, there shall have been established, with the coöperation of the United States of America, an international tribunal or tribunals competent to secure peaceful determinations of all international disputes, and which shall render unnecessary the maintenance of competitive armaments, then and in that case such naval expenditures as may be inconsistent with the engagements made in the establishment of such tribunal or tribunals shall be suspended, if so ordered by the President of the United States.

It is sincerely hoped that all who are striving toward better international relations will find it possible to support this proviso.