posting of a notice, by the officer, of the time and place of sale, in some convenient and public place within his precinct, three weeks before the time of sale as required by Massachusetts R. S., ch. 8, § 27, the time when such notice was posted must be established with certainty, and its contents must be sufficiently shown, in order to identify it with the notice required to be published by the 24th section of the same chapter. Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 260.

An affidavit of the collector that an advertisement of the lands had been posted up more than eight weeks, is no evidence that the lands have been duly advertised. The affidavit should state the time when the advertisement was posted up, so that it may be seen whether the posting was made in due season. Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194.

1. Lagroue v. Rains, 48 Mo. 536. In this case the court said: "There are doubtless good and sufficient reasons why the notice should be printed. Some persons can read printing who cannot read writing. Printed notices are calculated to attract more attention, impart more information, and give greater facility for examining into what land is to be sold or has become delinquent. Everything that has a tendency to inform the community and promote competition in these sales is essential. But without giving reasons, it is sufficient for us to know that the law absolutely demanded that the handbills posted up should be printed, and that the officers disregarded and disobeyed its express mandates. If they could make one kind of substitution, they could another, and no person could ever know how or where to look for the protection of his rights."

2. Hill v. Nicholson, 92 N. Car. 24. The written notice to the owner or his agent, prescribed by Louisiana Act No. 47 of 1873, is an essential prerequisite of the sale, and in its default, the sale is absolutely void. Villey v. Jarreau, 33 La. Ann. 291. Accordingly, a sale

of property assessed in the name of another person than the true owner, preceded by notices given to the party assessed and not to the true owner, is absolutely void. Lague v. Boagni, 32 La. Ann. 912. See also Workingman's Bank v. Lannes, 30 La. Ann. 871.

In McPhee v. Venable, 77 Ga. 772, the ordinance provided that personal notice should be given to "the owner, or the tenant in possession, if the owner is unknown." The owner was a nonresident, but had a resident agent, who was so known to be by the officer, he having paid the taxes on the lot for several years, and his name being entered on the city books as the agent of the owner. It was held that the notice required should have been given to him.

Where the statute requires notice to be served upon the owner, his agent or representative, or left at his residence, after the death of the owner, the notice must be given to his heirs, or personal representative, and a notice addressed to his "estate" and left at his former residence, confers no jurisdiction to order a sale, when it is shown that he had been dead many years, that his estate had been finally settled and distributed, and that the lands were at the time of the assessment in the possession of purchasers from his heirs. Carlisle v. Watts, 78 Ala. 486.

3. Hill v. Nicholson, 92 N. Car. 24; Whitehurst v. Gaskill, 69 N. Car. 449; 12 Am. Rep. 655; Ex p. McCay, 84 N. Car. 63.

4. Howze v. Dew, 90 Ala. 178.

Where an estate was owned by several heirs, and the collector levied upon the entire estate, and advertised it for sale, and gave notice to only one of the heirs, the sale was adjudged void for want of notice to the other heirs. It seems, however, that had the collector levied only on the interest of the heir who was notified, and advertised his interest for sale, the sale would have been good. Thurston v. Miller, 10 R. I. 358.

1. Cooley v. O'Connor, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 391.

2. Vernon v. Nelson, 33 Ark. 748; Allen v. Ozark Land Co., 55 Ark. 549; McGehee v. Martin, 53 Miss. 519; Mead v. Day, 54 Miss. 58; Harkreader v. Clayton, 56 Miss. 384; Mayer v. Peebles, 58 Miss. 628; Caston v. Caston, 60 Miss. 475; Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381; Eutrekin v. Chambers, 11 Kan. 368; Park v. Tinkman, 9 Kan. 615; Doe v. Allen, 67 N. Car. 346; Den v. Rose, 4 Dev. (N. Car.) 549; Essington v. Neill, 21 Ill. 139; Dougherty v. Crawford, 14 S. Car. 628; Roddy v. Purdy, 10 S. Car. 137; Chandler v. Keeler, 46 Iowa 596; Conrad v. Darden, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 307; Gomer v. Chaffee, 6 Colo. 314. If the statute does not specify the time and place, but provides that the sale shall be at a time and place to be stated in the notice of sale, a sale at another time or place than that stated in the notice is void. Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn. 212; Sheehy v. Hinds, 27 Minn. 259.

Under the Ohio Act of 1822, the sale must be on the day named in the advertisement, or, if made on a subsequent day, the reason therefor must appear in the officer's return. Wilkins v. Huse, 10 Ohio 140.

In Bestor v. Powell, 7 Ill. 119, the statute required the sale to be made on the "second Monday succeeding the term of the court" at which judgment against the land was rendered, and it was held that the statute intended the second Monday after the first day of the term. It was, however, intimated that a sale made on the second Monday after the close of the term, would not be objectionable. But the latter position was denied in Hope v. Sawyer, 14 Ill. 253, where it was held that the sale must be made on the second Monday succeeding the commencement of the term of the court, and if not made on that day, the sale is invalid. Followed in Polk v. Hill, 15 Ill. 131, where it was held that if more than two weeks intervene between the commencement of the term and the sale, the sale is void.

Where the statute directed the sale to be made on the first Monday in July "and the next ensuing days," and the officer's certificate recited that he

sold on the first Monday in July “and the next ensuing days," but failed to show on which of these days the tract in controversy was sold, or how long the sale continued, the omission was deemed fatal; as the statute authorized the owner to redeem within a certain time from the date of sale, if the day of sale does not appear, this valuable right may be lost. Bloomstein v. Brien, 3 Tenn. Ch. 55.

Where the tax deed shows that the land was sold two days before the time advertised for sale, the deed on its face shows that there is not a valid sale. Cook v. Pennington, 15 S. Car. 185.

While the sale may, under the charter of the City of Kansas, be continued from day to day, the officer must begin it on the day for which the notice was given; and if not begun then, his power to sell becomes functus officio. Sullivan v. Donnell, 90 Mo. 278.

In Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt. 419, it was held that where the officer advertises the sale to take place at a particular time and place, and his return states it to have been held in the town and on the day designated, it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that it was held at the precise time and place named.

Under the Kansas laws of 1860, when lands have been duly advertised for sale at the regular sale days, and are not sold on those days by reason of injunction or other judicial proceeding, they may be sold at any time after the dissolution of the injunction, or restraining order, upon ten days' notice. Patterson v. Carruth, 13 Kan. 494. See also Jordan v. Kyle, 27 Kan. 190; Morrill v. Douglass, 17 Kan. 291.

The auditor general of Michigan may not directly or indirectly postpone tax sales beyond the time fixed by law. People v. Auditor Gen'l, 41 Mich. 28.

In Shell v. Duncan, 31 S. Car. 547, South Carolina Gen. St., § 592 was construed as empowering the comptroller general to postpone the time of the sale in question.

Under section 558 of the Mississippi Code of 1880, providing that if from any cause the sale shall not be made at the time appointed by law, it may be had thereafter, in the same or a subsequent

year, at any time designated therefor by order of the board of supervisors of the county, the board may not, on the day fixed by law for the sale, make an order relieving the officer of the duty to sell on that day, and fixing a future day for such sale. Any such order and sales made in pursuance thereof are nullities. The purpose of the statute was to provide for failures to sell land at the time prescribed by law. It sprang from the apprehension that by inadvertence or oversight, some land might escape sale at the regular time, and was intended especially for such cases. Brougher v. Conley, 62

Miss. 358.

The treasurer may, under section 776 of the Iowa Revision, when, from certain named causes, the property cannot be duly advertised and offered for sale on the first Monday in October, make the sale on the first Monday of the next succeeding month in which it can be made, allowing time for publication. Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa 100; Sully v. Kuehl, 30 Iowa 274; Easton v. Savery, 44 Iowa 654.

And the reasons or causes why the sale was not held on the first Monday in October, but at such subsequent time, need not appear of record. Sully v. Kuehl, 30 Iowa 275.

And where the deed recites that the sale was begun on the first Monday of December, instead of on the first Monday of October, the presumption is that the causes recognized by the statute for commencing the sale on the first Monday of some month subsequent to October, existed. Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa 160; Love v. Welch, 33 Iowa 192; Easton v. Savery, 44 Iowa 654.

Under the Arkansas revenue laws, in force in 1867, it was only as to lands of non-residents that the county court was empowered, upon failure of the officer to sell on the day fixed by law, to order the sale to be had on a different day. Spain v. Johnson, 31 Ark. 314. See also McDermott v. Scully, 27 Ark. 226; Hogins v. Brashears, 13 Ark. 242.

In Doe v. Allen, 67 N. Car. 346, it was held that the sheriff's power to sell

lands for taxes being given on the condition that it be exercised within a certain time, the legislature may not, by a private act, empower him to sell after the expiration of the time allowed by law.

A sale made at 10 o'clock a. m., March 9th, 1887, instead of between the hours of 12 m. and 5 p. m., as required by Revision N. J. 1040, § 1, is validated by act March 23d, 1887, confirming all sales theretofore or thereafter made, although not made during the hours prescribed. State v. Landis Tp., 50 N. J. L. 374.

Sale Before Default.-Where the statute provides that the taxes are to be paid on or before the first day of May of each year, and lands delinquent are to be sold on the second Monday of the same month, a sale after the first day, but before the second Monday, of May, is void; the days intervening between said dates are intended as days of grace to the taxpayer, and no final default can occur until the latter date. Davis v. Schmidt, 68 Miss. 736. See also Orr v. Tasvacier, 21 Iowa 68; Person v. O'Neal, 32 La. Ann. 228.

1. Park v. Tinkham, 9 Kan. 615; Richards v. Cole, 31 Kan. 205.

Where the statute requires the sale to be made before the courthouse door, a sale made within the courthouse cannot be upheld. Rubey v. Huntsman, 32 Mo. 501. In this case it was said: "It is immaterial whether it was more convenient to all persons or better in any respect to sell within than before the courthouse. The law has prescribed the place of sale and that is the only proper place. It is so because the law has said so, and there can be no reasoning about it." Followed in McNair v. Jenson, 33 Mo. 312. See also Vasser v. George, 47 Miss. 713.

Where Statute is Silent as to PlaceExtent of Officer's Power.-In Rice v. Johnson, 20 Ga. 639, the statute was silent as to the place of sale, but it was held that the power of the officer must nevertheless be restricted to this extent-the sale is to be held at that place where there will be the best

chance for the sale accomplishing the objects of the grant of the power to sell-viz., the collection of the tax, and its collection at the least cost to the taxpayer-the place where the property is situated, or some place in that vicinity, as the courthouse of the county is such place, and a sale out of the county is unauthorized.

In Rhode Island, where the statute is silent as to the place of sale, a sale at the sheriff's office about twenty miles from the lands sold, will be upheld, where it appears that the officer acted in good faith, that no objection was made by complainant to the place of sale during the time the advertisement was running, and no steps were taken to set it aside for more than five years after the sale. Howland v. Pettey, 15 R. I. 603.

1. See cases cited in notes to this section.

2. Wells v. Austin, 59 Vt. 157; Butler v. Delano, 42 Iowa 350.

Under the Iowa Rev. Sts., §§ 764, 773, and Laws of Extra Sess. 1861, p. 32, when lands have been once properly advertised for sale, the sale may be made at any time thereafter, pursuant to adjournments regularly made, without a further advertisement. Hurley v. Street, 29 Iowa 429.

And the tax deed is at least prima facie evidence that a proper adjournment was made to the day on which the sale took place. It is not essential that such adjournment should be shown by the records. Bullis v. Marsh, 56 Iowa 747. See also Lorain v. Smith, 37 Iowa 67.

But proof that the alleged sale took place at a time to which there had been no adjournment of a prior sale, will overcome the prima facie evidence of the sale presented by the deed. Thompson v. Ware, 43 Iowa 455.

In Plympton v. Sapp, 55 Iowa 195,

the answer averred that the sale "was held upon the 17th day of March, 1870, a day not authorized by law therefor." The time fixed by law was the first Monday of October. The plaintiff insisted that March 17th may have been a legal day for the sale, because there may have been an adjournment from the day appointed by law. But the court held that the averment precluded the supposition that it may have been an authorized day by reason of an adjournment.

3. Buzzell v. Johnson, 54 Vt. 90.

4. Buzzell v. Johnson, 54 Vt. 90. In this case the adjournment was to one o'clock in the afternoon, and the sale was made at ten o'clock in the forenoon. It was held that the sale could not be sustained, notwithstanding the property sold well, and that the owner's attorney was present, knew of the collector's mistake, and said nothing. Butler v. Delano, 42 Iowa 350.

5. Burns . Lyon, 4 Watts (Pa.) 363. But at the same time, it was held in this latter case that, although the Pennsylvania act authorizing the sale of unseated lands for taxes, provides for an adjournment of the sale "from day to day," yet a title is good that is founded on a sale made by adjournment to a certain day, which does not immediately succeed the first. The uniform practice in the state requires such

a construction.

6. In Louisiana, a sale may be made by the deputy of the collector. Villey v. Jarreau, 33 La. Ann. 291.

Under the Virginia statute of 18131814, a sale of land forfeited for nonpayment of taxes, may be made either by the sheriff or his deputy, but whichever officer makes the sale, that officer alone is competent to make the conveyance to the purchaser. Chapman v. Doe, 2 Leigh (Va.) 329; Wilsons v. Doe, 7 Leigh (Va.) 22.