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liability while the child was at work for it. The authorities on this point are in conflict, and we refer to case notes in 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 500, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708 and 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 624 for a collection of the authorities on both sides of the question. We take the view that the right of the child to maintain an action for injuries under the statute is not affected by the fact that he obtained employment by misrepresenting his age. Section 1 of the act under which the case at bar was brought contains an absolute prohibition against the employment of children under fourteen years of age. They were considered by the Legislature as being too young and inexperienced to work for any one except their parents and guardians during the vacation. The prohibition extend to all children within the prescribed age. The good faith of the employer or his knowledge of the age of the child is not material. The defendant was by the statute permitted to employ only children above the age of fourteen years. It must ascertain at its peril that the boys that it employs are of the class that it may lawfully employ. In this connection we refer to the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Mining Co., 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, which is copied above. This court has held that, under the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to minors, it is no excuse or justification of the one selling the liquor to the minor without the consent of the parent or guardian that both he and the minor believed at the time that the latter was of age. Edgar v. State, 37 Ark. 219, and Harper v. State, 91 Ark. 422.

For another reason, however, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. The defendant offered to prove that the plaintiff represented to it that he was sixteen years of age at the time he was employed, and that it would not have employed him unless it had thought he was over fourteen years of age. This testimony was competent. The plaintiff's right to recover depended upon the fact that he was under fourteen years of age. His father testified as to his age, and it was competent for the defendant to introduce in evidence his declaration as to his age.

In Edgar v. State, 37 Ark. 219, and Pounders v. State, 37 Ark. 399, it was held that a minor to whom liquor was sold was a competent witness to prove his own age, and that there could be no objection to his stating that he derived his knowledge from an entry of his birth in a family Bible or from other source of information. Prof. Greenleaf says, that while a person's belief as to his own age rests upon hearsay only and not on actual observation and recollection, such belief, sufficient as it is for action in the practical affairs of life, ought also to be admissible in judicial inquiries, and such is the view generally accepted. Greenleaf on Evidence (16 ed.), vol. 1, § 430k. The same author says that a person's appearance may be evidence of his age, at least, within broad limits. Ib., § 14 L.

In Commonwealth v. Hollis, 49 N. E. 632, the defendant was charged with carnal knowledge of a female under sixteen years of age, and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that her testimony as to her age would have been competent, and that it was also competent for the jury to consider her appearance in determining her age. Of course, the value of such testimony is for the jury.

Therefore, we are of the opinion that the excluded evidence would have tended to contradict the evidence adduced by the plaintiff at the trial as to his age. The age of the plaintiff was material, and the exclusion of testimony which tended to contradict the evidence adduced by him on that point was necessarily prejudicial. Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) (N. Y. Ct. of Appeals) 783 and cases cited.

For the error in excluding the evidence offered by the defendant as to the plaintiff's age, the judgment must be reversed and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.

2.

WOOTEN & COMPANY v. BAIN-ADAMS COMPANY.

Opinion delivered December 13, 1920.

1. APPEAL AND ERROR-JUDGMENT ON DIRECTED VERDICT. - On an appeal from a judgment on a directed verdict, the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to appellant's contention. SALES-DELIVERY. In an action against a purchaser for failure to receive cotton, delivery or tender of the cotton pursuant to the usual custom of the trade is sufficient, where there was no stipulation or agreement that the delivery should be made at any special time.

3.

4.

WITNESSES

IMPEACHMENT BY CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT.

Where the purchaser's agent testified concerning the transaction, it was competent to impeach him by proving a telephone conversation between him and the purchaser which occurred on the day the sale was made and in regard to the same subject-matter, and which would have tended to contradict his testimony.

SALES QUESTION FOR JURY.-It was error to direct a verdict for the seller upon the theory that the undisputed testimony showed an offer to comply with a contract for sale of cotton on the part of the sellers and a refusal to comply on the part of the purchasers, where the latter's testimony tended to prove that the cotton tendered was not of the grade required by the contract.

5. SALES-INSTALLMENT CONTRACT. - Where delivery of cotton under a contract was to be made in installments, it was the buyers' duty to accept all the cotton conforming to the contract, and they could not accept a portion and reject the balance, nor could they accept the first shipment, even though it did not conform to the contract, and thereafter refuse on that account to accept other shipments which did conform to the contract; but the fact that they accepted a shipment which did not comply with the contract did not require them to accept other shipments which did not meet the requirements of the contract.

Appeal from Phillips Circuit Court; J. M. Jackson, Judge; reversed.

Moore & Vineyard, for appellants.

1. The alleged confirmation paper by J. R. Woods was not a confirmation of the contract of September 28, and plaintiffs must fail in their action because the proof wholly fails to bear out the confirmation. 137 S. W. 827; 96 S. W. 386.

2. It was error to instruct a verdict. The case upon the evidence was one for a jury. Ib.; 89 Id. 368; 106 Id. 482. Where there is any evidence tending to support the issue, it is error to take the case from the jury. 103 Ark. 401; 104 Id. 267; 120 Id. 206; 132 Id. 441. An agent who is only empowered by his principal to solicit orders for, or make sale of goods, has no implied authority to receive payment therefor or to modify, cancel or rescind the sale. 100 Ark. 363; 92 Id. 315; 94 Id. 301. The authority of an agent must be shown by positive proof or by circumstances showing satisfaction or assent to the sale or contract. 132 Ark. 155. Parties dealing with a special agent must look to his authority. 23 Id. 411; 74 Id. 557; 104 Id. 150; 132 Id. 155; 105 Id. 111. There was evidence for a jury and it was error to direct a verdict.

Rowell & Alexander, for appellees.

The court properly instructed a verdict, as under the evidence no case for a jury was made. The undisputed evidence fixed the amount of the verdict and there was no evidence to establish an issue for the appellants. 95 Ark. 488; 2 C. J. 570; 219 S. W. 319; 55 Ark. 627; 122 Id. 357. The principal is bound by the authority given to his agent and by the authority which a third person dealing with him has a right to believe has been given to him. 103 Ark. 79-86; 96 Id. 456. If the agent's authority is limited, the burden is on the principal to show that the third person had notice of same. 103 Ark. 79-86 See, also, 100 Ark. 240. Woods was instructed by appellants to buy this cotton and they are liable to appellees. 87 Ark. 374. The general rule of agency is correctly stated in 21 R. C. L. 837-8-844. Where an agent is acting for his principal, he will be presumed to be a general agent in the absence of notice to the contrary. 112 Ark. 63-8. The measure of damages was the market value of the cotton at the place of delivery at the time Wooten Company breached the contract. 134 Ark. 300. There was nothing for a jury to pass upon, and an instructed verdict was proper.

SMITH, J. This appeal comes from a judgment pronounced upon a verdict returned under the direction of the court, after the jury trying the cause had been unable to agree. As the verdict was directed against appellants, we must view the testimony in the light most favorable to their contention, and the case may be stated as follows: Appellants compose a copartnership engaged in buying cotton, with their principal office at Helena, Arkansas. Appellees compose a copartnership, and are merchants and cotton buyers, with their place of business at Portland, Arkansas. J. R. Woods was the agent of appellants, and bought cotton for them in the territory adjacent to Portland, and on September 28, 1918, bought from appellees two hundred bales of cotton for the account of appellants. Woods bought on orders given him daily by appellants, and made a report in writing at the close of each day, showing what he had bought. Appellants declined to accept certain cotton tendered in discharge of this contract, and appellee brought this suit to recover damages on that account.

At the trial from which this appeal comes Adams, who was one of the partners composing the Bain-Adams Company, testified in behalf of appellees, as did Woods. According to Adams, the sale to Woods included certain specific cotton, and all of the cotton tendered conformed to the specifications of the contract. In stating his contract with Woods, Adams testified that there was nothing said about the staple of the cotton, "only it was to be Portland." He explained that it was the early part of the season, and that the grade of all the cotton in controversy was practically the same. The testimony shows that Portland cotton classed along with what was called bayou cotton, and that this staple averaged 11-16 inches in length. The staple of other cotton grown in the same county, but away from Bayou Bartholomew, averaged less than that, and was less valuable. Woods gave testimony substantially corroborating that of Adams. He admitted that on September 29th he had wired appel

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