tion of the tax.1 Constitutional requirements that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, have reference solely to the exercise of the power of eminent domain.2 b. DISTINGUISHED FROM POLICE POWER.-So the power to tax is to be distinguished from the police power.3 Speaking broadly, it may be said that the demand made for money under the police power is secondary to the police regulation out of which the demand grows, while in the case of taxation the principal object is revenue, and this distinction is not to be lost sight of, even though the procedure for collection may be similar in both cases.4 If, as is sometimes the case, a tax is laid for the 1. Astor v. New York, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 539; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 266; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 404; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28; 1 Am. Rep. 215; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Haas v. Misner, 1 Idaho 176; Goodrich v. Winchester, etc., Turnpike Co., 26 Ind. 119; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 77. Taxation differs from eminent domain in that there is no thought of compensation by way of return for that which it takes and applies to the public good, further than that all derive benefit from the purposes to which it is applied; in other words, that the support of government and other objects of public utility promoted by taxation are supposed to return to the individual the same which has been taken from him as his share of the public burden. Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54; Washington Ave., 69 Pa. St. 352; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 404; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 266. 2. White v. People, 94 Ill. 609; Hessler v. Drainage Com'rs, 53 Ill. 105; Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa 31; Stewart v. Polk County, 30 Iowa 9; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53; 24 Am. Rep. 661; People v. Brooklyn, N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 266; Kittle v. Shirvin, II Neb. 81; Hanscom v. Omaha, II Neb. 37; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 175; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black (U. S.) 510. In Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 209; 41 Am. Dec. 508, it was held that the exercise of the power to tax, for the purpose of raising money to construct a public work, cannot be regarded as an attempt to take private property for public use without compensation. 3. See, for definition and discussion of the police power generally, POLICE PoWER, vol. 18, p. 739. See also LICENSE, vol. 13, P. 574; and infra, this title, Occupation, Business, and Privilege Taxes. 4. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.), p. 586. See also Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147; 12 Am. Rep. 367; East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 Ill. 392; Louisville City R. Co. v. Louisville, 4 Bush (Ky.) 478; Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich. 183; 41 Am. Rep. 159; People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 456; 4 Am. Rep. 400; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; State v. U. S., etc., Express Co., 60 N. H. 219; Matter of New York, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 77; New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261; State v. Penny, 19 S. Car. 218; Columbia v. Beasly, 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 232; Collins . Louisville, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 134; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Ga. 530; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 480; St. Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 146; St. Louis v. Boatmen's Ins., etc., Co., 47 Mo. 150; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 462; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 418; State v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71; Mays v. Cincinnati, I Ohio St. 268; People v. Martin, 60 Cal. 153. Laws relating to the licensing of butchers, victualers, hackmen, stagedrivers, etc., in a city, are branches of the law for good government, and not a part of a revenue system. People v. New York, 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 81. It may be said that every burden imposed for revenue purposes is levied under the taxing power, irrespective of the name by which the imposition is designated. St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468. double purpose of regulation and revenue, the imposition of such tax may be said to be founded upon each power.1 2. Constitutional Restrictions (See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, vol. 3, p. 670)-a. UPON FEDERAL TAXATION.-Restrictions upon the power of the federal government to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, must be found in the Constitution of the United States, and the only direct limitation therein contained is that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state. It is provided also that capitation or other direct taxes must be paid in proportion to the federal census or enumeration, according to which the representation of the states in the proper branches of Congress is determined,4 that duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform throughout the United States,5 and that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of any one state over those of another. These are not, strictly speaking, limita 1. See Temple v. Sumner, 51 Miss. 13; 24 Am. Rep. 615; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; 69 Am. Dec. 226; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325; Walcott v. People, 17 Mich. 78; Ex p. Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547; Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush (Ky.) 406; Aulanier v. Governor, I Tex. 653. A license may include a tax, or it may not. If the exaction goes no further than to cover the necessary expenses of issuing it, it does not, but if it is made a means of supplying money for the public treasury, it is a tax. Mays v. Cincinnati, Ohio St. 269. 2. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed.) 110. And see Lane County . Oregon, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418. The inherent restrictions upon the power to tax growing out of its nature and out of general constitutional principles apply to federal taxation as well as to state taxation. See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533 3. Const. U. S., art. 1, § 9, par. 5; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 71; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 462; Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 433; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 418; Whiteaker v. Haley, 2 Oregon 128. In Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504, it was held that the constitutional prohibition against taxing exports, when directed to the United States, acts in substantially the same manner as when directed to a state. The prohibition in both cases has reference to the im 21 position of duties on goods, by reason or cause of their exportation or intended exportation. 4. Const. U. S., art. 1, § 9, par. 4; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 533. And see Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 433; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 419; U. S. v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 32. When the United States statutes require a direct tax to be apportioned according to the last state assessment and valuation, the action of tax commissioners in substituting a different and higher rate is in excess of their authority, and the excess is recoverable from the United States. Seabrook v. U. S., 21 Ct. of Cl. 39. 5. Const. U. S., art. 1, § 8, par. 1; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71; Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 433; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 419. Taxes imposed by the internal revenue laws upon gains, profits, and incomes, are excises or duties, and not direct taxes within the constitutional provision requiring an apportionment of direct taxes. Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586. 6. Const. U. S., art. 1, § 9, par. 5. A law requiring vessels refusing or neglecting to take a pilot, to forfeit to the warden of the port one-half the regular amount of pilotage, does not give preference to the ports of one state over those of another, even though vessels engaged in a trade largely local in its nature are exempted from the requirement. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299. tions of power, but rather rules prescribing the mode in which the power shall be exercised.1 Power to tax without apportionment extends to all objects except direct taxes,2 but all such taxes, except direct taxes, must be laid and collected by the rule of uniformity.3 The requirement of the federal constitution that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,4 applies to all laws which provide for the assessment and collection of taxes to defray the expenses of government,5 and to all laws, the principal object of which is to raise revenue, but not to laws under which revenue incidentally arises, nor to appropriation statutes, even though taxation necessarily follows.8 6 b. UPON STATE TAXATION-(1) Generally.-The power of the state to tax can be exercised only within constitutional limitations, which, however, are not to be implied.9 1. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71. 2. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533; Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 299. And see Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586. In Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 317, it was held that Congress may impose direct taxes upon the District of Columbia as well as upon the territories, in proportion to the census required to be taken by the constitu tion. 3. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71. A tax act which recognizes the fact that its execution may be temporarily prevented, and which provides for the collection of the tax as soon as the authority of the government shall be reëstablished, is not unconstitutional on the ground that the tax imposed is not uniform throughout the United States. U. S. v. Riley, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 204. 4. Const. U. S., art. 1, § 7. Similar provisions exist in the constitutions of many of the states, requiring bills for raising revenue to originate in the popular or most numerous branch of the legislative department. Desty on Taxation 97, citing Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Opinion of Justices, 126 Mass. 557. In England, all revenue measures must originate in the popular house of Parliament. 4 Co. Inst. 169; 1 Black. Com. 169. 5. Peyton v. Bliss, 1 Woolw. (U. S.) 173; Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58 Ala. 546. And see STATUTES, vol. 23, p. 140. In Perry County v. Selma, etc., R. Co., 58. Ala. 546, it was held that a bill for reducing revenue which provides for collecting revenue is a bill for raising revenue. 6. The Nashville, 4 Biss. (U. S.) 188. In U. S. v. James, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 207, it was held that the requirement of the federal constitution that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, applies to bills that draw money from citizens but give no direct equivalent for it. 7. The Nashville, 4 Biss. (U. S.) 188. And see Rankin v. Henderson (Ky. 1888), 7 S. W. Rep. 174. Under the Massachusetts constitution, requiring all money bills to originate in the House of Representatives, the Senate has an equal right with the House to originate an inquiry into the returns made from the towns for the purpose of settling a valuation and of concluding on the proportion of ratable property within each town. Opinion of Justices, 126 Mass. 547. In Rankin v. Henderson (Ky. 1888), 7 S. W. Rep. 174, it was held that a statute authorizing a municipality to impose a license tax upon certain occupations within its limits, the tax being for municipal purposes, may originate in either branch of the legislature, notwithstanding a constitutional provision requiring bills for raising revenue to originate in the House. 8. Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1. 9. See Lane County . Oregon, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71; State v. Parker, 32 N. J. L. 426; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. (2) Restrictions in Federal Constitution-(a) Upon Export and Import Taxation; Inspection Laws.-The states may not, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws.1 Goods become exports within this provision when they are separated from the general mass of the property of the state for the purpose of exportation.2 Goods imported do not lose their character as imports until they have passed from the control of the importer, or been broken up by him from the original packages or cases. The term "import" covers nothing which is not actually brought within the limits of the ports of the country to which it is sent.5 (Va.) 422; 73 Am. Dec. 367. And see People v. Seymour, 16 Cal. 332; 76 Am. Dec. 521; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; 60 Am. Dec. 581; State v. Hayne, 4 S. Car. 403; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Marion County, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 665; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 319; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania (State Freight Tax Case), 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black (U. S.) 620; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 200; Society for Savings . Coite, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 594; Providence Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 611; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419; Hays. Pacific Mail, etc., Co., 17 How. (U. S.) 596; Southern Steamship Co. v. Wardens, etc., 6 Wall. (U.S.) 31; Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U. S.) 283; Almy v. California, 24 How. (U. S.) 169; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 204; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 139; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Com., 87 Pa. St. 173; 30 Am. Rep. 352. "If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 21. 1. U. S. Const., art. 10, § 10. 2. Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Wood (U. S.) 408; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 565; Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 61. In Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, it was held that exportation is not begun until goods are committed to the common carrier for transportation out of the state, or until they have started on their ultimate passage to their destination, and that, until that time, they are taxable as a part of the general mass of the property of the state, but not as exports; and that the carrying of property in cars or vehicles, or floating it to the depot where the journey is to commence, is no part of the exportation. See also C. Ñ. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 22 Fed. Rep. 54; Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 504. 3. Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods (U. S.) 408; Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 29; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419; License Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 504; Almy v. California, 24 How. (U. S.) 169; Duer v. Small, 4 Blatchf. (U.S.) 263; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; 49 Am. Dec. 226; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) 474 Merchandise, when once sold by the importer, is taxable as other property, even though it still remains in the original packages. Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110. 4. Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods (U. S.) 408; Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 29; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419; License Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 504; Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 122; Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall. (U. S.) 479; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (Ŭ. S.) 123; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 148; Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; State v. Shapleigh, 27 Mo. 344; Wynne v. Wright, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 19; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) 474. 5. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. (Ü. S.) 619; Meredith v. U. S., 13 Pet. (U. S.) 486. A purchaser of goods coming from abroad, the goods to be at his risk until So long as the goods imported retain their character of imports, a tax in any shape is within the prohibition.1 A tax upon the occupation of an importer is within the prohibition;2 so is a tax upon the sale of imported goods in the original packages.3 Even after the thing imported has become a part of the general mass of the property of the state, it cannot be taxed merely because it had been imported or had been an instrument of commerce, though the mere fact that goods had been imported or that they are intended for exportation, does not interfere with their taxation to the same extent as other property within the state is taxed. In order to fall within the prohibition the tax must either be a duty levied on goods as a condition of or by delivered to him, is not an importer, and the goods may be taxed while in the original packages. Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110. 1. In People v. National F. Ins. Co., 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 334, it was held that premiums of insurance upon goods imported from foreign countries, stored in bonded warehouses, were not taxable. But see People v. National F. Ins. Co., 27 Hun (N. Y.) 188. In Almy v. California, 24 How. (U. S.) 169, it was held that a statute imposing a stamp tax on bills of lading for the transportation from any place within the state to any place without the state, of gold or silver coin, gold dust, or gold or silver in bars, or other form, imposed a duty upon the export of gold and silver, and, therefore, was unconstitutional. See also Ex p. Martin, 7 Nev. 140; 8 Am. Rep. 707. In People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; 60 Am. Dec. 581, a tax which was not levied on the foreign owner of consigned goods in the hands of the consignee, but only upon their sale, was held to be valid. 2. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110; Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 29; American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 43 Fed. Rep. 609; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464. The inquiry is upon what did the burden really rest, and not upon the question from whom the state exacts payment. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 238. 3. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 200; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 594; Daniel v. Richmond, 78 Ky. 542; People v. Moring, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 642; People v. National F. Ins. Co., 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 341. But see State v. Peckham, 3 R. I. 289. The right to import includes the right to sell. When the importer purchases the right to import by the payment of a duty to the general government, he purchases also the privileges of a market, and taxing the market is in effect taxing the import. Lin Sing . Washburn, 20 Cal. 534; License Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 504; Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1; Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall. (U. S.) 478. 4. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; People v. Moring, 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 642. The power of the national government over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, reaches the interior of every state, so far as it may be necessary to protect the products of other states and countries from discrimination by reason of their foreign origin. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. 5. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; License Cases, 5 How. (U. S.) 504; Waring v. Mobile, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 110; Pervear v. Com., 5 Wall. (U. S.) 475; State v. Pickney, 10 Rich. (S. Car.) 474; State v. Crawford, 2 Head (Tenn.) 460; Wynne v. Wright, 1 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 19; Cowles v. Brittain, 2 Hawks (N. Car.) 204; Kenny v. Harwell, 42 Ga. 416; Cumming v. Savannah, R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 26; Pittsburgh, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 40 La. Ann. 226; 8 Am. St. Rep. 519; Tracy v. State, 3 Mo. 3; Biddle v. Com., 13 |