against the supposed offender should appear to the justice of the peace (by the 8 and 9 Vict., c. 120, the police magistrate) to be clearly set forth in such warrant of arrest, or other equivalent judicial document. The document which has been called "mise en accusation," and is described on the face of it as "arrêt qui renvoie Coppin (absent) aux assises de l'Yonne," was admitted to be equivalent, at least, to a warrant of arrest, if not identical with such a warrant. For after reciting various crimes and offences with which the prisoner was charged, it goes on in these terms: Paul Emile Charles Coppin, &c., sera pris au corps conduit dans la maison de justice près la Cour d'Assises du department de l'Yonne, et ecroiré sur les registres de la dite maison." This is an act of the Cour Imperiale de Paris, authenticated by the seal of the Court, and also by the seal of the Minister of Justice in France; and it contains a variety of charges of forgery of the most specific descriptions. Therefore, the arrêt is not only sufficiently authenticated to have justified the arrest of Coppin in France, but the acts charged are also set forth in it, so as clearly to appear to the magistrate to whom it was produced. The original depositions are all of them sealed, like the arrêt, with the seal of the Minister of Justice. Every condition required by the Acts has been fully complied with, in respect of all the documents in evidence before the police magistrate, to support the requisition for the delivering up of Coppin.

The third objection was, that Coppin was charged not with forgery, but with having uttered a forged document, which, it was argued, was not an offence included within the treaty and the Act of Parliament. In answer to this it was said, that by the "Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law relating to Indictable Offences by Forgery,' (24 and 25 Vict., c. 73,) uttering a forged document knowing it to be forged was classed under the general head of forgery, and was not a distinct offence from actual forgery, but was included in that description, and might be so named. If that be so, even if the charge against Coppin had been only for uttering a forged document, his offence would have been, within the terms of the treaty, the crime of forgery. But it is unnecessary for me to decide this question, as there is ample evidence, upon the documents produced before the police magistrate, to establish the offence, not of uttering only, but also of actual forgery. The "mise en accusation" contains a very large number of charges, some of forgery, others of knowingly uttering

forged documents. Coppin, who was probably well aware of the charges preferred against him, or, at all events, must have known the acts which he had committed, wrote a letter to the Juge d'Instruction in these terms:-"Permettez-moi d'intervenir dans l'instruction que necessite mon epouvantable catastrophe pour vous dire que j'attends encore deux ou trois renseignements afin de pouvoir vous donner la liste exacte et complète de faux qui me sont reprochés, avec distinction des actes et des billets comme je suis disposé aujourd'hui devant vous, et plus tard devant le jury, à avouer tous ces faux, sans en excepter un. Je viens éclarer votre religion et vous guider dans le pénible tache qui vous est imposé." After this letter, it would be a hopeless task to contend that the magistrate would not have been justified in sending the prisoner to trial for forgery, if the offence had been committed in this country.

The fourth and last objection was, that Coppin had ceased to be an "accused" person, because he had been already "condemned" in France for the offences with which he was charged; and it was contended that I was bound to accept the fact of his condemnation, without looking at the nature of the proceeding upon which it was founded. When this argument was first addressed to me, I was under the impression that there would be found amongst the documents a formal judgment against the prisoner. But it appears that there is no other proof of this alleged judgment than the deposition of a witness named Derepas, that "there was no trial, because the prisoner left, and that he was judged par contumace." This, of course, is not proper or even admissible evidence of a foreign judgment, and the objection might have been disposed of at once upon this ground. But so much misapprehension seems to prevail as to the effect of a judgment par contumace in France, with reference especially to the Extradition Treaty, that I thought it desirable, notwithstanding the imperfect evidence, to permit the question to be argued.

This being a question of foreign law, it was necessary that there should be evidence given to the magistrate by some person skilled in that law as to the nature and effect of such a judgment. Accordingly a French advocate, M. Eugene Rasul, deposed as follows:-"If a man is accused of forgery in France, and a judgment par contumace obtained against him, it would be a sentence of the court without the assistance of a jury. If that man is arrested

or surrenders himself, that judgment is annulled, so that it is exactly the same as if no proceedings had been taken against him, and then he undergoes his trial for the offence with which he was charged." Without this evidence it would have been impossible for the magistrate to have any competent knowledge upon the subject; for, as Lord Brougham said in The Sussex Peerage Case, (11 Cl. and Fin. 115,) "the judge has not organs to know and to deal with the text of the foreign law, and therefore requires the assistance of a lawyer who knows how to interpret it." But, having this assistance, and being referred by M. Rasul to the Code Napoleon, we may venture to look into the text and to the article 476 of the Code d'Instruction Criminelle, upon which he founds his opinion, which is in these terms:-"Si l'accusé se constitue prisonnier ou s'il est arreté avant que la peine soit eteinte par prescription, le jugement rendu par contumace et les procedures faites contre lui depuis l'ordonnance de prise de corps ou de se representer, seront anéantis de plein droit et il sera procédé à son egard dans la forme ordinaire." It will be observed that the article commences by calling the alleged offender, after a judgment par contumace, the accused and not the condemned. And as upon his appearance or upon his apprehension judgment against him is annulled, and he is to be put upon his trial for the offence, I do not see how he can be described otherwise than as an accused person.

But it is said that the judgment par contumace places the party who afterwards surrenders himself, or is apprehended and brought before the court, in a less favourable position upon the trial which ensues, and articles 518 and 519 of the Code d'Instruction Criminelle were referred to to establish this assertion. I ought, perhaps, to refuse to look at these articles without a skilled interpreter, but I am so anxious that the case should be thoroughly investigated, that I am disposed to permit this further irregularity in the proceedings.

It appears to me that the object and effect of these articles have been entirely misunderstood. The title of the chapter under which they are merged is, "De la Reconnoissance de l'identité d'un individu condamné evadé et repris ;" and article 18 is to this effect :-"La reconnoissance de l'identité d'un individu condamné evadé et repris sera faite par la cour qui aura prononcé sa condamnation." It merely provides for establishing the identity. of the party before he is sent to his trial. And in a note

to this article in the edition of the Code which I have, it is said, "Au reste, cette identité reconnue comme l'arrêt de condamnation se trouve anéanti de plein droit, l'accusé devrait être soumis à de nouveaux debats devant les jurés." The 519th article merely provides that all the judgments with regard to the identification of an accused party shall be without the assistance of a jury. It does not appear, therefore, that the trial of a person condemned par contumace differs at all from that of a party who is put upon his trial without any previous condemnation.

But in order that no part of the argument for the prisoner may be disregarded, I will assume that it has been established that the judgment par contumace does work some prejudice to the party upon the trial, either by reducing the amount of necessary proof, or by changing its character, or by making him liable to costs; but how could that possibly take him out of the category of accused persons? He has ceased to be a person condemned, because his condemnation is annulled upon his appearance, and he is to take his trial for offences with which he stands charged. What better, I ought rather to say what other, description of him could be given than that of a person accused?

I have not at any period of the argument entertained the slightest doubt as to the invalidity of all the objections, but I was anxious that the subject should be fully discussed, in order that it might be publicly known that the delivery up of the prisoner to France was in strict accordance with law, and the correct interpretation of the treaty, and of the acts for giving effect to it. The question has been fully argued, and I am of opinion that no case has been made out for the discharge of the prisoner, and that he must be remanded.

NOTE UPON POLITICAL OFFENCES.

The following are the clauses upon this subject inserted in the most recent French treaties :

Il est expressément stipulé que le prévenu ou le condamné dont l'extradition aura été accordée ne pourra être, dans aucun cas, poursuivi ou puni pour aucun crime ou délet politique anterieur à l'extradition.

Ne sera pas réputé crime politique ni fait connexe à un semblable crime, l'attentat contre la personne du chef d'un gouvernement étranger, ou contre celle d'un des membres de sa famille, lorsque cet attentat constituera le fait, soit de meurtre, soit d'assassinat, soit d'empoisonnement.

Article 8 of Convention between France and Saxe-Weimar, 7 Aug. 1858.

9. § 1. Il est expressément stipulé que le prévenu ou le condamné dont l'extradition aura été accordée, ne pourra, dans aucun cas, être poursuivi ou puni pour un délit politique antérieur à l'extradition, ni pour un des crimes ou délits non prévus par la presente convention.

§ 2. Mais il est entendu que les crimes contre la personne du souverain, ou des membres de sa famille, et respectivement des cardinaux de la Sainte Eglise, ne sont point compris dans le § 1 du présent article.

Convention between France and the Pontifical States, 19 July 1859.

Ses tentatives d'assassinat, d'homicide, ou d'empoisonnement contre le chef d'un gouvernement étranger ne seront pas réputés crimes politiques pour l'effet de l'extradition. Ne seront pas non plus considérés comme crimes politiques ceux énumerés dans cet article, lorsqu'ils seront commis contre l'héritier immédiat de la couronne de France.

Convention between France and Chili, 11 April 1860.

Il est bien entendu que ne sera pas réputé délit politique, ni fait connexe à un semblable délit, l'attentat contre la personne d'un souverain étranger ou contre celle des membres de sa famille, lorsque cet attentat constituera le fait, soit d'assassinat, soit d'empoisonnement, soit de ineurtre.

Additional Convention between France and the Low Countries, 2 Aug. 1860.

"I see a notice has been given that when the Bill goes into committee a clause will be proposed, the purpose of which is to exclude all offences which are considered to be of a political character. I do not say that on principle I should have any objection to that, provided you define what is to be treated as a political offence. I take it that, in a rough and popular way, it would not be difficult to do that. For instance, if a man were killed in a riot, or in an attempt to excite a tumult or popular insurrection, that probably