dent. It has already been maintained (and it is not conceivable that the resolution of the Senate can be based on any other principle) that the secretary of the treasury is the officer of Congress, and independent of the Presi dent; that the President has no right to control him, and consequently none to remove him. With the same propriety, and on similar grounds, may the secretary of state, the secretaries of war and the navy, and the postmastergeneral, each in succession, be declared independent of the President, and subordinates of Congress, and removable only with the concurrence of the Senate. Followed to its consequences, this principle will be found effectually to destroy one co-ordinate department of the government, to concentrate in the hands of the Senate the whole executive power, and to leave the President as powerless as he would be useless, the shadow of authority after the substance had departed.

The time and the occasion which have called forth the resolution of the Senate, seem to impose upon me an additional obligation not to pass it over in silence. Nearly forty-five years had the President exercised, without a question as to his rightful authority, those powers for the recent resumption of which he is now denounced. The vicissitudes of peace and war had attended our government, violent parties, watchful to take advantage of any seeming usurpation on the part of the executive, had distracted our counsels; frequent removals, or forced resignations in every sense tantamount to remo vals, had been made by the secretary and other officers of the treasury; and yet in no one instance is it known that any man, whether patriot or parti san, had raised his voice against it as a violation of the constitution. The expediency and justice of such changes, in reference to public officers of all grades, have frequently been the topics of discussion; but the constitutional right of the President to appoint, control, and remove the head of the trea sury, as well as all other departments, seems to have been universally conceded. And what is the occasion upon which other principles have been first officially asserted? The Bank of the United States, a great moneyed monopoly, had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter, by controlling the elections of the people, and the action of the government. The use of its corporate funds and power in that attempt, was fully disclosed; and it was made known to the President that the corporation was putting in train the same course of measures, with the view of making another vigorous effort, through an interference in the election of the people, to control public opinion, and force the government to yield to its demands. This, with its corruption of the press, its violation of its charter, its exclusion of the govern ment directors from its proceedings, its neglect of duty, and arrogant pretensions, made it, in the opinion of the President, incompatible with the public interest and the safety of our institutions, that it should be longer employed as the fiscal agent of the treasury. A secretary of the treasury, appointed in the recess of the Senate, who had not been confirmed by that body, and whom the President might or might not at his pleasure nominate to them, refused to do what his superior in the executive department considered the most imperative of his duties, and became in fact, however innocent his motives, the protector of the bank. And on this occasion it is discovered, for the first time, that those who framed the constitution misunderstood it; that the first Congress and all its successors have been under a delusion; that the practice of nearly forty-five years is but a continued usurpation; that the secretary of the treasury is not responsible to the President, and that to remove him is a violation of the constitution and laws,

for which the President deserves to stand for ever dishonored on the journals of the Senate.

There are also some other circumstances connected with the discussion and passage of the resolution, to which I feel it to be not only my right but my duty to refer. It appears by the journal of the Senate, that among the twenty-six senators who voted for the resolution on its final passage, and who had supported it in debate in its original form, were, one of the senators from the state of Maine, the two senators from New Jersey, and one of the senators from Ohio. It also appears by the same journal, and by the files of the Senate, that the legislatures of those states had severally expressed their opinions in respect to the executive proceedings drawn in question before the Senate.

The two branches of the legislature of the state of Maine, on the 25th January, 1834, passed a preamble and series of resolutions in the following words: Whereas, at an early period after the election of Andrew Jackson to the presidency, in accordance with the sentiments which he had uniformly expressed, the attention of Congress was called to the constitutionality and expediency of the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank; and whereas the bank has transcended its chartered limits in the management of its business transactions, and has abandoned the object of its creation, by engaging in political controversies, by wielding its power and influence to embarrass the administration of the general government, and by bringing insolvency and distress upon the commercial community; and whereas, the public security from such an institution consists less in its present pecuniary capacity to discharge its liabilities than in the fidelity with which the trusts reposed in it have been executed; and whereas, the abuse and misapplication of the powers conferred have destroyed the confidence of the public in the officers of the bank, and demonstrated that such powers endangered the stability of republican institutions: therefore,

Resolved, That in the removal of the public deposites from the Bank of the United States, as well as in the manner of their removal, we recognise in the administration an adherence to constitutional rights, and the performance of a public duty.

Resolved, That this legislature entertain the same opinion as heretofore expressed by preceding legislatures of this state, that the Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered.

"Resolved, That the senators of this state in the Congress of the United States be instructed, and the representatives be requested to oppose the restoration of the deposites and the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank."

On the 11th of January, 1834, the House of Assembly and Council composing the legislature of the state of New Jersey, passed a preamble and a series of resolutions, in the following words:

"Whereas the present crisis in our public affairs calls for a decided expression of the voice of the people of this state; and whereas we consider it the undoubted right of the legislatures of the several states to instruct those who represent their interests in the councils of the nation, in all matters which intimately concern the public weal, and may affect the happiness or well-being of the people; therefore

"1. Be it resolved by the Council and General Assembly of this state, That while we acknowledge with feelings of devout gratitude our obligations to the great Ruler of nations for his mercies to us as a people, that we

have been preserved alike from foreign war, from the evils of internal commotions, and the machinations of designing and ambitious men, who would prostrate the fair fabric of our Union; that we ought, nevertheless, to humble ourselves in his presence and implore his aid for the perpetuation of our republican institutions, and for a continuance of that unexampled prosperity which our country has hitherto enjoyed.

"2. Resolved, That we have undiminished confidence in the integrity and firmness of the venerable patriot who now holds the distinguished post of chief magistrate of this nation, and whose purity of purpose and elevated motives have so often received the unqualified approbation of a large majority of his fellow citizens.

3. Resolved, That we view with agitation and alarm the existence of a great moneyed incorporation, which threatens to embarrass the operations of the government, and by means of its unbounded influence upon the cur rency of the country, to scatter distress and ruin throughout the community; and that we, therefore, solemnly believe the present Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered.

"4. Resolved, That our senators in Congress be instructed, and our members of the House of Representatives be requested, to sustain, by their votes and influence, the course adopted by the secretary of the treasury, Mr. Taney, in relation to the Bank of the United States and the deposites of the government moneys, believing as we do the course of the secretary to have been constitutional, and that the public good required its adoption.

"5. Resolved, That the governor be requested to forward a copy of the above resolutions to each of our senators and representatives from this state, in the Congress of the United States."

On the 21st of February last, the legislature of the same state reiterated the opinions and instructions before given, by joint resolutions, in the follow ing words:

"Resolved by the Council and General Assembly of the state of New Jersey, That they do adhere to the resolutions passed by them on the 11th day of January last, relative to the President of the United States, the Bank of the United States, and the course of Mr. Taney in removing the gov ernment deposites.

"Resolved, That the legislature of New Jersey have not seen any reason to depart from such resolutions since the passage thereof; and it is their wish that they should receive from our senators and representatives of this state in the Congress of the United States, that attention and obedience which are due to the opinion of a sovereign state, openly expressed in its legislative capacity."

On the 2d of January, 1834, the Senate and House of Representatives composing the legislature of Ohio passed a preamble and resolution in the following words:

"Whereas there is reason to believe that the Bank of the United States will attempt to obtain a renewal of its charter at the present session of Congress: And whereas, it is abundantly evident that the said bank has exercised powers derogatory to the spirit of our free institutions and dangerous to the liberties of these United States. And whereas, there is just reason to doubt the constitutional power of Congress to grant acts of incorporation for banking purposes out of the District of Columbia. And whereas, we believe the proper disposal of the public lands to be of the utmost impor tance to the people of these United States, and that honor and good faith require their equitable distribution: Therefore,

"Resolved by the General Assembly of the state of Ohio, That we consider the removal of the public deposites from the Bank of the United States as required by the best interests of our country, and that a proper sense of public duty imperiously demanded that that institution should be no longer used as a depository of the public funds.

"Resolved, also, That we view, with decided disapprobation, the renewed attempts in Congress to secure the passage of the bill provided for the disposal of the public domain upon the principle proposed by Mr. Clay, inasmuch as we believe that such a law would be unequal in its operations, and unjust in its results.

"Resolved, also, That we heartily approve of the principles set forth in the late veto message upon that subject, and

"Resolved, That our senators in Congress be instructed, and our representatives requested, to use their influence to prevent the rechartering of the Bank of the United States; to sustain the administration in its removal of the public deposites; and to oppose the passage of a land bill containing the principles adopted in the act upon that subject passed at the last session of Congress.

"Resolved, That the governor be requested to transmit copies of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to each of our senators and representatives."

It is thus seen that four senators have declared by their votes that the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the revenue, had been guilty of the impeachable offence of "assuming upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both," whilst the legislatures of their respective states had deliberately approved those very proceedings, as consistent with the constitution and demanded by the public good. If these four votes had been given in accordance with the sentiments of the legislatures, as above expressed, there would have been but twenty-four votes out of forty-six for censuring the President, and the unprecedented record of his conviction could not have been placed upon the journals of the Senate.

In thus referring to the resolutions and instructions of the state legislatures, I disclaim and repudiate all authority or design to interfere with the responsibility due from members of the Senate to their own consciences, their constituents, and their country. The facts now stated belong to the history of these proceedings, and are important to the just development of the principles and interests involved in them, as well as to the proper vindication of the executive department; and with that view, and that view only, are they here made the topic of remark.

The dangerous tendency of the doctrine which denies to the President the power of supervising, directing, and removing the secretary of the treasury in like manner with other executive officers, would soon be manifest in practice, were the doctrine to be established. The President is the direct representative of the American people, but the secretaries are not. If the secretary of the treasury be independent of the President in the execution of the laws, then is there no direct responsibility to the people in that important branch of this government, to which is committed the care of the national finances. And it is in the power of the bank of the United States, or any other corporation, body of men, or individuals, if a secretary shall be found to accord with them in opinion, or can be induced in practice to promote their views, to control through him the whole action of gov

ernment (so far as it is exercised by his department,) in defiance of the chief magistrate elected by the people and responsible to them.

But the evil tendency of the particular doctrine adverted to, though superficially serious, would be as nothing in comparison with the pernicious consequences which would inevitably flow from the high approbation and allowance by the people, and the practice by the Senate, of the unconstitutional power of arraigning and censuring the official conduct of the execu tive, in the manner recently pursued. Such proceedings are eminently calculated to unsettle the foundations of the government; to disturb the harmonious action of its different departments; and to break down the checks and balances by which the wisdom of its framers sought to ensure its stability and usefulness.

The honest differences of opinion which occasionally exist between the Senate and the President, in regard to matters in which both are obliged to participate, are sufficiently embarrassing. But if the course recently adopted by the Senate shall hereafter be frequently pursued, it is not only obvious that the harmony of the relations between the President and the Senate will be destroyed, but that other and graver effects will ultimately ensue. If the censures of the Senate be submitted to by the President, the confidence of the people in his ability and virtue, and the character and usefulness of his administration will soon be at an end, and the real power of the government will fall into the hands of a body, holding their offices for long terms, not elected by the people, and not to them directly responsi ble. If, on the other hand, the illegal censures of the Senate should be resisted by the President, collisions and angry controversies might ensue, discreditable in their progress, and in the end compelling the people to adopt the conclusion, either that their chief magistrate was unworthy of their respect, or that the Senate was chargeable with calumny and injustice. Either of these results would impair public confidence in the perfection of the system, and lead to serious alterations of its framework, or to the practi cal abandonment of some of its provisions.

The influence of such proceedings on the other departments of the gov ernment, and more especially on the states, could not fail to be extensively pernicious. When the judges, in the last resort of official misconduct, them. selves overleaped the bounds of their authority, as prescribed by the constitution, what general disregard of its provisions might not their example be expected to produce? And who does not perceive that such contempt of the federal constitution, by one of its most important departments, would hold out the strongest temptations to resistance on the part of the state sovereignties, whenever they shall suppose their just rights to have been inva ded? Thus all the independent departments of the government, and the states which compose our confederated union, instead of attending to their appropriate duties, and leaving those who may offend to be reclaimed or punished in the manner pointed out in the constitution, would fall to mutual crimination and recrimination, and give to the people confusion and anarchy, instead of order and law; until at length some form of aristocratic power would be established on the ruins of the constitution, or the states be broken into separate communities.

Far be it from me to charge, or to insinuate, that the present Senate of the United States intended, in the most distant way, to encourage such a result. It is not of their motives or designs, but only of the tendency of their acts, that it is my duty to speak. It is, if possible, to make Senators themselves