alone costing twenty or thirty gui

neas.

"The dress of the Persians is very expensive, frequently amounting to sixty or one hundred guineas; but which, of course, must be in proportion to their capacity to bear this expence. The poor people wear no cap, and very little clothes; when the cold weather comes on, they make dresses out of sheep skins, &c.

"The women of Persia, when at home, do not encumber themselves with many clothes, nor are they very attentive to the whiteness of their garments. A peerahun and a pair of zeer jamus is the whole of their dress, the trowsers are made of thick velvet, and their shift either of muslin, silk, or gauze. Their legs appear literally to be tied up in two sacks, and the peerahun is but concealment visible to the rest of their persons. This is their summer apparel; in the winter they wear garments made of shawls, silks stuffed with cotton, and, if they can afford it, cloaks made of sable.

"The Persian women, like the Indian, are totally devoid of delicacy; their language is often gross and disgusting, nor do they feel less hesitation in expressing themselves before men, than they would before their female associates. Their terms of abuse or reproach are indelicate to the utmost degree. I will not disgust the reader by noticing any of them; but I may safely aver, that it is not possible for language to express, or the imagination to conceive, more indecent or grosser images.

When they leave the house, they put on a cloak, which descends from the head to their feet, and their faces are concealed with oriental scrupulosity. The veil which

they wear is sometimes worked like a net, or else two holes are made in the cloak for their eyes. It is curious to see a number of tall and ele gant formed figures walking in the streets, and presenting nothing to your view but a pair of sparkling black eyes, which seem to enjoy the curiosity they excite. The veil ap‐ pears to be essential to their virtue; for as long as they can conceal their face, they care not how much they expose the rest of their person. The women in Persia are the only people who wear jewels or use perfumes; and this is a privilege they take much delight in.

"The Persians differ as much from us in their notions of beauty, as they do in those of taste. A large, soft, and languishing black eye with them constitutes the perfection of beauty; and which, they say, diffuses an amorous softness over the whole countenance, infinitely supe rior to the piercing and ardent glance of majestic beauty. It is chiefly on this account that the wo men use the powder of antimony, although it adds to the vivacity of the eye, throws a kind of voluptu ous languor over it, which makes it appear (if I may use the expression) dissolving in bliss.

Many of the women of Sheeraz are as fair as those of Europe, but confinement robs them of that lovely bloom so becoming and so essential to female beauty. The Persian women have a curious custom of making their eye-brows meet; and, if this charm be denied them, they paint the forehead with a kind of preparation made for that purpose.

"I need hardly mention that, agreeably to the laws of the Moosul mans, a man may have four wives, and as many concubines as he is able to maintain. Many descriptions have already been given of the se

raglios of the east; with what correctness I am unable to determine. I can pretend to no more information on this subject, than that it is customary, when a man marries a woman, whose age does not admit of her managing his domestic concerns, for him to place at the head of his family a kud banoo (a duenna) who instructs his wife in all the duties it is necessary for her to acquire.

"It is not an observance in Persia as in India, not to marry a widow. After a certain time of mourning, a woman marries again, and is treated by her husband with the same distinction as is shewn to his other wives.

vernor.

"The city of Sheeraz is divided into muhuls (wards), over which a kud khoda or superintendant presides, but who receives no salary for executing this duty. This office is generally conferred on the most respectable man of the ward, and over all these khud khodas another is appointed, who receives their reports, and communicates them to the goIt was formerly the custom for them to report the minutest transaction which might happen in their wards; the birth of a child, a marriage or death was instantly conveyed to the ears of the Hakim. This practice is dispensed with at Sheeraz, but is still, I believe, observed in some cities. It is the duty of the kud khoda to acquaint himself with the trade and occupation of the different persons who reside in the ward, and of the means they have of subsistence.

"But the great advantage which results from this division of the city, not only to government, but also to the inhabitants, is on the sudden arrival of a large body of troops, or when the city is laid under contribution In either case,

the kud khodas attend the governor, who informs them what number of men their wards must ac commodate, or what sum of money it is requisite they should contribute. They are responsible to the governor; and it is their business to make such an arrangement, that each individual shall suffer in proportion to his capacity to bear this act of violence. The people are generally satisfied with their decisions; for it is needless for them to desist, and often dangerous to delay.

"The licentiousness of the troops is thus prevented by their finding houses ready to receive them; and an indiscriminate plunder is averted by a compliance with the terms of the conqueror. In a despotic monarchy, this division of the city is of wonderful utility; it allows a tyrant, who captures a place, to proceed on a systematic plan of plunder; and the inhabitants of the city suffer much less than those in similar cases have done in Europe.

"There is often a degree of weight attached to the representations of the kud khodas, which serves as a strong restraint on the oppression of a governor. In the event of their suffering greatly from the rapacity or tyranny of the hakim, they sign a petition, representing the causes of complaint, and praying for redress. It is seldom that the king refuses to grant their request. They are the mediators for the poor people; and despots have the sense to know, that oppression, carried beyond a certain extent, can be but of short duration.

"In all the little trifling disputes which occur among neighbours, the kud khoda exerts his influence to bring them to an amicable termination, and frequently with good sucCess, If a husband and wife dis

agree

agree, he endeavours to effect a reconciliation by remonstrating with the husband, and through the medium of a kud banoo (a kind of governess), with the wife. In short, it is bis business to be a peacemaker, and to exert himself for the good of the community over which he presides.

The office of khud knoda appears to me to be a most admirable institution; and, though it will doubtless be often abused, it must, in the end, prove beneficial to the poorer classes of people. Nor can the kud khoda oppress them with impunity; he exposes himself to frequent complaints, and complaints in Persia are generally listened to with avidity. They certainly may become the instruments of tyranny; but we have yet to discover an institution that cannot be abused.

"It has been remarked, that the police of a despotic monarchy is in finitely superior to that in a free state. It is necessary that it should be so; for suspicion is the prevailing cause which directs the actions and councils of a despot.

"The police of Sheeraz is admirably regulated; and I hardly think it possible for the middling classes of people to harbour any design against the government, which should not come to the immediate notice of the governor. The darogha, or superintendent of the bazars, holds his office from government; it is his duty to settle the disputes that may occur in the markets, and to hear the complaints of the people of the bazar. If a shopkeeper refuses to execute, or violates his agreement, you make your complaint to the darogha, who obliges him to perform it; or, if he should prove that he is totally unable, he grants him a certain time for its performance. The humanity of the Moo

sulman law grants a merchant an opportunity of recovering himself from unforeseen misfortunes. But if the person complained against is of an infamous character, a fine is imposed on him, and the darogha orders him either to be punished put in confinement.

The darogha of the bazar likewise superintends the morals of the people; and if he detects any of them drinking wine, or in the society of courtezans, he compels them to purchase his connivance at no small expence.

"I remember Aga Ruza's receir ing fifty toomans (guineas) from an unfortunate Armenian, who was caught in the house of a prostitute; and he thought he conferred a favour on him, in allowing him to escape at so easy a rate. He has a large esta blishment under him, who are em ployed in preserving the peace of the markets, and in apprehending persons whom they detect acting contrary to the orders of the darogha.

"This appointment is considered to be very lucrative; for, in addition to the presents and bribes he is in the habit of receiving, the people of the bazar furnish him with every thing he requires, that they may ensure his protection and favour.

"The appointment of Meer Usus, or Uhdas, greatly resembles that of Darogha of the Bazar; the former is superintendant of the police during the day, the latter at night. It is his office to preserve the peace nf the city, to take up persons who may be out of their houses at improper hours, and to prevent robberies. He has a number of people under him for this purpose, who patrole the streets, and keep watch on the top of the houses. Each shopkeeper in the bazar contributes about two or three-pence a month

to

to defray the expences of this establishment If a house-keeper is robbed, the Meer Usus, or kucheekchee-bashee (the head of the watch) are accountable for the robbery, and are obliged either to produce the property stolen, or pay the amount. This rarely happens, for the Meer Usus is generally connected with all the thieves in the city, and can answer for their obedience to his orders. They rob, therefore, in places not under his protection; and, as it is commonly supposed he participates in their plunder, they are connected with each other by a common interest.

The Mohtusib is, I believe, subject to the orders of the Darogha of the Bazar; it is his business to regulate the prices of every article, which is sold in the Bazar, and to see that the weights are of the proper standard. This duty is usually performed once a week; and if he convicts any person of using false weights, the punishment is often death.

"Besides these officers, there are others who are stationed at the gates of the city, to prevent the inhabitants of any consequence from leaving the city without the governor's permission. These appointments are doubtless obnoxious to the grossest bribery; but, notwithstanding the evils which result from this system of corruption, they are at least equal to similar institutions in any European country. People have, in general, been clamorous against the laws and ordinances of despotic monarchies, which, they conceive, like the source of a poisoned river, must necessarily infect all its branches; but with what propriety I shall leave those to determine who are acquainted with other states, where property is secured by the payment of a monthly tax of threepence; and where merchandize is

conveyed to the remotest parts of the empire without the smallest risk. It may be said, that in despotic monarchies, not only property, but life, depends upon the will of one man, and that where the latter is uncertain, there can be little satisfaction in the enjoyment of the former. This is a maxim which may be disputed; for we have no reason to suppose that the life of either a soldier or a sailor is any ways more uncomfortable, than that of a merchant, remote from the probability or chance of dangers.

"Men or rank or enterprise, who expose themselves by holding responsible situations to imminent hazard, gratify their ambition at the risk of their lives; but they are aware of this, and as they court the danger which it would have been easy for them to avoid, they can have no reason to complain if they fail in their pursuit. They can with no more justice lanent their fate, than a minister of state can his being impeached. Far be it from me to become an advocate in favour of a despotic monarchy; yet there is, I think, some reason to doubt the relations we have of the wretchedness and misery of those who live under and are ruled by the laws of an arbitrary government.

That the Persians suffer greatly from the enormities and oppression of government no one will attempt to deny; nor will any person suppose that an inhabitant of a free country could live either happily or comfortably under the governinent of a Persian despot. I may, however, be excused doubting, whether the moral character of the Persians qualifies them for a better government; or whether they may not attribute the tyrannical measures of their prince to the enormity of their own excesses.

N

CUSTOMS