is not obtained either from intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not require demonstrative evidence, because it is not consistent with the nature of the subject, and to insist upon it would be unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things is, that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them.1 The true question, therefore, in trials of fact, is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false, but whether there is sufficient probability of its truth; that is, whether the facts are shown by competent and satisfactory evidence. Things established by competent and satisfactory evidence are said to be proved.

§ 2. By competent evidence is meant that which the very nature of the thing to be proved requires, as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case, such as the production of a writing, where its contents are the subject of inquiry. By satisfactory evidence, which is sometimes called sufficient evidence, is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances which will amount to this degree of proof can never be previously defined; the only legal test of which they are susceptible is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man; and so to convince him, that he would venture to act upon that conviction, in matters of the highest concern and importance to his own interest.2 Questions respecting the competency and admissibility of evidence, are entirely distinct from those which respect its sufficiency or effect; the former being exclusively within the province of the court; the latter belonging exclusively to the jury. Cumulative evidence is evidence of the same kind, to the same point. Thus, if a fact is attempted to be proved by the verbal admission of the party, evidence of another verbal admission of the same fact is cumulative; but evidence of other circumstances, tending to establish the fact, is not.1

1 See Gambier's Guide to the Study of Moral Evidence, p. 121. Even of mathematical truths, this writer justly remarks, that, though capable of demonstration, they are admitted by most men solely on the moral evidence of general notoriety. For most men are neither able themselves to understand mathematical demonstrations, nor have they, ordinarily, for their truth, the testimony of those who do understand them; but finding them generally believed in the world

they also believe them. Their belief is
afterwards confirmed by experience; for
whenever there is occasion to apply them,
they are found to lead to just conclusions.
Id. 196.

21 Stark. Evid. 514.

8 Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. 25, 44; Bank United States v. Corcoran, Íd. 121, 133; Van Ness v. Pacard, Id. 137, 149.

• Parker v. Hardy, 24 Pick. 246, 248

§ 3. This branch of the law may be considered under three gen. eral heads, namely: First, The Nature and Principles of Evidence; - Secondly, The Object of Evidence, and the Rules which govern in the production of testimony; - And Thirdly, The Means of Proof, or the Instruments, by which facts are established. This order will be followed in farther treating this subject. But before we proceed, it will be proper first to consider what things courts will, of themselves, take notice of, without proof

1.

CHAPTER II.

OF THINGS JUDICIALLY TAKEN NOTICE OF, WITHOUT PROOF.

[4. Courts take judicial notice of the national seal of other nations.

5. So also of the law of nations, courts of admiralty, notarial seals, the course of nature, the calendar, &c. &c.

6. Of the territorial divisions of the country, its courts, general laws, officers, and all things universally known, &c.

6a. The subject further illustrated with reference to more recent cases.]

§ 4. ALL civilized nations, being alike members of the great family of sovereignties, may well be supposed to recognize each other's existence, and general public and external relations. The usual and appropriate symbols of nationality and sovereignty are the national flag and seal. Every sovereign, therefore, recognizes, and, of course, the public tribunals and functionaries of every nation take notice of the existence and titles of all the other sovereign powers in the civilized world, their respective flags, and their seals of state. Public acts, decrees, and judgments, exemplified under this seal, are received as true and genuine, it being the highest evidence of their character. If, however, upon a civil war in any country, one part of the nation shall separate itself from the other, and establish for itself an independent government, the newlyformed nation cannot without proof be recognized as such, by the judicial tribunals of other nations, until it has been acknowledged by the sovereign power under which those tribunals are constituted; the first act of recognition belonging to the executive function, [and courts will take judicial notice, whether or no, such governments have been so acknowledged]. But though the seal of the new power, prior to such acknowledgment, is not permitted

1 Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187, 238; Griswold v. Pitcairn, 2 Conn. 85, 90; United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 416; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 273, 835; Anon. 9 Mod. 66; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475. It is held in New York that such seal, to be recognized in

the courts, must be a common-law seal, that is, an impression upon wax. Coit v. Milliken, 1 Denio, R. 376.

2 City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Ves. 347; United States v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 610, 634.

8

3 [* Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 218.1

to prove itself, yet it may be proved as a fact by other competent testimony. And the existence of such unacknowledged government or State may, in like manner, be proved; the rule being, that if a body of persons assemble together to protect themselves, and sup port their own independence, make laws, and have courts of justice this is evidence of their being a state."

§ 5. In like manner, the Law of Nations, and the general cus toms and usages of merchants, as well as the public statutes and general laws and customs of their own country, as well ecclesiasti cal as civil, are recognized, without proof, by the courts of all civil ized nations. The seal of a notary-public is also judicially taken notice of by the courts, he being an officer recognized by the whole commercial world. Foreign Admiralty and Maritime Courts, too, being the courts of the civilized world, and of coördinate jurisdic tion, are judicially recognized everywhere; and their seals need not be proved. Neither is it necessary to prove things which must have happened according to the ordinary course of nature; nor to prove the course of time, or of the heavenly bodies; nor the ordinary public fasts and festivals; nor the coincidence of days of the week with days of the month; nor the meaning of words

1 United States v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 610, 634; The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298. What is sufficient evidence to authenticate, in the courts of this country, the sentence or decree of the court of a foreign government, after the destruction of such government, and while the country is possessed by the conqueror, remains undecided. Hatfield v. Jameson, 2 Munf. 53, 70, 71.

2 Yrissarri v. Clement, 2 C. & P. 223, per Best, C. J. And see 1 Kent, Comm. 189; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. b. 3, c. 3, § 1.

Ereskine v. Murray, 2 Ld. Raym. 1542; Heineccius ad Pand. 1. 22, tit. 3, sec. 119; 1 Bl. Comm. 75, 76, 85; Edie v. East India Co. 2 Burr. 1226, 1228; Chandler v. Grieves, 2 H. Bl. 606, n.; Rex v. Sutton, 4 M. & S. 542; 6 Vin. Abr. tit. Court, D; 1 Rol. Abr. 526, D. Judges will also take notice of the usual practice and course of conveyancing. 8 Sugd. Vend. & Pur. 28; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1 T. R. 772, per Ld. Hardwicke; Doe v. Hilder, 2 B. & Ald. 793; Rowe v. Grenfel, Ry. & Mo. 398, per Abbott, C. J. So, of the general lien of bankers on securities of their customers, deposited with them. Brandao v. Barnett, 8 M. G. & Sc. 519. [See also infra, § 489, 490. A special act for the survey of a particular tract

of land is not, as a general rule, such a public statute as the courts are bound to take notice of and expound, without requiring its production. Allegheny v. Nelson, 25 Penn. State R. 832.]

Anon. 12 Mod. 345; Wright v. Barnard, 2 Esp. 700; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 535; Brown v. Philadelphia Bank, 6 S. & R. 484; Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173, 178; Bayley on Bills, 515 (2d Am. ed. by Phillips & Sewall); Hutcheon v. Mannington, 6 Ves. 823; Porter v. Judson, 1 Gray, 175.

5 Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, 435; Rose v. Himely, Id. 292; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 187; Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. 171, 181; Green v. Waller, 2 Ld. Raym. 891, 893; Anon. 9 Mod. 66; Story on the Conflict of Laws, § 643; Hughes v. Cornelius, as stated by Lord Holt, in 2 Ld. Raym. 893. And see T. Raym. 473; 2 Show. 232, s. c.

Rex v. Luffe, 8 East, 202; Fay v. Prentice, 9 Jur. 876.

76 Vin. Abr. 491, pl. 6, 7, 8; Hoyle v. Cornwallis, 1 Stra. 887; Page v. Faucet, Cro. El. 227; Harvey v. Broad, 2 Salk 626; Hanson v. Shackelton, 4 Dowl. 48; Dawkins v. Smithwick, 4 Flor. R. 158 [Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409;1 Sprowl v. Lawrence, 38 Ala. 674.1

in the vernacular language;1 nor the legal weights and measures;2 nor any matters of public history, affecting the whole people ;* nor public matters, affecting the government of the country. [*Nor will it be required to give evidence of the course of the seasons, and the date of the ordinary maturity of particular crops.5 But the courts cannot take judicial notice of the meaning of catchwords, such as "the cost book principle; " "Black Republicans or supporters of the Helper book;"7 nor of the import of abbreviations, as "St. Louis, Mo.;" and others more difficult of interpretation.8 And it was held, in a recent case before the New York Court of Appeals, that in a trial by jury, it was proper to give evidence of historical facts.]

66

§ 6. Courts also take notice of the territorial extent of the . jurisdiction and sovereignty, exercised de facto by their own government; and of the local divisions of their country, as into states, provinces, counties, cities, towns, local parishes, or the like, so far as political government is concerned or affected; and of the relative positions of such local divisions; but not of their precise boundaries, farther than they may be described in public statutes.10 [* But not whether the jurisdiction de facto be rightfully exercised."]

1 Clementi v. Golding, 2 Campb. 25; Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 239. [Courts will take judicial notice of the customary abbreviations of Christian names. Stephen v. State, 11 Geo. 225; Weaver v. McElhenon, 13 Miss. 89.]

2 Hockin v. Cooke, 4 T. R. 314. The current coins of the country, whether established by statute or existing immemorially, will be judicially recognized. [* Daily v. State, 10 Ind. 536.] The courts will also take notice of the character of the existing circulating medium, and of the popular language in reference to it; Lampton v. Haggard, 3 Monr. 149; Jones v. Overstreet, 4 Monr. 547; [United States v. Burns, 5 McLean, 23; United States v. King, Ib. 208;] but not of the current value of the notes of a bank at any particular time. Feemster v. Ringo, 5 Monr.

886.

8 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 590; 1 Stark. Ev. 211 (6th Am. ed.). [See also Douglass v. Branch Bank, 19 Ala. 659.]

Taylor v. Barclay, 2 Sim. 221. Where a libel was charged, in stating that the plaintiff's friends, in the advocacy of her claims, "had realized the fable of the Frozen Snake," it was held that the court might judicially take no

206.]

10 Deybel's case, 4 B. & Ald. 242; 2 Inst. 557; Fazakerley v. Wiltshire, 1 Stra. 469; Humphreys v. Budd, 9 Dowl. 1000; Ross v. Reddick, 1 Scam. 73; Goodwin v. Appleton, 9 Shepl. 458; Vanderwerker v. The People, 5 Wend. 580; [State v. Powers, 25 Conn. 48;] [Ham v. Ham, 39 Maine, 263; Ib. 291; Wright v. Phillips, 2 Greene (Iowa), 191; Robertson v. Teal, 9 Texas, 344; Wheeler v. Moody, Ib. 372; Ross v. Austill, 2 Cal. 183; Kidder v. Blaisdell, 45 Maine, 461; Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420.] But courts do not take notice that particular places are or not in particular counties. Bruce v. Thompson, 2 Âd. & El. 789, N s.

But see Cooke v Wilson, 1 C. B. N. S.,

158.]

If [* State v. Dunwell, 8 R. I. 127.]