as in the case of an obligation to pay money absolutely or conditionally. If the obligation begins, "we promise to pay," etc., all the parties who execute it are bound; or where in such an instrument a blank is left for the names of the obligors; but all these cases fall short, for the reason assigned herein before to govern this. The conveyance by Peter Kerns takes not the slightest notice of any interest in the land possessed by the wife Polly. The deed was full and complete when Peter Kerns executed and delivered it, and the wife was no party to it. Nor did Swink bargain for her right, but for the husband's. The only way whereby in our law a feme covert can convey her real estate is by joining her husband in the conveyance. It takes the place of the common-law assurance by fine. Justice Blackstone, in the second volume of his commentaries, page 355, says: "The fine is the usual, and almost the only safe, method whereby she can join in the sale, settlement, or incumbrance of any estate." In order to assure the estate of the feme covert to the cognizee, she must be a party to the whole proceedings, and be privily examined. This mode of conveyance never was in force in this state. The conveyance by deed of bargain and sale, accompanied by the privy examination of the wife, being more expeditious and less expensive. In analogy to the conveyance by fine, she must be a party with her husband in the conveyance at the time it is executed. It is not sufficient that at any subsequent period she signs and seals the deed so previously made. At the time she attempted to execute the deed her husband had no estate in it; she therefore could not join him in the sale at that time. The legal title to the premises is not in the defendant, but in the lessor of the plaintiff. Judgment affirmed. DEED OF FEME COVERT IS VOID IF IT DOES NOT APPEAR from the certificate of her acknowledgment that she was examined separately and apart from her husband, and stating that she voluntarily consented will not cure the defect: Jourdan v. Jourdan, 11 Am. Dec. 724; 22 Id. 100; Livingston v. Kettelle, 41 Id. 180; Callahan v. Patterson, 51 Id. 712, where it is held that privy examination apart from her husband is indispensable to conveyance of wife's separate property; see also notes to above cases; as to the validity of conveyances of married women's property generally, see notes to Carr v. Williams, 36 Id. 90; Brunce v. Wood, 35 Id. 381; conveyance by husband of wife's estate: See Evans v. Kingsberry, 14 Id. 779; Payne v. Parker, 25 Id. 221; Baykin v. Ciples, 29 Id. 67; Youse v. Norcoms, 51 Id. 175; Howey v. Goings, 54 Id. 427. THE PRINCIPAL CASE HAS BEEN CITED, and its doctrine approved and followed, in Green v. Thornton, 4 Jones L. 231; Adams v. Hedgepeth, 5 Id. 329; Gray v. Mathis, 7 Id. 504; Barnes v. Haybarger, 8 Id. 82; Harris v. Jenkins, 72 N. C. 186; Scott v. Battle, 85 Id. 188. CASES IN-THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. HILL V. HIGDON. [5 OHIO STATE, 243.] LAWS AUTHORIZING CORPORATE AUTHORITIES OF CITIES AND VILLAGES TO LEVY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS upon property particularly benefited, for the purpose of improving streets, are constitutional. SUM EXACTED AS SPECIAL ASSESSMENT UPON PROPERTY PECULIARLY BENEFITED by street improvement is not a taking of private property for public use, and infringes no constitutional provision providing for the inviolability of such right. SPECIAL ASSESSMENT LEVY UPON PROPERTY PARTICULARLY BENEFITED BY STREET IMPROVEMENT is an exercise of the taxing power, and the tax levied is for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. RIGHT OF TAXATION IS INSEPARABLE INCIDENT OF SOVEREIGNTY, delegated in the general grant of legislative authority, and, the provision against poll-taxes excepted, is subject to no express limitations or restrictions, when used by the legislature as a means to accomplish a lawful purpose. POWER TO TAX FOR LAWFUL PURPOSE NECESSARILY INCLUDES POWER to determine the extent and upon what property the tax should be levied. TAXATION AND ASSESSMENT ARE REGARDED AS DISTINCT MODES OF RAISING MONEY FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES, and founded upon different principles. Taxation is a general burden imposed for supporting the gov ernment, and the revenue raised is expended for the equal benefit of the public at large. Assessment rests upon the taxing power, but describes a distinct and well-known mode of laying a local burden upon particular property, with reference to the peculiar and special benefit derived to such property from expenditure of the money. OHIO CONSTITUTION OF 1851, SECTION 6, ARTICLE 13, CONTEMPLAtes DeleGATION OF POWER OF TAXATION, in all its forms, to municipal corporations, with no other limitation upon this power than that it shall be so restricted by the legislature as to prevent an abuse of its exercise; but a failure to perform this duty lays no foundation for judicial correction. The principles in section 2, article 12, upon which all taxes for general revenue purposes must be levied, do not include special assessments. ERROR to the district court of Hamilton county. Hill owned a lot in Cincinnati, fronting fifty-one feet on Seventh street. The city council passed an ordinance to regrade and pave Seventh street, and to assess the expense of so doing according to the provisions of the act of March 20, 1850, “further to amend the charter of the city of Cincinnati," and of the general ordinance of June 12, 1850, upon the subject of special taxes for the improvement of streets, etc. On October 21, 1851, about a month after the ordinance was passed, Higdon contracted with the city to do the work; and to pay for the expense incurred, the city council, on November 3, 1851, assessed a special tax of one dollar and sixty-six cents and seven mills per front foot for each front foot on Seventh street between two stated points, and on the line between which a part of Hill's land fronted. Hill, with other property owners on Seventh street, was ordered to pay the assessment on his lot within twenty days from the date of the ordinance, or be subject to penalty and interest. Hill refused to pay the assessment, and on December 1, 1851, Higdon sued him for the amount of it before a justice of the peace. An appeal was taken to the common pleas of Hamilton county, where the question of the constitutionality of the law providing for the assessment was raised by special demurrer to the declaration. This was overruled, and judgment was rendered against Hill, with interest and costs. The district court affirmed this judgment, and to reverse the judgment of the district court was this petition prosecuted. A. P. Hill and J. T. Crapsey, for the plaintiff in error. By Court, RANNEY, C. J. The real question upon which the parties are at issue, and which has been fully argued, is this: Can laws authorizing the corporate authorities of cities and villages to levy a special assessment upon property particularly benefited, for the purpose of improving streets, continue in force or be now passed consistently with the present constitution of the state? Upon this question, involved in several other cases before us, as well as in this, the court have bestowed the most careful attention, and I now proceed to state the conclusion to which they have arrived. The subject is very important in its practical bearings, and not without serious difficulty; and for myself, I am bound to admit that the doubts which I at first entertained have not been entirely removed. But it is not upon doubts that this case is to be decided. The question can only be solved by a construction of several provisions of the constitution; and a proper construction can only be given when the intention of those who framed and adopted that instrument is ascertained. We are bound to presume that the general assembly have continued to pass laws conferring this authority, upon a settled conviction of their power to do so; and it is only when a clear incompatibility between the constitution and the law is made to appear that the courts are authorized to interfere. We cannot overturn in doubt what they have established in settled conviction: Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77. Laws of the character of those now drawn in question are no novelty in this state. Their origin is nearly coeval with our legislative history, and they have continued to multiply, as occasion has required, from that time to the present. Indeed, so true has this been that there is no hazard in affirming that the authority they give has been almost uniformly one of the important powers conferred upon municipal corporations. Nor has their consistency with our first constitution remained unchallenged. In at least two well-considered cases, every objection that could be suggested has been answered, and their constitutionality fully affirmed: Bonsal v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 418; Scovill v. City of Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 127. It is no part of my purpose to go again over the ground covered by those decisions. It was there shown, with what of clearness and force the judges delivering the opinion were capable of employing, that the sum exacted was not a taking of private property, within the meaning of the constitution; and consequently, that the article providing for its inviolability was not infringed. That it was an exercise of the taxing power, and the sum demanded, a tax levied for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. That the right of taxation was an inseparable incident of sovereignty, delegated in the general grant of legislative authority, and when used by the general assembly as a means to accomplish a lawful purpose, was subject to no express limitations or restrictions but the provision against polltaxes. That the right to tax for such a purpose necessarily included the power to determine the extent and upon what property the tax should be levied, and that its imposition upon the property particularly and specially benefited by the improve ment, was but a lawful exercise of the discretion with which the legislative body was invested in apportioning the tax. That it was a power liable to abuse, and very often abused, was conceded, but as the people had made a plenary delegation of authority, and had imposed no positive restrictions upon its exercise, it was thought to be clear that they had relied for protection upon the wisdom and justice of the representative body, and the accountability of its members to them, rather than the restraining powers of the courts of law. We see no reason to doubt the correctness of these conclusions; and their application to the present controversy demonstrates the entire inapplicability of those provisions of the present constitution which provide for the inviolability of private property, and regulate the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and leave nothing but the question whether the principles or mode of assessment upon which such taxes are levied are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this constitution. That the twelfth article was intended to impose, and has imposed, most important limitations and restrictions upon the taxing power, is certainly true; and that any substantial departure from the principles therein established, in the cases to which the provisions of that article extend, is such an invasion of the constitutional rights of the citizen as to call for the interposition of the judiciary, may be deemed equally certain. By the positive terms of the second section of that article, "laws shall be passed taxing, by a uniform rule, all moneys, etc., and also all real and personal property, according to its true value in money." In the case of City of Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St. 589, decided at the present term, we have held that this section is equally applicable to and furnishes the governing principle for all laws levying taxes for general revenue, whether for state, county, township, or corporation purposes; and that it requires a uniform rate per cent to be levied upon all property, according to its true value in money, within the limits of the state, or the local subdivision for which the revenue is collected. The general assembly is no longer invested with the discretion to apportion the tax, and to determine upon what property and in what proportion the burden shall be laid. A uniform rate per cent must be levied upon all property subject to taxation, "according to its true value in money," so that all may bear an equal burden. If laws of the character of those now under investigation are controlled by this section, it is evident they cannot be sustained. They do not impose the |