the statute. Under section 3066 of Kirby's Digest printed copies of the ordinances and by-laws of any city or incorporated town, published by authority, and manuscript copies of the same certified under the hand of the proper officer, are made the evidence of passage of such ordinances, by-laws, etc. See case of Malvern v. Cooper, 108 Ark. 24, which is identical to the case now presented, and was decided adversely to appellant's contention.

It is next contended that there was no acceptance of the terms of the ordinance by appellant, and that the contract was one not to be performed within a year, and therefore within the statute of frauds. We are of the opinion that the written notice signed by Mr. Reynolds as manager constituted sufficient acceptance in writing to bind appellant to the terms of the contract. The ordinance required appellant to install the pumping plant and machinery and to give notice to the city "that its equipment has been installed and it is prepared to render said service of pumping water." The written acceptance did not literally follow the language of the ordinance, but it necessarily implied the acceptance of its terms, and was not susceptible to any other interpretation. It contained distinct notice that appellant had completed the installation of the pump and machinery "as per contract with the city of Paragould." The contract could only be accepted in its entirety, and written notice of the acceptance of any part of it would necessarily constitute an acceptance of the whole. The effect of this was not to alter the contract or to hold out a counter-proposal, but it was an unqualified acceptance of the contract, if it amounted to anything at all. It contained no counterproposal, and no indications that any portion of the contract was unacceptable. The initial feature of the performance of the contract was the installation of the pumping plant and machinery, and the notice of such installation, in writing, was necessarily an acceptance of the terms of the contract, and an expression of readiness to proceed with its performance.

The rule is that where a contract is within the statute of frauds, different writings essential to an expression of the terms of the contract, in order to be considered together, must connect themselves with each other on their faces. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Beidler, 45 Ark. 17; Beckwith v. Talbot, 95 U. S. 289; Whitted v. Fairchild Cotton Mills, 128 C. C. A. 219. The essential features of the contract evidenced by the two writings are present in this instance, for the notice of acceptance referred to the contract between appellant and the city, and there appears to have been no other contract between those parties to which the language of the notice was referable. It seems clear to us therefore that the writing constituted sufficient acceptance. The ordinance expressed all of the terms of a complete contract, and the letter which referred to that contract and impliedly accepted its terms was sufficient to bind the other party. 25 Ruling Case Law, page 639.

It is contended further on this subject that there is no evidence of authority on the part of Reynolds to bind appellant. The evidence shows that he was the manager of the electric plant that was being operated there, but there was no testimony adduced to show that he had authority to enter into new contracts. Conceding this to be true, there was evidence sufficient to justify a finding that appellant ratified the action of its agent, Reynolds, in entering into the contract by proceeding with and continuing in performance of the contract for a period of more than a year. Appellant was bound to have known that the contract was being performed, and that the performance was referable to the terms of the ordinance. Therefore the performance by the company constituted a ratification of the previously unauthorized action of its agent in writing this letter. It was not essential that the act of ratification should have been of equal dignity with the original form of the contract which the statute of fraud required to be in writing. The writing itself was sufficient, when ratified by the party to be bound, to satisfy the statute of frauds. When appellant proceeded with the performance of the contract, its act in so doing was referable only to the written acceptance made by its agent, of which it was bound to take notice.

It is contended that the contract was void for the further reason that its performance would restrict the power of the city to alter rates for water furnished to consumers. The argument is that, because in the contract the compensation payable to appellant was based on a maximum percentage of the gross receipts collected from the consumers, this constituted an abdication by the city of its power to change the water rates to the consumers and rendered the contract void. In other words, it is insisted that the city could not contract away its legal power, and that the contract is void on that account. The first answer to this contention is that it is a mistake to say that in this contract the city has restricted its power to change the water rate. Under the contract the compensation to appellant for furnishing the current is based on the scale of water rates then in force, and the monthly compensation should not exceed 40 per cent. of the gross revenue collected; but it is further provided that "said 40 per cent. shall be determined by calculation based on the water rates now in force for sale of water and rental of hydrants." This language of the contract fixed the maximum rate of compensation on the schedule of rates then in force, and any change thereafter made by the city would not reduce the monthly compensation payable to appellant. Therefore this clause of the contract placed no restriction whatever on the right and power of the city to change the schedule of rates. But, even if the monthly maximum compensation was under the contract regulated by a new schedule of rates fixed from time to time, the result would be the same, because the contract must be construed in the light of the law in force at the time and with reference to the powers of the city to regulate water rates. The parties are presumed to have contracted with reference to the power of the city to change the rates which entered into and became a part of the contract. It would have to be assumed that the city would not reduce the rates so as to deprive appellant of a reasonable compensation for its service to be performed under the contract. The contract fixed definitely the maximum amount of compensation, and any change which the city might make in the price of water furnished to the consumers could not alter the specified contract price to be paid to appellant as compensation for its services in furnishing power. This contract must be treated the same as any other made by the city in the operation of the water works, and, regardless of the schedule of rates to consumers, the city was bound by contracts made and obligations incurred in the operation of the plant. There is therefore no foundation for the contention that the city has contracted away its power to change the rates.

It is thus seen that the evidence in the case was sufficient to show that the contract set forth in the complaint was entered into and that appellant broke the contract by refusing after a time to perform it, and to make out a case in favor of the city for the recovery of damages. There was evidence which tended to establish damages resulting from appellant's breach of the contract. There was a conflict in the testimony as to the amount of damages, and under those circumstances this court will not reverse the decision of the trial court in setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial. Clements v. Knight & Co., 125 Ark. 488; Wilhelm v. Collison, 133 Ark. 167.

The judgment of the circuit court in granting a new trial is affirmed, and judgment absolute will be entered to the effect that appellee is entitled to recover in accordance with the prayer of the complaint and the cause will be remanded for the assessment of damages.

DICKSON V. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LONG PRAIRIE LEVEE

DISTRICT.

Opinion delivered November 8, 1920.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONDEMNATION FOR LEVEE PURPOSES.-Acts 1917, p. 1683, which provides for the relocation of a levee built by a district organized under a previous act, and for assessment of damages to owners whose property is taken on relocation of the levee, held to comply with the constitutional requirements as to due process and compensation, though condemnation is made only by adoption of relocation plans, instead of by the method provided by the general law.

2. EVIDENCE-RECORD OF PLANS OF LEVEE DISTRICT ORAL EVIDENCE. -In an action by a levee district to restrain a landowner from preventing access to his land sought to be taken for relocation, oral evidence as to the filing and record of the relocation plans was inadmissible, the record being the best evidence.

Appeal from Lafayette Chancery Court; J. M. Barker, Chancellor; reversed.

J. M. Carter, for appellant.

1. The demurrer to the complaint should have been sustained, as it shows no right in plaintiff to go upon and construct a levee across appellant's lands. Act 106, Acts 1905, p. 267. Act 339, Acts 1917, p. 1863, does not authorize the district to exercise the right of eminent domain, and the demurrer should have been sustained.

2. It was error to admit oral proof of the filing of the plans and specifications. 80 Ark. 80. See, also, 15 Ν. Ε. 601; 37 Id. 91; 3 Tex. Civ. App. 436; 48 Atl. 218; 10 N. E. 657; 19 So. 239; 63 N. Ε. 118.

MCCULLOCH, C. J. Appellee is a levee district in Lafayette County, organized by special statute enacted by the General Assembly of 1905. Acts 1905, page 267. A levee was constructed to protect the lands in the district from inundation from the waters of Red River. The General Assembly of 1917 (Acts 1917, page 1683) enacted another special statute reciting the fact that a considerable portion of the levee built by said district had been washed away, and that it had become necessary