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acquire the title by adverse possession. We will not review those cases, as the law of the subject is well defined.

In the case of Parsons v. Sharpe, 102 Ark. 615, we said: "The rule sustained by the overwhelming weight of authority with reference to conveyances by one or more cotenants to a stranger, and the character of possession taken thereunder, is correctly stated as follows: 'The conveyance by one cotenant of the entire estate gives color of title; and if possession is taken, and the grantee claims title to the whole, it amounts to an ouster of the cotenants, and the possession of the grantee is adverse to them.' 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2 ed.), p. 806, and numerous authorities there cited.

"That rule was recognized by this court in Brown v. Bocquin, 57 Ark. 97.

"On the other hand, the principle is well settled that where a conveyance is executed to a stranger by one tenant in common, purporting to convey only his undivided interest, he becomes a tenant in common with the other tenant (17 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2 ed.), p. 661); and, in order to constitute an ouster, 'the tenant out of possession must have actual notice of the adverse holding or the hostile character of the possession must be so openly manifest that notice on his part will be presumed.' 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2 ed.), p. 805."

The cases appearing in this quotation were cited and approved in the later case of Wilson v. Storthz, 117 Ark. 14. See, also, Brashear v. Taylor, 109 Ark. 281; McKneely v. Terry, 61 Ark. 527; Cocks v. Simmons, 55 Ark. 104; Brewer v. Keeler, 42 Ark. 289.

It is the law, as was stated in the case of Wilson v. Storthz, supra, that one entering upon the possession of land, under a deed of conveyance to him is presumed to occupy, and intends to claim, only the interest named in his conveyance. But Isaiah Jackson received a deed to the whole title, and he conveyed to these defendants the whole title, and the undisputed testimony is that these defendants occupied the land, and claimed the title, under these deeds for more than seven years before the institution of this suit.

The subject under discussion is one which has frequently received attention in the annotated cases, many of which are cited in the notes to section 48 of the article on Cotenancy in 7 R. C. L., pages 854-855. Among these are Lloyd v. Mills, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702; Allen v. Morris, 29 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1310.

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In the text of the section of R. C. L. above mentioned the law is stated as follows: “Entry under conveyance of property by one cotenant. A conveyance to a stranger to the title, by one cotenant, by an instrument purporting to pass the entire title in severalty, and not merely such cotenant's individual interest, followed by an entry into actual, open and exclusive possession by such a stranger, under claim of ownership in severalty, amounts to a disseisin of the other cotenants, which, if continued for the statutory period, will ripen into good title by adverse possession. In considering this question the familiar principle is recalled that when one enters upon land, he is presumed to enter under the title which his deed purports upon its face to convey, both as respects the extent of the land and the nature of his interest." The author continues: "Therefore, in such a case, a sale of the whole tract is, in effect, such assertion of claim to the whole as is quite incompatible with an admission that the other tenant in common has any right whatever; and it follows that acts of ownership on the part of such a grantee must necessarily be adverse to any other part owner, even though, in such a case, the latter had no actual notice of the adverse character of the possession." It is stated in this same section that the authorities are conflicting on this last proposition. But it is not essential that we approve the law as thus stated to affirm the action of the court in giving instruction numbered 4, because that instruction required a finding that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the facts there hypothetically stated.

In the section quoted from it is further stated that the presumption that a grantee in possession, under a conveyance of the whole title by one tenant in common, holds adversely to the other cotenant may be overcome by words, acts and circumstances showing that at the time or subsequent to his taking possession the grantee acknowledged the rights of his cotenant. But here there is an entire absence of such testimony.

In Freeman on Cotenancy (2 ed.), § 197, the law is stated as follows: “As Color of Title: A conveyance by one cotenant, purporting to convey an estate in severalty, can not operate to the prejudice of another. This is true only so far as the immediate effect of such conveyance as a transfer of title is concerned. It does not follow that no rights can grow out of it, nor that it is, even as against the other cotenants, mere waste paper for all purposes. Such a conveyance constitutes color of title. The entry of the grantee made under the deed, and claiming an interest coextensive with that with which the deed purports to deal, is an entry under color of title. The cotenants are therefore bound to take notice of the deed and of the entry made under it, and to take such steps as may be required to enforce a recognition of their legal rights. Should they fail to do so within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, their rights will be no longer susceptible of enforcement; and their interests, by operation of that statute, will vest in the party in possession under the deed."

In the case of Newmarket v. Pendergrast, 24 N. H. 54, one of the head notes is as follows: "If a tenant in common, being in possession of the land, conveys it with a covenant of warranty against all claims and demands, possession under the deed will be adverse to the title of the other tenants in common. In such case, if the fact is found that the possession of the grantee is under his deed, it is a legal conclusion that his possession is adverse and the question is not for the jury."

What we have said is conclusive as to the claim of the plaintiff, A. D. Jackson, who has been under no disability.

It is also conclusive as to his sister and coplaintiff, Mrs. Penny. It is true Mrs. Penny was a married woman from February, 1879, until April 7, 1916, but she became discovert on the last named date, through the death of her husband, and more than three years expired thereafter before the institution of this suit. Section 5056, Kirby's Digest.

This also disposes of the claim of Mildred Huff, who was born July 16, 1897, and, therefore, became eighteen years of age on July 16, 1915, a period of more than three years before the institution of this suit. Brake v. Sides, 95 Ark. 74; Shapard v. Mixon, 122 Ark. 530.

But the instruction was not a proper one as to Carrol Huff, who did not become twenty-one years of age until July 16, 1918, which was less than a year before the institution of this suit.

The judgment of the court must, therefore, be reversed as to Carrol Huff, as the statute of limitations did not run against him on account of his infancy, and the suit was brought within three years of the time when he became of full age.

The judgment of the court will therefore be reversed, and upon the remand of the cause it will be submitted to the jury as to Carrol Huff upon the other issues involved in the case, towit, that of the exchange of the lands and that of the acquisition of the title by Isaiah Jackson himself by his own possession.

As to all other appellants the judgment is affirmed. MCCULLOCH, C. J., (dissenting). The evidence warranted the finding that the possession of Isaiah Jackson began permissively under his brothers, J. R. Jackson and Richard Jackson, and that the character of that possession continued until the time of the conveyance to him by J. R. Jackson. Isaiah was not in the attitude of a stranger to the original owners, J. R. and R. Jackson, for he occupied the land as the tenant by sufferance of the two owners, and his acceptance of the conveyance from one of them made him a tenant in common with the other. The character of the possession of appellees under the conveyance from their father, Isaiah Jackson, was not different. They resided on the place were reared there and there was no visible change of possession. So the possession, as shown by the evidence, was not necessarily hostile, and the issue should have been submitted to the jury. Instruction number 4 took that question away from the jury by declaring as a matter of law that the facts recited constituted adverse possession. When possession begins permissively, actual knowledge of adverse holding must be brought home to the owner, either directly or by notorious acts of unequivocal character. Singer v. Naron, 99 Ark. 446.

My opinion, therefore, is that the court erred in giving the instruction referred to.

ALIX COAL COMPANY v. NELSON.

Opinion delivered December 20, 1920.

MASTER AND SERVANT- ASSUMED RISK. A coal miner engaged in the day shift in driving an entry in a coal mine, and who knew that the night shift had been blasting down the roof near his working place, in view of the fact that it was his duty to look after and secure the safety of such place, will be held to have assumed, as a risk incident to his employment, that the rock in the roof of his working place might have been loosened and sprung by a false shot in the entry made by the night shift.

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court, Ozark District; James Cochran, Judge; reversed.

J. D. Benson and Pryor & Miles, for appellant.

1. Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict. Nelson was an experienced miner and knew the danger and assumed the risk. 76 Ark. 72; 97 Id. 486; 98 Id. 145; 87 N. W. 736; 114 S. W. 785; 50 N. E. 36; 71 S. W. 80,

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