local; but where the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, either in consequence of contract, or as trustee, or as the holder of a legal title acquired by any species of mala fides practiced on the plaintiff, equity will have jurisdiction wherever the defendant may be found: Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 158, 100; or, briefly stated, equity will grant relief of this sort in cases of contract, fraud, or trust: Pike v. Hoare, 2 Eden, 185; Selkrig v. Davies, 2 Dow, 231; Moore v. Jaeger, 2 McArthur, 465; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 669. The following are examples of cases where equity will not exercise this power: Equity will not extend its jurisdiction over the person of a defendant so as to affect lands in a foreign jurisdiction (create a lien upon them), when there is no privity between the parties: Norris v. Chambres, 29 Deav. 253. It will not direct an issue to try the validity of a will of lands in a foreign jurisdiction: Pike v. Hoare, 2 Eden, 185. No authority is given by the English bankrupt law to compel a bankrupt to convey his foreign realty to the assignees, and therefore this will not be decreed: Selkrig v. Davies, 2 Dow, 231,

Nor will such a decree be made when it cannot be enforced. Thus we have seen that it is indispensable that the court should have jurisdiction of the defendant. And the court will not decree that an executor shall sell lands in another state for payment of debts, since the decree would not be enforceable, as the executor's conveyance might not be valid in the state where the land is situated. In fact, the court had not jurisdiction of those in whom the legal title was vested. There were two executors in the state where the land was situated: Blount v. Blount, 1 Hawks, 365; see also White • v. White, 7 Gill & J. 208. The court will not exercise its power to compel a person to perform a nugatory act, as compelling a bankrupt to assign to his assignees debts due him in a foreign country, when that country refuses to recognize the authority of the assignees, and the instrument which it is sought to compel him to execute is, in contemplation of law, of no effect: Ex parte Blakes, 1 Cox, 398. But whenever the parties, or the subject, or such portion of the subject, are within the jurisdiction, so that an effectual decree can be made and enforced so as to do justice between the parties, and the matter is one of equitable jurisdiction, the court will act: Ward v. Arredondo, 1 Hopk. Ch. 213; S. C., 14 Am. Dec. 543.

CONTRACT.-EQUITY WILL DECREE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION. This is a matter arising out of contract and of familiar equitable cognizance. In such a suit, when the court has obtained jurisdiction of the person of the defendant the court will decree a conveyance of the land though it be situated without the jurisdiction of the court, and will enforce its decree by acting in personam. One of the earliest instances of the exercise of this jurisdiction is the case of Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. sen. 444, where specific performance was decreed of articles executed in England concerning the boundaries of Maryland and Pennsylvania. And the following cases sustain this jurisdiction of equity: Archer v. Preston, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 133, c. 3, cited 1 Vern. 75; Caldwell v. Carrington, 9 Pet. 86; Watts v. Waddle, 6 Id. 389, 400; Carrington v. Brents, 1 McLean, 167; Rourke v. McLaughlin, 38 Cal. 196; White v. White, 7 Gill & J. 208; Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94, 98; Brown v. Desmond, 100 Mass. 267; Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 120; Baldwin v. Talmadge, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 400; Shattuck v. Cassidy, 3 Edw. Ch. 152; Ward v. Arredondo, 1 Hopk. Ch. 213; S. C., 14 Am. Dec. 543; Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280; Cleveland v. Burrill, 25 Barb. 532; Penn v. Hayward, 14 Ohio St. 302; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Id. 474; Topp v. White, 12 Heisk. 165; Hughes v. Hall, 5 Munf. 431;

Story's Confl. L., sec. 541. In Cleveland v. Burrill, 25 Barb. 532, this jurisdiction was carried to the extent that specific performance was enforced of a contract of sale of lands situated in another state, though the contract was made and was to have been performed there, and though plaintiff, the vendor, was a non-resident, the defendant having been duly served: See also Myres v. De Mier, 4 Daly, 343; Baldwin v. Talmadge, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 400. The court took jurisdiction of a bill for specific performance, though the only subjects of its jurisdiction were the defendant's agent and the deed, and enjoined the agent from sending the deed out of the state back to the owners of the land before the determination of the suit: Ward v. Arredondo, 1 Hopk. Ch. 213; S. C., 14 Am. Dec. 543. The defendant was decreed to pay the purchase money on condition that the plaintiff execute and tender titles to be approved by the commissioner, in Episcopal Church v. Wiley, 2 Hill Ch. 584. Where the defendant in a suit for specific performance is an infant, the proper decree is that he convey the legal title to the premises when he arrives at a proper age to do so, according to the laws of the state where the property is situated; and that in the mean time the vendee be permitted to receive and retain possession of the property: Sutphen v. Fowler, 9 Paige, 280. Where, however, only a part of the persons from whom the conveyance is sought are residents, and the court has not acquired jurisdiction of the non-residents, so that complete relief can be had, the suit will be dismissed: Penn v. Hayward, 14 Ohio St. 302.

CONTRACTS MORTGAGES, ACCOUNTING, DEBTS-Upon a bill to foreclose a mortgage, equity will take jurisdiction and decree foreclosure and a sale of the land, though situated within a foreign jurisdiction, if it has acquired jurisdiction of the person of the defendant by service of process upon him within the jurisdiction, or by his voluntary appearance and submission to the jurisdiction. Thus, in Toller v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494, a bill to foreclose a mortgage upon the island of Sarke, a part of the duchy of Normandy, and under the jurisdiction of the courts of Guernsey, was sus tained, the defendant having been served with process within the jurisdiction of the court; for æquitas agit in personam. A decree foreclosing a mortgage and ordering a sale of the mortgaged property is not invalid because a part of the property is without the jurisdiction, if the court had jurisdiction of the mortgagor and the mortgagees: Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444. Where corporations of three states are consolidated into one, a court of equity, in foreclosing a consolidated mortgage upon the entire property, has jurisdiction to sell all the property in all the states, and separate suits are unnecessary: Blackburn v. Selma etc. R. R. Co., 2 Flip. 525, 537, 538; see McElrath v. Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 189.

So upon a bill for an account and settlement of a partnership, and for general relief, the court may direct a public sale within the state of land without the state, and compel the parties to convey title accordingly: Lyman v. Lyman, 2 Paine, 46. The complainants and defendants were joint owners of an island in the Carribean sea. It was agreed that the complainants should conduct the business of collecting and selling guano, which was found upon the island, and that the profits should be proportionally divided, and the complainants were to have a lien upon the island and the personal property used there in the business for any advances made by them. The undertaking proved unprofitable, and the complainants filed a bill against the defendants, who were resident within the jurisdiction and duly appeared, praying an accounting and a decree against the defendants for their proportion of the losses and for a sale of the island, its contents, and the personal property con

nected with it. The court sustained the bill, holding that it was no objection to its jurisdiction that the land was situated without its jurisdiction: Wood v. Warner, 15 N. J. Eq. 81. Upon a creditor's bill to subject the land of a judgment debtor, the latter may be compelled to convey lands in another state for the benefit of his creditors, in such a manner as to vest in the grantee the legal title: Bailey v. Ryder, 10 N. Y. 363. Where a receiver of an insolvent firm sold all the debts due the firm to a purchaser, who collected part of them, and among them were debts due from non-residents, if the payment of these latter debts was refused, the court could compel the firm which was within its jurisdiction to assign all its interest therein to the purchaser from the receiver, so as to vest the same in him: Loney v. Penniman, 43 Md. 130. But in Ex parte Blakes, 1 Cox, 398, the court refused to compel a bankrupt to assign to his regularly appointed assignees debts due him in America, when that country refused to recognize the authority of the assignees in England to receive the debts, on the ground that such an assignment by the debtor was, by the law of England, idle and of no effect.

TRUSTS. So in the enforcement of trusts, express, implied, or resulting, equity, if it is necessary for the equitable adjustment of rights, the furtherance of justice, and the due execution of the trust, will decree the performance of an act affecting foreign property, such as the conveyance of realty in a foreign state or country: Moore v. Jaeger, 2 McArthur, 465; Vaughan v. Barclay, 6 Whart. 392; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474; and in addition thereto, will decree an accounting of rents and profits: Farley v. Shippen, 1 Wythe, 254. In Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 404, one of the early authorities for this power of equity, a bill was sustained that prayed for relief touching a trust of lands in Ireland, the defendant being in England. The trustee of a mortgage by a railroad company of their property, real and personal, some of which is situated without the state, may be compelled to sell whatever interest of the company will pass under the terms of the mortgage: McElrath v. Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 189; see also McCurdy's Appeal, 65 Id. 290, 296. Where a testator devised land in another state to trustees, upon trusts that were illegal and void, a resulting trust vested in the heirs, and the trustees were decreed to convey the land to the heirs: Hawley v. James, 7 Paige, 213; S. C., 32 Am. Dec. 623. Heirs were decreed to account for lands in another state descended to them as a trust, subject to the payment of debts, where in that state lands descended were subject to the payment of debts: Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. 353. A suit to aunul trust deeds of lands in a foreign state was sustained in McDowell v. Read, 3 La. Ann. 391. But the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts to decree the conveyance of land in another state was denied in Mussina v. Alling, 11 Id. 568.

FRAUD. So where the suit involves a fraud, and the equities of the parties demand the conveyance of land, this will be decreed from a defendant within the jurisdiction, though the property be situated without its limits, and will decree other relief though the subject-matter be without the jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction of a bill praying relief from a grant of an annuity or rent-charge upon lands in Ireland, alleged to have been fraudulently obtained, was overruled in Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75; S. C., Id. 135. One of the leading cases in this country that establish this power of equity with respect to foreign subject-matter is Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148. In that case suit was commenced in the United States circuit court for the district of Kentucky to compel a conveyance by the defendant of land in Ohio, on the ground that the defendant had notice at the time of his purchase of a prior equity of the complainant. The defense that the land was

without the jurisdiction of the court was overruled, and afterwards, on appeal to the supreme court, this judgment was sustained, on the ground that, as the defendant was equitably bound to convey the land, equity would de. cree its conveyance notwithstanding it was situated in another state.

A purchase by a creditor of an estate in the West Indies, by a creditor under his own execution, was, under the circumstances, held to be only a security for the debt and expenses of the proceeding and incumbrances paid by him, with interest, and subject to this a reconveyance was decreed: Cranstown v. Johnson, 3 Ves. jun. 170. But in White v. Hall, 12 Id. 323, it was held that a judicial sale had under process and judgment of court of competent jurisdiction in one of the colonies would not be interfered with under a mere general allegation of fraud, not stating the facts constituting it.

Where an agent appointed to sell lands in another state causes a conveyance to be made to himself, this conveyance will be set aside upon the application of the principal or his heirs: Sturdevant v. Pike, 1 Ind. 277. So equity may decree the execution or the cancellation of a deed for lands situated without the limits of the jurisdiction of the court, when the lands were obtained by fraud: Guerrant v. Fowler, 1 Hen. & M. 5. A vendor was enjoined from bringing any suit to enforce a contract for the sale of land with-/ out the jurisdiction, on the ground of the fraudulency of the contract: Dale v. Roosevelt, 5 Johns. Ch. 174. So an assignment for the benefit of creditors' made by citizens of the state may be declared void for fraud, though it embraces real and personal property in other states: D'Ivernois v. Leavitt, 23 Barb. 63. Chancery has jurisdiction of an action for a fraudulent conspiracy formed by the defendants in another state to divest the plaintiff of his title to lands in that state, when the relief sought is damages for the wrong, and an accounting, and payment of rents and profits: Mussina v. Belden, 6 Abb. Pr.

165.

A motion for a writ of ne exeat regno was made in Jackson v. Petrie, 10 Ves. 164, upon allegations that defendant had fraudulently obtained a sale co himself of land in the West Indies, and that the sale was liable to be set aside, and the court had jurisdiction.

MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE CONCERNING FOREIGN SUBJECT-MATTER.-As we have seen, equity in decreeing any act to be done relative to subject-matter situated beyond the jurisdiction of the courts acts in personam, upon the conscience of the party who is ordered to act. And to enforce its decree it will make use of compulsion upon the person of the defendant: Foster v. Vassall, 3 Atk. 589; Carroll v. Lee, 3 Gill & J. 504; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 350. It enforces its decrees by attachment and sequestration: Shephard v. Ross County, 7 Ohio, 271. But although the defendant's property be beyond the jurisdiction so that it cannot be sequestered or taken in execution, the court does not lose its jurisdiction in relation thereto: Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; S. C., 22 Am. Dec. 669; but it may enforce its decree by an attachment of the person: Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 478; for contempt if he fail to obey the decree: Archer v. Preston, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 133, c. 3, cited 1 Vern. 75; Penn v. Hayward, 14 Ohio St. 302. And in Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. 120, it was said that the decree might be enforced by imprisonment or by the infliction of peine fort et dure. In Pingree v. Coffin, 12 Gray, 304, 305, it was said that to enforce a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land situate within a foreign jurisdiction, the personal property of the defendant might be sequestered; the court might retain the bill, and under the general prayer for relief mold the decree to one of damages for non-conveyance; and the decree might be a foundation for other courts to compel performance specifically.

POWER OF COURT TO COMPEL PERSON TO BRING BETORE COURT CHILDREN OR OTHER PERSONS-HABEAS CORPUS.-This power, if it exists, has been seldom exercised. In United States v. Davis, 5 Cranch C. C. 622, a habeas corpus was directed to the defendant, directing him to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writs of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshal until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. The same question, whether the court can by means of habeas corpus compel the production of a person without the limits of its jurisdiction, afterwards arose in Michigan in the Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, but it was not decided, as the justices were equally divided upon the question, and therefore agreed that the proceedings should be dismissed. Justice Campbell, with whom concurred Chief Justice Martin, refused to follow Davis's case, supra, not considering it sound law, while Justice Cooley, who delivered an opinion in which Justice Christiancy concurred, considered it as a sufficient precedent, and forcibly substantiated his opinion. It was alleged that the respondent in this case had caused an infant, Samuel W. Jackson, to be removed from Michigan, purposing to detain him out of his guardian's custody, and since then had been instrumental in keeping him out of the state, though he himself remained within the state; and the question was, whether the court could by means of the writ of habeas corpus compel the respondent to bring back the child into Michigan, the respondent being within the jurisdiction. Justice Campbell, in his opinion, considered that the matter of the illegality of the imprisonment to which the writ of habeas corpus was directed was a matter of local jurisdiction, to be dealt with at the place of the imprisonment, which was in this case Canada. Of the case in Cranch, supra, he said: "The only case which has been thus far discovered in which the writ has been made a foundation for reaching persons restrained of their freedom beyond the jurisdiction is that of United States v. Davis, 5 Cranch C. C. 622. . . . . This case is entirely bald of reasons, and the most that can be said in its favor is that the judges probably decided the matter in haste, and looked more to the demerits of the respondent than to any rules of law. . . . . The facts were such as to make it very desirable to deal with the wrong-doer; and if the courts were allowed to devise remedies at their option, there could be no objection to following the precedent. But it seems difficult to maintain it upon any sound principle:" Id. 430, 431. Further on he says: "It may be worthy of consideration whether the case does not come within the jurisdiction of equity. But it would be out of place now to make any investigation on that point."

Mr. Justice Cooley's opinion, on the other hand, is of course entitled to great weight. He is too well known as a thorough lawyer and a careful judge not to entitle his opinion to the most attentive consideration. He