time national and international laws.

3. To urge an agreement upon the call and procedure of the Conference, by which it shall become internationalized and in which no nation shall take a preponderating part.

right of one is the duty of all to observe. (U. S. vs. Arjona, 120 U. S. 479, decided by Chief Justice Waite).

6. International law is at one and the same time both national and international: national in the sense that it is the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles. (The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, decided by Justice Gray).

tions and Declarations in order to secure their observance.

5. To obtain as far as possible the acceptance of an agreement upon the basic principles of international law, such as contained in the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations adopted by the American Institute of International Law on January 6, 1916, and which are here quoted, with reference in parentheses to the decisions of the Supreme Court on which they are based:

I, Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect and to conserve its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states. (Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, decided by Mr. Justice Field). 2. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that, it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states.

3. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other state composing the society of nations, and all nations have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, "to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them." (The Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, decided by Chief Justice Marshall).

4. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all persons whether native or foreign found therein. (The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116, decided by Chief Justice Marshall).

5. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the

6. To advocate the extension of the

ment of disputes of a non-justiciable nature, or of disputes of a justiciable nature which have assumed political importance such that nations prefer to submit them to arbitrators of their own choice rather than to the judges of a permanent tribunal. If nations should consent to the formation of a judicial union as they agreed to the Universal Postal Union, containing a clause binding them to submit the disputes concerning interpretation of the Convention to arbitration, as well as disputes arising under the Convention and to form a commission of three arbiters to settle such disputes, it would be unnecessary to negotiate treaties of arbitration, as the plaintiff state, under the procedure of the Supreme Court, could set the court in motion upon its own initiative without calling to its aid. the members of the union, just as a state of the American judicial union. files its bill in the Supreme Court without the aid, and indeed without the knowledge, of the forty-seven states of the union.

7. To advocate the creation of an international council of conciliation, to consider, to discuss, and to report upon such questions of a non-justiciable character as may be submitted to such council by an agreement entered into by the powers to this end. The type of this council of conciliation is the International Commission of Inquiry, and the form of it may well be that adopted by Mr. Bryan in his various treaties

for the advancement of peace concluded by the United States with many foreign nations, in all of which it is provided that disputes shall be presented to a permanent commission consisting of five members, which shall have a year within which to report its conclusions, which are not binding upon the nations, but during which time a resort shall not be made to arms. Mr. Bryan's commissions are national; an agreement might be secured to make such a commission international, as is the proposed court; or, if not permanent, machinery should be devised in order to enable the commission to be very rapidly created, as it might largely fail of its purpose if it were created after the dispute in question had become acute.

8. To negotiate a convention creating a judicial union of the nations along the Universal Postal Union of 1908, to which all civilized nations and self-governing dominions are parties, to submit their disputes involving law and equity, that is to say, disputes of a justiciable nature, to a court of this union, whose decision will bind not only the litigating nations but all parties to its creation, based upon the jurisdiction and procedure of the Supreme Court of the United States, which may be thus briefly stated:

1. The Supreme Court determines for itself the question of jurisdiction, receiving the case if it finds states to be parties, and if the case as presented involves questions of law or equity. (Rhode Island vs. Massachusetts, 12 Peters 655, decided by Justice Baldwin).

2. If states be parties to the suit, and if it be justiciable, the plaintiff state has the right to have a subpoena issue against the defendant state, to be issued by the Supreme Court at its request. (New Jersey vs. New York, 3 Peters 461, decided by Chief Justice Marshall; New Jersey vs. New York, 5 Peters 284, decided by Chief Justice Marshal).

3. The plaintiff state has the right to proceed ex parte if the defendant state does not appear and litigate the case. (New Jersey vs. New York, 5 Peters 284, opinion by Chief Justice Marshall; Massachusetts vs. Rhode Island, 12 Peters 755, opinion by Justice Thompson).

4. The plaintiff state has the right, in the

absence of the defendant duly summoned, to proceed to judgment against the defendant state in a suit which the Supreme Court has held to be between states and to be of a justiciable nature. (New Jersey vs. New York, 5 Peters 284, opinion by Chief Justice Marshall).

5. The Supreme Court does not compel the presence of the defendant state (Massaschusetts vs. Rhode Island, 12 Peters 755, opinion by Justice Thompson), nor does it execute by force its judgment against a defendant state. (Kentucky vs. Dennison, 24 Howard 66, opinion by Chief Justice Taney). The reasonableness of the judgment and the advantage of judicial settlement have created a public opinion which is the sole sanction of the Supreme Court in suits between

states.

6. The Supreme Court has moulded a system of procedure based upon equity procedure between individuals in such a way as to simplify it and to give the defendant state opportunity to present its defense, as wel! as the plaintiff state opportunity to present its case, without taking note of technical objections. (Rhode Island vs. Massachusetts, 14 Peters 210, opinion by Chief Justice Taney).

I have not mentioned, in this brief but comprehensive outline of work to be done, the question of force either to hale a nation into the court or to execute the judgment of an international tribunal. The sheriff did not antedate the judge nor did he come into being at the same time. He is a later creation, if not an afterthought. He is necessary in disputes between individuals. He is not a part of the machinery of the Supreme Court in the trial of disputes between states of the American judicial union and in the execution of the judgments. It may be that an international sheriff may prove to be necessary. But nations shy at force, especially if they understand it is to be used against them, and the presence of the sheriff armed with force, that is to say, of an international police, would make an agreement upon a national court more difficult; and if an international sheriff should prove to be unnecessary it would delay the constitution of this much-needed institution. If the sheriff should be needed, or if some form of compulsion be necessary in order to procure the pres(Continued on page 238)

BY

T

HE necessity of a World Court rests ultimately upon the necessity of peace, and the necessity of peace in its turn rests upon justice. Give justice; peace comes. And peace has never come except where there was somewhere a court that could be trusted. When we remember this, we can see that peace at any price is the just view, provided you are willing to pay the price of peace, and the price of peace is justice at any cost. We need not speculate at this point, we need not peer into the future, though we sit here a band of those who through earth's mists first see the coming of the dawn. We are as men who sat at the opening of the Seventeenth Century in England, looking to self-government and freedom for worship. We sit here as committees of safety sat in all our cities in the middle of the Eighteenth Century, to seek and to plan and to secure liberty, and we sit here as sixty or seventy years ago men sat in groups, smaller than this or more scattered, determined that liberty should come instead of slavery, and in deciding the necessity of the step which we urge, we can look back as they did, to the experience of the past and when we ask ourselves in what manner peace has been secured, we need only to turn to the peace of the commonwealth under whose protection we are now at peace. Its peace rests upon law known to all, upon courts trusted by all, and upon force back of the decision of the court

sufficiently strong to make resistance futile. The same principle which keeps the peace of the State of New York and its sovereign people, keeps the peace of the United States and its sovereign federal union between the oceans. And the only way in which peace will ever be kept by humanity is by the presence of a law known to all, of a court trusted by all, and of a force strong enough to be respected and obeyed by all.

And those of us who hesitate at arming, and those of us who believe that the nation should stand like a strong man armed, keeping the light in the house of its fathers and the temples of its liberties, we can unite in the conviction that peace is worth the price by which it has always been secured. These three great factors of law, of court and of some authority strong enough to make the decisions obeyed -on these three pillars stand the security of the future. Upon these rests all information which men rejoice in and hold dear, and the centre and pivot of this system is the court. If you have law without court, you have the aspiration of righteousness without the capacity to express it, you have force without a court, you have despotism without restraint, and the court in every society is the inevitable and necessary link between the aspirations of men and the execution of the justice of the divine. These things come in their slow degrees, for through all the centuries law first appears, the