mentioned in the briefs, but we do not think they are of sufficient evidentiary value to warrant discussion. The court directed a verdict in favor of appellee, and that action is assigned as error, the insistence being that a case was made for the jury. This court has had frequent occasion to define the words "accidental injury" and "accidental death." In the case of Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 595, the court approved an instruction given by the trial court, in a suit on an accident policy, "that the term 'accidental' was used in the policy in its ordinary, popular sense, as meaning 'happening by chance; unexpectedly taking place; not according to the usual course of things; or not as expected;' that, if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it can not be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means." See, also, Maloney v. Maryland Casualty Co., 113 Ark. 174; Harrison v. Business Men's Accident Assn., 133 Ark. 163; Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Chambers, 136 Ark. 84; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 128 Ark. 155. The insistence of counsel is that the death of Judge Little was brought about by his own agency, that is, that his death was the probable, and not the unexpected, result of his conduct. But the presumption is otherwise. It having been shown that Judge Little died as a result of violent and external means, the presumption is that it was accidental, and the burden is on the insurance company of showing otherwise. Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Chambers, supra. Of course, this burden could be discharged (or, at least, a question be made for the jury) by the proof of circumstances from which the inference might reasonably be drawn that the deceased was guilty of conduct which would likely or probably subject him to the injury which he sustained. But, as was said in the case of Business Men's Accident Assn. v. Cowden, 131 Ark. 419, the testimony from which the inference is to be drawn must be such as to make it reasonable and probable, and not merely speculative or conjectural. That case was a suit on an accident policy, and the verdict was directed against the insurance company. The policy provided against liability, if the insured met his death from intentional injuries inflicted by himself or others except in an assault committed for burglary or robbery. The insured in that case was found dead in the Missouri River, with a wound on the head and face that penetrated the brain and caused his death. The wound was a sharp and incised wound that did not fracture the bone or tear the flesh. It was there insisted by the insurance company that the jury should have been permitted to say how the insured came to his death. But we said the insurance company had failed to maintain the burden cast upon it to make out a defense, and that the court was correct in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, instead of submitting the case to the conjecture of the jury. Judge Little may have been guilty of a careless act in going to the window under the circumstances stated; but negligence would not defeat a recovery. See 14 R. C. L., p. 1256, and authorities cited in the note to section 435. It is probably true that the element of carelessness or negligence enters into most accidents, and such policies would be of little value, if the policyholder was insured against the consequences of those accidents only in which his own negligence played no part. We think that only by conjecture or speculation could the jury have found that Judge Little was guilty of wrongful or unlawful conduct, and if this be true there was no question for the jury, although Williams intended to hit the man at whom he shot. No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed. 1. MARSH V. STATE. Opinion delivered November 8, 1920. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-EVIDENCE OF SALE. In a prosecution for the illegal sale of whiskey, evidence of the discovery of mash, moonshine liquors, etc., in and about defendant's premises is admissible as tending to show that he was engaged in the whiskey business. 2. CRIMINAL LAW-REMARK OF COURT-ABSENCE OF OBJECTION. -In a prosecution for a criminal offense, a remark of the court made during the trial will not be considered where no objection or exception was saved thereto. 3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS QUESTION FOR JURY. In a prosecution for the illegal sale of whiskey, evidence held sufficient to carry to the jury the question of identification of defendant. Appeal from White Circuit Court; J. M. Jackson, Judge; affirmed. J. N. Rachels, for appellant. The court erred in admitting Sheriff Plant's testimony and in addressing the remarks to the prosecuting attorney in the presence of the jury during the crossexamination of R. M. Clayton; also in admitting the evidence of H. B. Rogers. This was extremely prejudicial to appellant. Without this evidence a verdict of "not guilty" would certainly have been the result. There was no competent testimony to support a verdict of guilty, and the court really should have instructed a verdict for defendant in both cases. There was no testimony that Marsh was the man who sold the whiskey to Harve Hall. Marsh was proved to be an honored citizen, without blemish or spot, until Castleberry, a lifelong bootlegger, falsely attempted to put the blame on appellant, and a new trial should be granted. John D. Arbuckle, Attorney General, and Silas W. Rogers, Assistant, for appellee. There was no error in the admission of evidence, and the instructions were correct. No proper exceptions were saved at the trial to the admission of evidence and the evidence warrants a conviction in both cases. HUMPHREYS, J. These appeals are from judgments of conviction of appellant in the White Circuit Court for the illegal sale of whiskey. The cases being against the same party and of the same general character, one opinion will suffice in both cases. The first conviction was obtained in case No. 2463 upon an indictment charging appellant with a sale of whiskey to Riley L. Castleberry, and the second upon an indictment charging him with a sale to Harve Hall. As a punishment in each case, appellant was sentenced to serve one year in the penitentiary. In the first case, or case numbered 2463, attorney for appellant admits that the testimony for and against the sale of four gallons of whiskey by appellant to Riley L. Castleberry, in December, 1919, in Pangburn, White County, Arkansas, presented an issue of fact to be determined by the jury; but contends that the court erred in permitting the sheriff, Tatum C. Plant, to testify in substance that he visited appellant's farm, across the line in Cleburne County, about ten miles from Pangburn, and found a one-gallon demijohn and a two-gallon wooden keg of moonshine whiskey buried in his garden; also a lot of mash in his smokehouse; also, five barrels of mash about one-quarter of a mile outside of his field where a still had been located; also eight or nine halfgallon fruit jars of sugar and molasses in a tow-sack in the barn. This evidence tended to show that appellant was in the whiskey business and was a circumstance tending to establish the sale of whiskey to Riley L. Castleberry. It was therefore proper to admit it for that purpose. It is insisted that the court erred in addressing the following remark to the prosecuting attorney in the presence of the jury during the cross-examination of R. M. Clayton, one of appellant's witnesses: "Court: That is one of the ingredients, isn't it? “Prosecuting Attorney: Yes, sir." The connection in which the remark of the court, and answer of the prosecuting attorney was made is as follows: R. M. Clayton was asked the following question in reference to the molasses and sugar found in the barn: "Q. It was molasses and sugar, wasn't it?" "A. It looked to me like it was molasses and sugar, or molasses that went to sugar." No objection was made or exception saved at the time to the remark of the court and the answer of the prosecuting attorney. The objection and ruling related to the question propounded by the prosecuting attorney to the witness in reference to the molasses and sugar and was proper and competent. Two questions are presented for determination on appeal in case No. 2464. The first challenged the admissibility of the evidence of H. B. Rogers, in substance similar to that of Tatum Plant adduced by the State in case No. 2463; and to the evidence of Harve Hall, Ralph M. Jones and Ezra Marsh, concerning the purchase of whiskey at a later date by them from appellant near his farm in Cleburné County. The competency of this evidence was discussed in case No. 2463. For the same reason there assigned, the evidence was admissible in this case. The second question challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to identify appellant as the party who made the sale of whiskey in Pangburn to Harve Hall. Harve Hall testified that he bought a gallon and a half of whiskey from a man they called S. A. Marsh, in Pangburn, on or about the first of May, 1920; that he paid him $30 for it in a check made payable to S. A. Marsh; that the man from whom he purchased the whiskey looked like appellant except that appellant's beard at the time of the trial was a whole lot longer and some whiter than the beard worn by the man from whom he bought it; that he afterwards went in a car to Cleburne County with Ralph Jones, Charley Marsh and Asa Marsh, and met the man |