was working for the Terry Dairy Company until about a week before he was hurt, and said that he did not notify the Terry Dairy Company how old the boy was.

The defendant offered to prove that Charles Nalley had stated to the witness that the street car hit him and bumped him off of the wagon. The court refused to permit the defendant to prove this, and the defendant duly saved its exceptions. The defendant also offered to prove that its agent who employed the boy asked him how old he was before he was employed, and the boy stated that he was over sixteen years of age; that the company believed this statement to be true, and but for this statement would not have employed the boy.

The defendant duly excepted to the ruling of the court in refusing to allow it to prove these facts. Evidence was adduced in favor of the plaintiff tending to show the character and extent of his injuries.

The court directed the jury to find for the plaintiff, but submitted to the jury the question of the amount of damages to be recovered.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000, and from the judgment rendered the defendant has appealed.

Hendricks & Snodgress and Carmichael & Brooks, for appellant.

1. The misrepresentations of the boy as to his age bar a recovery. 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 443; 66 Iowa 346; 23 N. W. 736; 81 Pac. 869, 870; 47 N. W. 1037.

2. Act No. 1, Acts 1915, p. 1505, does not create civil liability. 58 Hun. 381, 12 N. Y. Supp. 188; 62 Ark. 235; 62 Id. 245. Contributory negligence bars a recovery. Ib.; 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339. Mere employment in violation of a statute does not constitute sufficient negligence to warrant a recovery. The act of negligence in employment must contribute to cause the injury and must not be casually incident thereto. The act does not create a civil cause of action but only fixes a penalty for the doing of the thing. 20 R. C. L., § 37. The violation of the stat ute would not be continuing nor supply negligence otherwise wanting. 13 Ill. 548; 56 Am. Dec. 471; 21 L. R. A. 723 and note; 18 R. C. L., § 65; 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881; 48 Id. 660; 14 Id. 609; 67 N. W. 729; 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 336 and note; 61 L. R. A. 811. See, also, 31 L. R. A. (Ν. S.) 506; 56 Ark. 216; 18 R. C. L., § 65; 19 L. R. A. (Ν. S.) 783; 106 N. Y. Supp. 443; 148 Fed. 482. Under these cases the court erred in refusing to submit the question of liability to the jury and in refusing to permit defendant's witnesses to testify as to what investigation they made and what statements plaintiff made as to his age. The evidence shows that defendant was not guilty of any negligence. The evidence tending to show that a street car hit the wagon was competent and the court erred in excluding the testimony.

3. The act is not constitutional. It is not authenticated properly. Its title involves several questions and is in no way descriptive of the act. Berry v. Majestic Milling Co., 223 S. W. 738.

Mehaffy, Donham & Mehaffy, for appellee.

1. Misrepresentations of the boy as to his age do not bar recovery. Cases cited by appellant are not in point. Representations of the boy as to his age were immaterial. The employer must know that the boy employed was over the prohibited age. There was no question for a jury on this point, and the evidence of the boy's representations as to his age was properly excluded. There was no question for a jury. 115 Pac. 843; 73 Ν. E. 766; 68 Id. 754; 70 Id. 669; 87 Id. 229. One employing a child must ascertain at his peril whether the child is of age. 156 N. W. 971; 67 Atl. 642; 60 So. Rep. 583; 116 N. W. 1107; 95 N. E. 204. Misstatement of age by a minor is no defense. 5 Labatt on Master and S., § 1903.

2. The act itself creates civil liability. 112 Pac. 145; 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 657 and note; 87 N. E. 358; 79 S. E. 836; 26 Cyc. 1091; 5 Labatt, M. and S., § 1899; 26 Сус. 1080.

3. Contributory negligence is no defense where the injured is a minor. 87 N. E. 358; 73 Id. 766; 66 Id. 572; 60 So. 587. See, also, 18 R. C. L. 554, § 65.

4. Violation of a statute forbidding the employment of a minor child is negligence per se. 87 Ν. Ε. 229; 61 S. E. 525; 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602; 65 S. E. 399; 32 S. W. 460; 115 Pac. 843; 18 R. C. L. 551.

5. The act is constitutional. 117 Ark. 465. It is within the scope of the police power of the State. Labatt on M. and S. (2 ed.), § 2338.

HART, J. (after stating the facts). Under the facts stated in the abstract, the court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the question of the liability of the defendant. This suit was brought under Initiative Act No. 1, providing for the health, safety and welfare of minors by forbidding their employment altogether under a certain age, and by forbidding their employment in certain occupations under a certain specified age, and the issues raised by the appeal involved the construction of this act. See Acts of Arkansas, 1915, р. 1505.

Section 1 of the act reads as follows: "No child under the age of fourteen shall be employed or permitted to work in any remunerative occupation in this State, except that during school vacation children under fourteen years may be employed by their parents or guardians in occupations owned or controlled by them."

Sections Nos. 2 and 3 provide that no child under sixteen shall be employed or permitted to work in certain specified occupations. Sections Nos. 7 and 8 provide for the issuance of employment certificates in certain instances allowing children under the age of sixteen years to work in certain establishments, or occupations. Section 13 makes it a misdemeanor to violate the provisions of the act.

It is first contended by counsel for the defendant that the judgment should be reversed because the act under which the suit was brought is unconstitutional. Child labor laws have been enacted in most of the States and in Canada. They have been uniformly upheld as being within the police power of the State, and it has been said that the legislative judgment in regard to such regulations will not be interfered with by the court. It is specially insisted that the present act is unconstitutional because it prohibits children under fourteen years of age from engaging in any occupation, except that during the school vacation, children under fourteen years may be employed by their parents or guardians in ocсиpations owned or controlled by them. The constitutional guaranty of the liberty of contract does not apply to children of tender years, nor prevent legislation for their protection.

In discussing the question, Mr. Tiedeman says: "The constitutional guaranty of the liberty of contract does not, therefore, necessarily cover their cases, and prevent such legislation for their protection. So far as such regulations control and limit the powers of minors to contract for labor, there has never been, and never can be, any question as to their constitutionality. Minors are the wards of the nation, and even the control of them by parents is subject to the unlimited supervisory control of the State." Tiedeman on State and Federal Control of Persons and Property, vol. 1, p. 335.

Again, the learned author said: "But children under ages, stated in and varying with the provisions of the different States, are in some States prohibited altogether from working outside of their homes, while in others they are only prohibited from engaging in certain kinds of work. The total prohibition is designed to aid in the enforcement of the attendance upon the school, and both the total and partial prohibitions of child labor are designed to promote their physical and mental growth, by the removal of all strains, which may be caused by excessive labor. Ib., vol. 1, pp. 240, 241.

Professor Freund says, that the constitutionality of legislation for the protection of children is rarely questioned, and that the Legislature is conceded a wide discretion in creating restraints. Continuing, he said: "But even the courts which take a very liberal view of individual liberty and are inclined to condemn paternal legislation would concede that such paternal control may be exercised over children, so especially in the choice of occupations, hours of labor, payment of wages, and everything pertaining to education, and in these matters a wide and constantly expanding legislative activity is exercised. While different grades in the age of minority have not been constantly fixed, it is a reasonable principle which in practice is observed, that the exercise of control must decrease as the age advances." Freund on Police Power, section 259; see also, Starnes v. Albion Mfg. Co. (N. C.), 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602, and cases cited and Re Spencer (Cal), 117 Am. St. Rep. 137. Therefore we are of the opinion that the statute is not unconstitutional.

It is next contended that the trial court erred in holding that the employment of a minor under fourteen years of age is contrary to the provisions of section 1 of the act and constituted negligence per se. The authorities on this point are in decided conflict. It has been said that the violation of a statute forbidding the employment of children under a certain age, or their employment at certain kinds of work or without complying with certain conditions, is held by the weight of authority to be negligence as a matter of law, in an action by the child for injuries received during the course of the employment. See case note to 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335 and 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 657. Numerous cases from the various courts of last resort of the several States where child labor laws have been adopted are cited in support of each view. A leading case supporting what is termed the minority rule or the rule that the unlawful employment is only evidence of negligence, is the case of Berdos v. Tremont and Suffolk Mills (Mass.), Ann. Cas. 1912 В, р. 797. The case of Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant (Ga.), 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 656, is a leading case