NOTE ON THE PRACTICAL NEUTRALISATION OF THE AMERICAN LAKES

The negotiations for the reduction of the naval force on the American lakes began in 1806, but only matured after Monroe

had become President. The Prince Regent in the meantime had agreed to the proposal. A formal agreement was entered into on April 28 and 29, 1817, by an exchange of notes, which could be annulled by either party giving the other six months' notice. The British Government had already issued orders to the officers on the lakes, directing that the limited naval force should be restricted to such services as would " in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party." Orders to the same effect were issued to the American commanding naval officers on service on the lakes. The agreement became effective at once upon the exchange of notes. There is no evidence that Great Britain gave it the formalities of a treaty, and it was not till April 16, 1818, that President Monroe formally notified the Senate of the United States of the arrangement, and submitted to its consideration whether this was "such an arrangement as the Executive is competent to enter into by the powers vested in it by the Constitution, or is such a one as requires the advice and consent of the Senate. . . ." The approval and consent of the Senate were given on April 16, 1818, with no dissenting vote. The Agreement was proclaimed by President Monroe on April 28, and was published in the National Intelligencer of April 30. It is as follows:

"Whereas, an arrangement was entered into at the city of Washington, in the month of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, between Richard Rush, Esq., at that time acting as secretary for the Department of State of the United States, for and in behalf of the Government of the United States, and the Right Honorable Charles Bagot for and in behalf of His Britannic Majesty, which arrangement is in the words following, to wit:

"The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is,

"On Lake Ontario, to one vessel, not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon.

"On the upper lakes, to two vessels, not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force.

"On the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding like burden, and armed with like force.

"All other armed vessels on those lakes shall be forthwith

XI

NEUTRALISATION OF OCEAN ROUTES

A MOVEMENT recently set on foot at the instance of the late Edward Atkinson, the well-known Boston economist, and warmly supported by the Massachusetts State Board of Trade, seeks to establish by Treaty "neutral zones from the ports of North America to the ports of Great Britain and Ireland and the Continent of Europe, within which zones steamship and sailing vessels in the conduct of lawful commerce shall be free to pass without seizure or interruption in time of war."

There is no precedent of neutralisation of any such area of the High Sea.

International rivers, ocean canals, and neutralised States are obviously no criterion in discussing a proposal to neutralise a strip of the ocean, which may be defined accurately enough on the map and which skilful navigators could approximately determine, but which might be violated without any practical means of detection by a belligerent commander whenever he misread, or it suited him to misread, his bearings.

The example of territorial waters is also no criterion, there being in their case a fixed boundary on one side in the shore. Land-bound seas are still less so.

Nevertheless the Massachusetts State Board of Trade believes "that the time has come to extend neutralisation to

what may be called the 'ferry ways' of the great commerce passing over the Atlantic. The lines of traffic, over which steamers and sailing vessels pass, are now," it observes, "almost as well defined as if they were rivers bordered by banks. These ways of commerce can be defined by treaty among the States which have became interdependent for food, fibres, and fabrics of every kind. They may be neutralised by States bordering upon the Atlantic and those that can be reached from the Ocean."

This may be regarded as a sort of alternative proposition to the one the United States Government will probably put forward at the next Hague Peace Conference in favour of making all private property at sea free from capture.1

1 See Chapter VIII., p. 63.

The limitation of the area of hostilities might come practically to the same result in many cases.2

2 See Chapters IX. and X., pp. 71 and 73.

XII

REVISION OF THE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LAW OF

NEUTRALITY

THE general notion or principle of the International Law of Neutrality is that it is the duty of neutral States to abstain from all acts favourable to the success of either belligerent against the other. In practice this notion or principle does not work out in all contingencies homogeneously. I have endeavoured to group the differences in the following subdivisions:

1. Absolute duty of the neutral State to abstain, in its corporate capacity, from all acts which may help the one belligerent to the disadvantage of the other.

2. Relative duty of the neutral State to prevent its subjects from helping either belligerent.

3. Contingent duty of the neutral State to grant impartially to the one or the other belligerent any rights, advantages, or privileges which, according to the recognised usage of nations, are not considered as an intervention in the struggle.

4. Right of belligerent State to interfere with the subjects or citizens, and their property, of the neutral State which interference, by the recognised usage of nations, they are bound to suffer during the continuance of war.

On the first of these duties there is no essential difference of opinion. The fourth relates to (1) contraband, (2) visit and search, and (3) blockade, the controversial matter of which is dealt with under separate headings.

With regard to the second, it is clear that the duty of a State to forbear from committing any act which may be of assistance to either belligerent cannot in reason be absolute as regards private persons merely within its territorial jurisdiction. The practice, therefore, is to let the belligerents themselves look after private infringers of neutrality. In recent times, however, with the development of means of communication, it