in the deed to that effect, or some clear and unequivocal declaration, or
certain and immemorial usage. Id.
5. ALTHOUGH MEASUREMENT OF DISTANCE SET FORTH IN CONVEYANCE
BRINGS LINE ONLY TO SIDE of the street or highway, this is not sufficient
to control the rule of law which carries the title to the center of such
street or highway. Id.
6. CONVEYANCE REFERRING TO "DIVIDING LINE" WILL BE CONSTRUED TO
MEAN REAL LINE, and not an imaginary one, and will constitute an ex-
press recognition of such line by the parties. George v. Thomas, 612.
7. SUIT TO HAVE DIVISION LINE RUN BETWEEN TWO TRACTS OF LAND may
be maintained where the deed of one tract, which was granted out of a
larger tract, does not ascertain the boundaries of the land conveyed, but
merely gives a description by which they may be ascertained, and where
the owner of the other tract will not permit the line to be run; such suit
is in the nature of a suit for specific performance. Id.
8. SUIT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED TO HAVE DIVISION LINE RUN where such
a line has been already run and marked by the parties. Id.
9. DIVISION LINE RUN BY PARTIES IN INTEREST CANNOT BE DISREGARDED
because it cannot be found in its whole extent, or because it was not
actually run through, if its two extremes can be found, and it can be
traced for a part of the distance. Id.
10. LINES ACTUALLY MARKED IN RUNNING DIVISION LINE MUST BE AD-
HERED TO, though they vary from the course, and do not form a right
line from corner to corner, especially after lapse of time and long-contin-
ued occupancy with reference to them. Id.
11. WHERE LINE HAS BEEN MARKED ONLY PART OF WAY, the boundary for
the rest of the distance will be a direct line from the termination of the
marked line to the point of intersection, or to the corner called for. Id.
12. DIVISION LINE WILL BE CONSIDERED CONTINUOUS LINE where it exists
at its two extremities and for a principal part of the distance. Id.
13. RULE FOR DETERMINATION OF DIVISION LINF BETWEEN GRANTOR AND
GRANTEE OF PART OF TRACT is the same whether the deed or convey-
ance refer for its boundaries to the marked lines or monuments, or they
be afterwards marked and established by the parties. Id.
14. WHERE PARTIES HAVE AGREED UPON AND MARKED BOUNDARY LINE,
and the possession is in accordance with it for such a length of time as
may give title by disseisin, the line cannot be disturbed, although found
to be erroneously established, unless there be clear proof that the posses-
sion was not adverse. Id.
See Equity, 1, 2; Evidence, 4, 5; Husband and WIFE, 1; INFANCY, 5.
CHARITABLE USES.
See USES, 2-5.
1. WAGONER IS COMMON CARRIER where he carries goods for hire for all per-
sons indiferently. Philleo v. Sanford, 654.
2. COMMON CARRIER CARRYING GOODS IN COVERED WAGON IS LIABLE FOR
INJURY BY RAIN, although guilty of no negligence, being regarded as an
insurer against loss from any such cause.
3. BURDEN IS ON COMMON CARRIER TO SHOW THAT LOSS IS WITHIN STIPU
LATED EXCEPTION from liability, and that there was no negligence.
Baker v. Brinson, 548.
4. EXCEPTION OF "RUST AND BREAKAGE," IN BILL OF LADING, exempts the
carrier from liability for such rust and breakage only as could not have
been avoided by care and diligence. Id.
5. ONUS UPON CARRIER TO PROVE NO NEGLIgence, where HE STIPULATES
FOR NO LIABILITY for rust and breakage, and a stove is broken in the
transit, is not discharged by merely proving that the stove was stored in
a proper place, especially when another stove stored there was also
broken. Id.
6. AS BETWEEN RAILROAD COMPANY AND PASSENger, Duty of Safe Convey-
ANCE IS MEASURED by a severe rule arising out of the nature of the obli-
gation, and a principle of public policy; and passengers undertake to run
those risks only which cannot be avoided by the utmost degree of care
and skill on the part of the carrier in the preparation and management of
the means of conveyance. Mad River etc. R. R. Co. v. Barber, 312.
7. COMMON CARRIER WHO SELLS THROUGH-TICKETS TO PLACE BEYOND HIS
OWN LINE, in pursuance to an agreement between him and proprietors
of connecting lines that passengers might pay the whole fare at either
end and receive through-tickets, is liable for damages to passengers hin-
dered and detained on their journey through the fault of the proprietors
of a connecting line, and it is immaterial whether or not the passengers
knew of the agreement between the carriers. Carter v. Peck, 604.
8. RAILROAD COMPANY ACTING AS COMMON CARRIER OF ANIMALS is not liable
for their dying or being injured from causes arising from their animal
nature and propensities, and which diligent care could not have pre-
vented; but is liable, in the absence of special agreement or proof of in-
evitable accident, for loss or damage which might have been avoided by
use of care and foresight, whether due to conduct of the anin.als them-
selves or to incidents of the company business. Clarke v. Rochester etc.
R. R. Co., 205.
9. TITLE TO GOODS IN TRANSIT IS PRESUMED TO BE IN CONSIGNEE, and one
carrier who receives them from another to be delivered to the consignee
is not presumed to know that they are the property of the person who
ships them. Bingham v. Lamping, 418.
10. CARRIER RECEIVING GOODS CANNOT HOLD THEM TO ANSWER ATTACHMENT
at the suit of a creditor of the shipper, previously served upon him; nor
is he liable for them if attached while he is in the faithful performance
of his contract as a common carrier. Id.
11. ONE WHO IS BOTH CARRIER AND WAREHOUSEMAN IS LIABLE AS CARRIER
for goods deposited in warehouse as a mere accessory to the carriage; that
is, deposited for the purpose of being carried without further orders;
and his responsibility as carrier begins from the time of the receipt of
the goods. Blossom v. Griffin, 75.
12. RECEIPT GIVEN BY PARTIES WHO WERE CARRIFRS AS WELL AS FORWARD-
ERS stated that goods were received to be forwarded.
burned in the warehouse before carriage commenced.
The goods were
Held, that the
signers were responsible as carriers, not as forwarders only. The receipt
did not exclude evidence of the circumstances under which it was given,
and of an antecedent parol agreement to carry plaintiff's goods gener-
ally, and these showed that the words "to be forwarded" were not used
in a technical sense. Id.
IN ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW IN TEXAS, COMMON LAW, where not
modified by the constitution or statutes, furnishes the rule of decision,
as well in matters of practice as principle; though a departure from the
common-law system of pleading has caused a corresponding departure
from the common-law practice in civil cases. Hyde v. State, 630.
1. LAWS AUTHORIZING CORPORATE AUTHORITIES OF CITIES AND VILLAGES TO
LEVY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS upon property particularly benefited, for the
purpose of improving streets, are constitutional. Hill v. Higdon, 289.
2. SUM EXACTED AS SPECIAL ASSESSMENT UPON PROPERTY PECULIARLY
BENEFITED by street improvement is not a taking of private property
for public use, and infringes no constitutional provision providing for
the inviolability of such right. Id.
1. CONTEMPT OF COURT IS SPECIFIC CRIMINAL OFFENSE, and the power to
punish it belongs to the court in which it was committed. No other
court, not even the highest, can interfere with the exercise of this author-
ity, either by writ of error, mandamus, or habeas corpus. Williamson's
Case, 374.
2. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE POWER TO TRY AND PUNISH CRIME OF CONTEMPT,
and state courts will not interfere with their sentences therefor on the
writ of habeas corpus. Such judgments are conclusive. Id.
3. EVIDENCE UNDER WHICH Offender was TRIED, FOUND GUILTY, AND SEN-
TENCED FOR CONTEMPT of court cannot be re-examined on habeas corpus by
another court, however innocent the petitioner may appear to be. Id.
4. RECORD OF CONVICTION FOR CONTEMPT IS AS DISTINCT from the matter
under investigation when it was committed as an indictment for perjury
is from the cause in which the false oath was taken.
5. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR CONTEMPT ARE NONE THE LESS CONCLU-
SIVE on habeas corpus before another tribunal because the contempt was
committed while the offended court was investigating, or trying to inves-
tigate, a matter beyond its jurisdiction. Id.
6. CONVICTION OF CONTEMPT IS SEPARATE PROCEEDING, AND IS CONCLUSIVE
OF EVERY FACT which might have been urged on the trial for contempt;
and among others, want of jurisdiction to try the cause in which the con-
tempt was committed. Such objection must be made on the trial for
contempt; it is too late to make it after conviction. Id.
7. ON TRIAL FOR CONTEMPT, IT IS NO DEFENSE TO SHOW that the misconduct
merely obstructed the progress of an investigation which the court
would have been obliged in the end to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Id.
See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, 2, 3.
1. RULE EXCLUDING PAROL EVIDENCE TO AFFECT WRITTEN CONTRACTS does
not reject an antecedent parol agreement of a different character, and
imposing a very different, but not inconsistent, obligation. Blossom v.
Griffin, 75.
2. IN CONSTRUING WRITING, IT IS PROPER TO LOOK AT ALL SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES, the pre-existing relation between the parties, and then
to see what they mean when they speak. Id.
3. VERBAL AGREEMENT, TO HAVE EFFECT OF ALTERING TERMS OF PRIOR
WRITTEN CONTRACT, must be supported by a new and valid considera-
tion, or must have been so far acted upon that a refusal to carry it
out would work a fraud on one of the parties. Thurston v. Ludwig,
328.
4. NO LEGAL PROTECTION IS GIVEN TO PROHIBITED CONTRACTS, prohibited
trades, or prohibited things; but persons are never outlawed, and their
lawful property is under the protection of the state, even when used im-
properly. Mohney v. Cook, 419.
5. CONTRACT NOT IN ITSELF IMMORAL NOR IN CONTRAVENTION OF ANY LAW,
by which the state acquires a citizen, cannot be contrary to its policy.
Miller v. Roberts, CSS.
6. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO FUTURE EVENTS will vitiate a contract,
where those events depend upon the acts of the party making the repre-
sentations and form the inducement for the contract. Henderson v. San
Antonio etc. R. R. Co., 675.
7. FALSE REPRESENTATIONS NFED NOT BE MADE WITH INTENT TO DECEIVE
or defraud in order to vitiate a contract; if made through carelessness,
mistake, or ignorance, they will have the same effect. Id.
8. ACT EXTENDING TIME FOR COMPLETING RAILROAD DOES NOT AFFECT CON-
TRACT entered into with the railroad company, the essential inducement
of which was an assurance that the road would be built within a certain
time, and failure to complete it within that time discharges the other
party to the contract, notwithstanding the extension of time. Id.
9. PLEADING EVIDENCE.-In an action for refusing to furnish the necessary
kiln and hop-house for preparing hops for market, under a contract to pre-
pare a suitable and convenient kiln and dry-house, to be prepared and
ready for use when the same should be required, evidence that the con-
tractee directed the contractor not to build them, but to use the con-
tractor's kiln and dry-house for the purpose, that the contractor did so,
and paid for the use of the same, and that the contractee made no objec
tions, but fully assented to the arrangement, is admissible under a plea
by the contractor that he did prepare a suitable kiln and dry-house,
ready for use when required; also that he did prepare the same accord-
ing to the true intent and meaning of said contract, and to the full satis-
faction of plaintiff. Thompson v. Kilborne, 742.
10.-COMMON-LAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN JOINT AND JOINT AND SEVERAL
CONTRACTS was always with regard to the remedy, and the discharge of
one by taking action against the other is the peculiarity which the Penn-
sylvania statute takes away. Miller v. Reed, 459.
See PARENT AND CHILD, 3, 4; SALES.
1. POWERS GIVEN TO CORPORATION WHICH CANNOT BE EXERCISED without
disregard of restrictions with which they are coupled cannot be exercised
at all. Commonwealth v. Erie etc. P. R. Co., 471.
2. CHARTER OF CORPORATION MUST BE CONSTRUED favorably to the public,
and against the grantees. Id.
3. CORPORATION MAY DO THOSE ACTS ONLY WHICH IT IS AUTHORIZED TO Do
BY ITS ACT OF INCORPORATION, and may exercise only such powers as are
given in plain words, or by necessary implication, and all powers not
given in this direct and unmistakable manner are withheld. Id.
4. CHARTER OF CORPORATION AUTHORIZING IT TO BUILD RAILROAD from
borough of Erie, then bounded south by Twelfth street, is not complied
with, where the borough is subsequently extended farther south, by a
building of the road from a point within the enlarged borough, but some
distance outside of the former borough line, the change of the borough
lines not affecting the obligations of the corporations. Il.
5. CORPORATION WHOSE EXISTENCE IS LIMITED TO SIXTY YEARS MAY, WHEN
GIVEN SUCH POWER BY ITS CHARTER, ACQUIRE AND CONVEY LAND IN
FEE, and an equity of redemption in land so conveyed is subject to sale
under execution. Rives v. Dudley, 231.
6. PROVISO OR SAVING CLAUSE IN STATUTE IS NOT TO HAVE EFFECT where
repugnant to the purview or body of the act; but this rule does not apply
to acts constituting private corporations, for the proviso in such cases is
to be taken as an essential condition of the compact between the public
and the corporation. Dugan v. Bridge Co., 464.
7. ACT OF INCORPORATION IS COMPACT BETWEEN PUBLIC and Corporation,
and the rights of the latter thereunder are only such as the very terms of
the enactment confer, and any ambiguity therein must operate against
the corporation and in favor of the public. Id.
8. CORPORATION CANNOT, ON GROUND OF PUBLIC INTEREST, CLAIM IMMUNITY
FOR WRONGFUL ACTS or violations of its contracts, to the prejudice of
others, any more than a natural person. Henderson v. San Antonio etc.
R. R. Co., 675.
9. STOCKHOLDER MAY SUE CORPORATION for any cause for which any other
person might sue, being deemed a stranger to the artifical body created
by the charter. Id.
10. RIGHTS AND FRANCHISES OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CAN NEVER BECOME
VESTED RIGHTS AS AGAINST STATE. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 748.
11. SO FAR AS PUBLIC AND MUNICIPAL FRANCHISES AND EXISTENCE OF Mc-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE CONCERNED, the legislature may exercise over
them exclusive control, and may constitutionally enlarge, restrain, and
even destroy their municipal existence. This may be done although the
municipality is trustee for a charity. Id.
12. LEGISLATURE MAY DIVIDE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION INTO TWO SEPARATE
MUNICIPALITIES, and may also direct a division of the property of the
original town, held under its original charter in its corporate and munici-
pal capacity, and which was to be used for municipal purposes. Id.
13. ACT OF LEGISLATURE SEPARATING MUNICIPAL CORPORATION INTO TWO
SEPARATE MUNICIPALITIES HAS NO EFFECT upon property held by the
original city in trust for specific purposes mentioned in its charter. Id.
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