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ANNEX 6-Continued

CORRESPONDING TITLES AND RANK OF THE SANITARY PERSONNEL OF THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN LAND

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ANNEX 7

DEFINITIONS

1. Prisoners of War

The term "prisoners of war" shall comprise those officers, officials, noncommissioned officers and enlisted or enrolled persons, male or female, of all branches and corps of the army, navy and marine corps, whether on the active, retired or reserve lists, who are captured while in the active service of the armed forces of their State of Origin. Sanitary personnel are excluded.

2. Civil Prisoners

The term "civil prisoners" shall comprise all citizens or subjects of either Contracting Party held in confinement by the other for any reason except the violation of the penal laws in force in the territories of the Captor State or any of its subdivisions; inclusive of the officers and members of crews of merchant ships, and exclusive of persons coming within the definition of "prisoners of war," or Article 139 or 140.

3. Officers

The term "officer" shall comprise the officers of all corps of the armed forces, military or naval, of the two Contracting Parties and shall include commissioned, warranted, and appointed officers of the United States, "Hilfsoffiziere" of the German navy and officials with the rank of officer in the German army or navy.

4. Noncommissioned Officers

The term "noncommissioned officer" shall include in the American army corporals, and in the German army or navy "Offiziersstellvertreter" and "Beamtenstellvertreter," "Deckoffiziere," "Vizedeckoffiziere," and "Hilfsdeckoffiziere."

5. State of Origin

The term "State of Origin" shall be held to mean:

(a) with reference to military or naval personnel, the State in

whose armed forces they are commissioned, warranted, appointed, enlisted or enrolled;

(b) with reference to nonmilitary persons, the State with whose armed forces they are exclusively connected.

6. Invalid and Valid Prisoners of War

The term "invalid prisoners of war" shall comprise those who are eligible for internment in a neutral country or repatriation under the terms of this Agreement because of physical or mental unsoundness. All other prisoners of war shall be deemed "valid."

7. Repatriation

The term "repatriation" shall, when applied to prisoners of war and sanitary personnel, mean the return to American or German military control; as applied to civilians it is defined in Article 163.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY REGARDING AN ARMISTICE

Minister of Sweden to the Secretary of State.1

LEGATION OF SWEDEN,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

September 16, 1918.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to communicate to you the following note addressed by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the Royal Government of Sweden and received by me on this day by telegraph:

Although it was declined by the enemy Powers, the peace proposal made on December 12, 1916, by the four Allied Powers which never desisted from the conciliatory intent that had prompted it, nevertheless, was the beginning of a new phase in the history of this war. From that day the question of peace after two and a half years of fierce struggle suddenly became the main topic of discussion in Europe, nay, in the world, and has been steadily gaining prominence ever since. From that day nearly every belligerent state has repeatedly voiced its opinion on the subject of peace. The discussion, however, was not carried on along the same lines. Viewpoints varied according to the military and political conditions, and so, thus far at least, no tangible or practical result has been achieved. Notwithstanding those fluctuations, a lessening of the distance between the viewpoints of the two parties could be noted though no attempt will be made to deny the great divergences of opinions which divide the two enemy camps and which it has heretofore been impossible to reconcile. One may be, nevertheless, permitted to notice that some of the extreme war aims have been departed from, and that the fundamental basis of a universal peace is to some extent agreed upon. There is no doubt that on either side the desire of the peoples to reach an understanding and bring about peace is becoming more and more manifest. The same impression is created when the manner in which the peace proposal of the four allied Powers was received in the past is compared with the subsequent utterances of their adversaries whether they came from responsible statesmen or from personages holding no office but likewise wielding political influence. By way of illustration confined to a few instances, the Allies in their reply to President Wilson's note advanced claims which meant nothing 1 Official U. S. Bulletin, September 17, 1918.

less than the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the mutilation and radical changes in the political structure of Germany, and also the annihilation of European Turkey. With time, those terms that could not be enforced without a crushing victory were modified or partly abandoned by some of the official declarations of the Entente.

Thus Mr. Balfour, in the course of last year, plainly declared to the English Parliament that Austria-Hungary was to solve her domestic problems by herself and that Germany could not be given another constitution through foreign influence; Mr. Lloyd George afterward announced, in the beginning of this year, that the Allies were not fighting for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or to despoil the Ottoman Empire of its Turkish provinces, or, again, to bring internal reforms to Germany. We may also add that in December, 1917, Mr. Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy had pledged itself to create an independent state including the German territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the utterances of the Central Powers, they leave no doubt that those states are merely fighting to defend the integrity and safety of their territories. Much greater than in respect to concrete war aims is the evidence that the principles upon which peace could be concluded and a new order of things established in Europe and throughout the world have in a way drawn nearer to one another. On this point President Wilson in his address of February 12, and July 4, 1918, formulated principles that have raised no objection from his Allies and whose wide application will shortly meet with objections from the four allied Powers provided to be general and consistent with the vital interests of the states concerned. To agree upon general principles, however, would not suffice; an agreement should also be reached as to their interpretation and application to the several concrete questions of war and peace.

To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a compromise peace has been enormously strengthened; that the conviction is increasing that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will check its development for decades to come-and this without any guarantee of thereby bringing about the decision by arms which four years of efforts, hardships and immense sacrifices have failed to bring about. Now, by what means, in what manner can the way be paved that will finally lead to such a compromise. Can anyone in earnest expect that goal to be attained by adhering to the method heretofore followed in the discussion of the peace problem? We dare not answer that question in the affirmative. The discussion as conducted until now from one rostrum to another by the statesmen of the several countries was substantially but a series of monologues. It lacked sequence above all. Speeches delivered, arguments expounded by the orators of the opposite parties, received no direct immediate reply. Again, the publicity of those utterances, the places where they were delivered, excluded every possible serviceable result. In such public utterances the eloquence used is of the high-pitched kind which is intended to thrill the masses. Whether intentionally or not, the gap between conflicting ideas is thus widened. Misunderstandings that cannot easily be eradicated spring up, and a simple straightforward exchange of ideas is hampered as soon as mentioned, and even before an official answer can be made by

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