They will also judicially recognize the political constitution or frame of their own government; its essential political agents or public officers, sharing in its regular administration; and its essential and regular political operations, powers, and action. Thus, notice is taken, by all tribunals, of the accession of the Chief Executive of the nation or state, under whose authority they act; his powers and privileges;1 the genuineness of his signature,2 the heads of departments, and principal officers of state, and the public seals; the election or resignation of a senator of the United States; the appointment of a cabinet or foreign minister; marshals and sheriffs, and the genuineness of their signatures, but not their deputies; courts of general jurisdiction, their judges, their seals, their rules and maxims in the administration of justice, and course of proceeding; also, of public proclamations of war and peace, and of days of special public fasts and thanksgivings; stated days of general political elections; the sittings of the legislature, and its established and usual course

1 Elderton's case, 2 Ld. Raym. 980, per Holt, C. J.; [* Hizer v. State, 12 Ind. 330; Lindsey v. Attorney-general, 33 Miss. 508; State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308.]

2 Jones v. Gale's Ex'r, 4 Martin, 635. And see Rex v. Miller, 2 W. Bl. 797; 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 74; Rex v. Gully, 1 Leach, Cr. Cas. 98.

8 Rex v. Jones, 2 Campb. 121; Bennett v. The State of Tennessee, Mart. & Yerg. 133; Ld. Melville's case, 29 How. St. Tr. 707. And see as to seals, infra, § 503, and cases there cited. [The courts of the United States will take notice of the persons who from time to time preside over the patent-office, whether permanently or transiently. York, &c., Railroad Co. v. Winans, 17 How. U. S. 30.]

4 Walden v. Canfield, 2 Rob. Louis. R. 466.

Holman v. Burrow, 2 Ld. Raym. 794; [Ingraham v. State, 27 Ala. 17; Major v. State, 2 Sneed (Tenn.), 11. The Court of Common Pleas will take judicial notice that the Queen's prison is in England. Wickens v. Goatley, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. 420, 422.]

6 Alcock v. Whatmore, 8 Dowl. P. C. 615.

7 Watson v. Hay, 3 Kerr, 559. [The Supreme Court (of Ohio) will take judi

cial notice of the time fixed for the commencement of its sessions, but not of the duration of any particular session. Gilliland v. Sellers, 2 Ohio (N. 8.), 223. See also Lindsay v. Williams, 17 Ala. 229.]

8 Tregany v. Fletcher, 1 Ld. Raym. 154; Lane's case, 2 Co. 16; 3 Com. Dig. 336, Courts, Q.; Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick. 470; Elliott v. Evans, 3 B. & P. 183, 184, per Ld. Alvanley, C. J.; Maberley v. Robins, 5 Taunt. 625; Tooker v. Duke of Beaufort, Sayer, 296; [* Tucker v. State, 11 Md. 322.] Whether Superior Courts are bound to take notice who are Justices of the inferior tribunals, is not clearly settled. In Skipp v. Hook, 2 Stra. 1080, it was objected that they were not; but whether the case was decided on that, or on the other exception taken, does not appear. Andrews, 74, reports the same case, ex relatione alterius," and equally doubtful. And see Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Ad. & El. 773, 786, per Ld. Denman. The weight of American authorities seems rather on the affirmative side of the question. Hawks v. Kennebec, 7 Mass. 461; Ripley v. Warren, 2 Pick. 592; Despau v. Swindler, 3 Martin, N. s. 705; Follain v. Lefevre, 8 Rob. Louis. R. 13. In Louisiana the courts take notice of the signatures of executive and judicial officers to all official acts. Jones v. Gale's Ex'r, 4 Martin, 635; Wood v. Fitz, 10 Martin, 196. [Courts will also take notice of the times and places of holding their sessions. Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Maine, 461.]

9 Dolder v. Ld. Huntingfield, 11 Ves. 292; Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M & S. 67, Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 213

of proceeding; the privileges of its members, but not the transac tions on its journals. The courts of the United States, moreover, take judicial notice of the ports and waters of the United States in which the tide ebbs and flows; of the boundaries of the several states and judicial districts; and, in an especial manner, of all the laws and jurisprudence of the several states in which they exercise an original or an appellate jurisdiction. The judges of the Supreme Court of the United States are, on this account, bound to take judicial notice of the laws and jurisprudence of all the states and territories.8 A Court of Errors will also take notice of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the inferior court whose judgment it revises. In fine, courts will generally take notice of whatever ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction. In all these, and the like cases, where the memory of the judge is at fault, he resorts to such documents of reference as may be at hand, and he may deem worthy of confidence.5

[* § 6a. There is not an entire consistency, in principle, in the decisions in the several states, upon this question. Thus it has been held courts will take notice of the usual route and course of travel between different points within the state, in order to determine the reasonableness of notice to take depositions; but that they will not take notice of the quantity of land contained within given courses and distances. But in fact the latter is a matter of mere computation, and no more requires proof than any other

1 Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131; Birt v. Rothwell, 1 Ld. Raym. 210, 343; Rex v. Wilde, 1 Lev. 296; 1 Doug. 97, n. 41; Rex v. Arundel, Hob. 109, 110, 111; Rex v. Knollys, 1 Ld. Raym. 10, 15; Stockdale v. Hansard, 7 C. & P. 731; 9 Ad. & El. 1; 11 Ad. & El. 253; Sheriff of Middlesex's case, Id. 273; Cassidy v. Stewart, 2 M. & G. 437.

2 Story on Eq. Plead., § 24, cites United States v. La Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 874; The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet. 342. They will also recognize the usual course of the great inland commerce, by which the products of agriculture in the valley of the Mississippi find their way to market. Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. S. C. R. 884; [Lathrop v. Stewart, 5 McLean, 167. They will take notice without proof of the legal coins of the United States. United States v. Burns

6

5 McLean, 23; United States v. King, Ib. 208. They also take judicial notice of treaties between the United States and foreign governments; and of the public acts and proclamations of those governments and their publicly authorized agents in carrying those treaties into effect. United States v. Reynes, 9 How. U. S. 127; and of the Spanish Laws which prevailed in Louisiana, before its cession to the United States. United States v. Tur ner, 11 Ib. 668.]

8 Ibid.; Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 607, 624, 625; Jasper v. Porter, 2 McLean, 579; [Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean, 469]

Chitty v. Dendy, 8 Ad. & El. 819. [See March v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon. 25.)

6

Gresley on Evid. 295.

hipes v. Cochran, 18 Ind. 17 Tison. Smith, 8 Texas, 147.J

proposition based upon the fundamental rules of arithmetic; and the former is a thing liable to vary with every change of the timetables, upon a railway. It is most unquestionable, that courts will take notice of what is within the common experience or knowledge of all men; as the length of time ordinarily required to cross the Atlantic by steam,1 or the nature of lotteries and the manner in which they are conducted.2 And it is no objection that the court may require instruction upon the point, themselves. They will make inquiries, at the proper place for acquiring information. For this purpose in one case the Vice-Chancellor made inquiries at the Foreign Office, whether the Federal Republic of Central America had been recognized by the British Government. And Lord Hardwicke inquired of an eminent conveyancer as to the existence of a rule of practice in that department of the profession. And the United States Supreme Court resorted to the archives and public record-books of the United States to inform themselves of particular facts material to be known to the proper understanding of a cause before it.] 5

1 [* Openheim v. Leo Wolf, 8 Sandf. Ch. 671.

↑ Boullemet v. State, 28 Ala. 83. 8 Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 221.

772.

Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 T. R.

5 Romero v. The United States, 1 Wallace, U. S. 721; Nelson, J., in United States v. Teschmaker, 22 How. U. S. 405.]

CHAPTER III.

OF THE GROUNDS OF BELIEF.

1* § 7. Our experience forms the basis of our belief in human testimony.

8. But we also derive great aid from the experience of others.

9. The belief in human testimony, a fundamental principle of our moral nature. 10. This belief is strengthened by many corroborative circumstances.

11. The probability of an hypothesis is determined by experience and reasoning combined.

12. Extensive induction tests the probability of a narrative of events, with sur prising certainty.

13. Distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.

18a. Consideration of the degrees of certainty produced by circumstantial evidence.]

§ 7. WE proceed now to a brief consideration of the General Nature and Principles of Evidence. No inquiry is here proposed into the origin of human knowledge; it being assumed, on the authority of approved writers, that all that men know is referable, in a philosophical view, to perception and reflection. But, in fact, the knowledge acquired by an individual, through his own perception and reflection, is but a small part of what he possesses; much of what we are content to regard and act upon as knowledge having been acquired through the perception of others.1 It is not easy to conceive that the Supreme Being, whose wisdom is so conspicuous in all his works, constituted man to believe only upon his own personal experience; since in that case the world could neither be governed nor improved; and society must remain in the state in which it was left by the first generation of men. On the contrary, during the period of childhood, we believe implicitly almost all that is told us; and thus are furnished with information which we could not otherwise obtain, but which is necessary, at the time, for our present protection, or as the means of future improvement. This disposition to believe may be termed instinctive. At an early period, however, we begin to find that, of the things told to us, some are not true, and thus our implicit reliance on the

1 Abercrombie on the Intellectual Powers, Part II. sec. 1, pp. 45, 46.

testimony of others is weakened; first, in regard to particular things in which we have been deceived; then in regard to persons whose falsehood we have detected; and, as these instances multiply upon us, we gradually become more and more distrustful of such statements, and learn by experience the necessity of testing them by certain rules. Thus, as our ability to obtain knowledge by other means increases, our instinctive reliance on testimony diminishes, by yielding to a more rational belief.1

§ 8. It is true, that in receiving the knowledge of facts from the testimony of others, we are much influenced by their accordance