the cord of confidence has snapped. Are they right or are the men who hold to the old faith right? There has been treachery and disregard of honor and a throwing down of chivalry. Technical development, successful government of cities, astonishing results in dealing with poverty, progress in all departments of science, and, above all, education of the masses, which latter was supposed to lead to the reign of reason-what a sorry spectacle of failure they all offer! The acts committed in this war-the great war itself-were simply unbelievable before the event. If people so gifted and endowed can be tricked by ruling classes into acts so unworthy, if the native virtues and humane qualities which undoubtedly characterize them can be overborne in passionate hate and turned in a single hour into folly and flaming madness, can we count upon any people to hold true to the ideals of our day? These are the questions which every thoughtful man is putting to himself and they have caused some of the most experienced to readjust their estimates. Now let us look at the other side of the picture. To offset the perfidy we have in this war examples of entire faithfulness to treaty obligations. We behold in some performance better than the promise. On the part of a large group of nations the events of the war have actually strengthened confidence in each other. Second sober thought suggests that the world will recover from the shock to its faith in treaties. It must recover. Without such confidence conditions will be impossible. Confidence not only in the written and spoken word but confidence in the good intentions of the neighboring State constitute the very basis of all tolerable relations. Without it any untoward incident may flame into war. up It would be folly to assert that this restoration of confidence will be immediate. The shock has been too great. For many years nations will be on their guard. They will probably maintain stronger armies and navies than hitherto. But we shall have a final recovery of the loss which the Great War has caused, progress in all lines of international endeavor will be resumed, and it is not impossible that by a working international agreement, if statesmen have the vision required to frame and establish such, the pace of progress in this direction may be increased. THE WORLD'S COURT LEAGUE Favors a League among Nations to secure 1. An International Court of Justice sustained by public opinion. 2. An International Council of Conciliation. 8. A World Conference meeting regularly, To establish and support the Court and Council. To interpret and expand International Law. 4. A Permanent Continuation Committee of the World Conference. Power of the Supreme Court Over Defendant States By JACKSON H. RALSTON [Mr. Ralston, a prominent lawyer in Washington, D. C., takes up the questions: How does the United States Supreme Court endeavor to obtain the presence of a defendant State? Can the Supreme Court or can the Government under our system compel appearance of a defendant State? He spoke before the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.] T HE constitutional provision giving the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction over controversies between states finds its origin in principle in the Articles of Confederation of 1777, which in Article 9 said: "The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any cause whatever." The Article further provides for the presentation to Congress of a petition stating the matter in question, praying for a hearing; notice to be given by order of Congress to the other states in difference, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent commissioners or judges to constitute a Court, and in the event of a disagreement, Congress to name three persons out of each of the United States and each party should alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number be reduced to thirteen; from this number not less than seven or more than nine names, as Congress should direct, should, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose names were finally drawn, or any five of them, should be commissioners or judges to determine the controversy. Further provisions were made for the selection of judges in the event that a party should neglect to attend without sufficient reason, or refuse to strike out. Jefferson, discussing the articles Confederation and, referring to settlement by Congress of disputes between states (Works, Vol. 5, page 16, Ford's edition), remarks: "It has been often said that the decisions of Congress are impotent because the Confederation provides no compulsory power. But when two or more nations enter into compact, it is not usual for them to say what shall be done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this, and it is as unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally results to the party injured by the breach. When any one State in the American Union refuses obedience to the Confederation by which they have bound themselves, the rest have a natural right to compel it to obedience." The general subject of the right of the Supreme Court over controversies between states as finally embodied in the Constitution appears to have received little, if any, discussion in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, this, doubtless, for the reason that the Articles of Confedera tion had made the general idea of judicial settlement familiar to the public mind. When we turn to the Federalist, we find in letter LXXX, supposed to have been written by Hamilton, that the subject is dismissed in two brief paragraphs, in the course of which it is said: "The power of determining causes between two States, between one State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the nation than that which has been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture of the dissentions and private wars which distracted and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by Maximilian, toward the close of the fifteenth century, and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the tranquility of the Empire. This was a court invested with authority to decide finally all differences among the members of the Germanic body. "A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under the authority of the federal head, was not unattended to even in the imperfect system by which they had been hitherto held together; but there are many other sources, beside interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of the Union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course of our past experience. * Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal superintendence and control." Very speedily after the adoption of the Constitution the general provisions we are discussing received the attention of the Supreme Court. In 1798, in the case of Chisholm's executors vs. Georgia, the matter of service of process upon a State (although the suit was by a private individual) was given consideration, and the Supreme Court decided (2 Dallas, 419) that service on the Governor and Attorney-General of a State was sufficient. Justice Wilson, who had been himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, took part in the decision of this case, and as relating to the general subject matter in which the Judicial Settlement Society is interested, it seems well to call attention to one or two features of his decision. He says: "By a State, I mean a complete body of free persons united together for their common benefit, to enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to others. It is an artificial person. It has its affairs and its interests; It has its rules; It has its rights; And it has its obligations. In all our contemplations, however, concerning this feigned and artificial person, we should never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who think and speak and act are men. "Is the foregoing description of a State a true description? It will not be questioned but it is. Is there any part of this description, which intimates, in the remotest manner, that a State any more than the men who compose it, ought not to do justice and fulfill engagements? It will not be pretended that there is. If justice is not done; if engagements are not fulfilled; is it, upon general principles of right, less proper, in the case of a great number than in the case of an individual, to secure by compulsion that which will not be voluntarily performed?" In the case of Grayson vs. Virginia (3 Dallas, p. 320), the practice already recognized as proper was formulated into a general rule of Court as follows: "Ordered that when process at common law, or eq uity, shall issue against a State, it shall be served upon the Governor, or Chief Executive Magistrate, and the Attorney-General of such State." We have not answered the question as to the power of the Supreme Court to compel the appearance of a State. If we understand this question to be predicated upon the power of the Court to insist upon the physical presence of the State in the person of appropriate representatives, no answer being filed, and no step taken demanding individual initiative, it seems that our response must be that no such power exists. If we understand the query to be whether the Supreme Court has power, a State having been summoned and failed to appear, to declare a default and to proceed as if the State were before it through its proper representatives, then our answer will be that such power exists in the Supreme Court. The existence of this power seems incidental to the proper exercise of its jurisdiction under the Constitution. In other words, if the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over controversies between States, it certainly has jurisdiction to do those things which are ordinarily incidental to the determination of issues between private parties. One of these things recognized in all Courts of justice is the declaration of default. body as a State is the party concerned, and when, to a degree, governmental agencies are thereby involved, a Court will be exceedingly slow about the declaration of a default, and this was demonstrated in the case of Chisholm's executors vs. Georgia. While the case to which we are now referring was that of a private individual against a State, a sort of suit which must not be brought today, nevertheless for the purpose of the present inquiry the case is a precedent, as is also that of Huger vs. South Carolina (3 Dallas, p. 359). In the latter case, the service of the subpoena being proven, it was held that the complainant was entitled to proceed ex parte, and he was accordingly allowed to take out commissions to take testimony. The Judicial Settlement Society is justified, taking a long look into the future, in believing that the world will some day discover that juridically there is no impassable difference between the situation of American States and of independent nations. We may, therefore, believe that, just as the American Colonies worked out a scheme of administrative and judicial union insuring peace between them, so the nations of the earth may sometime be able to forget all false ideas of sovereignty, all arrogance of size, wealth or assumed culture, and submit them Naturally when such an important selves to regular judicial processes. EDITORIALS DISARMAMENT AND BENEFICENT WORLD LEADERSHIP AMID the babel of voices now heard across the ocean speaking for or against peace, none rings more clear than the demand for disarmament. It is significant that Germany, the most militaristic nation since the Roman Empire, is so convinced of the futility and danger of a purely military government that she may be willing to propose the most extreme pacifist measure possible, believing that this and this only will ensure peace. The report that she is willing to consider not only a World Court and other institutions essential to its success, but wishes to add disarmament as the great objective when it comes time to arrange for the future, should give joy and courage to sincere people the world over. It is perfectly clear that there is little hope for durable peace or for the progress of civilization unless armies and navies can be reduced to a police basis. Without doubt the people of all countries now at war would rejoice and sing Te-Deums, if they were sure that armies could be disbanded, and that the men under arms could be released to engage in peaceful industries. After the universal chastisement of war, when every hearthstone is under the shadow of mourning, what better thing, what more logical thing, than that the people of all lands should unite in demanding that another great war be made impossible by reducing the manufacture of guns and munitions and the size of armies and navies. What is the matter with this proposition, excepting the opposition which may come from the devotees of militarism, and those who have no faith in the improvement of human society? It seems very radical, to be sure. Anyone proposing disarmament three years ago was counted as a light-headed mollycoddle. But we are coming upon new times and a new world order. If we are to have any league of nations whatever, it should be one swept clean of militarism, a league whose permanence rests, not upon use of force, but rather upon the absence of force, not one which functions in a continuing threat of military compulsion. It may be better to have no league pledge beyond the simple agreement to establish and support a World Court and other accessory institutions. Are we ready to assume that civilization has utterly failed, and that there are not in the world moral forces competent to sustain a plan of reorganization based upon disarmament and judicial settlement of disputes? It has long been a belief of Americans that the United States has a mission of beneficent leadership in the world. Can she best realize this mis |