sonable request, and cannot be enforced by indictment without exposing the railway company to great inconvenience; and in the end, it would not prove such a remedy as the case demands. Corporate bodies must be compelled, in the performance of their duties, to discharge their public obligations. This court is of opinion that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the defendants, in crossing "rivers or other watercourses," to pursue the mode prescribed by their charter. The other grounds having been abandoned, the court has not considered the questions which they suggest. Since the writ of mandamus was granted, an act has been passed by the general assembly, and has been brought to the notice of the court, which declares "that the existing structure of said railway at the points of intersection of said road with the creeks, known as New Market and Vardell's creeks, is hereby declared to be lawful, and the said company is hereby authorized to cross said creeks without draw-bridges or other provision for the navigation of the same." This enactment necessarily supersedes the writ. It is therefore ordered that the motion be dismissed, and that all further proceedings on the writ be restrained. O'NEALL, WARDLAW, WITHERS, WHITNER, and MUNRO, JJ., concurred. Motion dismissed. MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE WHERE PARTY HAS OTHER ADEQUATE MEANS OF REDRESS: Arberry v. Beavers, 55 Am. Dec. 791, note 806; People v. Olds, 58 Id. 398, and cases cited in the note 407. Mandamus to a municipal corporation to remove obstructions and keep open a public street will not lie where no special injury to the relators is alleged, because an indictment for nuisance is an effectual remedy: Reading v. Commonwealth, 51 Id. 534. MANDAMUS IS APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO COMPEL PUBLIC FUNCTIONARIES OR TRIBUNALS to perform some duty required by law, where the party has no other remedy: Board of Police v. Grant, 47 Am. Dec. 102, and note 107. See also note to State v. Dunn, 12 Id. 30, 31; note to Mayor v. Morgan, 18 Id. 239; note to Arberry v. Beavers, 55 Id. 806, MCBRIDE v. ELLIS. [9 RICHARDSON'S LAW, 313.] NOTICE OF DEATH OF LIVING PERSON PUBLISHED MALICIOUSLY, and calculated to subject the person to ridicule, is libelous and actionable. NEW TRIAL OF ACTION FOR LIBEL WILL NOT BE GRANTED on the ground that plaintiff's counsel submitted certain writings of defendant to defendant's witnesses for the purpose of testing their accuracy in recogniz ing the defendant's handwriting, and afterwards, by his own witnesses, proved such writings to be authentic, when the writings themselves were not submitted to the jury either in the argument or in their deliberations. ACTION for libel for publishing in the Charlestown Mercury, a newspaper, the following item: "Obituary. Departed this life on the second day of April, at Hickory Hill, in Prince William's parish, Mrs. Rebecca McBride, in the ninety-fifth year of her age. The editor will publish the above obituary, and oblige the subscriber. Respectfully, W. Bowers. April 4, 1853.” Upon cross examination, the plaintiff's counsel exhibited to several of the defendant's witnesses five other specimens of writing, and inquired of them their opinion whether these specimens were in the handwriting of the defendant, with a view of testing their accuracy in recognizing the defendant's handwriting. Some of them recognized the handwriting in some of the specimens, and some did not. The opinions were various, and the grounds of them were given. The plaintiff then called witnesses who testified that the specimens were written by Ellis. They were not exhibited to the jury in the argument, nor were they before them in their deliberations. Verdict was for the plaintiff for thirty dollars damages. other respects the opinion states the case. The defendant appealed, and moved the court to arrest the judgment, on the ground that the writing declared on was not a libel in law; and failing in that motion, moved for a new trial on the ground that the plaintiff's counsel was permitted to submit to the defendant's witnesses certain writings and compare them with the alleged libel, not only to test the accuracy of their opinions upon the defendant's handwriting, but to prove them to be in the defendant's handwriting. Tillinghast, for the appellant. Fickling, contra. In By Court, WHITNER, J. This was an action founded on an alleged libel published in a newspaper in the form of an obituary, the lady announced as dead being yet living, and the nextdoor neighbor of the defendant. The residence and name are truly given, though the age was greatly exaggerated. The communication was made as though coming from one known in the same parish, whose participation it seems was not even pretended, the whole being traced to the defendant. The presiding judge held the writing to be a libel, if conceived and pub lished falsely and maliciously. This question has been settled by the jury, together with other facts necessary to the maintenance of the action, against the defendant, and his first motion in this court is to arrest the judgment, "because the writing declared on is not a libel." Eminent jurists, it has been said, have declared they had not been able to find a satisfactory definition of a libel. "It seemeth that a libel, in a strict sense, is taken for a malicious defamation, expressed either in printing or writing, and tending either to blacken the memory of one who is dead or the reputation of one who is alive, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule:" Hawk. P. C., c. 73, sec. 1. This definition has long been familiar to the ears of the profession, and any case falling within its range will be universally regarded as well sustained. In my investigations on this subject, I find these elements discussed and variously applied. Mr. Hamilton, in a learned argument before the court in New York, "ventured with diffidence," after alluding to the embarrassment of Lord Camden, to submit the following definition: "A libel is a censorious or ridiculing writing, picture, or sign, made with a mischievous and malicious intent towards government, magistrates, or individuals:" People v. Crosswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 354. This definition is subsequently approved and adopted by the court: Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214. The principle on which such actions are sustained is rather narrowly laid down by not observing the distinction which obtains between written and oral slander. Notwithstanding the hesitation expressed by Mansfield, C. J., in Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, he admits it was then too late to deny, the difference having been recognized long before. In Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403, Bathurst, J., held that writing and publishing anything of a man that rendered him ridiculous is a libel, and actionable. In Bell v. Stone, 1 Bos. & Pul. 331, written words of contumely were held to be actionable. In Cook v. Ward, 6 Bing. 409, in which a verdict had been rendered for the plaintiff, Sergeant Jones moved in arrest of judgment, because there was nothing in the alleged libel calculated to injure the plaintiff, or even to make him the object of ridicule. The production complained of was a dull joke, intended, no doubt, as it was admitted, to raise a laugh, an effect which, by the way, it was proved to have produced. The case is instructive on the point under consideration, and the verdict was sustained, because of the tendency of this writing to render the plaintiff ridiculous, and notwithstanding its ludicrous character, the additional proof of the consequences was held admissible, as at once identifying the subject of the libel, and showing the necessary result from its publication. In Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214, to publish maliciously of one that he had testified with levity was held to be cause of action; for although, says the judge, the words do not import perjury in a legal sense, the view was doubtless to hold the individual up to contempt and ridicule; and the court in their judgment say that Villers v. Monsley, supra, asserts a doctrine founded in law, justice, and sound policy. I think the case of Southwick v. Stevens, 10 Johns. 443, still more to the point. The writing might well be denominated a piece of sarcastic irony. A verdict was rendered for plaintiff in that case. The publication was of the following import: "It is with unfeigned grief we inform our readers that Southwick, late editor of the Albany Register, has become insane; the progress of his malady has been observed for some time past; and at length, much to the regret of his friends and his adversaries, it has resulted in a confirmed lunacy," etc. This was held by the circuit judge, "though merely ironical, yet as holding up the plaintiff in a ridiculous point of light, and in that view it was libelous." It was in vain that the counsel for the defendant urged before the appellate tribunal that the matter set forth as a libel was so innocent and harmless that it could not be deemed a libel, especially under the circumstances, and when published of the printer of a newspaper. The ruling of the judge was sustained by the entire court. Such authorities, I presume, might be greatly multiplied. I will only add references to Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 120, 131; Bradley v. Methwyn, 2 Sel. N. P. 1062, note 2; and Cropp v. Tilney, 3 Salk. 225. In the last case Holt, C. J., says: "Scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel; it is enough if the defendant induces an ill opinion to be had of the plaintiff, or to make him contemptible and ridiculous." It remains only to inquire whether the publication in question does hold up the plaintiff " to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." In the judgment of this court, such a notice in the public gazettes was well calculated to subject one, under such circumstances, to ridicule; was intended and calculated to impair this lady in the enjoyment of society, and to throw a contempt on her which might affect her general comfort. Such, I think, is the ready response of every bosom; and to allow the press to be the vehicle of such malicious ridicule of private persons, and yet the offender escape with impunity, would shock the moral sense and vitiate the moral taste of the community. According to the rule established by the cases referred to, the publication being false and malicious, was libelous and sufficient to maintain the action. In reference to the ground submitted for a new trial, it is unnecessary to consider the point raised. The brief informs us that the writings in question were not exhibited to the jury in argument, nor were they before them in their deliberations. The motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial is dismissed. O'NEALL, WARDLAW, WITHERS, and GLOVER, JJ., concurred. Motion-dismissed. PUBLICATION CALCULATED TO SUBJECT ONE TO CONTEMPT OR RIDICULE IS LIBELOUS: Miller v. Butler, 52 Am. Dec. 768, and cases cited in the note 770; Rice v. Simmons, 31 Id. 766. WORDS TO BE ACTIONABLE MUST HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED WITH MALICE EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED: Hart v. Reed, 35 Am. Dec. 179. GARRETT V. RHAME. [9 RICHARDSON'S LAW, 407.] ALLOWING CHATTEL PURCHASED AT SHERIFF'S SALE TO REMAIN IN POS- debtor's refunding purchase money and interest to such purchaser, who, TROVER for a slave by John A. Garrett against John C. Rhame, the late sheriff. The slave was sold under execution against Thomas Garrett, and was purchased by Richardson, who had been requested by Thomas Garrett to befriend him, who paid his own money, and took a bill of sale to himself. Four years afterwards, after Thomas Garrett had refunded the purchase money with interest to Richardson, the latter, by bill of sale, transferred the slave, at the request of Thomas Garrett, to the |