[Act," enacts generally, that if any twelve persons are unlawfully assembled to the disturbance of the peace; and any one justice of the peace, sheriff, under-sheriff or mayor of a town, shall think proper to command them by proclamation to disperse,-if they contemn his orders and continue together for one hour afterwards, such contempt shall be felony] and the punishment is penal servitude for life, or not less than five years; or imprisonment to the extent of two years with or without hard labour and solitary confinement (y). [The Riot Act declares further, that if the reading of the proclamation be by force opposed, or the reader be in any manner wilfully hindered from the reading of it, such opposers and hinderers, and all persons to whom such proclamation ought to have been made, and knowing of such hindrance, and not dispersing, are felons] and they are liable to the like punishment (≈). [The same Act also contains a clause indemnifying the officers and their assistants in case any of the mob be unfortunately killed in the endeavour to disperse them ;such clause being copied from the Act of Queen Mary.]

XXI. [Nearly related to this head of riots is the misdemeanor of tumultuous petitioning; which was carried to an enormous height, in the times preceding the grand rebellion. Wherefore by statute 13 Car. II. st. 1, c. 5, it was enacted, that not more than twenty names shall be signed to any petition to the Crown or either house of parliament for the alteration of matters established by law in Church or State: unless the contents thereof be previously approved, in the country, by three justices, or the majority of the grand jury at the assizes or quarter sessions; and, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common council (a): and that no petition shall be delivered

(y) 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 5; 7 Will. 4

& 1 Vict. c. 91; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 24; 16 & 17 Vict. c. 99; 20 & 21 Vict. c. 3; 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47.

(z) Ibid.

(a) This may be one reason, says Blackstone (vol. iv. p. 147), why the corporation of London has, since

[by a company of more than ten persons. On pain, in either case, of incurring a penalty not exceeding 1007. and three months' imprisonment (b).]

Moreover, it was provided by 57 Geo. III. c. 19, s. 23, that it shall not be lawful for any person to convene, or give notice of convening, any meeting, consisting of more than fifty persons, or for any number of persons exceeding the number of fifty, to meet in any street, square or open space in the city or liberties of Westminster or county of Middlesex, within a distance of a mile from the gate of Westminster Hall, (except such parts of the parish of St. Paul's, Covent Garden, as are within such distance,)for the purpose of considering of or preparing any petition, complaint, remonstrance, declaration or other address to both or either house of parliament for alteration of matters in Church or State,-on any day on which the two houses or either house of parliament shall meet and sit; or shall be summoned or adjourned or prorogued to meet or sit; or on any day on which the courts shall sit in Westminster Hall. And any such meeting is by the Act made an unlawful assembly (c). But there is a provision that the enactment shall not apply to any meeting for the election of members to serve in parliament, nor to persons attending upon the business of either house of parliament, or any of the said courts (d).

the Restoration, usually taken the lead in petitions to parliament for the alteration of any established law.

(b) At the trial of Lord George Gordon, it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench (see Dougl. Rep. 591), under the Presidency of Lord Mansfield, that 13 Car. 2, st. 1, c. 5, was not affected by the declaration subsequently inserted into the Bill of Rights (1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2), that "the subject has a right to petition, and that all commitments and prosecutions for

such petitions are illegal." However, the provisions of the Act have not been enforced in modern times, though, on the other hand, at a season of great public excitement, fresh, though temporary, prohibitions as to meetings, for deliberations on public questions, were made by 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 6.

(c) As to what this term imports vide sup. p. 215.

(d) As to this Act, see 1 Russ. on Crimes, p. 280.

XXII. [Another offence against the peace is that of a forcible entry or detainer; which is committed by violently taking,—or, after an unlawful taking, violently keeping possession of-lands and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without the authority of law (e). A forcible entry was formerly allowable to every person disseised or turned out of possession, unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own neglect or other circumstances; but it is now,-as well as a forcible detainer, a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment (ƒ).

XXIII. The offence of riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons is a misdemeanor, tending to disturb the peace, by terrifying the good people of the land; and it was particularly prohibited by the Statute of Northampton, (2 Edw. III. c. 3,) upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the pleasure of the Crown; in like manner, as by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armour (g).

XXIV. Spreading false news, to make discord between the sovereign and nobility, or concerning any great man of the realm, is also said in the books to be a misdemeanor, punishable by common law with fine and imprisonment (h); and this is confirmed by statutes Westminster the first (3 Edw. I. c. 34), 2 Ric. II. st. 1, c. 5, and 12 Ric. II. c. 11.

XXV. False and pretended prophecies, with intent to disturb the peace, are equally unlawful, as they raise enthusiastic jealousies in the people, and terrify them with imaginary fears. They, too, are said to be punishable as misdemeanors: and that upon the same principle that

(e) See R. v. Oakley, 4 Barn. & Adol. 30; R. v. Wilson, 3 Ad. & El. 817; 1 Russ. on Crimes, p. 340. (f) See 5 Ric. 2, st. 1, c. 7; 15

Ric. 2, c. 2; 31 Eliz. c. 11; 21
Jac. 1, c. 15.

(g) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 26.
(h) 2 Inst. 226; 3 Inst. 198.

[spreading of public news of any kind, without communicating it first to the magistrate, was prohibited by the antient Gauls (i). Indeed, the offence was made capital by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 14, though this was altered by 3 & 4 Edw. VI. c. 15, and 7 Edw. VI. c. 11 (k): and afterwards by the statute 5 Eliz. c. 15, the penalty for the first offence was made a fine of ten pounds and one year's imprisonment; and for the second, forfeiture of all goods and chattels and imprisonment during life (1).]

XXVI. We may observe here that besides actual breaches of the peace (of which enough has been said), any thing that tends to provoke or incite others to break it, is also an offence against public order. Therefore, challenges to fight, either by word or letter, or the bearing of such challenges, are misdemeanors, punishable by fine and imprisonment, according to the circumstances of the offence (m).

XXVII. We next come to consider a class of offences which are against public order when considered in its external aspect, and as provided for by the universal law of society, which regulates the mutual intercourse between one State and another. It will be found that practices repugnant to that law, are in some instances particularly animadverted on, as such, by the English law.

[The law of nations, to which we have before had occasion briefly to advert (n), is a system of rules, established

(i) "Habent legibus sanctum, si quis quid de republicâ a finitimis rumore aut famâ acceperit, uti ad magistratum deferat, neve cum alio communicet; quod sæpe homines temerarios atque imperitos falsis rumoribus terreri, et ad facinus impelli, et de summis rebus consilium capere, cognitum est." (Cæs. de Bell. Gall. lib. 6, cap. 19.)

(k) See Coleridge's Blackstone (vol. iv. p. 149), in notis, where Blackstone's statement on this subject is corrected.

(1) These antient statutes were all expressly repealed as obsolete by 26 & 27 Vict. c. 125, in the year 1863.

(m) Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 63, 88. 3, 21.

(») Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 24.

[by universal consent, among the civilized inhabitants of the world (0); in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to ensure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more independent States, and the individuals belonging to each: being founded upon this general principle, that different nations ought, in time of peace, to do to one another all the good they can: and in time of war, as little harm as possible, without prejudice to their own real interests. And as none of these States will allow a superiority in the other, therefore neither can dictate or prescribe the rules of this law to the rest; but such rules must necessarily result from those principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every nation agree, and to which all civilized States have assented.

In arbitrary States this law, whenever it contradicts or is not provided for by the municipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal power; but, since in England no royal power can introduce a new law, or suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of nations, whenever any question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and held to be the law of the land. Hence those Acts of Parliament, which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom, without which it must cease to be a part of the civilized world. But though in civil transactions, and questions of property between the subjects of different States, the law of nations has much scope and extent, as adopted by the law of England; yet the present branch of our inquiries will fall within a narrow compass, as offences against the law of nations can rarely be the object of the criminal law of any (0) Sp. L. b. 1, c. 7.