It is sufficient if the parties interested are given an opportunity to be heard before the lien becomes final upon their property, and they are not entitled to be heard upon the question whether or not the improvement should be made. (Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71; Board of Directors v. Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 26 Pac. 237.)

Where the limits of an assessment district are defined in the statute, notice need not be addressed to the persons affected by name. (Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71.)

An act for the protection of swamp lands, which provides for making assessments therefor a charge upon the lands benefited, and for a sale of such lands for such assessments, without any opportunity for a hearing of the land owner in regard to the assessment, and without any suit or opportunity of defense, is invalid. (Hutson v. Protection Dist., 79 Cal. 90, 16 Pac. 549, 21 Pac. 435.)

The property of a land owner within an irrigation district is not taken from him without due process of law, if he is allowed a hearing at any time before the lien of an assessment for taxes levied thereon becomes final. (In re Madera Irr. Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272.)

When the legal title of the property of irrigation districts is vested in the district only in trust for the land owners, the rights of such land owners are private property which cannot be taken without due process of law. (Merchants' Bank v. Escondido Irr. Dist., 144 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937.)

The "Wright act" providing for irrigation districts is constitutional. (In re Central Irr. Dist., 117

Cal. 382, 49 Pac. 354, and cases there cited.)

DEPOSITIONS.-This section does not prevent the legislature from providing that depositions taken on the preliminary examination may be used on the trial. (People v. Oiler, 66 Cal. 101, 4 Pac. 1066.) As to the power of the legislature to authorize the conditional examination of witnesses, see Willard v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 456, 22 Pac. 1120.

The provision of the Penal Code allowing depositions taken at the preliminary examination of a defendant charged with murder to be read in evidence

for the prosecution upon the trial is not in conflict with this section. (People v. Sierp, 116 Cal. 249, 48 Pac. 88; People v. Cady, 117 Cal. 10, 48 Pac. 908.)

Sec. 14. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to, or paid into court, for the owner, and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal until full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law.

PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE.-A municipal corporation has no power to take a lot to which it has no title, which is in the actual possession of another, who claims to be the owner, although he in fact is not, and appropriate it to the use of the public, without paying compensation. (Gunter v. Geary, 1 Cal. 462.)

The property of a citizen cannot be taken from him for public use, unless ample means of remuneration are provided. (McCann v. Sierra County, 7 Cal. 121.)

A municipal corporation cannot take private property for public use, without making compensation in advance or providing a fund out of which compensation shall be made as soon as the amount to be paid can be determined. (Colton v. Rossi, 9 Cal. 595.)

The legislature has no power to take the property of one person and give it to another; nor can it be taken for public use, unless compensation to the owner precede or accompany the taking. (Gillan v. Hutchinson, 16 Cal 153.)

An act directing the governor to take possession of the state prison in the possession of a lessee, without making any provision for compensation, is void. (McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500.)

The act of 1863, providing for the widening of streets in San Francisco by agreement with the owners, does not deprive the owners of any right or privilege guaranteed by this section. (San Francisco v. Kiernan, 98 Cal. 614, 33 Pac. 720.)

Property. The right of a riparian owner cannot be taken away, except for public use on due compensation. (Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 372, 10 Pac. 674.)

This section does not apply to any mere diminution in value of abutting lands by the closing of a street in whole or in part, nor to any mere inconvenience to abutting owners thereby occasioned, if access to their land is not prevented. (Brown v. Supervisors, 124 Cal. 275, 57 Pac. 82.)

Although the supervisors have authority to close a public street, the owner of adjoining property has an easement therein, of which he cannot be deprived without compensation. (Bigelow v. Ballerino, 111 Cal. 559, 44 Pac. 307.)

The right of the owner of a city lot to the use of the street adjacent thereto is property, and any act by which this right is impaired is to that extent a damage. (Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 37 Pac. 750.)

The right of the owner of land abutting on a city street to access over it to and from his premises is a right of property of which he cannot be deprived without compensation. (Coats v. Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 1 Cal. App. 441, 82 Pac. 640.)

No compensation need be made for the vacation of a public street which has not been dedicated by the owners of the land. (Levee Dist. No. 9 v. Farmer, 101 Cal. 178, 35 Pac. 569.)

Money is not that species of property which the Sovereign authority can authorize to be taken in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. (Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Emery v. San Francisco, 28 Cal. 345.)

J

The leasehold interest in convicts leased by the state is as much property as are lands held in fee. (McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. 11.)

A franchise for a street railroad is property capable of being benefited by the widening of the street. (Appeal of North Beach etc. R. R. Co., 32 Cal. 499.)

The legislature may grant the right to construct a railroad upon a public street without providing for compensation for the damage done to the owners of the adjacent property, provided the owners of the property are not the owners usque ad filum viae. (Carson v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 35 Cal. 325.)

A person who owns lots fronting on a street dedicated by himself to the public use is entitled to damages, if a railroad company lays its track along the street, and thereby obstructs it for the use of teams and vehicles, and if the value of the lot is diminished thereby. (Southern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Reed, 41 Cal. 256.)

An act providing that a tax collector shall receive the fees allowed by law, and pay a part of such fees into the treasury for the benefit of the county, does not take private property for public use. (Ream v. Siskiyou County, 36 Cal. 620.)

Public use.-The formation of irrigation district for the purpose of reclaiming arid land is a public purpose for which private property may be taken. (Thurlock Irr. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360, 18 Pac. 379; Central Irr. Dist. v. De Lappe, 79 Cal. 351, 21 Pac. 825; Crall v. Poso Irr. Dist., 87 Cal. 140, 26 Pac. 797.)

The legislature is the sole judge of the public necessity or advantage of a proposed improvement as a public use. (Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229.)

The words "public use" mean a use which con-
cerns the whole community, as distinguished from a
particular individual or a particular number of in-
dividuals. But it is not necessary that each and
every individual member of society should have the
same degree of interest in this use, or be personally
or directly affected by it, in order to make it public.
(Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229.)

To condemn land within the state for a United
States fort or other military or naval purpose is to

condemn land for a public use. (Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229.)

The only test of the admissibility of the power of the state to condemn land for "public use" is that the particular object for which the land is condemned tends to promote the general interest, in its relation to any legitimate object of government. (Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229.)

The "public use" is left in large measure to legislative determination; and the legislative resolve, by which a tax is imposed or private property taken, is such legislative determination. (Stockton etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Contra Costa etc. Co. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 323.)

But the legislative determination that a certain business is a public use is not conclusive of its character. (Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 269.)

A railroad for the transportation of passengers and freight is a public use. (San Francisco etc. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367; Contra Costa etc. Co. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 323; Stockton etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Napa Valley R. R. Co. v. Napa, 30 Cal. 435.)

The taking of land by a drainage district for its ditch is a public use. (Laguna Drainage District v. Charles Main Co., 144 Cal. 209, 77 Pac. 933.)

Private use. The legislature cannot take private property for a private use, and it must declare the purpose to be one of public necessity or convenience. (Nickey v. Stearns Ranchos Co., 126 Cal. 150, 58 Pac. 459; Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 269; Brenham v. Story, 39 Cal. 179; Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241.)

Thus an act permitting a person to build a flume on the land of another to carry off the tailings from his mine is void. (Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 269.)

Also an act giving a right to miners to enter upon private property, where no such right existed anterior to its passage. (Gillan v. Hutchinson, 16 Cal. 153.)

Also an act authorizing an administrator to sell real property belonging to the estate of his decedent,