eventually be laid before Parliament and Congress showing how the agreement to negotiate the new treaty had been arrived at, and that Lord Pauncefote, who sails to-day, would be furnished with his views on the subject and be in a position to settle the question with you on his arrival. I also inclose a confidential paper which Lord Lansdowne marked in my presence and handed to me showing the paragraph which is now to be omitted. I observe that in Article IV the word "beforementioned" is used instead of "such " before "ship canal," whereas in a memorandum sent to Mr. Choate by Lord Lansdowne, on the 1st instant, of the proposed amendments, the word "such" is used, but it does not appear to be material and I have not called the attention of the foreign office thereto, feeling that you will be able to do so when discussing the final draft with Lord Paunce fote if you deem it necessary or important. I have, etc., HENRY WHITE. Mr. Hay to Lord Pauncefote. WASHINGTON, November 8, 1901. EXCELLENCY: Upon your return to Washington, I had the honor to receive from you a copy of the instruction addressed to you on the 23d October last by the Marquis of Lansdowne, accepting and reducing to final shape the various amendments in the draft of an Interoceanic Canal treaty, as developed in the course of the negotiations lately conducted in London, through Mr. Choate, with yourself and Lord Lansdowne. The treaty being thus brought into a form representing a complete agreement on the part of the negotiators, has been submitted to the President, who approves of the conclusions reached and directs me to proceed to the formal signature thereof. I have, accordingly, the pleasure to send you a clear copy of the text of the treaty, embodying the several modifications agreed upon. Upon being advised by you that this text correctly represents your understanding of the agreement thus happily brought about, the treaty will be engrossed for signature at such time as may be most convenient to you. I have, etc., JOHN HAY. Lord Pauncefote to the Marquis of Lansdowne.2 WASHINGTON, November 19, 1901. MY LORD: I have the honor to report that, by appointment with Mr. Hay, I yesterday went to the State Department, accompanied by Mr. Wyndham, and signed the new treaty for the construction of an interoceanic canal. I have, etc. PAUNCEFOTE. 1 Printed, ante. 2 British Blue Book "United States, 1902." [Telegraphic.] Lord Pauncefote to the Marquis of Lansdowne.1 WASHINGTON, December 16, 1901. Canal treaty ratified by 72 votes to 6 in Senate to-day. Lord Pauncefote to the Marquis of Lansdowne.1 WASHINGTON, November 18, 1901. MY LORD: I have the honor to transmit to your lordship herewith a copy of a communication from Mr. Hay, dated the 8th November, formally placing on record the President's approval of the various amendments made in the draft of the new interoceanic canal treaty in the course of the negotiations, and particularly set forth in your lordship's dispatch to me of the 23d October. I have, etc. [Inclosure in No. 5.] PAUNCEFOTE. Mr. Hay to Lord Pauncefote. WASHINGTON, November 8, 1901. EXCELLENCY: Upon your return to Washington I had the honor to receive from you a copy of the instruction addressed to you on the 23d October last by the Marquis of Lansdowne, accepting and reducing to final shape the various amendments in the draft of an interoceanic canal treaty, as developed in the course of the negotiations lately conducted in London, through Mr. Choate, with yourself and Lord Lansdowne. The treaty, being thus brought into a form representing a complete agreement on the part of the negotiators, has been submitted to the President, who approves of the conclusions reached, and directs me to proceed to the formal signature thereof. I have, accordingly, the pleasure to send you a clear copy of the text of the treaty, embodying the several modifications agreed upon. Upon being advised by you that this text correctly represents your understanding of the agreement thus happily brought about, the treaty will be engrossed for signature at such time as may be most convenient to you. I have, etc. JOHN HAY. [Personal-Not of record-Original not in department files.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, December 12, 1901. MY DEAR MR. CULLOM: The treaty with England in respect to the construction of a ship canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, 1 British Blue Book "United States, 1902." which the President has sent to the Senate, is the result of careful negotiations conducted between the two Governments since the receipt of Lord Lansdowne's dispatch of the 22d of February last, whereby His Majesty's Government declined to accept, for the reasons therein stated, the former convention of February 5, 1900, as amended by the Senate on the 20th of January, 1901. Under the instructions of the President I have signed on behalf of the United States the treaty now prepared. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, which contemplated the construction of a canal under the joint auspices of the two Governments, to be controlled by them jointly, its neutrality and security to be guaranteed by both, was almost from the date of its ratification the subject of frequent discussion and occasional irritation between the two Governments. Nearly half a century elapsed without any step being taken by either toward carrying it into practical effect by the construction of a canal under its provisions. Instead of being, as was intended, an instrument for facilitating the construction of a canal it became a serious obstacle in the way of such construction. In the meantime the conditions which had existed at the time of its ratification had wholly changed. The commerce of the world had multiplied many fold. The growth of the United States in population, resources, and ability had been greater still. The occupation and development of its Pacific coast and its commercial necessities upon the Pacific Ocean created a state of things hardly dreamt of at the date of the treaty. At last the acquisition of the Hawaiian and the Philippine Islands rendered the construction of the canal a matter of imperative and absolute necessity to the Govern ent and people of the United States, and a strong national feeling in favor of such construction arose, which grew with the progress of events into an irrevocable determination to accomplish that object at the earliest possible moment. The incident of one of our great ships of war lying in the North Pacific, being ordered to join our fleet in the West Indies in time. of actual war, and being obliged for that purpose to round Cape Horn, when through an isthmian canal she could in much less than half the time have reached the scene of action in which she was destined to take part, was an unanswerable illustration of the urgent and immediate need of such a canal for the protection and safety of the interests of the United States. But the Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood in the way. Great Britain did not manifest, and it is believed did not entertain, the remotest idea of joining or aiding in such a work. The United States was able to bear alone the entire cost of the canal, but was apparently prohibited by the existing treaty from undertaking the enterprise which, although carried out at its own expense, would redound to the benefit of the world's commerce quite as much as to its own advantage. The President, loyal to treaty obligations, was unwilling to countenance any demand, however widespread, for proceeding with the construction of the canal until he could obtain by friendly negotiation, on which he confidently relied, the consent of Great Britain to the abrogation of the ClaytonBulwer treaty, or such a modification of its terms as would enable the United States untrammeled to enter upon the great work whose successful accomplishment was vitally necessary to its own security, and would benefit the people of all other nations according to their respective interests in the commerce of the world. Such was the situation in which the negotiations for the supersession of the treaty were commenced and have been conducted, and we can not but recognize the fair and friendly spirit in which the successive overtures of the United States toward that end have been met by Great Britain. It has been my firm and constant hope throughout these negotiations that a solution of this difficult and important question between the two Governments would finally be reached which, instead of disturbing the amicable relations which have recently existed and ought always to exist between the United States and Great Britain, would make them more friendly still, and I believe that the treaty now presented, if finally established, will have this desired effect. It is unnecessary to recall the discussions and negotiations which resulted in the making of the treaty of February 5, 1900, its deliberate consideration by the Senate, the amendments proposed by that body as a condition of its ratification by the United States, and its rejection as so amended by the British cabinet. In rejecting the amended treaty, in the memorandum of February 22, 1901, Lord Lansdowne gave evidence of the sincere desire of His Majesty's Government to meet the views of the United States and earnestly deprecated any final failure to come to an understanding on this important subject. Reciprocating these friendly intentions and determined, if possible, to devise a form of treaty which should reconcile the conflicting views which had proved fatal to that of 1900, I prepared and submitted to Lord Pauncefote in March last, for the consideration of his Government, a project for a treaty which, after long and careful consideration and negotiation, has been so perfected as to receive the approval both of the President and of the British Government in the form now presented. The points on which there was failure to agree in the former treaty consisted of the amendments proposed by the Senate and were three in number: First. The insertion of the clause relating to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty "superseding" the same. Second. The addition of the clause providing that the stipulations and conditions of the first five clauses of the third article, as to the neutrality of the canal, should not "apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defense of the United States and the maintenance of public order," and Third. The omission of the invitation to other powers to adhere to the treaty when ratified. Although on all three of these important points the opposing views of the Senate and of the British Government were most emphatic, I deemed it not impossible that a project might be framed which would satisfy both, without a sacrifice of any essential principle on either side and that the supreme importance of the end in view would justify the attempt. In the new draft of treaty the clause superseding the ClaytonBulwer treaty was made the subject of a separate article and was submitted to the consideration of the British Government upon terms which would permanently secure the neutrality of the canal for the use of all nations on terms of entire equality and at the same time would relieve Great Britain of all responsibility and obligation to enforce the conditions which, by the former treaty, had been imposed upon or assumed by her jointly with the United States. And to this end instead of the provision that the United States alone adopted them and undertook the whole of that burden. Second. No longer insisting upon the language of the amendment, which had in terms reserved to the United States express permission to disregard the rules of neutrality prescribed when necessary to secure its own defense-which the Senate had apparently deemed necessary because of the provision in rule 1 that the canal should be free and open "in time of war as in time of peace" to the vessels of all nations-it was considered that the omission of the words "in time of war as in time of peace" would dispense with the necessity of the amendment referred to, and that war between the contracting parties or between the United States and any other power would have the ordinary effect of war upon treaties and would remit both parties to their original and natural right of self-defense and give to the United States the clear right to close the canal against the other belligerent and to protect it by whatever means might be necessary. Third. While omitting to invite other nations to adhere to the treaty when ratified, and so to acquire contract rights in the canal, it was thought that the provision that the canal should be free and open to all nations on terms of entire equality, now that Great Britain was relieved of all obligation to defend such neutrality, would practically meet the objection which had been made by Lord Lansdowne to the Senate's third amendment, viz, that Great Britain was thereby placed in a worse position than other nations in case of war. Fourth. In view of the facts that the enormous cost of constructing the canal was to be borne by the United States alone; that when constructed the canal was to be the absolute property of the United States, and to be managed, controlled, and defended by it; and that now by the new project the whole burden of maintaining its neutrality and security was thrown upon the United States, it was deemed fair to omit the prohibition contained in the former treaty forbidding the fortification of the canal and the waters adjacent. Fifth. The sixth clause of article 3 was retained, which provides that "in time of war as in time of peace" the canal itself shall enjoy complete immunity from attack or injury by belligerents, in the belief that such a provision was in the general interest of commerce and civilization, and that all nations should and would regard such a work as sacred under all circumstances. With the exception of the changes above enumerated, which were made to reconcile conflicting views, care was taken to preserve in the new draft the exact language which had already passed the Senate without objection, and so far as known without criticism. The draft of the new treaty was transmitted by Lord Pauncefote to Lord Lansdowne, and its treatment by him manifested a most conciliatory spirit and an earnest desire to reach a conclusion which should be satisfactory to the United States, if this could be done without departing |