DEDICATED

ΤΟ

MY FRIEND

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN BRUNNER, BART., M.P.

IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT

OF MUCH HELP AND SYMPATHY

vii

PREFACE

THE form of this volume requires explanation. It has already been privately issued, partly in fragments and partly as a confidential memorandum, for the consideration of my colleagues of the Institute of International Law, different government departments at home and abroad, and others. The wide margins and blanks were left for the insertion of new matter and the convenience of the specialist readers whose views on different points I had solicited. As they may also prove serviceable to the readers of a book of this kind generally, and changing the form would have entailed delay and labour out of proportion to the resulting advantage, I hope I may be pardoned for in this respect not adhering strictly to time-honoured traditions of bookproduction.

As regards the subject-matter, the purpose of the book is far less pretentious than a cursory glance at the table of contents might lead the reader to suppose. If I have made suggestions, I have done so in all humility, knowing that imperfections in human character, collective emotions and unforeseen emergencies tend to upset the best calculated international appliances. Yet the spirit of law and order does unquestionably progress, not only in the domestic polity of nations, but also in relations between State and State. And the growth of this spirit of law and order as between State and State has largely been due to direct and conscious effort, as will be seen in every chapter of this book.

My object has, therefore, been to single out these cases of direct and conscious effort, and to endeavour to isolate the ethical principles or reasons of expediency which seem to have underlain their application, and to utilise them for the solution of other kindred problems. In this country it is a truism to say that a

...

"Your observation that 'conflicts arise chiefly out of matters of rivalry connected with territorial aggrandisement and expansion' (p. 154), takes no account of all the possessions obtained by violence—by violation—violation by which a people is held in subjugation by another people or by a foreign government, in circumstances which are unendurable. Witness the states of things in Macedonia and Armenia-even Manchuria. . . . Would you consecrate such states of things, such bleeding wounds, such disgraces for humanity and civilisation, by an undertaking among the Powers to 'respect as between and among them the integrity of their respective dominions, possessions, etc.'? . . . Such a clause presupposes exclusively legitimate 'possessions.' Your proposal would hand over numerous peoples to their oppressors; and this would not be progress, but retrogression."

Another asks me in reference to the same subject:

"Do you intend Turkey to be a party to it? If she is excluded, that exclusion would be like a call to war. If she is included, Art. I. (p. 154) would guarantee her the continuance of her fiendish misrule."

There is much truth in these observations. At the same time, the suggestion that the Powers agree to respect the territorial status quô for ten years is not a consecration of misrule in perpetuity, and I think my two distinguished friends have not considered that concerted action for the preservation of peace among the Powers might strengthen their joint influence, possibly facilitate joint action in dealing with the difficulties which are smouldering in the near East, and avert a danger to the peace of Europe.

Several of my correspondents express doubts as to the expediency of adopting any kind of Arbitration Treaty which would include "vital interests" or "national honour," on the ground that such questions are not of a character which can be decided by judicial methods. Yet several questions involving national