Calhoun, and the Dewberry stock can now be transferred to him. We have sent Mr. Calhoun a blank on which to furnish us a list of the goods to be transferred." Witness continuing said that, after receiving the above letter, he considered the matter closed, so far as the guarantors were concerned. Witness went with Calhoun to Hope and helped him pack up his stuff and ship it back to appellees. This was after the appellees had written that they had made a mistake in assigning Calhoun that county. Witness wrote to appellees that, if they would release the guarantors from the bond, they would get appellees another salesman, and the appellees accepted the proposition. The court ruled that the correspondence and the oral testimony in regard to the appellees accepting Calhoun in the place of Dewberry and releasing the appellants' guarantors from the contract of guaranty was incompetent because it tended to vary the terms of a written contract. The court, among other things, instructed the jury that the action was brought by the appellees against Dewberry and the other appellants as sureties or guarantors on his bond for goods furnished by the appellees to Dewberry; that if they found from the evidence that appellees furnished Dewberry with certain goods, and that Dewberry refused to pay for same after demand was made, the verdict would be in favor of the appellees in such amount as the jury found was due them. The jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff." The court thereupon asked the following question: "Do you mean to say, gentlemen, $228.93?" A juror responded: "For the amount he sues for." The appellants objected to the verdict. Thereupon judgment was rendered in favor of the appellees for $228.93, from which is this appeal. The appellants challenged the ruling of the court in excluding the oral testimony and the correspondence. The court erred in holding that the letters and oral testimony offered by the appellants were incompetent. The law is well settled that “a written contract may, in the absence of statutory provision requiring a writing, be modified by a subsequent oral agreement." 13 Corpus Juris, 593; 6 Rul. Case Law, section 306, p. 922, and cases cited in note to the above; 1 Black on Rescission and Cancellation of Contracts, section 13; Von Berg v. Goodman, 85 Ark. 605; Brickey v. Continental Gin Co., 113 Ark. 15. The error of the court, however, in excluding this testimony from the jury was not prejudicial to the rights of appellants; for, when the oral testimony and the written correspondence is considered, it is not sufficient to show a completed contract on the part of the appellees and the appellants, whereby the latter were released from the obligations of their contract. The oral testimony and the correspondence show that Calhoun was to be substituted for Dewberry to take over his stock of merchandise and to carry out his contract. The appellees accepted the contract to substitute Calhoun for Dewberry, but the undisputed testimony shows that Calhoun, after making bond, which was accepted by the appellees, upon being informed by the appellees that he could have White County, dropped the work in Hempstead County; that he did not assume the business, did not take over the stock of merchandise that Dewberry had or his accounts, and did not become responsible for them or attempt to collect them. Thus the undisputed testimony shows that the consideration for the contract of rescission on the part of the appellants failed. The contract was never completed because Calhoun failed to comply with the conditions upon which the contract, which is the basis of this action, was to be rescinded. The contract, being in full force, the undisputed evidence shows that the amount due the appellees on the contract, and for which they sued, was the amount for which the jury returned a verdict. The sum was definitely ascertained, and the inquiry of the court to the jury and the answer thereto showed that the verdict was returned for this specified amount. There was no error in the form of the verdict. The judgment is correct, and it is affirmed. COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 52 v. RURAL SPECIAL Opinion delivered November 8, 1920. 1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-REPEAL OF STATUTE. - Act No. 15 of 1919 covers the entire subject-matter of act No. 321 of 1909, relating to the establishment of rural special school districts, and was intended as a substitute for it, and therefore repeals it. 2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-RURAL SPECIAL DISTRICTS.-Under act No. 15 of 1919, rural special school districts can not be formed by dismembering one or more common school districts, but must be formed by embracing such common school districts in their entirety. 3. STATUTES CONFLICT. - Where there is irreconcilable conflict between two acts, the latest act controls. Appeal from Lonoke Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor; reversed. lants. Trimble & Trimble and Chas. A. Walls, for appel 1. Act 15, Acts 1919, is in conflict with and repugnant to act 321, Acts 1909, and repeals it. 112 Ark. 437 does not sustain appellees in their contention. Where the Legislature takes up an old subject anew and covers the entire ground of the subject-matter of a former statute, it is evidently intended as a substitute for and repeals the prior act. 80 Ark. 411; 82 Id. 302; 112 Id. 440;92 Id. 600; 100 Id. 504; 41 Id. 149; 92 Id. 266. See, also, 47 Ark. 489; 73 Id. 536; 72 Id. 8; 76 Id. 32; 93 U. S. 266; 170 S. W. 563. Dwight L. Savage, for appellee. Act 15, Acts 1919, is neither in conflict with nor repugnant to act 321, Acts 1909. 112 Ark. 437 is directly in point. Repeals by implication are not favored. 112 Ark. 441; 92 Id. 600. The acts are cumulative, and it was the intention of the Legislature to preserve the act of 1909 and not to repeal it. 170 S. W. 563. 114 Ark. 526 is clearly distinguishable from this. 112 Ark. 441. WOOD, J. Rural Special School Districts Nos. 11 and 13 were established under act No. 321 of the Acts of 1909, which in part is as follows: "Section 1. That when the people of any given territory in any county in this State, other than incorporated cities and towns, desire to avail themselves of the benefits of all laws of this State for the regulation of public schools in incorporated cities or towns, they may be organized into and established as a single school district in the manner and with powers therein provided, with such modifications of said laws as are herein provided. "Section 2. That the petitions provided for in section 7669 of Kirby's Digest of the laws of Arkansas shall be accompanied by a map showing the territory asked to be made into the special district and shall be presented to the county judge of the county containing such territory, who shall perform the duties imposed upon the mayor of cities and towns in said original act, and with like force and effect, and said county judge shall designate the time and place for holding the election provided for therein, and shall appoint three qualified electors of the proposed territory to hold said election." Acf No, 15 of the Acts of 1919 is in part as follows: "Section 1. When the people of any given territory comprising one or more common school districts in any county in the State, other than incorporated cities and towns, desire to avail themselves of the benefits of all the laws of this State for the regulation of public schools in incorporated cities or towns, they may be organized into and established as a rural special school district in the manner and with the power in said laws provided, with such modifications of said laws as are herein provided. "Section 2. The petition provided for in section 7669 of Kirby's Digest of the laws of Arkansas shall be ac34 Сом. ЅснOOL DIST. v. RURAL SPE. SCHOOL DIST. [146 companied by a map or plat showing the territory embraced in the common school district or districts to be included in the proposed rural special school district, and said petition and map shall be presented to the county judge of the county in which such territory is situated, who shall perform the duties imposed upon the mayor of cities and towns in said original act, and with like force and effect, except as otherwise herein provided, and said county judge shall designate the time and place for holding the election provided for therein, and shall appoint three qualified electors residing on said territory to hold said election. Said call shall also provide for the election of six qualified voters residing on said territory to serve as directors of the proposed rural special school district, if same should be created, until the first regular annual school election thereafter." Section 3 provides for the election returns to be filed with the county clerk. Section 4 provides for a canvass of these returns by the county court and an appropriate order by the court declaring the result, describing the boundaries of the district and designating the same as Rural Special School District No. Section 8 provides: "This act shall not have the effect of repealing any other laws not in conflict herewith, but shall be cumulative." There are other sections not necessary to set forth. Districts Nos. 11 and 13 were established under act No. 321 of the Acts of 1909 out of territory composing parts of a number of common school districts, after the enactment act No. 15 of the Acts of 1919. The requirements of act No. 15 of the Acts of 1919 were not complied with in the establishment of the districts involved. The only issue presented by this appeal is whether or not act No. 15 of the Acts of 1919 repeals the provisions of act No. 321 of the Acts of 1909. In Eubanks v. Futrell, 112 Ark. 437-440, we said: "The law is well established that where the Legislature |