Net $3.00

Net $1.50

THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE

APOCALYPSE

By VICENTE BLASCO IBANEZ. Net $1.90 Authorized Translation by Charlotte Brewster Jordan. A superb drama of modern life, leading up to and describing the first stage of the great War in France. The "Four Horsemen" are Pestilence, War, Famine and Death, who precede the Great Beast of the Book of Revelations.

The work of a great genius stirred to the bottom of his soul by the weeks of tension, violence and horror which culminated in the great epic of the Battle of the Marne, and by the splendor of the Spirit of France under the Trial.

WORK-A-DAY WARRIORS

Written and Illustrated by JOSEPH LEE. Net $1.50 Illustrates in moving verse the arduous realities and infinite humors of the soldier's life on the battlefield of Flanders and France.

BRITIAN AFTER THE PEACE

Revolution or Reconstruction.
By BROUGHAM VILLIERS.

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It is here argued that the problem of reconstruction after the war is essentially a revolutionary one, in the sense that implies the making of fundamental changes in a rapid manner instead of by the slower methods of reform and evolution. To attempt to show how this revolution may be carried out in a peaceful way, " in due form of law," avoiding violence, is the purpose of this work, which deals in a vigorous and independent way with the problems of demobilization, industrial control, taxation, agricultural reform and small holdings, the probable effects of the war in foreign countries, the foreign policy of the future, and the reaction of European politics on British problems. The book sets forth no Utopian schemes, but is a sane effort at constructive imagination, and will be welcomed as an important contribution to the discussion of the Problems of the Peace.

THE FABRIC OF DREAMS

By KATHERINE TAYLOR CRAIG.

Net $2.50

In this comprehensive volume, Mrs. Craig, the talented occultist, brings together from widely scattered sources, many of them inaccessible to the ordinary reader, the facts and the theories about dreams from the earliest dawn of human history to the latest psycho-analytical discoveries of Freud and Jung.

In addition she describes the best-authenticated instances of dream fulfilment, deals with the different old and new systems of dream interpretation and dream symbolism, and gives a very full and valuable reference list of dream symbols.

THE BELOVED CAPTAIN AND OTHER

SKETCHES

In the years intervening between the close of the sixteenth century and the end of the seventeenth, the English made their initial efforts to establish themselves as traders in the East. It was the age of the merchant adventurer-the true adventurer who seeks fortune by his daring enterprise and his mother wit. Tragedy and comedy mingled their elements in what was in essence one of the most romantic dramas of the world's history. The author's aim has not been so much to write exhaustive history as to bring into prominence the personalities of those engaged in this great work-those men who started out to build up a commercial connection and ended in laying the foundation of a dominion over alien peoples more wonderful than that of Rome in her palmiest days.

FURTHER INDISCRETIONS

By A WOMAN OF NO IMPORTANCE. Net $5.00 "There are not enough indiscretions," was the only criticism leveled at "Memories Discreet and Indiscreet," one of the most successful volumes of reminiscences of recent years. "A Woman of No Importance" therefore decided to be more indiscreet.

Among those who appear in the pages of her new volume are Queen Victoria, Queen Alexandra, King Edward VII, the Duke of Connaught, Cardinal Vaughan, Archbishop Temple, Lord Brampton, "Old

A. J. Balfour, Mrs. Langtry, the ubiquitous German Emperor, Joseph Chamberlain, Henry Labouchere, to name only a few.

WHEN CHENAL SINGS THE
"MARSEILLAISE" and Other Sketches.

By WYTHE WILLIAMS, author of "Passed by the
Censor."
Net 50c.
This description of Chenal's singing of the "Marseil-
laise" will take its place in the literature of the war.
It is a masterpiece.

Net $2.00

Hellmuth, whose incredible Graeco-German tragedies were a "compound of Ibsen, Homer and Oscar Wilde-and a few manuals of archaeology." Never Greek at all, except in their borrowed outlines; they were a parade of pretentious and neurasthentic characters that are related far less to the spirit of Sophocles than to the studies of Dr. Freud; their mixture of impotence and intensity is a rich mine for the psychoanalyst.

Mr.

Yet

The same characteristics, in a more restricted field, are true of von Hofmannsthal's lyrical poems. The sense of frustration and defeat, of discomfort in the presence of ordinary things, of a retreat into equivocal mysticism, is the outstanding feature of his verse. It is, like so much contemporary work, the art of evasion, of an inability to meet life frankly on its own harsh and uneven terms. Stork in his introduction only half agrees with Professor Grumann's objection that von Hofmannsthal's lyrics are "pervaded by an atmosphere acquired by idling in art museums rather than in immediate contact with life." Mr. Stork himself, conceding that von Hofmannsthal's interest in " a given idea, scene or personality is only for the purpose of arriving at some philosophical conclusion," states with a fine ambiguity, " He does not wish human emotion to disturb him in his attempt to contemplate reality," and concludes this confusing line of thought by fatuously adding "In The Two he symbolizes admirably the mysterious relation of sex to sex, but we who read instead of being stirred to a poignant feeling of pity, are only impelled to murmur: 'How strange is truth!'"

Mr. Stork does not make matters clearer by his translations, which seldom rise above a workmanlike level. At the Outward Life is an awkward piece of terza rima, World Secret is an almost unintelligible attempt at profundity, and Life-Song has thirty-two lines of such "elusive suggestive

VOLUME XVI

N his Labor Day address President Wilson has once more defined the war as it appears to the American people, a war of emancipation against "governments like that which after long premeditation drew Austria and Germany into this war," which plot "while honest men work, laying the fires of which innocent men, women and children are the fuel." Hohenzollernism must go: that is the gist of the President's declaration and of the American people's conviction about this war. The overwise minority will raise their brows. Germany may be invaded, devastated, her foreign influence destroyed, her economic future compromised; but how effect a divorce between the German people and the kind of government they want? "The kind of government they want ": who knows what that is? We know the kind of government they have. It is more firmly rooted in the national traditions and habits of loyalty than were the governments of the third or even the first Napoleon. Those governments fell when their ambitions involved the French people in utter disaster. The test of German loyalty not merely to the Hohenzollerns, but to the Hohenzollerns vested with auto

Number 201

cratic power, is coming when it becomes necessary to defend the Fatherland not on the soil of France but on German soil; when the pleasant towns and cities destroyed by retreating German armies are German, not French or Belgian. Hohenzollernism has lived upon the record of success upon success in the extension of the borders of the Fatherland. But the world means to attach a colossal failure to the Hohenzollern record. The borders of the Fatherland are to recede. Not even the German autocracy itself can expect to command the old loyalty of the people in the face of such a disaster.

S

EIZURE of German shipping by Spain is an event no German would have deemed possible a year ago. Spain was depended on as safely proGerman, partly because of ancient Spanish grudges against Anglo-Saxondom, but more especially because of the supposed potency in Spain of German intrigue. Spanish political life has not been stable for generations. Revolution is an ever present menace to the monarchy, and the Germans played up their influence with the revolutionists for all it was worth. It is no longer worth anything. No revolutionary faction would be mad enough to compromise itself with the declining fortunes of Germany. The Spanish government is therefore able safely to shape its policies according to its natural sympathies and interest. These policies are still neutral, but they may not be neutral much longer. For we can hardly imagine that Germany is ready as yet to acknowledge her impotence by acquiescing in the seizure of her ships. A diplomatic break is almost inevitable, followed by an intensified warfare against Spanish shipping. In this event, a declaration of war by Spain is not at all improbable. It must again be impressed upon the Germans that beyond the range of their guns they have no friends. Was there ever in history a nation so completely isolated, morally? So long as the memory of this war endures, it is unlikely that any statesman of intelligence will regard ruthlessness as a policy of expediency.

A

CCORDING to the calculations of M. André Chéradame, published in the New York Times of August 25th and September 1st, German man power is much less seriously depleted than is generally assumed by Allied commentators. On the basis of twenty for every one hundred of the population Germany had in 1914 13,600,000 potential soldiers. Since 1914 this figure has been modified by definitive losses of 4,800,000 up to June 1, 1918, calculated from information M. Chéradame vouches for as particularly authoritative. To this figure he adds 500,000 for men wounded or sick in hospitals, which may be treated as a constant, thus making a total of 5,300,000 put out of action. But four annual contingents, aggregating 2,900,000 men, have been mobilized, as a partial offset to the battle losses. Deducting the losses of 5,300,000 from the original 13,600,000 and adding the 2,900,000 to the remainder, we arrive at the figure of 11,200,000 as the total man power of Germany on June 1, 1918. These computations would allow for 7,000,000 on the western front and over four millions for the manifold services in the rear, in Russia and Turkey, etc. If they are to be accepted as valid, we must recognize that it is a long road still to be traversed before we can win the war by frontal attacks in the west alone. If it has taken four years for France and England, supported for most of the time by Russia, to reduce German man power from 13,600,000 to 11,200,000, how many years will it take for France and England, aided by America, to destroy enough Germans to make feasible the project of carrying the war across the Rhine? The prospect is appalling.

B

UT are not M. Chéradame's figures excessive? Is it really true that there were in 1914 13,600,000 Germans capable of bearing arms? Our own census figures indicate a male population, from the beginning of the 17th year to the end of the 44th, approximately 23 per cent of the aggregate. The German percentage may be assumed to be somewhat less, since immigration has swelled the proportion of males between these ages in America. But assuming that the German percentage is equal to ours, it would still be necessary to take 85 men out of every 100 to produce a total of 13,600,000. There is no state so healthy as to have so large a percentage of its males fit for military service. Again, if 2,900,000 men attained military age in the four year period, 1,500,ooo passed beyond it. Doubtless most of these men have been held to service in spite of their advancing years, but they could hardly be counted as first class fighting men. Finally, does M. Chéradame allow for the normal death rate in his calculations

of losses? At the very lowest, this rate would be 10 per 1,000 for the entire group, or over 500,000 for the four years. All these considerations lead us to the surmise that there are not really 11,200,000 fighting Germans confronting us, but a decidedly smaller number, perhaps not more than 9,000,000. That is enough, however, to support M. Chéradame's contention that we ought not to fix our attention exclusively upon military means and the western front. Time may yet prove that the shortest road is through the Balkans.

L

ENIN, apparently, has escaped death once more. It is probably well for Russia. He is not the dictator of the Soviet republic, but he is even more essential to its existence than a dictator. For him economic revolution and the establishment of a new order is everything. While the Tsar still reigned, Lenin rejoiced in Russian defeat, as bringing the revolution nearer. He was ready to sign a shameful peace, not because he was a pacifist but because with peace he believed that he could carry the revolution through in the greater part of the Russian domain and establish a centre from which revolutionary influences could play steadily upon the reactionary monarchy to the west, disintegrating it and preparing the way for the great proletarian war of revenge which should remake European civilization. It is probable that in the first flush of revolutionary success he believed that the Soviet form of organization contained within it all the resources necessary for the material and moral welfare of the people. But after a brief experience with actual government he has come to a realization that in the period of transition, at least, many of the forms of capitalism must be tolerated. For this reason he has been bitterly assailed as faithless to the socialistic ideal, just as he has been assailed as faithless to pacifism because of his avowal of an intent to try conclusions with the German monarchy as soon as the Soviet republic shall have attained the necessary stability and power. These departures from the received doctrines of socialism and pacifism offer evidence, however, of a mind capable of readjusting itself to practical life. If Lenin lives to a more settled time he will probably come to be regarded by the extremists as a base example of compromise, but as a statesman of no mean ability by those who now most severely condemn him.

HE Detroit Convention of the Poles of America, complained of by liberal Poles as reactionary in purpose and autocratic in method, has come to an end. Its decisions, affecting some three or four million Poles, were made for the most part in secret sessions, and are withheld from the