that a district or subdivision of the state is bound by the same rule.1 2. Taxes on Real Property—a. IN GENERAL.-The state may tax land within its limits, whether owned by a resident or non-resident, unless such land is within the recognized exceptions, as where it belongs to an Indian tribe or to the federal government. Land is not only to be assessed by the state in which it lies, and by it alone, but it is to be taxed, as a general rule, only in the subdivision of the state in which it is situated,3 whether the subdivision be a county, town,5 school district, or other public corporation. This is often expressly provided by statute. If the statute is silent, the law implies that such is the intention of the legislature. It is immaterial whether the land be that of a resi dent or non-resident,8 an individual or a corporation, foreign or domestic. In regard to the power of a state to allow real property to be taxed in a district other than that in which it lies, 1. Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 122; 11 Am. Rep. 440; Matter of Prospect Park, 60 N. Y. 398; People v. Townsend, 56 Cal. 633. 2. Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 210; Edwards v. Beaird, I Ill. 70; Newburyport Turnpike Co. v. Upton, 12 Mass. 575; Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H. 389. A tax against the land of a non-resident, while it may be a lien on the land, is not a personal charge against the owner, unless he becomes a party to the proceeding for collection, and thus submits to the jurisdiction. Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339. 3. Toby v. Haggerty, 23 Ark. 370; People v. Pearis, 37 Cal. 259; Sangamon, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163; 56 Am. Dec. 497; Hoffman v. Woods, 40 Kan. 382; Hartland v. Church, 47 Me. 169; Taylor v. Youngs, 48 Mich. 268; Nashua Co. Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 389; Cocheco Mfg. Co. v. Strafford, 51 N. H. 455; Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H. 500; Patton v. Long, 68 Pa. St. 260; Hubbard v. Newton, 52 Vt. 346. The right to tax lands situated outside of a taxing district cannot be acquired by prescription. Thus, where a town had exercised jurisdiction for more than twenty years over territory outside of its limits, a tax levied upon this district was held to be void. Ham v. Sawyer, 38 Me. 37. And an agreement between two towns, that one shall not tax the lands of the inhabitants of the other, is invalid. Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547. The attachment of a strip of land lying within the territorial limits of a county, to an adjoining county, for judicial purposes, does not render it taxable in the latter county. Yellowstone County v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 10 Mont. 414. The real estate of a corporation may be assessed for the support of public worship in the parish where it is situated. Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53; Goodell Mfg. Co. v. Trask, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 514. 4. People v. Pearis, 37 Cal. 259. 5. Van Rensselaer v. Cottrell, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 127. 6. Rowe v. Blakeslee, 11 Conn. 479. 7. See cases in preceding notes. 8. State v. Gray, 29 N. J.L. 380; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Pa. St. 432. The lands of non residents are taxable in the school district in which they lie. Allen v. Gleason, 4 Day (Conn.) 376; Rowe v. Blakeslee, II Conn. 479. 9. The real estate of a foreign corporation is taxable in the township in which it is located. State v. Berry, 52 N. J. L. 308; 19 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 586. New York.-Under the statutes providing for the taxation of corporations, the real property of toll-bridge companies is to be assessed in the town or ward in which it lies. The clause in New York Rev. Stat. 389, § 6, directing assessment in the town or ward where the tolls are collected, applies only to personal estate. Hudson River Bridge Co. v. Patterson, 74 N. Y. 365. there is some conflict. The general rule seems to be that, in the absence of prohibition in the state constitution, such power exists; at least, where the object to be attained would benefit the district taxed, where there is a doubt as to the question in what district the land lies, or where the tract taxed is situated in more than one taxing district. An unorganized district may be annexed to another for taxing purposes. The district in which the land is located at the time of the assessment determines where the tax is to be paid. If the lines are changed subsequent to this time, but prior to the collection of the tax, it is immaterial. The question of place is one of fact. It must be decided by the taxpayer at his peril. If land is wrongfully assessed elsewhere, this 1. In Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo. 385, it was held that the legislature could not authorize a municipal corporation to tax, for its own local purposes, lands lying beyond the corporate limits. See Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), pp. 1598-163; Čooley on Const. Lim. (2d ed.), p. 500. 2. În Conwell v. Connersville, 8 Ind. 358, an act authorizing a town to tax property within 200 yards of the corporation line, was held constitutional, though not discussed by counsel, and the court simply said: "We are not advised that such act is in conflict with the constitution." And in Langhorne · v. Robinson, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 661, it was held that a Virginia act, authorizing a city to tax persons and property for half a mile around and outside of the corporate limits, to pay the interest upon the guaranty by the city of certain railroad stock, was not in violation of the Virginia constitution. In regard to these two cases, Judge Cooley says: "These two, however, may well be deemed doubtful cases. It is certainly difficult to understand how the taxation of a district can be defended, whose people have no voice in voting it, in selecting the purposes, or in expending it." Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 160. In Maryland, an act authorizing a city to levy and collect a tax upon property adjacent thereto, for the purpose of defraying the expense of laying out streets within the city, has been held to be constitutional. Brooks v. Baltimore, 48 Md. 265. 3. People v. Wilkerson, 1 Idaho N. S. 619. 4. Ín Dubuque v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Iowa 196, the court held valid a law which imposed a tax upon the gross earnings of a railroad in lieu of all other taxes, and which apportioned the tax thus levied to the different counties in proportion to the number of miles of road in each. The court, by Rothrock, J., said: "The power of the legislature to fix the situs of property for the purpose of taxation is not confined to personal property alone; it exists as to real property also." The practical effect of this decision was to give to certain localities the equivalent of a tax levied upon property outside of their jurisdiction, and to prevent them from taxing the property of the road which was within their jurisdiction. See also People v. Fredericks, 33 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 150; Taylor v. Secor, 92 U. S. 575. 5. An unorganized county may be attached to another county for revenue purposes, and taxes made payable to the treasurer of the latter county. In that case, a tax sale by the treasurer of the former county would be void. Collins v. Storm, 75 Iowa 36. 6. A road tax on unseated land assessed and payable by a county to a township, before the division of it, is still payable to the same township, though the land lies in a new township. Barnett Tp. v. Jefferson County, 91 Watts (Pa.) 166. Where an assessment of real estate was made upon the date fixed by statute, and, before the completion of the assessment, that portion of the town in which such real estate was situated was set off to another town, the court held that the owner remained liable, nevertheless, upon the original assessment. Harman v. New Marlborough, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 525. See also Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush (Ky.) 37. 7. People v. Wilkerson, 1 Idaho N. S. 622. Where, under such a statute, a farm lying in two adjoining towns has been fact does not affect the owner's liability on an assessment rightly made.1 b. LAND LYING IN TWO DISTRICTS.-It is competent for the legislature to provide that a tract of land extending over two or more districts shall be taxed as a whole in one of them.2 Such provision is often made by enacting that the whole shall be assessed at the residence of the owner or occupant,3 or in the district in assessed and taxed in both towns, the owner and occupant may maintain an action in the nature of a bill of interpleader against the two collectors, to determine in which town his farm is properly taxed. Dorn v. Fox, 61 N. Y. 264. 1. Welty on Assessments, §§ 34, 46. 2. Welty on Assessments, § 32; Hairston v. Stinson, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 479. But see Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H. 500, which held that a provision that on the division of a town, each tract through which the divisional line passed and on which the owner fived, should be taxed, was not a proper act of legislation, and long acquiescence did not estop either town from questioning it. A bridge across a navigable stream, separating two states, may be taxed in each state, one approach by the one and the other approach by the other. Keokuk Bridge Co. v. People, 145 Ill. 596; State v. Metz, 29 N. J. L. 122. And a boom consisting of a permanent line of piers extending across a river, with logs fastened thereto with iron chains, may be taxed as real estate; that part within the limits of one town, in that town; that within the limits of the other town, in such other town. Hall v. Benton, 69 Me. 346. 3. State v. Hoffman, 30 N. J. L. 346; State v. Reinhardt, 31 N. J. L. 218; State v. Hay, 31_ N. J. L. 275; State v. Jewell, 34 N. J. L. 259; State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 246; State v. Britton, 42 N. J. L. 103; State v. Dally, 47 N. J. L. 84; State v. Washer, 51 N. J. L. 122; Stewart v. Flummerfelt, 53 N. J. L. 540; Saunders v. Springsteen, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 429; Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, overruling 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 597; People v. Gaylord, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 335; Tebo v. Brooklyn, 134 N. Y. 341; Hughey v. Horrel, 2 Ohio 231; Barger v. Jackson, 9 Ohio 163; Bausman v. Lancaster County, 50 Pa. St. 208. Land lying in different counties, though in separate tracts divided by a river, will be taxed in the county where the owner resides, if it was conveyed by one deed. People v. Wilson, 125 N. Y. 367. To be an 66 occupant," one must have such possession as would enable him to maintain an action for trespass without the aid of a paper title. State v. Abbott, 42 N. J. L. III. If the town line passes through the owner's house, his residence is in that town in which the most necessary part of the house is situated. Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me. 386. In New York, if a town line divides a farm, and the owner resides in one of the towns, but not on the farm, and works the farm, it is taxable in the town where he lives. People v. Gaylord, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 335. See also People v. Wilson, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 388. In New Jersey, where a farm, made up of land which was formerly two separate farms, upon each of which were buildings, is divided by a township line and the owner resides on, and tills the land in, one township, and another, by agreement with him, lives on and tills that in the other on shares, the whole farm is taxable to the owner in the township of his residence. State v. Washer, 51 N. J. L. 122. But where a farm so divided, is occupied entirely by the tenant, it is taxed at his residence as a whole, even if the owner resides in the other township but not on the farm. State v. Britton, 42 N. J. L. 103. If the farm is under the control of the owner, who does not live upon it, but is cultivated by a tenant on shares, it is held to be in the possession of the owner and taxable at his residence. State v. Hoffman, 30 N. J. L. 346; State v. Hay, 31 N. J. L. 275; State v. Jewell, 34 N. J. L. 259. The five county act" of 1869, requiring all lands to be taxed in the township wherein they lie, repeals by implication the requirement of New Jersey Law of 1866, that an occupied farm or lot lying partly in one township and partly in another, shall be which the greater part of the improvements are.1 Such a provision will apply to the land of a partnership2 or corporation, as well as to the land of an individual.3 The benefit of such an enactment cannot be claimed as a right by the owner; it merely grants a privilege to the public authorities, who may, if they see fit, assess each piece in the district in which it lies.4 They must, however, follow the law closely. If they assess the land as a whole in the wrong county, the assessment will be void.5 3. Taxes on Personal Property-a. GENERAL RULE.-In the taxation of personal property, two inconsistent doctrines often come into conflict; the one, mobilia sequuntur personam, demanding that the property shall be taxed at the owner's domicile, on the theory that personalty has no other situs; the other, that it shall be taxed like real property, where it is situated. Ordinarily the first rule will prevail, and, as a general rule, personal property is taxable at the domicile of its owner. This is often so provided assessed in the township where the Occupant resides. State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 246. 1. The Georgia Code, § 829, provides that a plantation lying on the line between two counties shall be taxed in the one where the most improvements are. But where land belonging to the estate of a decedent and lying across the line had been divided into parcels by the executors, the court held that the land was not cultivated and carried on as one plantation, so as to come within this section of the act. Robson v. Du Bose, 79 Ga. 721. 2. In case of a partnership association formed under New Jersey Act of 1880, the residence in question is that of its principal office. If that is in neither county in which the land lies, the provision does not apply and the land cannot be taxed as a whole under New Jersey Revision, p. 1152, pl. 65, even though two of the members of the partnership association reside on the land. Stewart v. Flummerfelt, 53 N. J. L. 540. 3. State v. Warford, 37 N. J. L. 397. 4. Patton v. Long, 68 Pa. St. 260. 5. Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, reversing 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 597. 6. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), pp. 56, 372; Burroughs on Taxation, § 40; Sangamon, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163; 56 Am. Dec. 493; Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464; Phelps v. Thurston, 47 Conn. 477; People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543; Salem Iron Factory Co. v. Danvers, 10 Mass. 514; Amesbury Woolen, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461; Wilson v. New York, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 675; State v. Bishop, 34 N. J. L. 45; People v. Chenango County, II N. Y. 563; State v. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532; State v. Rahway, 24 N. J. L. 56; Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 30 N. J. L. 13; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316; Com. v. American Dredging Co., 122 Pa. St. 386; Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen (Mass.) 366. In Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 514, the court held that a building, owned by a non-resident but standing by license upon land in the state, could not be assessed and sold as personal property by the county in which it was situated, and that a purchaser entering under such sale would be a mere trespasser. Compare Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board of Equalization, 84 Iowa 407. Personal property not in the possession of a tenant, is to be taxed in the town in which the owner resides. And it makes no difference that the person assessed consented that the property should be set to him in the list of a town in which he does not reside, and that he gave to the listers, in such town, a list specifying the particular property therein. Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609. A statute, requiring the owner of personal property moving into a state, to list his property in the town in which he resides, refers to the moving of the owner, and not of the property, into the state. Johnson v. Lyon, 106 Ill. 64. But see, as holding the view that the personal property of residents situated without the state cannot be by statute.1 The state, may, however, and often does, make it taxable at its actual situs.2 The fact that double taxation may result from assessment in two states does not affect the validity of the assessment.3 If the property has no situs-either actual or constructive-within the state, it cannot be taxed. If it has a double situs, the legislature may choose between them.5 The domicile at the time of the completion of the assessment rolls determines the place of taxation of property taxable at the place of the domicile; similarly, the location of the property on that day, if the property is taxed at its situs. Neither removal from taxed at domicile, Matter of Swift's Estate, 137 N. Y. 77. Under the Illinois revenue law of 1853, farming implements, stock, etc., upon a farm, must be listed in the town, county, or district where the owner resides, wherever the property be in fact. King v. McDrew, 31 Ill. 418. Under I New York Rev. Stat. 908, § 5, chattels and capital owned and employed out of the state, by a resident, are liable to taxation as much as if situated or employed within the state. People v. Tax Com'rs, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 116. Under section 563 of the Tennessee code, relating to the taxation of slaves, slaves had to be assessed to the owner in the county where he resided, whether in his possession or not, and whether in the same county or not. Brown v. Greer, 3 Head (Tenn.) 695. 1. Thus, the Massachusetts statute defines personal estate for the purpose of taxation to include "goods, chattels, money and effects, wherever they are," etc. Supplement to Public Statutes (1890), p. 744. 2. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th ed.), § 786; Welty on Assessments, 34; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; 79 Am. Dec. 377; State v. Ross, 23 N. J. L. 517; People v. Tax Com'rs, 23 N. Y. 224; People v. Gardner, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 352. A portable sawmill and a yoke of oxen kept in a county for three years by a resident of another county, are taxable in the former county. Trammell v. Conner, 91 Ala. 398. An owner of personal property who, to escape taxation in one state, asserts that the situs of his property is in another state, cannot avoid taxation thereon in the latter state on the ground that he is a resident of the former. Bowman v. Boyd, 21 Nev. 281. 3. Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray (Mass.) 292. Where a steamboat owned by residents of New York was employed as a passenger and freight boat between San Francisco and Sacramento, the court held that the steamer was taxable as property in California, although the owner had been already taxed therefor in New York. Minturn v. Hays, 2 Cal. 590. 4. Cooley, Const. Lim. (6th ed.) 615; Corn v. Cameron, 19 Mo. App. 573. 5. Vail v. Runyon, 41 N. J. L. 98. An assessment of personal property to its owner at his residence, is not void for want of jurisdiction, although it is by law properly assessable in another county because of its relation to a business carried on by the owner in such county. Clarke v. Stearns County, 47 Minn. 552. 6. Welty on Assessments, § 35; Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 231; 28 Am. Dec. 293; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 320. In Hilgenberg v. Wilson, 55 Ind. 210, it was held that the fact that a person owning personal property had been assessed thereon for taxation for state and county purposes, would not prevent his being assessed upon the same property for city purposes, upon his removing with such property into a city of the county where he had been so assessed prior to the time of the completion of the assessment of a city tax. One who comes into the State of Georgia after the first day of April of any year, and who has no property therein before or at that time, is not liable to either state or county taxes for that year. White v. State, 51 Ga. 252. But in New Jersey, the day of commencing the assessment determines the place. State v. Bishop, 34 N. J. L. 45. 7. Wangler v. Black Hawk County, 56 Iowa 384; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. |