ACCORD AND SATISFACTION COMING FROM STRANGER having no pecuniary interest in the subject-matter is, if accepted, in discharge of the debt, a perfect defense to a subsequent action against the debtor. Leavitt v. Morrow, 334.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
See DEEDS, 5, 7; MARRIED WOMEN, 6, 7.
See PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
1. ADVERSE POSSESSION MAY BE NOTICE TO PURCHASER, BUT POSSESSION TO HAVE THAT EFFECT must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal. Martin v. Jackson, 489.
2. NOTICE TO PURCHASER AT SHERIFF'S SALE ON MORTGAGE of an existing adverse claim comes too late if the mortgagee had no notice when the mortgage was executed. Id.
3. ADVERSE POSSESSION WITH CONSENT AND CONNIVANCE OF MORTGAGOR, unless so open as to be notice, cannot affect the mortgagee. Id.
4. POSSESSION OF DISSEISOR, TO GIVE TITLE UNDER STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS must be actual, visible, notorious, distinct, hostile, and of twenty-one years continued duration. Id.
5. POSSESSION UNDER ENTRY ORIGINALLY MADE IN FIDUCIARY CAPACITY, to become adverse, must be evidenced by some decisive act or declaration. Id.
6. TENANT ENTERING UNDER TITLE OF MORTGAGEE IS PRESUMED TO CONTINUE IN POSSESSION in fidelity to the tenure; but when the mortgagee has notice of his adverse claim he may maintain ejectment. Id. 7. ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR TWENTY-ONE YEARS, though commenced before installments were due on a mortgage, would bar the mortgagee. Id.
1. ACCEPTANCE BY TWO JOINT OWNERS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THEIR SHARE OF PROCEEDS OF SALE is sufficient to constitute third joint owner agent to sell. Davis v. Burnett, 263.
2. AGENT TO SELL PERSONAL PROPERTY HAS POWER TO BIND HIS PRINCIPAL by warranty of soundness. Id.
3. AGENT IS NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE WHO AT TIME OF MAKING CONTRACT DISCLOSES HIS PRINCIPAL; but where he binds himself, he is answerable, and if made to suffer in damages arising out of the contract, he is entitled to compensation from his principal. Id.
4. CORPORATION IS LIABLE FOR AGENT'S ACTS, DECLARATIONS, AND FALSE REPRESENTATIONS to the same extent as natural persons. Henderson v. San Antonio etc. R. R. Co., 675.
5. AGENT'S FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATIONS WITHOUT PRINCIPAL'S KNOWL- EDGE or consent nevertheless invalidate a contract entered into on behalf of the principal by the agent within the scope of his authority; or even where the contract is beyond the agent's authority if the principal rati- fies it, for he cannot ratify it without assuming responsibility for the fraud entering into it. Id.
6. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS BY COMPANY'S AGENT AS TO TIME OF COMPLET- ING RAILROAD and as to its probable cost, forming the inducement for a contract with it, vitiate such contract, and the company cannot be held excused on the ground that the parties had equal opportunities for know- ing the facts. Id.
See COMMON CARRIERS, 9, 10; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 5; STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 7-9.
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 1, 3,
IT IS NO DEFENSE TO ACTION FOR INJURY FROM BITE OF VICIOUS DOG THAT PLAINTIFF WAS TRESPASSER at the time upon the land, if the owner of the dog, knowing of the propensities of the dog, permits it to run at large. Sherfey v. Bartley, 597.
OFFICER OR PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL MAY JUSTIFY ARREST, WITHOUT WARRANT, of a person suspected of having committed a felony, for the purpose of bringing him before a committing magistrate, when such arrest is made without malice and upon probable cause. Brockway v. Crawford, 250.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
See DAMAGES, 1, 2.
ASSIGNMENTS.
See BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, 7.
DEFENDANT MAY SHOW IN ABATEMENT OF ATTACHMENT, in Tennessee, that the property on which the attachment was levied is not his, or he may traverse and disprove the truth of the cause stated as the ground of attachment. Harris v. Taylor, 576.
See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1.
1. KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY ATTORNEY IN ANOTHER TRANSACTION BETWEEN OTHER PARTIES does not affect one who subsequently employs him, and is not notice to the latter. Martin v. Jackson, 489.
2. PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATIONS.-WHERE PERSON HAS GENERAL CON- VERSATION WITH ATTORNEY about a question of law, where no retainer is paid, and there is nothing to show that the person sought the alvice with any view to regulate his future conduct in regard to a pending or expected litigation, his communications are not privileged, as being made between counsel and client. Thompson v. Kilborne, 742.
3. PRACTICE OF GIVING ADVICE UPON LEGAL SUBJECTS WITHOUT STUDY and examination, and without corresponding pay and a distinct retainer, is a vicious one, which this court strongly disapprove of. Id.
4. ATTORNEY DOES NOT MAKE HIMSELF LIABLE AS TRESPASSER by communi- cating to the sheriff on behalf of his client instructions to levy an execu- tion upon specified property afterwards proved not to be the property of the execution debtor; nor by executing, in his client's name and by his authority, a bond of indemnity to the sheriff. Ford v. Williams, 83. 5. BOND OF INDEMNITY UNDER SEAL, EXECUTED BY ATTORNEY WHOSE AU- THORITY WAS BY PAROL, is valid against his client as a simple contract, without regard to the seal. Id.
6. FACT THAT ATTORNEY EXECUTES FOR HIS CLIENT BOND OF INDEMNITY UNDER SEAL, when his authority is by parol, does not make him person- ally liable for the wrongful taking of goods by the sheriff, since the specialty is binding upon his client as a simple contract. Id.
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.
1. EXPRESS PROMISE IS NECESSARY TO REVIVE DEBT BARRED BY BANK- RUPTCY DISCHARGE, and such promise must refer to the debt, though it need not be made to the holder thereof. It need not be in any particular form of words, but may be made by any words, or perhaps by signifying a present willingness to pay. Bennett v. Everett, 498.
2. BARE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBT BARRED BY BANKRUPTCY, and of its justice and non-payment, is not sufficient to revive it. Id.
3. JURY ARE JUDGES WHETHER PROMISE TO PAY DEBT BARRED BY BANK- RUPTCY was imported or intended by the language used by the debtor and the surrounding circumstances. Id.
1. BANKING CORPORATION ISSUING TIME PAPER IN VIOLATION OF STATUTE, IN FULFILLMENT OF CONTRACT OTHERWISE VALID, is alone the offender; the penalty does not attach to the other party to the transaction. Tracy v. Talmage, 132.
2. FREE BANKING ASSOCIATIONS, formed under the New York free banking law of 1838 (Laws 1838, p. 245), have power to carry on business only in the manner and to the extent authorized by the act; they cannot purchase stocks for the purpose of selling thein again at a profit. Id.
1. BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF LAND FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION WITHOUT NOTICE of prior unrecorded deeds who records his deed first is protected, though his grantor purchased with notice thereof. Wood v. Chapin, 62. 2. PURCHASER WITH NOTICE OF PRIOR UNRECORDED DEEDS IS PROTECTED by the recording act nevertheless, if he purchased from one who was so protected. Id.
3. PURCHASER OF LAND UNDER JUDICIAL PROCEEDING INSTITUTED BY HIM- SELF for the recovery of his debt is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, within the recording acts, though the whole purchase price is applied upon the debt, and no new consideration is paid except the expenses of the proceedings. Id.
4. ALL CONVEYANCES IN CHAIN OF TITLE FROM FORMER OWNER need not be recorded in order to protect bona fide purchaser whose deed is first recorded against prior unrecorded conveyances from such owner. Id. 5. TO CONSTITUTE BONA FIDE PURCHASER WITHIN MEANING OF RECORDING ACT, the purchaser must, before he receives notice of the prior unrecorded deed, have advanced some new consideration, or relinquished some se- curity for a pre-existing debt due to him; and the mere receiving a con- veyance in payment of a pre-existing debt is not enough. Id.
6. PURCHASER OF EQUITABLE TITLE TAKES IT SUBJECT TO ALL EQUITIES, though he purchases bona fide, for a valuable consideration, and without notice thereof. York v. McNutt, 607.
7. ASSIGNEE OF BOND FOR TITLE TAKES IT SUBJECT TO DEFENSES available against the original vendee, notwithstanding he purchased for a valuable consideration, and without notice of such defenses. Id.
See DEEDS, 9; PARTNERSHIP, 17.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 4-6; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 1-6; OFFICE AND OFFICERS, 1; SHERIFFS, 5; SURETYSHIP.
1. PRESUMPTION IS THAT OWNERS OF LAND ON EACH SIDE OF STREET, ROAD, OR HIGHWAY GO TO CENTER of such boundary, and they have the exclu sive right to the soil, subject to the right of passage in the public. Paul v. Carver, 413.
2. CONVEYANCE OF LAND BOUNDED BY PUBLIC STREET, DITCH, FRESH-WATER RIVER, OR HIGHWAY PASSES TITLE TO CENTER of such boundary; as it is regarded as a single line, and the thread of such boundary is the monu- ment or abuttal. Monuments control measurements. Id.
3. IT WILL NEVER BE PRESUMED THAT GRANTOR, after parting with all his right and title to the adjoining land, intended to withhold his interest in a street, road, or highway, to the center of it. Id.
4. GRANTEE'S TITLE CANNOT BE LIMITED TO EDGE OF PUBLIC STREET, DITCH, HIGHWAY, OR FRESH-WATER RIVER, unless there is an express exception
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