[treason, murders, manslaughters, bloodshed, and other malicious strikings," whereby blood should be shed in or within the limits (that is, within two hundred feet of the gate) of any of the palaces or houses of the king, or any other house where the royal person should abide. The proceedings were by jury, both a grand and petty one, as at common law: taken out of the officers and sworn servants of the king's household: and the form and solemnity of the process, particularly with regard to the execution of the sentence, for cutting off the hand,—which is part of the punishment for shedding blood in the king's court, are very minutely set forth in the said statute: where the several offices of the servants of the household in and about such execution are also described; from the serjeant of the woodyard, who furnished the choppingblock, to the serjeant farrier, who was to bring hot irons to sear the stump.] But so much of the above Act "as relates to the punishment of manslaughter and "malicious striking, by reason whereof blood shall be shed," was expressly repealed by 9 Geo. IV. c. 31; and the jurisdiction of the court itself has long since fallen into complete disuse.

Lastly, we will mention the courts of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, which have a criminal as well as a civil jurisdiction, and this of an extensive kind. The chancellor's court, indeed, hath authority to determine all offences which are misdemeanors only, when committed by a member of the university; and even treason, felony and mayhem, if found to have been committed by any member thereof, may be tried in the court of the Lord High Steward of the university (o).

(0) Blackstone (vol. iv. p. 277) treats only of the criminal jurisdiction of the University of Oxford. A similar jurisdiction is, however, enjoyed by that of Cambridge. (See Bac. Ab. tit. "Universities.")

As to the jurisdiction exercised by the proctors over persons not members of the university, in order to protect the morals of the students, see Kemp v. Neville, 10 C. B., N. S. 523.

[So far as Oxford is concerned this jurisdiction rests on a charter of the 7th June, in the second year of Henry the fourth (confirmed by statute 13 Eliz. c. 29); and by this charter cognizance is granted to that university of all indictments of treasons, insurrections, felonies and mayhem, which shall be found in any of the royal courts against a scholar or privileged person; and they are to be tried before the high steward of the university, or his deputy; who is to be nominated by the chancellor of the university for the time being. But when his office is called forth into action, such high steward must be approved by the lord high chancellor of England; and a special commission, under the Great Seal, is given to him and others, to try the indictment then depending, according to the law of the land, and the privileges of the university. When, therefore, an indictment is found at the assizes or elsewhere, against any scholar of the university or other privileged person, the vice-chancellor may claim the cognizance of it (p); and, (when claimed in due time and manner,) it ought to be allowed him by the judges of assize; and then it comes to be tried in the high steward's court. But the indictment must first be found by a grand jury, and then the cognizance claimed; for it is apprehended that the high steward cannot proceed originally ad inquirendum : but only, after inquest in the common law courts, ad audiendum et terminandum. Much in the same way as when a peer is to be tried in the court of the lord high steward of Great Britain, the indictment must first be found at the assizes or in the Queen's Bench: and then, in consequence of a writ of certiorari, transmitted to be finally heard and determined, before his grace the lord high steward and the peers.

(p) See R. v. Agar, 5 Burr. 2820; Kendrick v. Kynaston, 1 Bla. Rep. 454; Hayes v. Long, 2 Wils. 310; Leasingby v. Smith, ib. 406; R. v. Routledge, 2 Doug. 531; R. v. Grundon, Cowp. 319; Thornton v. Ford, 15 Exch. 634. The statute

19 & 20 Vict. c. xvii, s. 18, takes away all right of the University of Cambridge to claim cognizance in any proceedings (criminal or otherwise) to which any person, not a member of the university, is party.

[When the cognizance is so allowed,—if the offence be inter minora crimina, or a misdemeanor only, it is tried before the ordinary judge of the chancellor's court. But if it be for treason, felony, or mayhem, it is then, and then only, to be determined before the high steward, under the king's special commission to try the same. The process of the trial is this: The high steward issues one precept to the sheriff of the county, who thereupon returns a panel of eighteen freeholders; and another precept to the bedells of the university, who thereupon return a panel of eighteen matriculated laymen, "laicos privilegio universitatis gaudentes." And by a jury formed de medietate,-half of freeholders and half of matriculated persons,-is the indictment to be tried: and that in the Guildhall of the city of Oxford. And if execution be necessary to be awarded, in consequence of finding the party guilty of a capital offence, the sheriff of the county must execute the university process: to which he is annually bound by an oath.

These proceedings have been described with some minuteness, on account of the importance of the privilege; but in modern times the occasions for reducing them into practice have been happily very rare; nor will it perhaps ever be thought advisable to revive them, though it is not a right that rests merely in scriptis, or theory, but has formerly been carried into execution. There are several instances,-one in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, two in that of James the first, and two in that of Charles the first, where indictments for murder have been challenged by the vice-chancellor at the assizes, and afterwards tried before the high steward, by jury. The commissions under the Great Seal, the sheriff's and bedell's panels, and all the other proceedings on the trial of the several indictments,— are still extant in the archives of the university (q).]

(7) As to the university courts, see also sup. bk. v. c. rv., and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 26, s. 12.

CHAPTER XI.

OF PROCEEDINGS OF A SUMMARY NATURE, AND HEREIN OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS AND ATTACHMENT.

[WE are next, according to the plan we laid down, to take into consideration the proceedings which obtain in the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, in order to the punishment of offences (a). These proceedings are divisible into two kinds, summary and regular: the former of which shall be briefly explained, before we enter on the latter, which will require a more thorough and particular examination.

By a summary proceeding, is meant principally such as is directed by several Acts of Parliament, (for the common law is a stranger to it, unless in the case of contempts,) for the conviction of offenders, and the infliction of certain penalties created by those Acts. In a summary proceeding, there is no intervention of a jury; but the party accused is acquitted or condemned, according to the opinion of such person or persons, as the statute has appointed for his judge. An institution designed professedly for the greater ease of the subject; by doing him speedy justice, and by not harassing the freeholders with frequent and troublesome attendances to try every minute offence.

I. Of this summary nature are trials of frauds against, or breaches of, the laws of the excise and other branches of the revenue (b), many of which offences may be inquired into and determined either by the commissioners of

(a) Vide sup. p. 2.

(b) As to the excise, stamps, taxes,

customs, &c., vide sup. bk. IV. pt. 1.

C. VII.

[revenue (c), or in the country before justices of the peace.] And the Summary Jurisdiction Acts (presently to be noticed) are to apply to all informations, complaints, and other proceedings taken before "a court of summary jurisdiction,"—that is to say, a justice or justices to whom jurisdiction is given, or who is or are authorized to act under those Acts when sitting in open court,-under the Post Office, Inland Revenue, or Customs Acts (d); and in such cases, where the penalty exceeds 507., the period of imprisonment in respect of non-payment, or in default of a sufficient distress, may exceed three months, but shall not exceed six months (e).

II. Another branch of summary proceedings, is that which takes place before justices of the peace in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, in respect of a variety of minor offences: viz. such as are visited only with pecuniary penalties (f). Some of these were formerly punishable at the court leet, while that court was still in use; but the greater part have been both created and placed under the summary jurisdiction of the justices, by the provisions of modern Acts of Parliament, and are dealt with by them in accordance with what are known as the "Summary Jurisdiction Acts" (g). But besides these minor offences, there are others of a graver description, which may also now be dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction: and for which the punishment is in some cases a pecuniary penalty, and in others either a penalty or imprisonment with hard

(e) By 43 Geo. 3, c. 99, s. 33, a person commanded by the commissioners to pay tax duties may, if there be no sufficient distress on his premises, be committed to prison without bail or mainprize, till payment be made. And there are other statutory provisions for the protection of the revenue, of an equally stringent character.

(d) See 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, ss. 20, 50.

(e) See sects. 20, 50, 53..
(f) Vide sup. p. 6.

(g) These are the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, and the 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, and "any Act, past or future," amending either of them (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 50).