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It is a tragic spectacle, but perhaps no whit more tragic than our own determination to misunderstand events in Russia. There, too, we welcomed with enthusiasm a Revolution which we fondly hoped would follow the classic model of 1688. The conditions were unfavorable to that synthesis; a new class swept into power. The old Europe, unaccustomed even to the theory of proletarian government, except as a nightmare to be dealt with by the magistrate, turned as in 1790, from uncritical enthusiasm to obstinate hatred. It did not matter that it could not really know even the largest outlines of the fast-changing scene. knew only that there was a war and that Russia had ceased to fight. It pictured the new rulers as a grasping race of fanatics who had betrayed a sacred cause. There is a grim irony in the thought; protest against revolution in the name of freedom from those whose gold betrayed it a decade before. Nor is the fashion in which the new Russia has been invaded dissimilar to that of France. It would have been easy to recognize her government, to assist in her reconstruction that she might ring round Germany with a fence of liberal thought. So France looked to England in 1792; it appeared impossible, as M. Chardon well says, that the nation which had created representative government should not, as the parent, welcome its latest offspring. So Russia looked to England and France and America in our own day.

It will always be one of the great problems of historical enquiry as to why each age is unreceptive to its own novelties. Habit and fear, doubtless, account for much; for routine prevents the spending of that thought which is the chief direction of economy. Receptiveness to new ideas is yet the one sure hope we have against the pain of disorder. Reform if you would preserve, is as Macaulay said, the one sure lesson of events; it is also the one text for the preaching of which the prophet is certain of his neighbors' stones. There have, indeed, been men in the past who with a firm hand could feel the pulse of their generation. Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green, all of them, in the scholar's silent fashion, laid the foundation of changes more beneficent than those wrought by all the statesmen of their century. Of Cobden and Bright, perhaps in less degree, the same remark may be made. A fresh and eager welcome to what is unaccustomed cannot, perhaps, mark the acts of men who hold the reins of power. By what they are they stand as the symbol of set order and tradition. They lack the enthusiasm of youth. Experience has sobered them into that caution which is the parent of inaction. It may well be that, as with Fox, the supreme gesture must come from one uncharged with the responsibilities of power. The leader of an opposition can legislate only by prevention. It is his to give counsel and warning, to interpret the event rather than to meet it. In such an aspect, it may well seem the gravest of our misfortunes that the war, as in the Napoleonic period, has destroyed the system of parliamentary opposition. For, in so doing, it has made us as men whose tongues will not utter the fears and hopes within our hearts. H. J. L.

Contributors

ELIZABETH SHEPLEY SURGEANT, is the author of French Perspectives. Has been in France for several months and is contributing a series of articles to the New Republic.

WALTER PRITCHARD HATON, is a writer and dramatie critic. Author of The American Stage of Today, Boy Scouts in the White Mountains.

ERNEST POOLE, an American, returned from Russia some months age. Author of The Harbor, His Family, His Second Wife.

ONE KILLS the Hun, the other kills his hope. And to kill his hope of victory is as essential right now as to kill his fighting hordes. For while hope lasts, the Wolf of Prussia will force his subject soldiers to the fighting line.

We have floated other loans, built a great fleet of ships, sunk pirate submarines, sent our men across and shown the Kaiser's generals what American dash and grit and initiative can do. The Hun has felt the sting of our bullets and the thrust of our bayonets. He is beginning to understand America Aroused-to dread the weight of our arms and energy.

This is a crucial moment. Nothing can so smother the Hun morale, so blast his hopes, as a further message from a hundred million Freemen, a message that says in tones that cannot be misunderstood, "Our lives, our dollars, our ALL these are in the fight for that Liberty which was made sacred by the sacrifices of our forefathers."

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VOLUME XVI

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F. H. 376 S. B. 377 F. G. 378

ONCLUSIVENESS is the keynote of the President's reply to the German government. No doubt is left as to the final terms of peace. They are the President's general terms, already known to the world. No doubt is left as to the manner in which those terms will be carried out in detail. There will be haggling with Germany, but the nations associated against Germany will by the conditions of the armistice hold in their hands "the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German government has agreed." The terms of the armistice are equally unambiguous. It will not be one which corresponds with the respective "standards of power" of the belligerents, but one "which will make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible." There are no new conditions as to changes in the German government that must precede an armistice. On the contrary. The armistice terms, more drastic than any that have ever been proposed to a nation still capable of fighting, are explicitly defended on the ground that the German government is one that cannot be trusted. Apparently in law, certainly

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in fact, the King of Prussia still holds control of the army. No matter what constitutional changes may have been effected, the army, if presented with the alternative, would obey the Kaiser rather than the Reichstag. It is then not so much the will of any popular government in Germany, but the power that the President distrusts, so long as the German army remains powerful. He will not run the risk of counter-revolution against the government with which we may treat. The character of the present government, then, is no obstacle to the opening of peace negotiations, granted that it accepts the armistice proposals. But let it be noted, when it comes to the final conclusion of peace, the present government will not do. "In concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany." That means thoroughgoing constitutional reform actually effected, not partial constitutional reform merely promised.

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T first blush, it may seem that there is not a chance in the world that Germany will accept such terms. Can Germany consent to deliver up her border fortresses, disarm and demobilize her armies, yield control of her navy, in short, throw herself defenceless upon the mercy of her enemies? Would she not prefer to fight to the end? This will no doubt be the first impulse of the German people. And yet there are powerful reasons impelling the German people, if not the German government, to an acceptance of the President's terms. Under them they are assured a just peace, if a harsh one. They must make up their minds to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and of Prussian Poland. They must submit to reparative indemnities for acts in contravention of international law on land and sea. They must reform their constitution under alien command. But they need not fear the wresting away of true German soil

on the left bank of the Rhine. They will not need to stagger under punitive indemnities. There will be no economic boycott declared against them. This is what President Wilson offers as the price of submission. But what if, after the armistice, our Allies disclosed an intention of disregarding the President's principles, which, so far as the public knows, have never received full endorsement? The President specifically engages to secure such endorsement before the matter of the armistice moves farther. "The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the governments with which the government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated," their military advisers be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms on which an armistice will be granted. The President does not ask the Germans to disarm on the strength of engagements by the United States alone, but on those of all the Allied governments. The Germans must make themselves helpless, but before they have to do this they will have the word of honor of the whole Allied world that the peace will embody the principles of international justice to which they have already given their formal acceptance.

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HE most flagrant weakness of the German position is not military. It consists in the state of mind of the civilian population. They seem almost incapable of continuing the war. The President is building his whole policy on this warweariness. He hopes by the nature of the conditions preliminary to peace negotiations to evoke a more trustworthy Germany which can enter on equal terms into the future Society of Nations. He could never accomplish this by diplomacy alone. But neither will it be accomplished merely by force. The result of an exclusive policy of force would be to destroy the present coalition of parties in Germany and stimulate either a Junker or a Bolshevik revolution. Both of these alternatives would produce anarchy in Germany and throughout Middle Europe and would result in the perpetuation of militarism, not in its destruction. This was the meaning of the interview of Lord Milner, head of the British War Office, which was given out in London last week. The Allies doubtless have it in their power to kill political moderation in Germany, just as they and Germany together killed it in Russia, but is it worth while? Will the civilization which they represent gain any advantage from offering the German people a choice between Junkerism and Bolshevism?

NE section of American public opinion is in danger of ignoring the most fundamental aspect of the politics of war. A belligerent nation can achieve victory in a war by one of two ways. It can annihilate the army of the enemy and then impose its own terms regardless of the enemies' interests or feelings. Or it can declare in advance its political objects, and abandon fighting as soon as it has sufficient assurance that the enemy consents to accept them. It is the second of these methods which President Wilson adopted when America entered the war. He defined a group of war aims which were to constitute the test of political victory, and the acceptance of which by the enemy would bring peace. The British Premier followed in this respect the President's example. Last July he stated that if "the Kaiser and his advisers are prepared to accept" the President's conditions, "he can have peace not only with America but with Great Britain and France." Mr. Wilson is committed by every obligation of good faith to carry through this democratic political strategy and so are the American people. It is the only method which makes war subservient to political principle, and which prevents war from becoming a dangerous and eventually a culpable obsession. A democracy is not only bound in honor not to wage war except for a wholly justifiable political purpose which cannot be realized in any other way, but it is equally bound in honor not to continue a war, the political purposes of which are already achieved. The President's political strategy is being justified by the event. The purposes for which America entered this war are on the verge of achievement in so far as they are capable of achievement by victorious force. War dominated by a political purpose has saved civilization and Europe from Kaiserism. War released from political restraints may plunge it into Bolshevism. Peace will soon be necessary not only to consummate the victory over Kaiserism but to safeguard the world against its threatening anthesis.

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N the great majority of states the most effective way in which a liberal voter can use his suffrage on behalf of liberalism at the coming election is to support the President by voting for the Democratic congressional candidates, but the occasional exceptions are of the utmost importance. There are a few districts and a few states west of the Mississippi in which the National party is running candidates with some hope of success, and wherever the nominees of this party have any chance of success they, rather than the Democratic nominee, can put in a persuasive argument for the suffrages of the pro-war radicals. The candidates of the National party are pledged to support the President in his war and peace policies. If any one of them is elected he will in these essential matters strengthen rather than weaken the administration, but they are also pledged, as the Democratic candidates are not, to progressivism in the treatment of post-war economic and social problems. The organization of the National party has lacked the resources or the opportunity to put many candidates in the field, but it has selected certain districts in Washington, Montana, Minnesota to contest, and in several of these districts its candidates have more than a fighting chance of success. It is of the utmost importance that a few of them should succeed. Regular party politicians need to be emphatically reminded of the growth of a radical movement in this country, one which aims at socialization as contrasted with socialism and which is disgusted with the intellectual and moral stagnation of the two older parties.

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HE most significant aspect of Mr. Calderwood's candidacy as well as that of Miss Rankin's for the Montana Senatorship is the source from which their support is coming. Both of them are endorsed by the Non-Partisan League, and in some measure by local labor organizations. Such endorsement is indispensable. The future of the National party depends on the ability of its leaders to organize and maintain a large following among the farmers and wage-earners. The Progressive party failed because it remained to such large extent a middle-class organization. The National party must secure effective support from all classes, but particularly from those who have most reason to be interested in a new and more humane social order. In Montana and Minnesota its brand of radicalism is arousing interest among the farmers and wage-earners, because the people of those states resent the unscrupulous way in which business and commercial organizations have labored to capitalize the war for the benefit of a class interest. The workmen's support may or may not be sufficient to elect Miss Rankin and Mr. Calderwood, but the agitation in these states is prophetic of a political revolt which will assume large proportions as soon as the war is over. West of the Mississippi River the people are keenly interested in liberalizing and socializing the work of domestic reconstruction. They know from hard experience how little they can trust the old parties to carry out a sincere and thoroughgoing programme of social legislation. The National party is the only political organization now in sight which sees the need of allaying this social unrest and satisfying social aspirations, and if it can put up a good showing this fall it may fall heir to a great opportunity and a great task.

F the several elections contested with some chance of success by the National party, the fight against Senator Nelson for the Minnesota senatorship is much the most significant and important. In this instance the Democrats have declined to nominate a candidate, and Willis G Calderwood, Senator Nelson's opponent, has a clear title to the support both of the Democratic and Liberal voters. Since the Democrats originally decided not to contest Senator Nelson's reelection, conditions have radically changed. Republican opposition to the President's management of the peace discussions is growing, and if it should continue to gather until a break occurs Senator Nelson would naturally go with his party. A Minnesota Democrat who votes for him runs the risk of contributing to the election of a man who may within a few weeks or months be doing his best to defeat Mr. Wilson's method of bringing the war to a satisfactory conclusion. As to the nonpartisan liberals and radicals, Mr. Calderwood's title to their support is flawless. Senator Nelson can be fairly described as an honest, instinctive and incorrigible conservative. Minnesota is a state with progressive tendencies and its Senators must occasionally vote for progressive measures, but he has never shown any understanding of progressivism or any faith in it. He will bring a dogmatic, unawakened and reactionary mind to the problems of resconstruction.

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LL that Japan wants in Russia is the exclusion of German influence, and a responsible government, "whether Bolshevik or otherwise." Such is the announcement of Premier Hara, and it may be taken as the more authoritative because of the fact that the government over which Premier Hara presides represents rather the new commercial Japan than the old military autocratic order. Essentially, the policy is one of hands off, and taken in connection with the withdrawal of the CzechoSlovaks from Samara, it may foreshadow an important change in the Allied attitude toward the Russian republic. Intervention in Russia was defended on the ground that in order to defeat Germany the eastern front had to be reconstituted. But now nothing is more certain than that Germany will have been defeated long before any forces can possibly be constituted on Germany's eastern front. Shall we then go ahead with intervention in order to right Russia's internal affairs? Japan, apparently, would rather not. And one reason for this is that there is a brilliant future for Japanese trade in Siberia, and even in Russia proper, if the Russians can be convinced that Japan has no designs either against Russian soil or against the right of the Russians to determine their own institutions.