Held-That this was a valuable consideration, making the conveyance from the husband good as against a prior creditor, but the wife can not hold the land as against such a creditor of the husband after appellee's debt is satisfied. Ray, &c. v. Life Association of America. January 17, 1885. Hickman Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. Geo. L. Husbands for appellants. 3. Preference no fraud-It may often be meritorious in a debtor to prefer some particular creditor, and his doing so is not fraudulent, but merely a preference, which, by virtue of the statute, may be set aside if attacked within a given time. 4. Deed from father to son in consideration of maintenance-An aged father agreed with his son, one of several children, that if he would stay with him and support him and his wife he would compensate him by paying for a piece of land the son might select. After the son had remained with his father more than a year under the contract the father paid $450 upon a tract of land contracted for by, and conveyed to, the son. Held-That this conveyance was not fraudulent as to the father's creditors, as, when the money was paid, the father was indebted to the son under their contract to that extent, and hence it was not paid for a future support. It was merely a preference among creditors which did not make it fraudulent. Sweatman v. Spears. January 27, 1885. Johnson Cir. Ct. Opin. by Holt, J., Ct. Ap., aff. James E. Stewart for appellant. 5. Deed from mother to daughter-Conveyances from a mother to a daughter and son-in-law are held to be fraudulent, the grantor being indebted at the time in a sum sufficient to swallow up her estate, and the relation of the parties being such that the grantees, who fail to satisfactorily explain how the recited consideration was paid, must have known of the financial embarrassment of the grantor and of the fraudulent design. Caudill v. Goeble, Gd'n, &c. January 29, 1885. Carter Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., aff. E. B. Wilhoit and T. W. Mitchell for appellant; E. F. Dulin for appellee. Insanity 1. Definition-In law insanity is a generic term, and embraces every case of defect of reason or weakness of mind which leaves the person without mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or without the will power knowing right from wrong, to control a tendency to wrongdoing. To all such cases section 268 of the Criminal Code applies, although the term insanity alone is used. Richey v. Commonwealth. January 15, 1885. Harrison Cir. Ct. Opin. by Hines, Ch. J., Ct. Ap., aff. Ward & Blanton and Kennedy & Kennedy for appellant; P. W. Hardin for appellee. Interest 1. Note and mortgage construed together-Different writings relating to the same subject, executed at the same time and to effectuate the same object, are to be treated as one instrument, and construed together. was not recorded within eight months, and when at last recorded it was not re-acknowledged by the wife. B bought the land with full knowledge of this outstanding mortgage. Held-He was not bound by it, as the reacknowledgment of the wife was essential under the Revised Statutes to the validity of the mortgage. Appeal from Louisville Chancery Court. Opinion of the court by Judge Holt. The mortgage by Edwin Francis and his wife upon her land to the appellant, J. S. Butler, and which he is now seeking to enforce, was acknowledged by her on February 22, 1871, but not recorded until September 19, 1873, a period of over two and a half years. It was never re-acknowledged by her. On February 26, 1873, she and her husband sold and conveyed the land to one Kelly, and he, on April 6, 1876, to the appellee, Wheeler. The petition alleges that both Kelly and Wheeler had full notice when they purchased of the existence of the mortgage. This is admitted by the demurrer to be true; and the sole question is whether the delay in recording it was fatal to its validity. If it was a nullity when they purchased, then their knowledge of it avails nothing for the appellant. The question must be determined by the provisions of the Revised Statutes, and not by those now in force. Section 15, chapter 24, Revised Statutes, reads thus: "Deeds made by residents of Kentucky, other than deeds of trust and mortgages, shall not be good against a purchaser for a valuable consideration not having notice thereof, or any creditor, except from the time the same shall be legally acknowledged or proved and lodged for record, unless the same be so lodged within eight months from the date thereof." Section 23 says: "Where deeds have been or may be legally executed, but not recorded or lodged for record in proper time, such deeds may be proved or acknowledged and recorded, and be as effectual from the time of so recording as if recorded in proper time. This section shall not apply to the deed of a married woman unless re-acknowledged by her and recorded thereafter in proper time." Judicial Sale 1. Interest of commissioner in purchase-Where a judicial sale was fair and open to competition, the fact that the commissioner who made the sale afterwards became interested with the purchaser in his purchase does not authorize the chancellor to set aside the sale. Adams v. McClary. January 29, 1885. Rockcastle Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., aff. Isaac A. Stewart for appellant; W., O. Bradley and S. M. Burdett for appellee. 2. Defendant dies-Sale confirmed before revivor void-After the death of the defendant and before any revivor was had, an order was made confirming a commissioner's report of sale and directing a conveyance to be made to the purchaser. Held-That the order confirming the report of sale having been made after the death of the defendant and before a revivor was void, and no rights were acquired under it. Wheatley v. Hays' Heirs. January 31, 1885. Kenton Ch. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. James P. Tarvin for appellant; Whitaker & Durrett for appellees. Gaming 1. Accomplice-Where two persons play on the premises of another, without his consent, at a game of cards, at which money is bet and won or lost, they are not accomplices, and one of them may be convicted upon the testimony of the other. Cain v. Commonwealth. Knox Cr. Ct. Opin. by Ward, P. J., Sup. Ct., aff. Elroy for appellant; P. W. Hardin for appellee. Garnishment January 26, 1885. 1. Personal judgment against garnishee-It was error to render judgment by default against appellant, a garnishee, there being no prayer for a personal judgment against it. A bank being the garnishee, an allegation that the debtor "has on deposit in said bank" a certain sum, with a prayer that this deposit be subjected, was not sufficient to authorize a personal judgment. Owensboro Savings Bank v. Mattingly. January 19, 1885. Daviess Cir. Ct. Opin. by Richards, J., Sup. Ct., rev. Owen & Ellis for appellant; Jolly & Todd for appellee. Homestead 1. Leaving State-Abandonment-A debtor who has left Kentucky with his family, and engaged in an extensive business in another State, must be treated as having abandoned his homestead here, although he declares his intention to return. Williams, &c. v. Rose, &c. January 13, 1885. Montgomery Cir. Ct. Opin. by Pryor, J., Ct. Ap., rev. H. L. Stone & Wm. H. Winn for appellants; W. H. Holt and C. Brock for appellees. 2. Widow-The widow of the grantor, and not the grantee, is entitled to a homestead in the land. Menifield, &c. v. Menifield's Ass'ee. January 22, 1885. Nelson Cir. Ct. Opin. by Lewis, J., Ct. Ap., rev. G. H. Fulton, E. E. McKay, J. H. Wathen, J. A. Fulton and C. T. Atkinson for appellants; Wm. Johnson for appellee. to married women that it embraces a mortgage; and that section 15, supra, relates only to the deeds of persons sui juris, save so far as a time for recording is named; or otherwise no effect whatever can be given to the latter clause of section 23, which says: "This section shall not apply to the deed of a married woman unless re-acknowledged by her, and recorded thereafter in proper time." The statute made a difference between the deed of a married woman and that of a person sui juris. In the latter case it was always valid inter partes, although never recorded; but in the former this was not true under the Revised Statutes, while it is under the General Statutes, the last clause of said section 23 having been omitted from the latter. Under the Revised Statutes the purpose of recording in the one case was to give notice of the existence of the instrument, while in the other it was necessary to its validity; and if the deed of a feme covert was not recorded in proper time it was a nullity even inter partes. If the recording of the feme's deed was necessary to pass her right, we see no reason why it was not equally as necessary in the case of a mere mortgage. If it was needful in the one case because there had to be a privy examination, then it was equally so in the other, as the same formality of execution was requisite. The section of the statute which fixes the eight months limit for recording uses the term “deeds" in doing so; and the sections empowering a married woman to execute a mortgage use the same term, hence the limitation in the one section must have been intended to apply to the other, and this is the more evident because section 23, supra, speaks of a "proper time" within which the deed of a married woman must be recorded, and no time whatever is fixed by the statute save said eight months. When the entire statute relating to the subject is considered, but one conclusion can be reached; and that is, that the recording of the mortgage in question within a certain time was necessary to its validity, and that the appellant's loss results from his own neglect. The husband, Edwin Francis, has no interest in the land. liable to the mortgage. He acquired none at the death of his wife as they had previously sold it, and under the statute he could only become a tenant by the curtesy in the real estate owned or possessed by her at her death. Judgment affirmed. Sam'l McKee for appellant. SULLIVAN, &c. v. KUYKENDALL. (Filed January 22, 1885.) 1. Presumptions-Letters-Evidence-The fact of mailing a letter properly addressed, with postage prepaid, creates no legal presumption that it was duly received; but it is merely a fact which is to be weighed along with other evidence in determining the question, and to which no more presumption attaches than to any other fact. 2. Telephone message-Evidence-Where A, desiring to talk over the telephone with B, asked the operator to call him, and the operator thereupon had a conversation with B, reporting to A, who was standing by, what B said as it came over the wire, Held-In subsequent action between A and B the former might prove by himself and others what the operator reported to him as coming from B, the operator being called and not remembering the conversation. Appeal from Warren Circuit Court. Opinion of the court by Judge Holt. By the terms of a verbal contract for the sale of personal property the appellants, Sullivan & Co., were to estimate and receive it within ten days after notice from the appellee, Kuykendall, that it was ready. On January 26, 1880, he wrote them a letter, which by due course of mail should have been received by them within the next two days, but which in point of fact, as the testimony shows, was not received until February 17, 1880, notifying |