only necessary to the regular conduct of the public service, but it is vitally essential to the preservation of sound subordination, and is conformable to the rules of service in all armies, in as much as he who is responsible for all, should have the controul of all. 7th. I hope I may be expressly authorized to detach from my command, all persons who may manifest a temper or disposition to excite discontents, to generate factions, or embitter the service. This is indispensable to put down seditious spirits, and to harmonize the corps. 8th Should we move against Kingston in the first instance, the withdrawal of our force from Fort George will enable the enemy to re-occupy that point, and for a brief period to harrass our frontier on that strait. May not the militia, or a body of volunteers, be called forth to relieve the regular troops at that place, and prevent discontents and complaints? 9th. For the maintenance of the necessary authority of the chief, it is hoped the secretary of war will decline and forbid all correspondence with his subordinate officers, except in cases of personal grievance. 10th. I beg to be advised of the means of communication between our military positions, and particularly from Sackett's Harbor to Burlington, which should be rapid and infallible. 11th. I ask authority to equip the whole of our horse artillery, and to mount the whole of our dragoons, because these arms will be found all-important in every combat which may ensue. A serious impression of the dread responsibility which awaits me, and a correct sense of the public expectation which accompanies me, must be my apology for giving you so much trouble. With great respect, &c. your obedient servant, JAMES WILKINSON.. Honourable John Armstrong, Secretary of War, SIR, WAR DEPARTMENT, August 8th, 1813. I have given to your observations of the 6th instant all the consideration they so justly merit. The main objection to any plan, which shall carry our operations wide of Kingston and westward of it, is, that in the event of its success, it leaves the strength of the enemy unbroken; it but wounds the tail of the lion, and of course, is not calculated to hasten the termination of the war, either by encreasing our own vigour, or by diminishing that of the enemy. Kingston is the great depot of his resources, and so long as he retains this and keeps open his communication with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other defences, and of reinforcing or renewing the war in the west. Kingston, therefore, as well on grounds of policy as of military principle, presents the first and great object of the campaign. There are two ways of approaching this: by direct, or indirect, attack: by breaking down the enemy's battalions and forcing his works; or by seizing and obstructing the line of his communication, and thus drying up the sources by which he is nourished and maintained. Circumstances must govern in choosing between these different modes. Were our assembled land and naval forces competent to the object, a direct attack would no doubt be the shorter and better way; but if, on the contrary, our strength be inferior, or hardly equal to that of the enemy, the indirect attack must be preferred. These considerations have suggested the third plan, to be found in my note of the 23d ultimo. To give execution to this, I would collect my force at the head of the St. Lawrence, make every demonstration of attacking Kingston, proceed rapidly down the river, seize the northern bank at the village of Hamilton, leave a corps to fortify and to hold it, march upon Montreal with the main body, effect there a junction with Hampton, and take a position which shall enable you to secure what you gain. On this plan the navy would perform its part by occupying the mouth of the river, and preventing a pursuit by water; by clearing the river of the armed boats of the enemy; by holding, with its own, the passage at Hamilton, and by giving support to that position. If the enemy pursues, it must be by land, without subsistence, (excepting what he carries on his back) and without artillery. If he remains stationary, his situation must soon become even more serious, as the country in which he is cannot long subsist him. It will then but remain for him to fight his way to Quebec, to perish in the attempt, or to lay down his arms. After this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that in conducting the present campaign, you will make Kingston your primary object, and that you will choose (as circumstances may warrant) between a direct and indirect attack upon that I have the honour to be, &c. JOHN ARMSTRONG. Maj. Gen. Wilkinson, comnd'g district No. 9. post. SIR, WAR DEPARTMENT, August 9th, 1813. In answer to that part of your letter of the 6th instant, which calls for information, &c. on certain enumerated points, I have the honour to state: 1st. That general Hampton's instructions go only to assemble and organize his division at Burlington. It is intended that he shall operate cotemporarily with you, and under your orders, in prosecution of the plan of campaign which has been given to you. 2d. The senior major, general commanding the principal army entitled to the services of a private secretary. 3d. The ordnance and other departments of supply within the district (No. 9.) are subject of course to your orders. 4th. The quarter master general of the army will supply the funds for secret service. 5th. All orders to subordinate officers pass from the war department to the adjutant general; to be communicated by him to the general commanding the district in which such subordinate officer may serve. 6th. No specific permission is necessary for removing factious or disorderly men. All such will properly become subjects of the confidential reports to be made by inspectors. To detach such men from one district to another, is only shifting the evil; the better way is to report them for dismission. 7th. If the corps at fort George be recailed, the works should be razed or occupied by a force competent to hold it against an assault. There is a corps of militia and volunteers (to whom the Six Nation Indians have associated themselves) at Black Rock, which may be kept in service. They are commanded by general Porter and Mr. Parrish. 8th. The secretary of war will decline and forbid all improper communications, and particularly such as may bear any colour of insubordination. 9th. Besides the ordinary mode of communication by mail, expresses may be employed in extraordinary cases. 10th. The dragoons and light artillery corps shall be made efficient. Horses may be bought for both. An officer from each corps should be directed to superintend the purchases. Price (average) not to exceed 120 dollars. I have the honour to be, &c. Maj. Gen. Wilkinson, comdg. the N. Army. SIR, SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 21st, 1813. I arrived here yesterday: my machinery is in motion, and I have strong hopes of giving the change to sir George which will lead directly to the object of first importance. Commodore Chauncey is in port here, and his antagonist, sir James Yeo, at Kingston. In the late interviews between these naval commanders, the first has zealously sought a combat, which the latter has cautiously avoided; the superiority on the lake therefore remains still to be settled; but I have Chauncey's assurance for it, and place much confidence in his word; it is obviously sir James's plan to decline a conflict; but on what ground I cannot determine. Our schooner here will be equipt and manned by Wednesday, and I shall sail with the squadron for fort George probably the day after; I am endeavoring to draw sir George after me; but whether I succeed in this attempt or not, should our men and means answer report, and Heaven favour me, I will be in possession of Kingston, or below that place, on the 26th proximo. Major general Hampton must not budge until every thing is matured in this quarter, and we have either got possession of Kingston or have cut its communication with Montreal, of which I shall give him seasonable advice, via Plattsburg, where I shall calculate on his arrival the 20th of the ensuing month, completely equipt for a forward movement. If he changes his position and shows his column west of the lake sooner, it may carry sir George to Montreal and produce precautions which might otherwise be neglected until too late for any salutary effect. The militia called forth by governor Tompkins, of which by the bye you gave me no information, should not be arrayed before he hears from me at fort George, because the assembly of such a body would increase the alarm, and put all Canada in countermotion, while incidents beyond the controul of man may intervene to procrastinate my movements and thus baffle the effects of the proposed co-operation on the side of Vermont: should a corps of militia be drawn from thence, no movement should be made by them, until general Hampton has crossed Champlain. It would be highly interesting to the public service and extremely acceptable to me to see you at Niagara, from whence, should I find it practicable, it is my intention to commence my movement down the lake, about the 15th of the next month; the best possible disposition for the safety of that frontier, and for the security of the vast mass of ordnance and stores which I must leave there, may render your advice and authority indispensably necessary to avert clamors and prevent any obstruction to my prompt movement. I am, sir, your obedient servant, &c. JAMES WILKINSON. Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War. SIR, SACKETT'S HARBOR, August 26th, 1813. Chauncey will go out, he says, to-morrow or next day to seek sir James. I see the necessity of settling the point of naval superiority before we commit ourselves, and therefore, the decision cannot be had too soon. In the mean time the essential arrangements progress, and if the means can be mustered, they will ensure the end. I fear Yeo will avoid a contest to spin out the campaign, and gain time for reinforcements, and the organization of militia; but if he will not come out, we must blockade him. I go to Niagara the moment our arrangements are matured here. Sir George has actually gone for the head of the lake with a reinforcement. To prevent his playing tricks with Boyd, I have sent him (Boyd) the note of which you have a copy. On Saturday 21st, one hundred and sixty regular troops ascended by Ogdensburg to Kingston, and on the 23d and 24th, they were followed by five hundred Highlanders in their kilts, who conducted up one hundred boats. Thus we see that this quarter attracts chief attention. All my efforts will be made to induce sir George to draw after him a chief part of the garrison of Kingston, which must now be near five thousand strong. The situation of Proctor and the irruption of our Indians have gone far to excite these dispositions. Meet me at Niagara, if possible, and for God's sake press on the recruits from Albany and the southward, and send me Wadsworth, Swift, Fenwick, and Izard. All things go well here, and thank God, the men are recovering rapidly. I hear not a word from Hampton. I hope he does not mean to take the stud; but if so, we can do without him, and he should be sent home. Secretary of War. Truly yours, JAMES WILKINSON: WAR DEPARTMENT, SACKETT'S HARBOR, DEAR GENERAL, The battle on the lake! Shall we have one? If Yeo fights and is beaten, all will be well. If he does not fight, the result may also be favourable. Yours cordially, RONG.. General Wilkinson. |